The Lede

Why Russia and Ukraine Keep Resisting Trump’s Art of the Deal

为何俄罗斯与乌克兰始终抗拒特朗普的“交易的艺术”
The White House is leading a new round of negotiations this week to end the war, but all sides remain deeply at odds.
白宫本周牵头启动新一轮谈判以结束战争,但各方立场仍相去甚远。
Volodymyr Zelensky and Donald Trump seated next to each other.
Photograph by Brendan Smialowski / AFP / Getty

On November 10th, in Abu Dhabi, a familiar set piece will resume after a nine-month hiatus: direct, three-way talks between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine. The U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff said that the meeting would cover “post-war security arrangements, de-escalation, humanitarian efforts, and next steps toward peace.” The agenda sounds awfully similar to previous efforts made by the Trump Administration during the past two years. Is there any reason to think that this round of diplomacy could produce a different result?

11月10日,在阿布扎比,一场熟悉的固定戏码将在中断九个月后重新上演:美国、俄罗斯与乌克兰之间的直接三方会谈。美国特使史蒂夫·威特科夫表示,此次会议将涵盖“战后安全安排、局势降级、人道主义努力以及迈向和平的后续步骤”。这份议程听起来与特朗普政府过去两年间的历次尝试惊人地相似。有什么理由认为这一轮外交能产生不同的结果吗?

Under Donald Trump, the U.S. approach toward the war has appeared to swing wildly—for example, sanctioning Russian oil companies, only to ease restrictions on Russian fuel exports; or encouraging Ukrainian deep strikes inside Russia and later condemning them. These inconsistencies mask a set of remarkably durable assumptions. Above all, Trump wants to end the war quickly, an achievement in itself: a demonstration of his singular powers as a peacemaker and a means of unlocking what he imagines as a fruitful and profitable relationship with Russia.

在唐纳德·特朗普治下,美国对这场战争的态度看似剧烈摇摆——例如,一边制裁俄罗斯石油公司,一边又放松对俄罗斯燃料出口的限制;一边鼓励乌克兰对俄罗斯境内实施纵深打击,随后又加以谴责。这些反复无常的表象之下,掩藏着一套相当稳固的预设。首要的是,特朗普想尽快结束战争,这本身就是一项成就:既证明他作为和平缔造者独一无二的能力,也为他所设想的与俄罗斯之间富有成果且有利可图的关系打开大门。

That is, he is less concerned with the how than with the what. One doesn’t have to believe in kompromat to understand why Trump, time and again, ends up favoring Vladimir Putin’s position and interests. He believes that Russia, with its larger economy, population, and Army, is destined to prevail—“At some point, size will win,” Trump said last year—and so applying pressure to the weaker party can seem like the quickest path to a settlement. Moreover, as Trump sees it, relations with Russia, given its oil and gas and valuable mineral reserves, offer more economic upside than relations with Ukraine would, both for the U.S. and for Trump’s own family members and associates. “It’d be great for business,” Trump said, in September, of the prospect of an end to the war. “Russia’s got great land, very valuable land.”

也就是说,他关心的不是“如何结束”,而是“结束”本身。不必相信什么黑材料,也能理解特朗普为何一次又一次地偏向弗拉基米尔·普京的立场与利益。他相信,俄罗斯凭借更庞大的经济体量、人口和军队,注定会占上风——“到了某个节点,体量大的会赢,”特朗普去年曾说——因此,向较弱的一方施压,看起来就是达成协议最快的路径。此外,在特朗普看来,鉴于俄罗斯的油气资源和宝贵的矿产储备,与俄罗斯的关系比与乌克兰的关系更具经济上行空间,无论对美国还是对特朗普自己的家人和伙伴都是如此。“这对生意大有好处,”特朗普去年9月在谈到战争结束的前景时说,“俄罗斯拥有广袤的土地,非常有价值的土地。”

From the outset, Witkoff and his partner in the Russia-Ukraine talks, Jared Kushner, have projected a similar set of motives onto Putin. Beyond extravagant praise—last month, Witkoff called Putin a “humanitarian”—their tactic has rested on a transactional proposition: surely getting rich together is preferable to continuing the war, and whatever political problems remain can be resolved by deciding which side gets which piece of real estate. “They seem to have the idea that you can essentially buy him off,” a European intelligence official said, of Witkoff and Kushner. “If you can just figure out a way to pay him enough, make it worth his while, whether with land or money, then you can get him to agree to a deal.”

