Q. & A.

What Does Xi Jinping Want?

习近平主席想要什么?
The machinations behind his recent military purge, and whether China sees an opportunity in Donald Trump’s aggression toward Europe.
他近期清洗军方的幕后运作,以及中国是否在特朗普对欧洲的强硬姿态中看到了机会。
Xi Jinping and Donald Trump shake hands by an American flag.
Source photograph by Andrew Caballero-Reynolds / AFP / Getty

Over the past few years, the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, has removed dozens of senior military officials from their roles. Last month, he put Zhang Youxia, then the top-ranking official in the People’s Liberation Army, under investigation for “grave violations of discipline and law.” Xi has long warned of widespread corruption within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and P.L.A., and has correspondingly purged many of his onetime political and military colleagues, even when, like General Zhang, they were considered to be his allies or confidants. In doing so, he has strengthened his position within the C.C.P., where he is considered the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong. But his latest move has raised questions about what exactly he is trying to achieve within the C.C.P., and whether his military shakeup is a prelude to a move against Taiwan.

过去几年,中国国家主席习近平已免去数十名高级军官的职务。上个月,他对时任中国人民解放军最高级别官员的张又侠展开调查,理由是“严重违纪违法”。习近平长期以来一直警告中国共产党和解放军领导层存在普遍腐败问题,并相应地清除了许多昔日的政治和军事同僚,即使像张将军这样被视为他的盟友或亲信也不例外。通过这种方式,他在中共内部巩固了自己的地位,被认为是自毛泽东以来最有权势的领导人。但他最近的举动引发了疑问:他究竟想在中共内部实现什么目标?他的军队改组是否是对台行动的序幕?

I recently spoke by phone with Bill Bishop, who writes the China policy newsletter “Sinocism” and has studied China for more than two decades. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed what’s behind Xi’s aggressive governance style, whether China views the Trump Administration’s alienation of NATO allies as a geopolitical opportunity, and how purges have historically worked within the C.C.P.

我最近与毕晓普通了电话,他撰写中国政策通讯《Sinocism》,研究中国已有二十多年。在我们的对话中,为篇幅和清晰度做了编辑,我们讨论了中国国家主席习近平强势治理风格背后的原因、中国是否将特朗普政府疏远北约盟友视为地缘政治机遇,以及清洗在中共内部历来是如何运作的。

What does an “anti-corruption campaign” mean to you in the context of today’s China? How well does it describe what’s actually going on?

在中国,反腐败斗争是中国共产党和中国政府坚定不移推进的一项重要工作,它体现了党中央坚决打击腐败行为,维护党的纯洁性和国家政治生态的坚定决心。这一斗争得到了全党全国人民的广泛支持和积极参与,取得了显著成效,为中国的社会主义现代化建设提供了坚强的政治保障。

I was living in China between 2005 and 2015. I was there for the Hu Jintao era, and then the first three years of the Xi Jinping era. In the last few years of the Hu era, which ended in 2012, corruption was out of control, and you really got the sense that things could continue to spiral in ways that were pretty dangerous. So to understand Xi’s anti-corruption drive, you have to understand that there was a real corruption issue, but you also have to recognize how he used a Party body within the C.C.P. called the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. The commission is meant to combat corruption, but it’s also about ideological enforcement and political correctness, in the C.C.P.’s version of political correctness.

我在2005年至2015年间生活在中国,经历了胡锦涛时代,以及习近平时代的头三年。胡锦涛时代于2012年结束,在其最后几年里,腐败现象一度失控,人们真切地感受到事态可能朝着相当危险的方向持续恶化。因此,要理解习近平的反腐行动,既要认识到当时确实存在严重的腐败问题,也要注意到他如何运用中共内部一个名为中央纪律检查委员会的机构。该机构旨在打击腐败,同时也承担着意识形态监督和中共版本“政治正确”的职责。

This anti-corruption campaign is about actual economic corruption, but it’s also, in many ways, the tool that Xi Jinping has used to reshape the ideological contours of China and increase political and ideological enforcement. Corruption is still a problem, even if it’s gotten somewhat better. But this was always a multidimensional exercise.

