Q. & A.

Why the War in Iran Is Likely to Heat Up Again

伊朗战事为何可能再度升温
Oil exports in the Gulf have rebounded as the U.S. escorts ships through the Strait of Hormuz. But the obstacles to a lasting peace are greater than ever.
随着美国为通过霍尔木兹海峡的船只护航,海湾地区的石油出口已有所回升。但实现持久和平的障碍比以往任何时候都更大。
Tanker trucks in a row on a road.
Photograph by Omar Albam / AP

The war against Iran, launched earlier this year by the United States and Israel, has caused a spike in energy prices around the world, and this strain on the global economy was exacerbated by Iran shutting down the Strait of Hormuz in March. Recently, however, the amount of oil passing through the strait every day has climbed back up to ten million barrels, according to some estimates. (Before the war, the figure was at least sixteen million barrels per day.) This increase has led some analysts to suggest that America and its allies have managed to overcome Iran’s greatest leverage point in the conflict. But this, in turn, has led to another concern: that Iran will, in desperation, begin attacking other energy targets in the region.

今年早些时候由美国和以色列发起的对伊战争,已导致全球能源价格飙升,而伊朗在三月封锁霍尔木兹海峡更是加剧了对全球经济的冲击。不过,据一些估算,近日每天通过该海峡的石油量已回升至一千万桶。(战前这一数字为每天至少一千六百万桶。)这一增长让一些分析人士认为,美国及其盟友已经成功化解了伊朗在这场冲突中最大的筹码。但这反过来又引发了另一种担忧:走投无路的伊朗将开始攻击该地区的其他能源目标。

I recently spoke by phone with Sanam Vakil, who directs the Middle East and North Africa Programme at the British think tank Chatham House. She is also a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed whether the United States has actually found a lasting solution to Iran’s attempts to slow down commerce in the strait, whether higher oil prices really matter to the White House, and why a return to a larger conflict remains overwhelmingly likely.

我最近通过电话采访了萨纳姆·瓦基尔(Sanam Vakil),她是英国智库查塔姆研究所(Chatham House)中东与北非项目主任,同时也是约翰斯·霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院的教授。在我们的对话中——为篇幅和清晰度起见经过编辑——我们讨论了美国是否真的找到了应对伊朗阻碍海峡通航的持久方案,油价上涨对白宫是否真的重要,以及为何重返更大规模冲突的可能性仍然极高。

When you think about the status of the conflict between Iran and the United States today, does it feel like a stalemate, or does it feel more like a race against time, where one side is bleeding out and trying to survive as long as it can?

当你思考今天伊朗与美国之间冲突的状态时,感觉更像是僵局,还是更像一场与时间的赛跑——其中一方正在失血,尽可能撑得更久?

I do think we are in a stalemate. If you think that both sides assess the circumstances in the same way, you might not understand the logic of the stalemate analysis. But, as someone who’s followed and worked on Iran for quite some time, it’s a stalemate to me, because both sides are very much backed into their corners. The U.S. narrative is that time is on its side, in part because the blockade is certainly impacting the economic climate in Iran in an obviously negative way. Certainly, the Trump Administration has gone above and beyond what previous U.S. Administrations have done, not just in terms of the blockade but in enforcing sanctions and compliance, particularly among Iranian allies.

我确实认为我们处于僵局之中。如果你认为双方以同样的方式评估局势,你可能无法理解僵局分析的逻辑。但作为一个长期关注和研究伊朗的人,在我看来这就是僵局,因为双方都被逼到了墙角。美国的叙事是时间站在自己这边,部分原因是封锁显然正在以明显的负面方式影响伊朗的经济环境。当然,特朗普政府在封锁方面——不仅是在封锁本身,还包括在执行制裁和迫使伊朗盟友遵守方面——已经远远超出了此前历届美国政府的做法。