从一开始,威特科夫和他在俄乌谈判中的搭档贾里德·库什纳就把一套类似的动机投射到了普京身上。除了过分的溢美之词——上个月,威特科夫称普京为“人道主义者”——他们的策略建立在一个交易性的命题之上:一起发财总比继续打仗好,而剩下的政治问题,可以通过决定哪一方拿到哪块地皮来解决。“他们似乎抱有一种想法,认为你基本上可以收买他,”一位欧洲情报官员在谈到威特科夫和库什纳时说,“只要你能想出办法给他足够多的好处,让他觉得划算,不管是给地还是给钱,就能让他同意达成协议。”

The dilemma is that, as far as the war is concerned, Putin is guided by a sense of historical mission. Of course, he would like to see Western sanctions lifted and Russia capture the whole of the Donbas, in eastern Ukraine, a key aim that Russia’s military, despite nearly five years of fighting, has been unable to fulfill. (“No news is bad news,” a source in Russian defense circles told me. “There’s little movement on the ground, the troops are exhausted, and everything is being done ass-backwards.”) But even these objectives are part of a larger ambition: righting a set of geopolitical grievances that the Kremlin refers to as the “root causes” of the war. “Putin wants to determine Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation and have a say over security in Europe,” Tatiana Stanovaya, a political analyst at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, said.

困境在于,就这场战争而言,普京的驱动力是一种历史使命感。当然,他乐见西方解除制裁,也乐见俄罗斯拿下乌克兰东部的整个顿巴斯地区——这是俄军打了将近五年仍未能实现的关键目标。(“没有消息就是坏消息,”一位俄罗斯国防圈的消息人士告诉我,“地面几乎没什么进展,部队精疲力竭,所有事情都做得一团糟。”)但即便是这些目标,也只是一个更大野心的一部分:纠正克里姆林宫所称的战争“根源”——一系列地缘政治积怨。“普京想决定乌克兰的地缘政治走向,并在欧洲安全问题上拥有发言权,”卡内基俄罗斯欧亚中心的政治分析家塔季扬娜·斯塔诺瓦娅说。

The Kremlin initially hoped that Trump could deliver on a grand geopolitical bargain, which meant bending not just Kyiv’s arm but Europe’s, too. But Trump proved incapable of meeting that expectation. Last month, Yuri Ushakov, Putin’s foreign-policy adviser, noted that, when Trump and Putin met in Alaska, in August, 2025, it looked as if “the U.S. administration might be able to dictate something and force Kyiv to comply.” But, Ushakov said, “This hasn’t really worked out.”

克里姆林宫最初希望特朗普能促成一场宏大的地缘政治交易,这意味着不仅要扭住基辅的胳膊,还要扭住欧洲的胳膊。但特朗普被证明无力满足这一期望。上个月,普京的外交政策顾问尤里·乌沙科夫指出,2025年8月特朗普与普京在阿拉斯加会晤时,看起来“美国政府或许能够发号施令,迫使基辅就范”。但乌沙科夫说,“实际上并没有奏效。”

However, Trump’s previous attempts to pressure and cajole Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelensky—such as his Oval Office blowup aimed at Zelensky, in February of that year—led to an outcome that Trump himself called for: European countries have taken the lead in backstopping Ukraine’s defense. “After that meeting, a new model emerged,” Balázs Jarábik, a former European diplomat with extensive connections in Kyiv, said. “The Europeans provide the money”—the E.U. has committed ninety billion euros in loans, but U.S. aid has fallen to several hundred million dollars, a fraction of earlier levels—“which keeps the Ukrainian state afloat and buys U.S. weapons.”