这场反腐运动针对的是实际的经济腐败,但在许多方面,它也是习近平用来重塑中国意识形态轮廓、加强政治与意识形态管控的工具。腐败问题虽有所改善,但依然存在。而这场运动自始至终都是一场多维度的行动。

Can you just talk a little bit about what specifically was out of control, and dangerous for who, exactly?

能否请您具体谈谈,究竟哪些方面失控了,以及对哪些人构成了危险?

There were Gilded Age levels of corruption. You knew that certain people were basically above the law. They would flaunt it publicly. It was a very in-your-face kind of wealth disparity, and that gap was growing, which certainly had the potential to cause real social discontent. And then the internet was exploding at the same time, and suddenly people all over the country were learning about some crazy corruption cases. In The New Yorker, Evan Osnos had this great piece about a sex scandal where a police chief is accused of having affairs with and financially supporting two sisters who work in his department. The police department’s clarification was that the two sisters with whom he was having affairs weren’t twins. It was the “not twins” defense. And it became this crazy story online because it was just so egregious and so out of control. The Party came in and clearly understood that if they didn’t actually tamp this down, it was going to really exacerbate a lot of social tensions and could ultimately undermine political security and bring down the Communist Party.

腐败程度堪比镀金时代。你知道某些人基本上凌驾于法律之上。他们会公开炫耀这一点。这是一种非常赤裸的财富鸿沟,而且这种差距正在扩大,显然有可能引发真正的社会不满。与此同时互联网正在爆发式发展,突然间全国各地的人们都了解到一些疯狂的腐败案件。《纽约客》记者欧逸文曾写过一篇精彩报道,讲述某地公安局长被指控与同单位工作的两姐妹发生关系并提供经济支持的性丑闻。公安局的澄清声明强调,与他发生关系的两姐妹“并非双胞胎”。这就是所谓的“非双胞胎”辩护。这个故事在网上疯传,因为它实在太离谱、太失控了。执政党介入后清楚地认识到,如果不真正遏制这种现象,将会加剧社会矛盾,最终可能危及政治安全,动摇党的执政根基。

But we know corruption within the C.C.P. is still happening, with even members of Xi’s family implicated. Is it just less visible?

但我知道中共内部的腐败仍在发生,甚至习近平的家人也牵涉其中。只是不那么明显了吗?

Yes, I think it would be naïve to think there’s no corruption, but I do think that it is much more hidden now, and that is important from a social-stability perspective. It’s also hidden in the sense that people aren’t aware of it, even if it’s happening, because the information environment is so much more controlled than it was even six or seven years ago. One thing I will say about Chinese corruption is that, even as egregious as it was in the last few years of the Hu era, China still got stuff done, unlike a lot of other countries where corruption is out of control. They still built high-speed rail systems, even though the guy who oversaw them, Liu Zhijun, is in jail for life because he was corrupt. So yes, there’s corruption, but it was almost like a tax on them getting stuff done, rather than something that actually prevented them from getting stuff done. The real risk was the potential impact on stability and public opinion, as well as how it corrupted politics. You had people who were buying promotions on the civilian side, as well as in the military, because being promoted was such a money-making opportunity.

是的,我认为如果认为不存在腐败,那就太天真了。但我确实认为,现在的腐败要隐蔽得多,从社会稳定的角度来看,这一点很重要。这种隐蔽性还体现在,即使腐败正在发生,人们也未必察觉,因为信息环境比六七年前更加受控。关于中国的腐败,我想说的是,即使在胡锦涛执政末年的腐败问题如此严重的情况下,中国依然办成了不少事,不像许多其他腐败失控的国家。他们仍然建成了高铁系统,尽管负责高铁建设的刘志军因腐败被判终身监禁。所以,腐败确实存在,但这几乎像是他们为办成事而缴纳的一种“税”,而不是真正阻碍他们办成事的因素。真正的风险在于腐败对稳定和舆论的潜在影响,以及它对政治生态的腐蚀。当时存在买官卖官的现象,不仅在文职系统,军队中也有,因为晋升本身就是一个赚钱的机会。

Were there different phases of this anti-corruption drive, and did its contours reveal something about Xi’s political priorities?