But what Trump Administration officials are missing is that they’re trying to approach the strangulation of Iran in the same way that they would approach the strangulation of the United States or another Western country. And they are not factoring in how existential this war is for the Islamic Republic and its leadership, and not factoring in that the leadership does not have a track record of making good decisions under pressure, or because of factors such as declining growth, or currency devaluations, or inflation. They make decisions based on security, stability, and survival. And because the conflict is so consequential for the survival of this Islamic Republic, and for the individuals inside this Islamic Republic, they are not necessarily going to respond the way the Trump Administration would expect. Yes, there is economic pain, which is hard for the Iranian people, but the regime will manage to endure until the negotiating terms are more favorable. What they won’t do is bend the knee to Donald Trump. That’s just not in the world view and ideology of this group of people in charge. And so, from their perspective, it is a stalemate.

但特朗普政府官员忽略了一点:他们试图用扼杀美国或其他西方国家的思路来扼杀伊朗,却没有考虑到这场战争对伊斯兰共和国及其领导层而言是多么关乎存亡,也没有考虑到这个领导层在压力之下、在增长下滑、货币贬值或通胀等因素面前,并没有做出良好决策的记录。他们做决策的依据是安全、稳定和生存。正因为这场冲突对伊斯兰共和国的存续、对伊斯兰共和国内部的个人如此事关重大,他们未必会按照特朗普政府预期的方式做出回应。是的,经济上的痛苦确实存在,对伊朗人民来说很艰难,但政权会设法撑到谈判条件更有利的时候。他们不会做的,是向唐纳德·特朗普屈膝。这根本不在当前掌权群体的世界观和意识形态之内。所以,从他们的角度来看,这就是僵局。

They do want a deal, and they want a way out. But you’re not seeing them compromise in any sort of way. They’re trying to shape the conflict environment, and perhaps stave off another round of war, but they’re also preparing for another round of full-on war, which is also what the Trump Administration is doing.

他们确实想要一份协议,想要一条出路。但你看不到他们以任何方式妥协。他们在试图塑造冲突环境,或许是在拖延下一轮战争的到来,但他们同时也在为下一轮全面战争做准备——特朗普政府也在做同样的事。

Do you think the Islamic Republic made a mistake when it broke the terms of the memorandum of understanding that was reached earlier this summer? Because, at the time, most analysts said that deal was embarrassing for Trump, and that he had caved by offering a deal that had some similarities to the Obama nuclear deal. Or was the sense in Iran that Trump and the Israelis would never have stuck to the deal?

你认为伊斯兰共和国在今年夏天早些时候达成的谅解备忘录条款被打破时,是否犯了一个错误?因为当时大多数分析人士都说,那份协议让特朗普很难堪,他提出了一份与奥巴马核协议有某些相似之处的方案,等于是在让步。还是说,伊朗方面的判断是特朗普和以色列人根本不会遵守协议?

My view is that it was probably the best deal that Iran had on the table compared to any deal in previous years, and perhaps the best they would get going forward as well. I don’t think they are ever going to get such an arrangement again. But the Iranian system isn’t monolithic and is factionalized, and I think the Trump Administration doesn’t appreciate or understand the nature of that factionalism within the system. There are key decision-makers that are so deeply distrustful of Trump and the Israelis that they saw such a good deal as the beginning of further pressure, and they saw American efforts to set up a shipping lane on the Omani side as a suggestion of American efforts to weaken the deal. So that world view and that thinking are very much formed by decades of watching the U.S., and decades of learning from experience that the U.S. doesn’t stick to its plans, particularly with Iran. They see the American agenda toward Iran as akin to the way the U.S. dealt with the Soviet Union, where they saw that America ultimately wanted the Soviet Union to unravel.

