Q. & A.

Why Israel Is Attacking Lebanon

以色列为何袭击黎巴嫩
Hezbollah, Iran, and Israel helped fuel a disastrous political crisis in Lebanon. Now the Netanyahu government is using it to justify a larger conflict.
真主党、伊朗和以色列共同加剧了黎巴嫩灾难性的政治危机。如今,内塔尼亚胡政府正以此为借口,试图将冲突推向更危险的境地。
A person walking through a bombed street.
Photograph by Diego Ibarra Sanchez / NYT / Redux

Soon after the United States and Israel attacked Iran, Hezbollah—a paramilitary group and a political party that wields tremendous power in Lebanon, and is an Iranian proxy—struck back, firing missiles at Israel. Israel retaliated with strikes and a “limited” ground invasion of southern Lebanon. Even though the Iranian front of the war has received significantly more attention in the global press, the reality on the ground in Lebanon is staggering: the Israeli attacks have already killed more than a thousand people, and displaced upward of a million, in a country of some five million. The displacement orders affected more than fourteen per cent of the country. And many Lebanese are concerned that Israel intends to eventually redraw the border between the two countries.

美国和以色列袭击伊朗后不久,真主党——一个在黎巴嫩拥有巨大影响力的准军事组织和政党,也是伊朗的代理人——立即予以回击,向以色列发射导弹。以色列则以空袭和“有限”地面入侵黎巴嫩南部作为报复。尽管这场战争的伊朗战线在全球媒体中获得了更多关注,但黎巴嫩境内的实际情况却令人震惊:在这个约五百万人口的国家,以色列的袭击已造成逾千人死亡,超过一百万人流离失所。撤离令影响了全国超过14%的人口。许多黎巴嫩人担心,以色列最终意图重新划定两国边界。

To better understand this part of the widening Middle East conflict, I recently spoke by phone with Maha Yahya, the director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Middle East Center, who lives in Lebanon and was in Beirut when we talked. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed the roots of Lebanon’s long political crisis, how Israel’s war in Gaza changed Lebanese society, and what Israel really hopes to achieve with its bombing campaign in Lebanon.

为了更好地理解中东冲突扩大的这一部分,我最近通过电话采访了卡内基国际和平研究院中东中心主任玛哈·叶海亚(Maha Yahya)。她居住在黎巴嫩,我们通话时她正在贝鲁特。我们的对话经过编辑,以精简篇幅、确保清晰。我们探讨了黎巴嫩长期政治危机的根源、以色列在加沙的战争如何改变了黎巴嫩社会,以及以色列对黎巴嫩的轰炸行动究竟希望达成什么目标。

Can you describe the political situation in Lebanon leading up to the October 7th attacks? Because the period after that is when Israel has been especially aggressive in Lebanon, at least in recent years.

你能描述一下在10月7日袭击之前黎巴嫩的政治局势吗?因为在那之后,至少近年来,以色列在黎巴嫩的行动变得尤为激进。

God, it feels like a lifetime ago, honestly. I think the situation prior to October 7th was pretty much status quo, both internally, within the country, but also in the country’s relationship with Israel. The last war between Israel and Lebanon was in 2006. The cessation of hostilities, or ceasefire, that was put in place at the end of that conflict was holding. There was very little interaction along the border. In 2022, an agreement was struck between Lebanon and Israel to finalize the delineation of our maritime borders. And, as for the land borders, some of the disputed points had been resolved.

说实话,感觉像是上辈子的事了。我认为在10月7日之前,局势基本维持现状,无论是国内还是与以色列的关系。以色列和黎巴嫩之间的上一次战争是在2006年。那场冲突结束时达成的敌对行动停止或停火协议一直有效。边境沿线几乎没有互动。2022年,黎巴嫩和以色列达成协议,最终确定了我们的海上边界。至于陆地边界,一些争议点已经得到解决。

Internally, in Lebanon, there was a power struggle between the various political parties. Hezbollah still had quite a bit of political power. They were the central political power, in many ways. And then you had the Lebanese government forces on the other side, who were basically the heads of various militias during the Lebanese civil war who had simply moved from the street into government at the end of hostilities, in 1989. There had been growing resentment of that political class within Lebanon, especially after a series of protest movements in 2019, when the country seemed to be facing economic collapse. And the protests were about how grossly the country was being mismanaged, but also that a majority of Lebanese people, across all sectarian groups, were fed up.