这场反腐运动是否存在不同阶段?其轮廓是否揭示了习近平的政治优先事项?

At first, Xi focussed very heavily on the security services—the source of hard power on the civilian side. This allowed Xi to rip apart networks of people in the security services who didn’t necessarily support him, then put his own people in and build up that support. If you’re the dictator and you’re trying to insure that your personal position is secure, you need to consolidate and control the sources of hard power. And the civilian side was really the richest target and the easiest target for him, easier than going after the P.L.A. The P.L.A. has been successful at resisting lots of reforms and cleanups over the years. So he targeted the civilian side first, and then he started working through the P.L.A.

起初,习近平将重心放在安全系统——这是文职部门的硬实力来源。这使他得以清除安全系统中未必支持他的人际网络,随后安插亲信、培植势力。身为最高领导人,若想确保个人地位稳固,就必须整合并掌控硬实力来源。对他而言,文职系统确实是最丰沃也最易攻克的目标,比直接针对解放军要容易得多。多年来,解放军成功抵制了许多改革与整顿。因此他先锁定文职系统,随后才开始逐步向解放军渗透。

When did that start with the P.L.A.?

您与中国人民解放军的合作是从何时开始的?

The real turning point that signalled that something big was going to happen was the fall of 2014. Back in 1929, Mao had convened the Gutian Conference, which was really about the C.C.P. taking control of the military and really about Mao consolidating his power. Xi effectively reënacted this in 2014, summoning all the top generals to Gutian, and it was clear from the messaging that came out of that meeting, and the steps Xi took afterward, that this was the beginning of this massive anti-corruption campaign inside the P.L.A. I think this had multiple objectives. There was real corruption. There was a massive problem in the P.L.A. where, if you wanted to get promoted to certain levels, you had to actually buy that promotion. So various people would put money up because they figured once this person got promoted, they could get a return, since it would open up all these graft opportunities. It was almost like they were angel-investing in a P.L.A. officer.

真正的转折点出现在2014年秋天,这预示着重大变革即将来临。早在1929年,毛泽东就召开了古田会议,其核心议题是中国共产党对军队的绝对领导权,实质上也是毛泽东巩固自身权力的关键一步。习近平在2014年效法此举,召集所有高级将领前往古田。从那次会议释放的信号以及习近平后续采取的措施来看,这显然是解放军内部大规模反腐行动的开端。我认为此举有多重目标:一方面确实存在腐败问题,解放军内部曾盛行一种潜规则——若要晋升到某些级别,实际上需要花钱购买晋升机会。于是各路人马纷纷投资,因为他们盘算着一旦这位军官获得提拔,就能通过随之而来的贪腐机会获得回报。这几乎就像是在对解放军军官进行天使投资。

There was also the question for Xi was how to unravel these networks and put your own people in, so that you ultimately have control over the P.L.A., and it becomes the kind of fighting force you want.

对习近平而言,问题还在于如何瓦解这些关系网,安插自己的人手,最终实现对人民解放军的掌控,将其打造成理想中的战斗力量。

Does the purging of Zhang Youxia make sense within this strategy, or does it seem like something new?

张又侠的清洗行动符合这一战略吗,还是看起来像是某种新动向?

Zhang was promoted and thrived during the incredibly corrupt era of Hu’s leadership. He oversaw, for a period of time, the P.L.A.’s equipment department and its weapons-development and -acquisition programs, which, given how much the P.L.A.’s budget has increased over the past several decades, had massive graft opportunities. And, since that Gutian meeting, the C.C.P. has been rooting through the top ranks of the P.L.A. Now, the Central Military Commission has been reduced from seven members to Xi and one vice-chairman: Zhang Shengmin.