我的看法是,与往年任何协议相比,那可能是伊朗摆在桌面上的最好协议,而且可能也是他们今后能拿到的最好协议。我不认为他们还能再得到这样的安排。但伊朗体制并非铁板一块,而是派系林立的,我认为特朗普政府并不理解也不了解这种派系斗争的性质。有一些关键决策者对特朗普和以色列人极度不信任,他们把这样一份好协议视为进一步施压的开端,他们把美国在阿曼一侧建立航运通道的努力视为美国试图削弱协议的信号。这种世界观和思维方式,很大程度上是由几十年来观察美国、以及几十年来从经验中习得“美国不会坚持自己的计划——尤其是对伊朗”这一教训所塑造的。他们认为美国对伊朗的议程类似于当年对付苏联的方式——他们看到的是,美国最终想要苏联解体。

Right, presumably there needs to be some sort of deal at some point, which requires some amount of trust, but at the same time it’s hard to blame the Iranian regime for feeling that the Trump Administration and the Israeli government are completely untrustworthy.

对,按理说在某个时刻总需要达成某种协议,而这需要一定程度的信任,但与此同时,也很难责怪伊朗政权觉得特朗普政府和以色列政府完全不值得信任。

In terms of the Iranian security establishment, this is also about regime preservation. They feel very burned by all of the times that they have compromised—whether it’s the two times when they were negotiating with the Trump Administration and then were subsequently bombed, or when Trump, during his first term, ended the Obama nuclear deal. But, at the same time, these individuals are, of course, hostage to their own world view. And, by never being able to move beyond it, that world view becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

就伊朗安全机构而言,这也关乎政权存续。他们对自己每一次妥协的后果都感到深受伤害——无论是两次与特朗普政府谈判后随即遭到轰炸,还是特朗普在第一任期内退出奥巴马核协议。但与此同时,这些人当然也被自己的世界观所绑架。而由于永远无法超越这种世界观,这种世界观就成了一种自我实现的预言。

To return to this stalemate question: I had assumed that elevated oil prices would work in Iran’s favor and put pressure on the United States, and perhaps its allies, to wrap this up and make a deal. But the Trump Administration seems to just not really care about the politics, even with an election five weeks away. Does that then make Iran’s situation more difficult?

回到僵局这个问题:我原本以为油价上涨会对伊朗有利,给美国及其盟友施加压力,促使他们尽快收场并达成协议。但特朗普政府似乎真的不太在乎政治后果,即便距离选举只有五周了。这是否让伊朗的处境更加困难?

Well, that’s of course what’s interesting. The Iranians also thought that if they could amp up the pressure, amp up the prices, particularly around the midterms, that they would have an impact, and that has been very much their game and their gamble. But they, too, have been surprised that Trump seems unmoved by these dynamics and assumptions. I think about how he presented this conflict at the start. He is someone who is so obsessed with himself and his legacy that maybe he’s willing to take the pain, absorb the cost, and continue fighting until he can achieve something he sees as historic, perhaps a deal of some kind.

嗯,这正是有意思的地方。伊朗人也曾以为,如果他们能加大压力、推高油价——尤其是在中期选举前后——就能产生影响,这一直是他们的策略和赌注。但他们同样感到意外的是,特朗普似乎对这些动态和假设无动于衷。我在想他一开始是如何呈现这场冲突的。他是一个极度沉迷于自我和自身遗产的人,也许他愿意承受痛苦、吸收代价,继续打下去,直到他能取得某种他视为历史性的成就——也许是某种协议。

Earlier, you said that Iran isn’t thinking about this as a Western country would. And I assume what you meant by that is Iran isn’t thinking about this the way that a country with democratic feedback loops would.

你之前说,伊朗不会像西方国家那样思考这个问题。我猜你的意思是,伊朗不会像一个有民主反馈机制的国家那样思考。

Yes.

是的。

Maybe that’s also the case here in America now, though–that the normal democratic feedback loops have just sort of broken down, or Trump simply doesn’t care about them.

也许现在美国也是如此——正常的民主反馈机制已经某种程度上失灵了,或者特朗普根本不在乎这些机制。

Yes, and it’s possible he does not consult the wider bureaucracy or intelligence agencies in the way that past Presidents would have traditionally done. It seems as if there is no consultation with the community of experts that would have cautioned, advised, and warned. And, certainly, if you look at the polling and the sentiment of the American people, the vast majority are against this war. But what I think is lacking is that Trump has not made a consistent case for why this war is necessary, and what the United States is trying to achieve. And I don’t think it’s about opening the Strait of Hormuz. So, what does the U.S. want out of this? And how does the U.S. walk away?