在黎巴嫩国内,各政党之间存在着权力斗争。真主党仍然拥有相当大的政治权力。在许多方面,他们是核心政治力量。而另一边则是黎巴嫩政府军,他们基本上都是黎巴嫩内战期间各民兵组织的头目,在1989年战争结束后,这些人直接从街头走进了政府。黎巴嫩国内对这个政治阶层的怨恨日益增长,尤其是在2019年一系列抗议运动之后——当时该国似乎正面临经济崩溃。抗议的焦点在于国家管理严重不善,同时也反映出绝大多数黎巴嫩人,无论属于哪个教派群体,都已忍无可忍。

So that movement against Lebanon’s political status quo had quite a bit of momentum, but it was derailed. One of the reasons why it was derailed was something that took a lot of us by surprise but shouldn’t have, which was how fast Hezbollah came to the fore to defend the system. It derailed the protest movement within weeks. I remember those protests as such a moment of hope. People were energized like I’ve never seen before.

因此,这场反对黎巴嫩政治现状的运动曾势头强劲,但最终偏离了轨道。偏离的原因之一出乎许多人的意料,但本不该如此——那就是真主党(Hezbollah)迅速走上前台捍卫现有体制。短短几周内,抗议运动就被瓦解了。我至今记得那些抗议活动曾是多么充满希望的时刻。人们展现出的能量是我前所未见的。

Did Hezbollah dislike the protest movement because the fractured nature of Lebanese politics gave them a way of wielding de-facto power?

真主党之所以反感抗议运动,是否因为黎巴嫩政治的碎片化格局,恰恰为他们提供了掌握实际权力的途径?

It was that—the extent to which they were invested in the system as is. The division of power between six political leaders from different sectarian backgrounds gave them outsized political power. Of course, the arms also gave them power within that system. So, on the one hand, part of Hezbollah’s discourse is a commitment to anti-corruption, et cetera. None of this has ever happened, and at the same time they were very invested in making sure that the demonstrations quickly diminished. And then COVID came, and then the catastrophic Beirut port explosion that derailed the process as well.

关键在于——他们已深深嵌入现行体制。六位来自不同教派背景的政治领袖分享权力,这赋予了他们超乎寻常的政治影响力。当然,武装力量也巩固了他们在体制内的地位。因此,真主党一方面在话语中承诺反腐等等,但这些从未实现;另一方面,他们又极力确保抗议浪潮迅速消退。随后新冠疫情爆发,紧接着贝鲁特港发生灾难性大爆炸,彻底打乱了这一进程。

So how would you describe the period from October 7th until early March of this year? What changed?

那么,你会如何描述从去年10月7日到今年3月初的这段时间?发生了什么变化?

In the immediate aftermath of October 7th, Hezbollah made the decision to support Gaza by waging a low-intensity conflict on Israel’s northern borders. That opened the door for Israel. And I think this is where Hezbollah completely misread the situation. I don’t think many of us, frankly, understood the extent to which that created a shock within the system in Israel and within a society that already was veering to the right. So we saw an escalation. Israel was hitting deeper into Lebanon. And there were assassinations. And the response from Hezbollah was, We will respond at the time of our own choosing. They thought that, by maintaining a measured response to what Israel was doing, they could stave off a broader attack. But that did not work. And we saw that it did not work in September, 2024, when Hassan Nasrallah was assassinated, and there were these pager attacks on Hezbollah officials. This was interesting logistically, but it was also a terror operation. When you have pagers going off in public markets, in supermarkets, in pediatric offices, with children holding these pagers, the danger to civilians is quite significant.