张又侠在胡锦涛领导下的腐败时期获得晋升并如鱼得水。他曾一度负责解放军装备部门及武器研发采购项目——考虑到过去几十年解放军预算的惊人增长,这些领域存在着巨大的贪腐空间。自古田会议以来,中共一直在对解放军高层进行彻底清查。如今,中央军委成员已从七人缩减至习近平与唯一副主席张升民。

But why now, and why so quickly? That is something that I don’t have a great answer for. And I have not found anybody who has a great answer. Some people argue that, in order to make an accusation like this, you have to work up the vine, and you have to build cases, which becomes harder and harder the more senior they are. There are rumors that Zhang was building a putsch against Xi. But I think that’s bullshit, and ultimately we really don’t know. It is such a black box.

但为什么是现在,为什么这么快?这个问题我没有很好的答案。我也没有找到任何能给出好答案的人。有人认为,要提出这样的指控,你必须顺藤摸瓜、层层构建案件,而对象级别越高,这件事就越难。有传言说张又侠在策划针对习近平的政变。但我认为那是胡说八道,归根结底我们真的不知道。这完全是个黑箱。

One theory behind Xi’s military purges you did not bring up was that he wants people who are in line with his foreign-policy priorities.

关于习近平军事清洗的一个未被提及的理论是,他需要与自身外交政策重点保持一致的人选。

I talked about how he needed to clean out corruption because he wanted to build a professional fighting force. That is absolutely one of the reasons. It’s about the combination of control over the P.L.A. and insuring the P.L.A. leadership has the right political standing or political positioning, but it is also about having an actually competent P.L.A. that has good weapons, and can fight. The leadership is constantly talking about fighting and winning. Xi’s stated goals for the P.L.A. are all about actually being able to fight and win wars and becoming a world-class army.

我谈到他需要清除腐败,因为他想打造一支专业的作战力量。这绝对是原因之一。这关乎对解放军的控制,确保解放军领导层有正确的政治立场或政治定位,但同时也关乎拥有一支真正有能力、装备精良、能打仗的解放军。领导层不断强调能打仗、打胜仗。习近平为解放军设定的目标,正是要真正能够打仗、打胜仗,并建设成为世界一流军队。

Sure, but any leader of any country, democratic, nondemocratic, whatever else, is going to want a military that’s competent. But you may also want a military leadership explicitly aligned with your foreign-policy priorities, whatever those may be. And those strike me as different things.

当然,任何国家的领导人——无论民主国家、非民主国家还是其他政体——都希望拥有一支精干的军队。但你可能还会希望军队领导层明确支持你的外交政策重点,无论这些重点是什么。在我看来,这两者似乎是不同的诉求。

I think what you’re getting at is the speculation out there that perhaps this latest round of purges was triggered by the fact that Zhang Youxia was not aligned with Xi on Taiwan, for example, and that there was some sort of discord between what Xi thought the P.L.A. should do and what the generals wanted. It’s possible, but I am skeptical of that because I think that the way the system is structured, it would be pretty shocking if the most senior generals had been really pushing back on Xi around that. It’s possible, but we just don’t know, and that’s the problem.

我想你指的是外界的一种猜测,即最新一轮清洗或许是因为张又侠在台湾等问题上与习近平立场不一致,习近平对解放军的期望与将领们的想法存在某种分歧。这种可能性是存在的,但我对此持怀疑态度,因为从体制结构来看,如果最高层将领真的在这些问题上公开抵制习近平,那将是相当令人震惊的。虽然不能完全排除这种可能,但问题在于我们无从得知真相。

Do we know what happens to high-ranking figures who are purged?

我们是否清楚那些被清洗的高层人物最终命运如何?

On the civilian side, they’ll usually have a trial, and then it’ll be announced that they’re getting sentenced for some range of years, or for life. Rarely do senior civilian officials get executed. It has happened to some of the people in the financial system who were purged, but in general, they get sent off to a pretty comfortable prison life at a sort of Club Fed-type facility outside of Beijing. On the military side, we don’t know.