然而,特朗普此前对乌克兰总统弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基施压与哄劝的种种尝试——比如那年2月他在椭圆形办公室对泽连斯基的当面发难——却导向了一个特朗普本人曾呼吁的结果:欧洲国家已在为乌克兰的防务承担主要支撑作用。“那次会面之后,出现了一种新模式,”在基辅人脉广泛的前欧洲外交官鲍拉日·亚拉比克说,“欧洲人出钱”——欧盟已承诺提供九百亿欧元贷款,而美国援助已降至数亿美元,仅为早前水平的零头——“这笔钱维持着乌克兰国家的运转,并用来购买美国武器。”

In recent weeks, Trump tried a different approach: he began offering Moscow incentives not as rewards to be delivered upon a peace settlement but as benefits granted before one has been reached. The shift is consistent with Trump’s long-standing logic: the quickest route to ending the war lies in accommodating Russian interests and pressuring Ukraine to accept the result. But it was also a reflection of the political fallout from Trump’s war with Iran. Ahead of last week’s midterm elections, he grew even more sensitive to rising gas prices, up by fifty per cent since the start of the war, seventy per cent in the case of diesel. He singled out Ukraine’s campaign to strike Russian oil refineries and other energy infrastructure. “We told him, do whatever you want, but don’t hit the diesel fuel,” Trump said last month, of Zelensky. “And what does he do? He goes and hits the diesel fuel.” On October 9th, Trump announced a diesel deal with Putin, under which Russia would release hundreds of thousands of tons of diesel into American and global markets, while the U.S. temporarily lifted sanctions restrictions on Russian energy exports.

最近几周,特朗普尝试了另一种做法:他开始向莫斯科提供激励,不是作为和平协议达成后才兑现的奖赏,而是作为协议尚未达成之前就先行给予的好处。这一转变符合特朗普一贯的逻辑:结束战争最快的路径,在于迎合俄罗斯的利益,同时施压乌克兰接受结果。但这也是特朗普对伊朗战争所引发政治后果的一种反映。在上周中期选举之前,他对不断上涨的油价变得更加敏感——自战争开始以来,汽油价格上涨了百分之五十,柴油上涨了百分之七十。他特别点出乌克兰打击俄罗斯炼油厂及其他能源基础设施的行动。“我们跟他说了,你想干什么都行,但别碰柴油,”特朗普上个月谈到泽连斯基时说,“结果他干了什么?他跑去把柴油打了。”10月9日,特朗普宣布与普京达成一项柴油协议:俄罗斯将向美国及全球市场释放数十万吨柴油,而美国则暂时解除对俄罗斯能源出口的制裁限制。

For both sides, the deal was more about messaging than substance. The U.S. is a net exporter of diesel, and the amount that Russia can credibly export will barely affect global prices. “It won’t bring that much diesel to the U.S. market nor all that much money to the Russian budget,” Sergey Vakulenko, an energy analyst at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, said. The move didn’t yield much benefit for Republicans in last week’s election, either. But, for Russia, it was an example of how Western sanctions can be dialled back for the sake of political expediency. “The cordon sanitaire has been breached,” Vakulenko said. (That breach, however, may prove more in word than in deed: in early November, two tankers carrying Russian diesel turned around at sea amid warnings that imports of Russian fuel could violate U.S. law.)

对双方而言,这项协议的意义更多在于传递信号,而非实质内容。美国是柴油净出口国,而俄罗斯能够实际出口的数量几乎不会影响全球价格。“它既不会给美国市场带来多少柴油,也不会给俄罗斯财政带来多少钱,”卡内基俄罗斯欧亚中心的能源分析家谢尔盖·瓦库连科说。此举在上周的选举中也没给共和党人带来多少好处。但对俄罗斯来说,这是一个例证,说明西方制裁可以为了政治上的权宜之计而回调。“防疫封锁线已经被突破了,”瓦库连科说。(不过,这种突破可能更多停留在口头上而非行动上:11月初,两艘载有俄罗斯柴油的油轮在海上掉头返航,因为有人警告称,进口俄罗斯燃料可能违反美国法律。)

More consequently, for ten days in October, Ukraine faced sudden and unexplained speed limitations when operating drones using Starshield, a military application of SpaceX’s Starlink satellite-based communication technology. The de-facto speed cap of a hundred miles per hour meant that Ukraine’s new generation of jet-powered interceptor drones could not catch Russia’s increasingly fast jet-powered drones in the Geran family, which fly at speeds of more than three hundred miles per hour. At the same time, the restrictions hampered Ukraine’s campaign of so-called middle-strike drone operations, which target the Russian military’s logistical rear and have been crucial in disrupting and slowing Russian advances across the front.