10月7日事件发生后,真主党立即决定通过在以色列北部边境发动低强度冲突来支持加沙。这为以色列打开了大门。我认为这正是真主党完全误判局势之处。坦率地说,我认为我们许多人都没有充分理解,这在以色列体制内部以及这个本已右倾的社会中造成了何等程度的冲击。于是我们看到局势升级。以色列对黎巴嫩的打击日益深入。刺杀行动接连发生。而真主党的回应是:我们将在自己选择的时间作出回应。他们以为,通过对以色列的行动保持克制反应,就能避免更广泛的攻击。但这并未奏效。我们看到它在2024年9月失效了——哈桑·纳斯鲁拉遇刺身亡,真主党官员的寻呼机遭到攻击。从行动部署角度看这很有趣,但这也是一次恐怖行动。当寻呼机在公共市场、超市、儿科诊所爆炸,孩子们拿着这些寻呼机时,对平民构成的危险是相当严重的。

You also have other countries, led by the United States, pressuring the central government of Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah. Did that not happen because of a lack of will on the part of the central government, or because it did not have the power to do so?

还有以美国为首的其他国家,向黎巴嫩中央政府施压,要求其解除真主党的武装。之所以没有发生这种情况,是因为中央政府缺乏意愿,还是因为它没有能力这样做?

In terms of the relationship between Hezbollah and the central government, it was a very, very tenuous one, particularly after Nasrallah made the decision to join the fray and attack Israel, and then immediately afterward we had the war, which was followed by a cessation of hostilities, during which Hezbollah asked the speaker of parliament and the central government to basically negotiate with Israel on their behalf. And we ended up with a cessation of hostilities that was not to Hezbollah’s advantage. And, by then, Hezbollah really had been significantly weakened.

就真主党与中央政府的关系而言,这种关系非常、非常脆弱,尤其是在纳斯鲁拉决定加入战局并袭击以色列之后。紧接着战争爆发,随后是敌对行动的停止。在此期间,真主党要求议会议长和中央政府代表他们与以色列进行谈判。最终达成的停火协议对真主党不利。而到那时,真主党确实已被显著削弱。

What we do know is that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (I.R.G.C.), by then, had gone from being macromanagers to something else. They had been involved at the macro level in managing Hezbollah. There was an I.R.G.C. member on the seven-member Shura Council of Hezbollah. After Nasrallah was killed, and the war had started, I.R.G.C. members were on the ground and helping lead the battles, if you like. And over the past year, they’ve been helping reformulate and reorganize the military arm of Hezbollah.

我们所知道的是,伊朗的伊斯兰革命卫队(I.R.G.C.)在那时已从宏观管理者转变为另一种角色。他们曾在宏观层面参与管理真主党——真主党七人舒拉委员会中曾有一名革命卫队成员。在纳斯鲁拉遇害、战争爆发后,革命卫队成员更是亲临前线,可以说是在协助指挥作战。而过去一年来,他们一直在帮助真主党重整军事力量,调整其军事架构。

So, Hezbollah’s weakening by Israel led to more direct Iranian control?

那么,真主党被以色列削弱,是否导致了伊朗对其更直接的控制?

Yes, they became a lot more hands-on with Hezbollah’s military operations. But then there were elections. And, in early 2025, we had a new President, and then there was the selection of a new Prime Minister and the new government. And this was a turning point. You had the election of a former Army chief as President, and then a Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, who is not from the traditional political élite. His family is well known. It’s a traditional political family, but he himself worked outside Lebanon as the president of the International Court of Justice, and comes from a legal background, and doesn’t have any business dealings with any of the political parties here.

是的,他们对真主党军事行动的介入程度确实大幅加深。但随后选举来临。2025年初,我们迎来了新总统,接着是新总理人选确定与新政府组建。这成为一个转折点——前陆军总司令当选总统,随后出任总理的纳瓦夫·萨拉姆(Nawaf Salam)并非来自传统政治精英阶层。他的家族固然显赫,属于传统政治世家,但他本人长期在黎巴嫩境外工作,曾任国际法院院长,拥有法律专业背景,与国内任何政党都没有商业往来。

In terms of Hezbollah, there was international pressure, but there was also domestic pressure. People assume that the demand for the state to mobilize and to take full authority over arms in the country from Hezbollah is simply an international request. It’s not. That desire has been building up within Lebanon among very different population groups, including the other political parties. Hezbollah, for the longest time, was strong-arming other parties, and they are accused of assassinating a former Prime Minister. And there was one other thing: on December 8, 2024, Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell, and control of Syria changed hands. That also undermined Hezbollah significantly because the route via Syria for Iran to send weapons was no longer there or had become a lot more difficult to use. Iran had to pull out of Syria, having invested billions of dollars there.

