The Lede

Why the Houthis Are Saudi Arabia’s Problem

为什么胡塞武装成了沙特阿拉伯的难题
The U.S. opted not to intervene as Yemen’s Houthi rebels seized a major choke point for Saudi oil shipments on the Red Sea.
美国选择不介入,任由也门胡塞武装叛军夺取红海上沙特石油运输的一处关键咽喉要道。
Boats float on water
Photograph from Reuters

Last week, in a shock offensive, the Yemeni rebel group known as the Houthis seized territory near the Red Sea’s strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait. In doing so, they opened a volatile new front in the destabilizing war between the United States and Iran, and left Saudi Arabia, an old enemy of the rebels, searching for allies and scrambling for a response. Various military advances by the Houthis have rocked Yemen since 2014. That year, the group, whose official name is Ansar Allah, surged to prominence by capturing Sana’a, the country’s capital, a swaggering first step in their evolution from a scruffy militia to the rulers of large swaths of Yemeni territory. This led to more than a decade of conflict with a disparate band of Yemeni opponents, along with Saudi Arabia. Still, nothing in the war has seemed as startling or as consequential as their breakneck assault last week, which centered on the capture of Mokha, a major port city on the Red Sea, and Perim, a tiny island at the southern entrance to the waterway. Both locations put the Houthis within firing distance of any ships that attempt to traverse the narrow strait. The rebels now control Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline.

上周,在一场令人震惊的攻势中,名为胡塞武装的也门叛军组织夺取了红海战略要地曼德海峡附近的领土。此举为美国与伊朗之间这场动摇地区稳定的战争开辟了一条动荡的新战线,也让叛军的老对头沙特阿拉伯四处寻找盟友、仓促寻求应对之策。自2014年以来,胡塞武装的多次军事推进一直震动着也门。那一年,这个正式名称为“真主虔信者”的组织攻占首都萨那,一举崛起,迈出了从一支衣衫褴褛的民兵演变为也门大片领土统治者的第一步,气势逼人。这引发了与也门国内各色反对派以及沙特阿拉伯之间长达十余年的冲突。然而,这场战争中似乎没有任何事比得上他们上周的闪电攻势那样令人震惊、影响深远。此次攻势的核心是夺取红海重要港口城市摩卡,以及位于水道南端入口的小岛丕林岛。这两处地点都使胡塞武装处于能够对任何试图穿越这条狭窄海峡的船只开火的射程之内。叛军如今控制了也门整个红海海岸线。

In the path of the offensive, opposing forces—primarily trained, equipped, and supported by Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E.—seemed to melt away. “The result is catastrophic,” Amr al-Bidh, a senior official with Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council, a separatist group that has clashed with the Houthis, told me. “It’s created all these alarms.” Not only had war returned to Yemen but uncertainty had fallen over the Red Sea, which has served as a reliable alternative route for oil shipments in the Persian Gulf since Iran began blockading the Strait of Hormuz, the entrance to the gulf, earlier this year. In March, Saudi Arabia, because of the shipping restrictions in the Persian Gulf, began transporting its crude oil through a pipeline that stretches from the kingdom’s Eastern Province to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, on its western coast. Fears that Iran and its close ally, the Houthis, effectively control two of the world’s most important maritime choke points rattled global energy markets. Then, last week, a drone attack that Saudi Arabia said was launched by Iran-backed militias inside Iraq hit the pipeline, causing a spike in the price of a barrel of Brent crude oil, a global benchmark in the oil markets.

在攻势所经之处,主要由沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋训练、装备和支持的敌对武装似乎土崩瓦解。“结果是灾难性的,”也门南方过渡委员会高级官员阿姆鲁·比德告诉我,“这拉响了所有警报。”南方过渡委员会是一个与胡塞武装交过手的分裂主义组织。不仅战争重返也门,不确定性也笼罩了红海。自伊朗今年早些时候开始封锁波斯湾入口霍尔木兹海峡以来,红海一直是波斯湾石油运输的一条可靠替代路线。今年三月,由于波斯湾的航运限制,沙特阿拉伯开始通过一条从该国东部省延伸至西海岸红海港口延布的管道运输原油。人们担心伊朗及其亲密盟友胡塞武装实际上控制着世界上最重要的两条海上咽喉要道,这令全球能源市场感到不安。随后,上周一架无人机袭击了这条管道,沙特称袭击由伊朗支持的伊拉克境内民兵发动,导致全球石油市场基准布伦特原油价格飙升。