更具后果的是,10月里有十天,乌克兰在操作使用“星盾”的无人机时,突然遭遇了无法解释的速度限制。“星盾”是SpaceX公司“星链”卫星通信技术的军事应用版本。每小时一百英里的实际速度上限,意味着乌克兰新一代喷气动力拦截无人机无法追上俄罗斯日益提速的“天竺葵”系列喷气动力无人机——后者的飞行速度超过每小时三百英里。与此同时,这些限制还阻碍了乌克兰所谓“中段打击”无人机行动,这些行动以俄军后勤后方为目标,对打乱和迟滞俄军在全线的推进至关重要。

For days, neither Ukrainian military leaders nor top officials could get a direct answer about what had happened or why. “The worst thing was that there were absolutely no official explanations—nothing, zero,” a political source in Kyiv said. In mid-October, Ukraine appeared to pause its targeting of Russian refineries; by the end of the month, the speed restrictions were lifted. Trump and Elon Musk, the C.E.O. of SpaceX, both tried to deflect responsibility, but the message was sent. “They suddenly switched it off, then just as suddenly switched it back on,” the Kyiv source said. Jarábik said, “It was a way for the U.S. to try to reassert influence, to show what it’s still capable of doing in Ukraine.”

一连数日,无论是乌克兰军方领导人还是高层官员,都无法就发生了什么、为什么发生得到直接答复。“最糟糕的是,完全没有官方解释——什么都没有,零,”基辅一位政治消息人士说。10月中旬,乌克兰似乎暂停了对俄罗斯炼油厂的打击;到月底,速度限制被解除。特朗普和SpaceX首席执行官埃隆·马斯克都试图推卸责任,但信号已经发出。“他们突然把它关掉,然后又同样突然地把它打开,”那位基辅消息人士说。亚拉比克说:“这是美国试图重新施加影响力的一种方式,展示它在乌克兰仍然能够做到什么。”

The Starshield episode was an illustration of the Trump Administration’s undeniable levers of influence. But it also revealed the Administration’s limits. On October 30th, Ukrainian strikes against Russian refineries resumed. The Kyiv political source said that Zelensky had made an offer to Trump: if you want us to stop hitting Russian oil infrastructure, either we should reach a mutual agreement that stops Russian strikes on Ukrainian electricity sites, or the U.S. and its partners should provide Ukraine with Patriot air-defense interceptors for the period during which Ukraine refrains from its strikes. “The Americans said no,” the source said. “So, then, we don’t feel bound by any restrictions.”

“星盾”事件展示了特朗普政府不可否认的影响力杠杆。但它也暴露了这届政府的局限。10月30日,乌克兰对俄罗斯炼油厂的打击恢复。那位基辅政治消息人士说,泽连斯基曾向特朗普提出一个方案:如果你们想让我们停止打击俄罗斯石油基础设施,要么我们达成一项相互协议,让俄罗斯停止打击乌克兰的电力设施;要么在乌克兰暂停打击期间,美国及其伙伴向乌克兰提供“爱国者”防空拦截弹。“美国人说不,”该消息人士说,“所以,我们就不觉得自己受任何限制约束了。”

In recent weeks, Zelensky has allowed himself a new degree of open disagreement with Trump. He called Trump’s diesel deal “not fair and not honest” and a birthday present for Putin. Later, he said that he felt betrayed, that it’s “painful when President Trump chooses one side, not our side,” and that Trump was putting himself on the wrong side of history. But, for all of the bubbling animus between Zelensky and Trump, the U.S. remains the only player with the diplomatic reach and leverage to wrangle the relevant parties and broker a deal. “It turns out that the U.S. is replaceable to a large extent when it comes to money and weapons,” Jarábik said. “But not in terms of diplomacy and big strategic questions.” Last month, the Finnish President, Alexander Stubb, and the Norwegian Prime Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, tried to break this dynamic, placing a joint call to Putin, the first contact between Putin and a European head of state in more than a year.