就真主党而言,国际压力固然存在,但国内压力同样不容忽视。人们往往以为,要求国家动员起来、从真主党手中收回对全国武装力量的完全控制权,仅仅是国际社会的要求。事实并非如此。这种诉求在黎巴嫩国内不同群体中——包括其他政党——早已酝酿多时。长期以来,真主党一直对其他政党实施高压手段,更被指控暗杀前总理。还有另一关键转折:2024年12月8日,巴沙尔·阿萨德政权垮台,叙利亚控制权易主。这同样重创了真主党——伊朗经由叙利亚输送武器的通道就此中断,或至少变得极难使用。伊朗不得不从叙利亚撤出,尽管已在那里投入了数十亿美元。

So pressure against Hezbollah was growing internally and externally, and the government did things that were not well enough appreciated. There is a very delicate balance within Lebanon. You’ve got eighteen officially recognized sectarian communities, and most of the political parties represent these communities directly. But there was a seismic shift in the mind-set and in the approach of the Lebanese government toward Hezbollah. It was very clear in the decision of the cabinet to declare a state monopoly over arms on August 5, 2025.

真主党面临的内外压力与日俱增,而黎巴嫩政府采取的措施并未获得足够认可。这个国家内部存在着极其微妙的平衡——官方承认的教派社群多达十八个,多数政党都直接代表这些群体发声。但黎巴嫩政府对真主党的态度与策略发生了根本性转变,2025年8月5日内阁宣布国家对武器实行垄断的决定,便是最清晰的信号。

And then, in September, the Army chief made a plan to clear out all Hezbollah arms from south of the Litani River. That was phase one, and it was verified internationally. The Army had operational control south of the Litani. Further proof is that, if you look at the location of the rockets that are going to Israel now, most of them, very few are coming from south of the Litani.

随后在9月,陆军总司令制定了一项计划,要将真主党的所有武器清除出利塔尼河以南地区。这是第一阶段,并得到了国际核查。陆军在利塔尼河以南拥有作战控制权。进一步的证据是,如果你看看现在射向以色列的火箭弹的位置,其中绝大多数——只有极少数——来自利塔尼河以南。

The criticism was that the Army was not moving fast enough. They should have been a lot more aggressive. There were requests from Israel. And the government’s response was, Look, Lebanon is doing what it can. You need to show that diplomacy works. You’re occupying five points in Lebanon. Why don’t you withdraw from one? Why don’t you declare a unilateral cessation of hostilities for a period of twenty days?

批评的声音认为,以军行动不够迅速。他们本应采取更强势的推进态势。以色列方面也提出了相关要求。而政府的回应是:听着,黎巴嫩已在尽其所能。你们需要证明外交手段是有效的。你们现在占据着黎巴嫩境内的五个据点,何不先撤出一处?何不单方面宣布停火二十天?

Because let’s not forget that, since the ceasefire in November, 2024, until just before this war started, the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon was unilateral. Israel was continuing its bombing campaigns targeting members of Hezbollah, but many Lebanese civilians’ lives were also lost in the process. And that’s part of the logic that Hezbollah is using today, saying, Look, we didn’t respond to Israel’s attacks for a year and a half. And now we’re in a position where we knew that they were preparing to attack us, so we preëmpted it.

我们不应忘记,自2024年11月停火以来,直到这场战争爆发前夕,以色列与黎巴嫩之间的停火始终是单方面的。以色列持续针对真主党成员实施轰炸行动,但在此过程中许多黎巴嫩平民也失去了生命。这正是真主党当前行动逻辑的一部分——他们宣称:看吧,过去一年半里我们从未回应以色列的袭击。而当我们意识到他们正准备攻击我们时,我们选择了先发制人。

But I still think the Hezbollah decision to launch rockets after the Iran war started was foolish, and it dragged the country into a genuine abyss.