是的,而且他可能不会像过去的总统那样广泛咨询官僚机构或情报部门。似乎根本没有与那些本应提出告诫、建议和警告的专家群体进行磋商。而且,如果你看民调和美国民众的情绪,绝大多数人反对这场战争。但我认为缺失的是,特朗普没有就这场战争为何必要、美国试图达成什么目标做出连贯的阐述。而且我不认为这仅仅是为了打通霍尔木兹海峡。那么,美国到底想从中得到什么?美国又该如何抽身?

Let me ask you, then, about the American efforts to open up the strait more. There’s been some dispute about how much of the strait is actually open to oil tankers. What do you know about the current situation?

那么让我问问你关于美国进一步开放海峡的努力。关于海峡实际对油轮开放的程度存在一些争议。你对当前局势了解多少?

I think the United States is playing a role in creating safe passage—whatever that looks like—for a lot of ships to get through. There is also what’s taking place off the books—illicitly, however you want to look at it—where ships turn off their radar and are making side deals with the Iranians to get through. So I don’t think that there’s one story. I think that there are a couple of concentric explanations for what’s going on. What isn’t clear to me, though, is exactly who’s making deals with whom? There are all sorts of rumors about some Gulf countries having arrangements with the Iranians, and this could be one domain where that exists.

我认为美国正在为大量船只的安全通行发挥作用——不管具体形式如何。此外还有一些台面下的操作——非法的,随你怎么看——船只关闭雷达,与伊朗人达成私下交易以通过海峡。所以我不认为存在单一的解释。我认为有几个同心圆式的解释在同时起作用。不过我不清楚的是,究竟是谁在和谁做交易?有各种传言说一些海湾国家与伊朗人之间有安排,这可能就是其中一个领域。

Secondly, if so many ships are moving through the strait, formally or informally, certainly there is some Iranian fuel that is also moving. And then, thirdly, Iran still has disruptive capability. Control over Hormuz doesn’t mean Iran is the traffic warden on the bridge; it just means they are able to disrupt things, and they can keep disrupting things going forward in ways that will still be damaging.

其次,如果有这么多船只通过海峡——无论是正式还是非正式——那么肯定也有一些伊朗燃料在流动。第三,伊朗仍然具有破坏能力。控制霍尔木兹并不意味着伊朗是桥上的交通管理员;它只是意味着他们有能力进行破坏,而且他们可以在未来继续以仍然具有破坏性的方式进行破坏。

And there’s a sense that they could ramp up that disruption even more if they felt as if they were losing the leverage, correct?

而且有一种感觉是,如果他们觉得自己正在失去筹码,他们可以进一步升级这种破坏,对吗?

Well, I think we have to look at the region as a broader ecosystem. There may be a logic to why they’re lowering the temperature on disruption right now, and it could be for two reasons. One, there is active diplomacy under way, led by the Qataris and Omanis, and there are several different proposals out there about sequencing a series of maneuvers and measures, in order to get back to more formal nuclear negotiations between Iran and the U.S. And then, second, there is the Houthi variable. We’re not back in active military conflict, and so the Iranians have wanted to showcase their disruptive capability. But I don’t think they want to disrupt or close two choke points simultaneously. At least not yet. Because they don’t want to invite or trigger the return of military conflict.

嗯,我认为我们必须把该地区看作一个更广泛的生态系统。他们现在降低破坏力度可能有其逻辑,原因可能有两个。第一,目前有由卡塔尔人和阿曼人牵头的积极外交正在进行,桌面上有几项不同的提案,涉及一系列动作和措施的顺序安排,目的是让伊朗和美国回到更正式的核谈判。第二,还有胡塞武装这个变量。我们还没有回到直接的军事冲突状态,所以伊朗人一直想展示他们的破坏能力。但我不认为他们想同时破坏或关闭两个咽喉要道。至少目前还不想。因为他们不想招致或触发军事冲突的回归。

What can you tell us about the Houthi part of this?