Houthi officials tried to assuage fears about their intentions. Though they had previously announced a maritime blockade on Saudi Arabia, passage through the Red Sea remained “safe and orderly,” a Houthi spokesman, Mohammed Abdulsalam, said in a post on X on September 10th. The strait and the Red Sea faced “no danger” from the Yemeni side. But widely shared videos on social media showed that the rebels were also celebrating, hailing their offensive as a blow against foreign intervention and a strategic milestone that could tip the balance of Yemen’s once stalemated war. “The American-Saudi project aimed at regionalizing and fragmenting Yemen has been brought down,” a commentator wrote in Saba, a Houthi-run news agency. Control over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait would serve “Yemeni national interests” and “Arab and Islamic national security.”

胡塞武装官员试图安抚外界对其意图的担忧。尽管他们此前曾宣布对沙特阿拉伯实施海上封锁,但胡塞武装发言人穆罕默德·阿卜杜勒萨拉姆9月10日在X平台上发帖称,红海通行仍然“安全有序”。海峡和红海不存在来自也门方面的“任何危险”。但社交媒体上广泛传播的视频显示,叛军同时也在庆祝,将此次攻势誉为对外国干预的打击,以及可能打破也门战争长期僵局的战略里程碑。“旨在将也门区域化、碎片化的美沙计划已经被粉碎,”一位评论员在胡塞武装运营的萨巴通讯社写道。控制曼德海峡将服务于“也门国家利益”以及“阿拉伯和伊斯兰国家安全”。

The United States, which last year carried out a nearly two-month-long military campaign against the Houthis that left them battered but hardly vanquished, has signalled that it might accommodate the rebels this time around. Reuters reported that American officials met with Houthi representatives in Oman last weekend, and were told that there would be no attacks on American ships in the Red Sea. President Donald Trump, speaking to reporters last Saturday, seemed less than alarmed by the group’s success. The Houthis “called us and they don’t want to fight with us,” he said. “They don’t want us to go after them.” There was “one country,” Trump added, that the Houthis were “not too happy with”—an apparent reference to Saudi Arabia. “We’ll get that straightened out,” Trump said.

美国去年曾对胡塞武装发动了近两个月的军事行动,使其遭受重创但远未将其消灭。这一次,美国释放的信号是可能对叛军采取迁就态度。路透社报道称,美国官员上周末在阿曼会见了胡塞武装代表,并被告知红海上的美国船只不会遭到袭击。唐纳德·特朗普总统上周六对记者发表讲话时,对该组织的胜利似乎并不十分警觉。胡塞武装“给我们打了电话,他们不想和我们打,”他说,“他们不想让我们去追打他们。”特朗普补充说,有“一个国家”让胡塞武装“不太高兴”——显然指的是沙特阿拉伯。“我们会把这件事理顺的,”特朗普说。

Still, days later, there was no evidence that the Saudis and the Houthis were de-escalating, or that the United States, the kingdom’s defense partner, would immediately provide direct military support. Axios had reported that the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, had called Trump twice as the Houthis advanced, asking for U.S. air strikes against the rebels. Trump, who had signed what the White House called a “historic” defense agreement with the Saudis in November, 2025, declined. And few analysts expect Turkey and Pakistan, which also recently signed a joint-defense pact with the Saudis, to commit troops to Yemen. On Tuesday, Saudi Arabia called on the global community to present a unified front. “The security of maritime waterways is a collective responsibility that requires an active international partnership,” Abdulaziz Alwasil, the kingdom’s ambassador to the United Nations, said in an emergency Security Council Meeting on the crisis. Saudi Arabia, he added, had “left no stone unturned to help Yemen to realize peace, stability, and prosperity.”