最近几周,泽连斯基开始允许自己对特朗普表现出一种新的公开分歧。他称特朗普的柴油协议“不公平也不诚实”,是送给普京的生日礼物。后来,他说自己感到被背叛了,“当特朗普总统选择了一方,而不是我们这一方时,这令人痛心”,还说特朗普正把自己置于历史错误的一边。然而,尽管泽连斯基与特朗普之间敌意翻涌,美国仍然是唯一一个拥有外交触角和杠杆、能够把相关各方拉到一起并促成协议的角色。“事实证明,在资金和武器方面,美国在很大程度上是可以被替代的,”亚拉比克说,“但在外交和重大战略问题上并非如此。”上个月,芬兰总统亚历山大·斯图布和挪威首相约纳斯·加尔·斯特勒试图打破这一格局,联合致电普京,这是普京与欧洲国家元首一年多来的首次接触。

On November 5th, while hosting Kirill Dmitriev, the head of Russia’s sovereign wealth fund, at the White House, Trump said that a “big, beautiful agreement” could be close and suggested that it might involve not only Ukraine but “all of Europe.” That same day, Kushner announced a new framework for negotiations that would provide “practical arrangements that address the security concerns of all sides.” Such a notion may prove attractive to Moscow, depending on how serious the U.S. is about Kushner’s pledge that “no country would have a veto over another’s sovereign choices” and that “NATO will remain central to European collective defense.”

11月5日,特朗普在白宫接待俄罗斯主权财富基金负责人基里尔·德米特里耶夫时表示,一份“重大而美好的协议”可能已近在眼前,并暗示它不仅涉及乌克兰,还可能涉及“整个欧洲”。同一天,库什纳宣布了一个新的谈判框架,将提供“回应各方安全关切的务实安排”。这一构想对莫斯科而言可能具有吸引力,取决于美国对库什纳承诺的认真程度——“任何国家都不得对另一国的主权选择拥有否决权”,“北约仍将是欧洲集体防御的核心”。

Ultimately, all sides remain at odds: Ukraine wants a ceasefire first, followed by negotiations over a larger settlement; Russia wants to silence the guns only once its fundamental demands have been met; and Trump wants something fast—an end to the war that doesn’t address its core causes. Europe remains divided. Among E.U. members, the Stubb-Støre call drew as much skepticism and criticism as support, and European governments have yet to agree on who should represent them in negotiations, let alone what their common red lines should be.

归根结底,各方立场依然对立:乌克兰希望先停火,再就更大的解决方案进行谈判;俄罗斯希望在根本诉求得到满足之后才让枪炮沉寂;而特朗普想要的是快——一场不触及战争核心根源的结束。欧洲仍然分裂。在欧盟成员国中,斯图布与斯特勒的那通电话引发的怀疑和批评与支持一样多,欧洲各国政府尚未就由谁代表他们参与谈判达成一致,更不用说确定他们共同的红线是什么了。

In the meantime, a terrible winter awaits Ukraine. On November 2nd, in the Zaporizhzhia region, Russian glide bombs struck a school being used to distribute humanitarian aid to civilians, killing more than fifty people. This month has also seen Russia’s largest attack of the year on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. In Kyiv, residents have faced electricity blackouts lasting up to sixteen hours a day and more than twenty-four hours without running water. “Given the intensity of the enemy’s devastating attacks, without air-defense systems protecting key facilities, their restoration, stable operation, and very existence are seriously in doubt,” Kyiv’s mayor, Vitali Klitschko, said. The grim paradox persists: Putin has little reason to abandon diplomacy and even less incentive to stop fighting. He can pursue a settlement on his own terms while counting on continued misery to make his argument for him. ♦

与此同时,一个可怕的冬天正等待着乌克兰。11月2日,在扎波罗热地区,俄罗斯滑翔炸弹击中了一所正用于向平民分发人道主义援助的学校,造成五十多人死亡。本月还发生了俄罗斯今年对乌克兰能源基础设施规模最大的一次袭击。在基辅,居民面临每天长达十六小时的停电,以及超过二十四小时的停水。“鉴于敌人毁灭性打击的强度,如果没有防空系统保护关键设施,它们的修复、稳定运行乃至存在本身都面临严重疑问,”基辅市长维塔利·克利奇科说。残酷的悖论仍在延续:普京几乎没有理由放弃外交,更没有动力停止战斗。他可以按自己的条件寻求解决方案,同时指望持续的苦难替他说话。 ♦

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