关于胡塞武装这部分,你能告诉我们什么?

Over the past few weeks, Yemeni government forces mobilized a campaign against the Houthis, and the Houthis marshalled a more competent military response than was expected. They overturned those government forces in key areas, including the Red Sea, and this meant an internal Yemeni conflict, as well as the extension of the conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, both of which have disrupted shipping on the Red Sea. And there were also strikes from Iraq, where Saudi Arabia said Iraqi militias hit the Saudi East-West Pipeline, taking it offline for a few days. But the Iranians, so far, have not become directly involved in either conflict. In my mind, Iran doesn’t want to reactivate or broaden the conflict at a moment when diplomacy is under way. I think they would be holding that back for the future.

过去几周,也门政府军发动了一场针对胡塞武装的攻势,而胡塞武装组织起了比预期更有力的军事回应。他们在包括红海在内的关键地区击退了政府军,这意味着也门内部冲突以及胡塞武装与沙特阿拉伯之间冲突的延伸,两者都扰乱了红海的航运。还有来自伊拉克的打击——沙特阿拉伯称伊拉克民兵袭击了沙特东西输油管道,使其停运了几天。但伊朗人迄今为止没有直接卷入任何一场冲突。在我看来,伊朗不想在外交正在进行的时候重新激活或扩大冲突。我认为他们会把这一点留到将来。

There was some speculation and some reporting earlier in the war that the Saudis had become concerned about how aggressive the United States and Israel had become, and that the Saudis had broken with the United Arab Emirates, which was pushing for full-on regime change in Iran. It seems recently, though, that the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has been pushing Trump to attack the Houthis. Is this just about the importance of a shipping route in the Red Sea and the civil war in Yemen, which Saudi Arabia is involved in?

战争早期有一些猜测和报道称,沙特人对美国和以色列变得如此激进感到担忧,而且沙特人与阿联酋产生了分歧——阿联酋在推动对伊朗的全面政权更迭。不过最近似乎沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼一直在推动特朗普攻击胡塞武装。这只是因为红海航运路线的重要性以及沙特卷入的也门内战吗?

A ten-year war.

一场持续十年的战争。

Yes, which has killed lots of people, including lots of civilians.

是的,这场战争已经杀死了很多人,包括大量平民。

So, obviously, the war with Iran has been a huge challenge for Saudi Arabia, as well as all of the other Gulf states. It’s brought economic and security challenges of immense proportions not felt by this part of the world for decades, since the 2003 war and the first Gulf War, in 1990. They’re in very uncharted waters, and, while there have been very strong sentiments at the popular level in Saudi Arabia, I would also argue there is a feeling within the Saudi government that President Trump was led into this war by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu without seriously considering Gulf interests and Gulf relationships in the way that they had expected.

所以,显然,与伊朗的战争对沙特阿拉伯以及所有其他海湾国家来说都是一个巨大挑战。它带来了自2003年战争和1990年第一次海湾战争以来,该地区几十年来从未经历过的巨大经济和安全挑战。他们处于非常陌生的水域,虽然沙特阿拉伯民间有非常强烈的情绪,但我认为沙特政府内部也有一种感觉:特朗普总统是在本雅明·内塔尼亚胡总理的引导下卷入这场战争的,而没有像他们预期的那样认真考虑海湾国家的利益和关系。