然而,几天之后,没有证据表明沙特与胡塞武装在降级冲突,也没有证据表明作为沙特防务伙伴的美国会立即提供直接军事支持。Axios曾报道,随着胡塞武装推进,沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼两次致电特朗普,请求美国对叛军发动空袭。特朗普在2025年11月与沙特签署了白宫所称的“历史性”防务协议,但他拒绝了这一请求。也很少有分析人士预计,最近同样与沙特签署了联合防务协议的土耳其和巴基斯坦会向也门派兵。周二,沙特阿拉伯呼吁国际社会展现统一立场。“海上水道的安全是一项集体责任,需要积极的国际伙伴关系,”沙特常驻联合国代表阿卜杜勒阿齐兹·瓦西勒在安理会就这场危机召开的紧急会议上表示。他补充说,沙特阿拉伯“为帮助也门实现和平、稳定与繁荣已经竭尽全力”。

Saudi Arabia, as its cities and oil installations have come under Houthi attacks, faces a reckoning in Yemen. For now, the kingdom is going at it alone, carrying out air strikes across Yemen to shore up its beleaguered allies on the ground, but, in another setback, Houthi media aired a video on Wednesday of what it said was a Saudi fighter jet the rebels had downed using a locally made missile.

随着沙特的城市和石油设施遭到胡塞武装袭击,沙特阿拉伯在也门面临一场清算。目前,沙特只能独自应对,在也门各地发动空袭以支撑其处境艰难的地面盟友。但又一次挫折接踵而至:胡塞武装媒体周三播出了一段视频,称叛军用地对空导弹击落了一架沙特战斗机。

Across Yemen, front lines are reigniting, not just on the coast, but further east, in the Taiz Province, and in the oil-rich province of Marib, in central Yemen, with battles leading to the deaths of hundreds, according to both the Houthis and their adversaries. Across the rugged landscape that has made Yemen famed for its beauty, videos of the fighting over the last few days showed men dying violently on craggy mountains and on barren desert flats. In a matter of days, at least a hundred thousand people had been displaced by the fighting, the United Nations refugee agency said. More than twenty-four hundred people in Yemen have boarded boats and fled across the Red Sea to Djibouti. “The optimistic side of me says there is always hope, there is always a way for diplomacy and a political settlement,” Ahmed Nagi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group who focusses on Yemen, said. But the Saudis, humiliated by their losses in Yemen, seem likely to lash out. And the Houthis, emboldened by their victories, are already digging in. “The situation in Yemen is moving from bad to worse,” he said.

在整个也门,战线正在重新点燃,不仅在海岸,还包括更东边的塔伊兹省,以及也门中部石油资源丰富的马里卜省。据胡塞武装及其对手双方称,战斗已导致数百人死亡。在也门以崎岖地貌闻名的壮丽山野之间,过去几天的战斗视频显示,人们在嶙峋的山峰上和荒芜的沙漠平地上惨烈地死去。联合国难民署表示,短短几天内,至少有十万人因战斗而流离失所。也门已有超过两千四百人登船逃往红海对岸的吉布提。“我乐观的一面会说,希望总是存在的,外交和政治解决总是有出路的,”专注于也门问题的国际危机组织高级分析师艾哈迈德·纳吉说。但沙特在也门遭受的损失令其蒙羞,似乎很可能进行猛烈反击。而胡塞武装因胜利而士气大振,已经在巩固阵地。“也门的局势正在从糟糕走向更糟,”他说。

The rebels’ capture of Sana’a in 2014 spurred a military intervention by a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states—with intelligence, logistical, and munitions support from the U.S.—which aimed to defeat the Houthis. Its architect was Mohammed bin Salman, now Saudi Arabia’s de-facto leader, who, at the time, was serving as the defense minister. The Saudis, then mired in a regional cold war with Iran, viewed the Houthis as an Iranian proxy force that threatened the kingdom’s borders. Although the Houthis made no secret of their affinity for Iran—and their shared antipathy to Israel and the United States—the depth of their collaboration, for years, was a matter of debate, and the rebels were mostly seen to be acting in their own interests.