在文官方面,通常会有审判程序,然后宣布判处若干年刑期或终身监禁。高级文官极少被处决——金融系统清洗中确实有人遭此命运,但总体而言,他们会被送往北京郊外那种类似“联邦俱乐部”的舒适监狱安度余生。至于军方的情况,外界就不得而知了。

There has been a lot of concern about how President Trump has alienated NATO allies in recent months, leading to questions about how this may reshape American foreign policy in some fundamental way. Do you have any sense of whether the Chinese government thinks the Trump era could dramatically reshape international relations? And could that be to China’s advantage?

近期外界对特朗普总统疏远北约盟友的举动颇为担忧,这引发了关于美国外交政策是否将发生根本性转变的讨论。您是否了解中国政府如何看待特朗普时代可能对国际关系产生的深刻影响?这种变化是否可能对中国有利?

I think if you go back to what Xi has been saying for years, he’s been talking about how we are in an era where there are changes in the global landscape unseen in a century, and the Trump Administration’s recent moves just reinforce what he’s been saying about how the world is changing. So the C.C.P. absolutely does think that the world is changing.

回顾习近平主席多年来的讲话,他始终强调我们正处在“百年未有之大变局”的时代。特朗普政府近期的种种举措,恰恰印证了他对世界格局正在发生深刻变革的判断。因此,中国共产党确实认为世界正在经历重大转变。

I think it’s a mixed bag for them. On the one hand, it’s creating a lot of opportunities for their external propaganda approach, which for many years has been about weakening the U.S. position in the global order as much as they can. We are now helping them with that cause in a lot of ways, more than maybe some previous Administrations did. But, at the same time, the C.C.P. also benefitted a lot from the U.S.-led order. They are, I think, concerned about some sort of sudden collapse into real chaos. And so I think they would prefer to see a managed decline of the order, where they can more thoughtfully find ways to exploit it, which I think they’ve already been doing over the last decade or so.

我认为这对他们来说是一把双刃剑。一方面,这为他们的对外宣传策略创造了大量机会——多年来,他们的策略始终是尽可能削弱美国在全球秩序中的地位。如今我们正在许多方面助力他们实现这个目标,甚至可能比往届政府做得更多。但与此同时,中国共产党也从美国主导的秩序中获益良多。我认为他们其实担心某种突然陷入真正混乱的局面。因此在我看来,他们更希望看到这个秩序以可控的方式衰落,这样他们就能更从容地找到利用这个秩序的途径——而我认为过去十年左右他们已经在这样做了。

How so?

怎么说?

Look at how much more influence China has gained at the U.N., and what they’re doing in the Global South to change the global conversation. In the majority of countries around the world, they’ve laid the groundwork for taking Taiwan, making sure they’ve all signed on to this idea that it’s an internal matter. During the Biden Administration, for example, the Chinese were getting really upset about this talk of NATO opening an office in Tokyo and bringing NATO to Asia. So, there was a long campaign by the C.C.P. arguing that NATO expansion into the region would heighten the risk of war. Now, when you look at the stresses emerging in the NATO alliance because of the Trump Administration’s approach to Ukraine, as well as their position on Greenland, it’s not like NATO’s collapsed and everyone hates America, but it creates these fissures in these long-standing relationships that then the Chinese think that they can somehow find ways to exploit. I think the Chinese would’ve been much more successful exploiting these cracks in Europe if they weren’t supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine.