Over the course of the conflict with Iran, Saudi Arabia, along with many other Gulf states, has worked to temper the Trump Administration’s return to military conflict: they have warned, in multiple phone calls, “If you start attacking critical infrastructure in Iran, the Iranians are going to hit us.” So they’ve played a very important role in trying to stabilize the region, and build out diplomatic channels that are in use in negotiations by the U.S. and Iran today. But what Saudi Arabia didn’t prepare for adequately was the conflict in Yemen, which was actually very predictable. I think that they overestimated the Yemeni forces, who are traditionally very divided. They also fell out with the U.A.E. last December, and the Emiratis withdrew from southern Yemen, further weakening the government forces there. So perhaps the Saudis didn’t have that intelligence picture in the way that they should have. And I would also argue that they thought time was on their side, perhaps, with the Houthis. They miscalculated the military capacity of the Houthis, and in this climate of war they didn’t want to go back to the political negotiations that they had been having with the Houthis. There was a ceasefire between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia in 2022, and there had been negotiations in the following years. But then, after October 7th, all of those negotiations somewhat froze. And effectively, since then, Saudi Arabia has been buying time, but numerous regional conflicts all just spilled out in this ugly way, and I think now they’ve been caught off guard—and President Trump has been equally frustrated with Saudi Arabia. It has been quite embarrassing to the Saudis that the U.S. government has not been materially helpful to them in this moment of crisis.

在与伊朗冲突的过程中,沙特阿拉伯与许多其他海湾国家一道,一直在努力缓和特朗普政府重返军事冲突的倾向:他们在多次通话中警告说:“如果你们开始攻击伊朗的关键基础设施,伊朗人会来打我们。”所以他们在稳定地区局势、建立外交渠道方面发挥了非常重要的作用,这些渠道如今正被美国和伊朗用于谈判。但沙特阿拉伯没有做好充分准备的是也门冲突——而这实际上是非常可预测的。我认为他们高估了也门政府军,这些部队传统上非常分裂。他们去年十二月还与阿联酋闹翻了,阿联酋人从也门南部撤出,进一步削弱了那里的政府军。所以也许沙特人没有获得他们本应获得的情报图景。我还认为,他们也许以为时间站在自己这边——在胡塞武装的问题上。他们误判了胡塞武装的军事能力,而在这场战争氛围中,他们不想回到之前与胡塞武装进行的政治谈判。胡塞武装与沙特阿拉伯在2022年有过停火,之后几年也有过谈判。但10月7日之后,所有这些谈判都在某种程度上冻结了。实际上,自那以后,沙特阿拉伯一直在拖延时间,但多场地区冲突都以这种丑陋的方式爆发出来,我认为现在他们被打了个措手不及——而特朗普总统对沙特阿拉伯也同样感到沮丧。对沙特人来说相当难堪的是,美国政府在这个危机时刻没有给予他们实质性的帮助。

How do you see things changing or not changing after the November election?

你认为十一月选举之后局势会如何变化,或者不会变化?

I do not think the midterms change anything. I’m of the mindset that there will be another round of military conflict with Iran. It’s a question of whether it’s going to be going into the midterms or immediately after. And it could depend on the outcome of the election. Let’s imagine a scenario where the Democrats do swimmingly and also take the Senate: then, obviously, Trump will eventually have his hands tied on war matters. So, if he’s going to do it, he’s got to do it sooner rather than later. Maybe I’m wrong, but I would see war coming to a theatre near us, regardless.

我不认为中期选举会改变什么。我的判断是,还会有另一轮与伊朗的军事冲突。问题在于它是在中期选举之前还是之后立即发生。这可能取决于选举结果。设想一种情况:民主党大获全胜并且拿下参议院——那么显然,特朗普最终在战争问题上会受到束缚。所以,如果他要动手,就必须宜早不宜迟。也许我判断错了,但无论如何,我认为战争会来到我们附近的某个战场。

It does also seem as if the degree to which the Americans have eased passage through the strait requires a huge military burden that costs a lot of money and takes a lot of resources.

看起来也确实如此:美国人在缓解海峡通行方面所达到的程度,需要承担巨大的军事负担,花费大量资金,占用大量资源。

Yeah, the longer this drags on, the costs are going to mount from an economic perspective. But I think, above all, it takes resources away from other conflicts. And this could become a protracted conflict, like the Ukraine-Russia war, and that would be an awful scenario for the region, as well as for Iran. ♦

是的,拖得越久,从经济角度看成本就会越高。但我认为最重要的是,这会从其他冲突中抽走资源。而这可能演变成一场旷日持久的冲突,就像乌克兰-俄罗斯战争那样,那对该地区以及伊朗来说都将是一个可怕的局面。♦

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