叛军2014年攻占萨那,促使以沙特为首的阿拉伯国家联盟在美国的情报、后勤和弹药支持下发动军事干预,旨在击败胡塞武装。这场干预的策划者是穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼,他当时担任国防大臣,如今是沙特阿拉伯的实际领导人。当时深陷与伊朗地区冷战的沙特人将胡塞武装视为威胁王国边境的伊朗代理人力量。尽管胡塞武装毫不掩饰对伊朗的亲近——以及对以色列和美国的共同敌意——但多年来,双方合作的深度一直存在争议,叛军大多被视为在为自己的利益行事。

At the time, Yemen was divided by battle lines and ruled by feuding authorities: the Houthis in the north, and in the south the government that the rebels had expelled from Sana’a. Neither was capable of providing for citizens made desperate by endless war and endemic poverty, who were often left to fend for themselves. Meanwhile, the southern government enjoyed international recognition but was heavily under the sway of its Saudi backers. Years passed, and the Saudi-led coalition made little headway against the Houthis. Instead, their effort became known for a reckless and deadly air campaign that routinely killed civilians—including at weddings, at funerals, and in the factories where they worked. The strikes were often most vicious in the far north of Yemen, a rebel stronghold and the region where the Houthi movement had been founded, in the nineteen-nineties. The war immiserated Yemen. As a Saudi-imposed air and sea blockade contributed to disease outbreaks and famine-like conditions, the Houthis laid siege to cities and built a fiercely insular and repressive state, jailing critics and humanitarian workers. Then, in 2021, after years of criticism for its association with the Saudi war effort, the United States announced that it was ending all “support for offensive operations.” A United Nations-brokered truce the following year gave Yemen a period of relative calm.

当时,也门被战线分割,由相互争斗的当局统治:胡塞武装控制北部,被叛军赶出萨那的政府控制南部。双方都无力为因无休止的战争和普遍贫困而陷入绝望的民众提供保障,民众往往只能自谋生路。与此同时,南方政府享有国际承认,但深受沙特支持者的左右。数年过去,沙特领导的联盟对胡塞武装几乎没有取得什么进展。相反,他们的行动以鲁莽而致命的空袭行动而闻名,空袭经常杀害平民——包括在婚礼上、葬礼上,以及平民工作的工厂里。空袭在也门最北部往往最为残酷,那里是叛军的大本营,也是胡塞运动于上世纪九十年代发源的地区。这场战争使也门陷入赤贫。沙特实施的海空封锁导致疾病暴发和类似饥荒的状况,与此同时,胡塞武装围困城市,建立了一个极度封闭而高压的政权,关押批评者和人道主义工作者。随后,在2021年,因与沙特战争行动的关联而遭受多年批评之后,美国宣布终止一切“对进攻性行动的支持”。次年,联合国斡旋的停火协议给也门带来了一段相对平静的时期。

The country did not stay quiet for long. In 2023, at the start of the war in Gaza, the Houthis, still in control of the most populated areas in Yemen, began attacking ships in the Red Sea, in solidarity, they said, with Palestinians. In 2025, during the American campaign against the Houthis, the U.S. military said that air strikes hit hundreds of targets, including weapons depots and air-defense systems. A tally by the nonprofit watchdog Airwars found that the campaign killed at least two hundred and twenty-four civilians. By the time that the United States and Israel attacked Iran in February, there was an “interconnectedness between the Houthi strategy and the Iranian strategy,” Nagi said. The Houthis saw the attack as a blow not simply against Tehran but against “the whole of Axis of Resistance,” the constellation of Iranian-allied militias around the region, including in Lebanon and Iraq.

这个国家并没有安静太久。2023年,加沙战争爆发之初,仍控制着也门人口最稠密地区的胡塞武装开始袭击红海船只,声称是为了声援巴勒斯坦人。2025年,在美国对胡塞武装的军事行动期间,美军称空袭击中了数百个目标,包括武器库和防空系统。非营利监督机构Airwars的统计发现,这场行动至少造成224名平民死亡。到今年2月美国和以色列袭击伊朗时,“胡塞武装的战略与伊朗的战略之间已经形成了相互关联,”纳吉说。胡塞武装将这次袭击视为不仅是对德黑兰的打击,也是对“整个抵抗轴心”的打击——抵抗轴心指的是伊朗在该地区结盟的民兵网络,包括在黎巴嫩和伊拉克的武装力量。