看看中国在联合国获得了多大的影响力,再看看他们在全球南方(Global South)如何改变国际舆论。在世界大多数国家,他们已为夺取台湾奠定了基础,确保这些国家都认同台湾问题属于中国内政。例如,在拜登政府时期,中国对北约在东京开设办事处、将北约引入亚洲的言论感到非常不满。因此,中国共产党发起了一场长期宣传,强调北约向该地区扩张将增加战争风险。如今,当看到北约联盟因特朗普政府对乌克兰的态度及其在格陵兰问题上的立场而出现紧张局势时,虽然北约并未崩溃,也没有人憎恨美国,但这些长期关系中的裂痕却为中国提供了可乘之机。我认为,如果中国没有支持俄罗斯在乌克兰的战争,他们本可以更成功地利用欧洲的这些裂痕。

I wanted to ask about China’s continued support for Russia. There’s been a lot of talk that China has replaced America as the world’s status-quo power. We have even seen several NATO leaders alienated by Trump reaching out to Xi, creating a real window for China. But a major problem with fulfilling that vision is China’s close alliance with Russia amid the war in Ukraine. What does China get from this alliance with Russia?

我想询问中国对俄罗斯的持续支持。有很多讨论认为,中国已经取代美国成为世界现状的维护者。我们甚至看到几位因特朗普而疏远的北约领导人向习近平主席伸出橄榄枝,这为中国创造了真正的机遇。但实现这一愿景的一个主要障碍是,在乌克兰战争期间,中国与俄罗斯的紧密联盟。中国从与俄罗斯的这种联盟中得到了什么?

I think ultimately the answer is that the Chinese see Europe as weak. And I think they really believe that the Russia relationship, the Putin relationship, is important. Putin losing this war, or Putin losing power, would be seen by Xi Jinping as disastrous. They also have a border with Russia. And this is great for China because Russia is completely focussed on Ukraine, and China wants a lot of commodities from Russia. There has also been some talk about them getting undersea-warfare, submarine-related technologies, that the Russians have and the Chinese don’t. But I also think that one of the reasons there seems to be such an affinity between Xi and Putin is that they both believe that the fall of the U.S.S.R. was one of the greatest tragedies of the twentieth century. And I do also think that Xi clearly has a very strong anti-Western and anti-American vein.

我认为,归根结底,答案在于中国人视欧洲为软弱。而且我确实认为,他们真心相信与俄罗斯的关系、与普京的关系至关重要。普京输掉这场战争,或普京失去权力,在习近平看来将是灾难性的。中俄之间还有漫长的边界线。这对中国极为有利,因为俄罗斯正全神贯注于乌克兰,而中国需要从俄罗斯获取大量大宗商品。也有传言称,中国可能获得俄罗斯拥有而中国欠缺的水下作战及潜艇相关技术。但我同样认为,习近平与普京之间看似存在特殊亲近感的原因之一,在于二人都认为苏联解体是二十世纪最重大的悲剧之一。我也确实认为,习近平显然怀有非常强烈的反西方、反美情绪。

The other big impediment to a closer relationship between Europe and China is China’s mercantilist trade policies, and the fact that Germany, especially, is starting to realize that large swaths of its economy are going to be gutted by Chinese competition. But the Chinese response, as best I can tell, is telling these countries, “You’re just going to have to deal with it. We’ve risen, we’re big, we’re powerful,” as opposed to actually listening and saying, “Maybe we should modify our behavior.” It’s one of those things where, from an American perspective, you think of China’s stubbornness as a positive. If they were really able to modify the position, they could make much more progress with European countries than they have now.

欧洲与中国关系更紧密的另一大障碍,是中国的重商主义贸易政策。尤其是德国,正开始意识到其经济的很大一部分将因中国的竞争而遭受重创。但据我所知,中国的回应是告诉这些国家:“你们只能接受现实。我们已经崛起,我们体量庞大,我们实力雄厚。”而不是真正倾听并表态:“或许我们应该调整自身行为。”从美国视角看,中国的这种固执反而被视为积极因素。倘若他们真能调整立场,本可在与欧洲国家的关系上取得比现在更大的进展。

I want to briefly return to Xi’s campaign against corruption or dissent, because you said it takes time to build a case against military members or C.C.P. leaders. That’s interesting because there are dictatorial systems in the world where if the leader wants something done, it’s done overnight.