As the Houthis and Iran grew closer, another wartime partnership in Yemen, between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, was falling apart. The two Gulf powers—friends in the best of times but more often rivals—fell out spectacularly after Emirati-supported forces in Yemen, late last year, seized territory in two eastern provinces, including areas controlled by Saudi-backed groups. The U.A.E. announced that it was withdrawing its remaining troops in the country after the Saudis bombed an Emirati arms shipment bound for Yemen. Then, in July, whatever remained of the truce between the Saudis and the Houthis collapsed, after the Saudis, who control Yemen’s airspace, refused to let an Iranian airliner land at the airport in Sana’a. (The plane landed in the Houthi-controlled port city of Hodeida instead.) “It was the spark of this crisis,” Nagi explained. And, as the conflict escalated, he said, the Houthis had to choose where to send their fighters next. One obvious option was the province of Marib, which, with its oil wealth, would give the rebels a powerful card to play as they sought concessions in any future negotiations with the Saudis and their allies in Yemen. Instead, they went to the coast, where their interests in controlling a major shipping bottleneck dovetailed with those of Iran. When the rebels barrelled south, they found they were pushing at a nearly open door.

就在胡塞武装与伊朗日益走近的同时,也门战场上的另一对战时伙伴——沙特阿拉伯与阿拉伯联合酋长国——正在分道扬镳。这两个海湾大国在最好的时候是朋友,但更多时候是对手。去年年底,阿联酋支持的部队在也门东部两省夺取了领土,包括沙特支持团体控制的地区,此后两国关系急剧恶化。在沙特轰炸了一批运往也门的阿联酋武器后,阿联酋宣布撤出其在也门剩余的部队。随后,今年7月,沙特与胡塞武装之间停火协议仅存的部分也宣告破裂,原因是控制也门领空的沙特拒绝让一架伊朗客机降落在萨那机场。(这架飞机改在胡塞武装控制的港口城市荷台达降落。)“这就是这场危机的导火索,”纳吉解释道。他说,随着冲突升级,胡塞武装必须选择下一步将战斗人员派往何处。一个明显的选项是马里卜省,那里石油资源丰富,将给叛军在未来与沙特及其也门盟友的任何谈判中提供一张强有力的牌。但他们选择了海岸,在那里,控制重要航运瓶颈的利益与伊朗的利益不谋而合。当叛军向南猛冲时,他们发现几乎是在推开一扇敞开的大门。

As the Houthis approached the Red Sea, the area was defended by several armed formations that were nominally controlled by the Saudis. But it was quickly apparent that there was mistrust among the groups, which answered to different commanders and lacked the supervision of a unified operations room. I spoke with a Yemeni official, part of the internationally recognized government in the south, who described the groups as “nonstate actors, within the state, but not controlled by the state.”

胡塞武装逼近红海时,该地区由几支名义上受沙特控制的武装力量防守。但很快就显现出这些团体之间互不信任,它们听命于不同的指挥官,缺乏统一作战指挥室的协调。我与一位也门官员交谈过,他是南方国际公认政府的一员。他将这些团体描述为“国家内部的非国家行为体,不在国家的控制之下”。

For months before the advance, the Houthis had been carrying out ballistic-missile attacks and drone strikes in the region, bombing the port in Mokha to make sure that their Saudi-backed adversaries did not receive support from the sea, and advancing westward from Taiz to control the mountains overlooking the port. Early last week, Tareq Saleh, the commander of one of the most prominent anti-Houthi formations, the National Resistance, complained that the situation was getting worse and that he was receiving little support, the Yemeni official told me. “It was clear his lines of defense were failing,” the official said.