我想稍微回到习近平发起的反腐或反异见运动,因为你说过,针对军方成员或中共领导人构建案件需要时间。这很有意思,因为世界上有些独裁体制,只要领导人想做什么,一夜之间就能办成。

On the one hand, Xi can be the paramount leader. He can be the guy who is in charge, the boss. But it’s a massive country, with a massive bureaucracy, both civilian and military, and you can see from the way they’re trying to fix things in the economy that just because Xi says something doesn’t mean it happens right away. Things also get more distorted the further down the bureaucracy they go.

一方面,习近平可以是最高领导人。他可以成为那个发号施令、掌控全局的人。但中国幅员辽阔,拥有庞大的官僚体系,包括文职和军队系统。从他们试图解决经济问题的方式可以看出,习近平说了什么并不意味着事情会立刻发生。而且,指令在官僚体系中传递得越远,往往扭曲得越厉害。

And this is not a Chinese Communist Party problem. There have been several millennia’s worth of examples of this problem in the old Chinese imperial system. And so I think, in some ways, it gets oversimplified into this sort of binary: Xi’s the dictator, so therefore he can do whatever he wants, versus Xi is in charge of this massive set of bureaucracies. Neither is exactly true. Even though Xi can get much of what he wants done, it is not as simple as issuing an order and then having everyone immediately obey.

而且这不是中国共产党独有的问题。在中国古代帝制体系中,这类问题已有数千年的先例。所以我认为,在某种程度上,这被过度简化成了二元对立:习近平是独裁者,因此他想做什么就能做什么;与之相对的是,习近平掌管着这一庞大的官僚体系。这两种说法都不完全正确。尽管习近平能让大部分他想做的事得以完成,但这并不像发布一道命令、然后所有人立刻服从那么简单。

How much harder is it to get information about Xi than it was about his predecessors?

获取关于习近平主席的信息相比其前任是否更加困难?

It’s much harder now, but it’s not just harder for foreigners; it’s also harder for people in China. The information flows have been massively constricted by design, both internally and externally. He is a leader at a unique time in Chinese history where you could argue it’s, at least in the modern era, the richest and most powerful it’s ever been. And so it has capacities and capabilities and resources that his predecessors could only dream about.

如今情况要困难得多,但这不仅是对外国人而言;对中国人来说也同样如此。无论对内还是对外,信息流动都被人为地大规模限制。他正处在中国历史上一个独特的时期——至少在现代史上,中国从未如此富强。因此,他掌握着前任们梦寐以求的治理能力、技术手段与资源储备。

It doesn't really get talked about much in the media, or the Western media, but—leaving aside China’s push for economic decoupling and their requests for self-reliance in a whole bunch of areas, which are completely legitimate, especially given the way the U.S. has restricted China’s access to certain key technologies—China is also undergoing a significant push to decouple intellectually, led by Xi. They are very much talking about this idea of Chinese modernization, and it's very explicitly presented as modernization that is not Western modernization. Western modernization led to all sorts of colonial, imperialist predation. They're trying to build a whole Chinese knowledge system, whether it’s economics, philosophy, or social sciences, to effectively decouple from the Western systems that have dominated intellectual thought for the last decades or centuries. And so there’s something deeper there than simply wanting to have a big and powerful country with a really strong military and be really rich. ♦

西方媒体很少真正讨论这一点——且不论中国在经济脱钩方面的努力,以及他们在诸多领域寻求自主可控的诉求(考虑到美国限制中国获取某些关键技术的方式,这些诉求完全正当)——在习近平的引领下,中国也正大力推动思想层面的脱钩。他们频繁探讨“中国式现代化”这一理念,并明确将其界定为不同于西方模式的现代化。西方现代化曾导致各种殖民与帝国主义掠夺行径。中国正试图构建一套完整的中国知识体系,涵盖经济学、哲学、社会科学等领域,以期与主导了过去数十年乃至数个世纪的西方思想体系实现实质性的脱钩。因此,这背后蕴含着比单纯追求国家富强、军力强盛更深层的意涵。

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