在推进之前的数月里,胡塞武装一直在该地区发动弹道导弹袭击和无人机打击,轰炸摩卡港以确保其沙特支持的对手无法从海上获得支援,并从塔伊兹向西推进,控制俯瞰港口的山地。这位也门官员告诉我,上周初,最著名的反胡塞武装力量之一“全国抵抗”的指挥官塔里克·萨利赫抱怨局势正在恶化,而他几乎没有得到什么支援。“很明显,他的防线正在崩溃,”这位官员说。

Anti-Houthi soldiers began to see other allied forces retreating, and they assumed that the withdrawing fighters had “received better intelligence from their leadership, to leave,” Nagi told me. “Then you had this domino effect. Can you imagine, sixty thousand soldiers just running to save their lives?” There were reports, too, that the Houthis compromised the communications systems of their enemies and issued fraudulent orders to retreat.

反胡塞武装的士兵开始看到其他盟军部队在撤退,他们以为撤退的部队“从领导层那里获得了更好的情报,让他们撤离,”纳吉告诉我。“然后你就看到了这种多米诺骨牌效应。你能想象吗,六万名士兵只顾着逃命?”还有报道称,胡塞武装侵入了敌方的通信系统,发布了虚假的撤退命令。

Many observers believe that the battle might have unfolded differently if the Emiratis were still involved in Yemen. Emirati forces had been instrumental during several major operations during the civil war, helping to repel a Houthi advance on the southern city of Aden, and expelling Al Qaeda, which has had a presence in Yemen for decades, from the southern port city of Mukalla. “They are more aggressive. They are more disciplined. They don’t hesitate,” the senior Yemeni official said, comparing the Emiratis with Saudi forces. “When they go to war, they are physically present. That’s the difference.”

许多观察人士认为,如果阿联酋仍然介入也门事务,这场战斗可能会有不同的走向。在内战期间的几次重大行动中,阿联酋部队发挥了关键作用,帮助击退了胡塞武装对南部城市亚丁的推进,并将数十年来一直在也门活动的基地组织赶出了南部港口城市穆卡拉。“他们更具攻击性。他们更有纪律。他们不会犹豫,”这位也门高级官员在比较阿联酋部队与沙特部队时说。“他们上战场时,是实实在在地在场。这就是区别。”

But, for others, the crisis has been a warning about the ways Yemen has fallen captive to foreign states—whether the Saudis, the Emiratis, or Iran—that make decisions about when to escalate the war, how to prosecute it, and the compromises that Yemenis should be willing to accept to end the conflict. “The Yemenis lost their local agency,” Maysaa Shuja al-Din, a senior researcher at the Sana’a Center, a think tank based in Aden, told me. The war “started as a local conflict with local roots and started to become more regional.” As a result of years of interference, she said, many in the country have become increasingly hungry for more independent, homegrown leaders.

但对另一些人来说,这场危机是一个警示,揭示了也门如何沦为外国——无论是沙特、阿联酋还是伊朗——的俘虏,这些国家决定着何时升级战争、如何打仗,以及也门人应该愿意接受什么样的妥协来结束冲突。“也门人失去了自己的本地主体性,”设在亚丁的智库萨那中心高级研究员梅萨·舒贾·丁告诉我。这场战争“最初是一场有本地根源的本地冲突,后来开始变得越来越区域化。”她说,由于多年的外部干预,国内许多人越来越渴望出现更独立、更本土的领导人。

For now, it is likely that the Houthis will use their recent victories, and their newfound leverage in the Red Sea, to escalate their demands in any peace negotiations, she told me. In the past, the rebels have demanded the payment of public-sector wages in their areas using Yemen’s collective oil revenues, and that Saudi Arabia compensate the rebels for the war. Given the always shifting nature of the front lines in Yemen’s conflict, in addition to those across the region, the Houthis’ control of Bab el-Mandeb was likely “transitional,” the Yemeni official said. In any case, he said, the Houthis “want to bargain for something else.” ♦

她告诉我,就目前而言,胡塞武装很可能会利用最近的胜利以及他们在红海新获得的筹码,在任何和平谈判中提高要价。过去,叛军曾要求使用也门的集体石油收入支付其控制区公共部门的工资,并要求沙特阿拉伯为战争向叛军提供赔偿。这位也门官员说,鉴于也门冲突前线以及整个地区前线始终在变化的性质,胡塞武装对曼德海峡的控制很可能是“过渡性的”。他说,无论如何,胡塞武装“是想拿它来换取别的东西。” ♦

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