但我仍然认为,真主党在伊朗战争爆发后决定发射火箭弹是愚蠢之举,这无异于将整个国家拖入了真正的深渊。

Hezbollah started firing rockets after the attack on Iran began, and it seems Israel was probably planning to use this as a pretext to start this massive campaign in Lebanon. What have you been able to tell from Israel’s choice of targets so far about what they may be trying to accomplish here?

真主党在伊朗遇袭后开始发射火箭弹,以色列似乎正打算以此为借口,在黎巴嫩发动大规模军事行动。从以色列迄今选择的打击目标来看,您认为他们可能试图达成什么目标?

I think, frankly, if Israel were interested in weakening Hezbollah further, they would have engaged diplomatically with the government. There were plenty of offers before all of this started. This could have been avoided because the Lebanese government had made a commitment that, should any rockets be fired by Hezbollah, the Army would apprehend and stop it. But Israel started responding immediately. So this was prepared. Israel was intending to come in. We’d been hearing about this for ages, that they were preparing for a ground invasion. There’s an element of targeted punishment of the Shia community, because it’s mostly their areas that are being hit by Israel for having supported or elected Hezbollah. But I can tell you that, when the war started, there was significant anger at Hezbollah for dragging us into this, but now some are rallying back around them, partly because of the brutality of the bombardment.

坦率地说,我认为如果以色列真的有意进一步削弱真主党,他们本可以通过外交途径与黎巴嫩政府接触。在这一切开始之前,曾有过许多提议。这场冲突本可避免,因为黎巴嫩政府曾承诺,若真主党发射火箭弹,黎军将予以制止。但以色列立即作出了回应。这说明他们早有准备。以色列本就打算入侵。我们早就听说他们在为地面进攻做准备。这其中存在针对什叶派社区的定向惩罚成分,因为遭受以色列打击的主要是那些支持或选举真主党的地区。但我可以告诉你,战争开始时,许多人对真主党将我们拖入战火感到愤怒,但现在部分人又重新团结在他们周围,部分原因是轰炸的残酷性。

Many people are not happy with Hezbollah, but they feel that now is not the time to criticize.

许多人对真主党心怀不满,但他们觉得现在不是批评的时候。

Do you have faith that the Lebanese government would’ve acted against Hezbollah if Israel hadn’t attacked so quickly?

你是否相信,如果以色列没有如此迅速地发动攻击,黎巴嫩政府本会采取行动打击真主党?

I think the Army would’ve gone after those who fired at Israel. Definitely. The political will to prevent Hezbollah from attacking Israel is there. The next steps are a lot more challenging. Disarming and decommissioning Hezbollah requires a very strong army to be able to go in and find weapons depots and arrest people. To do that in a country where the sectarian balance is very delicate, you need to have at least one part of the Shia community politically supporting you. And what is very interesting for me is, when the government, after Hezbollah opened this front, held an emergency meeting, the Council of Ministers made the decision to consider Hezbollah’s military activities illegal and therefore prosecutable by law, to stop the visa-free arrangements between Lebanon and Iran, and to expel any I.R.G.C. members that are found in the country. That’s a seismic shift in the mentality. These are things we never thought we would see happen in a country like Lebanon, because going after Hezbollah, an armed group that represents at least part of the Shia community, could trigger civil strife. But three of the five Shia ministers did not protest this decision. The President has also offered direct talks with Israel.

我认为黎巴嫩军队本应追捕那些向以色列开火的人。毫无疑问。阻止真主党袭击以色列的政治意愿是存在的。但接下来的步骤要困难得多。解除真主党武装并使其非军事化,需要一支非常强大的军队才能进入并找到武器库、逮捕相关人员。在一个教派平衡极其微妙的国家执行这样的任务,至少需要什叶派社群中有一部分人在政治上支持你。令我感到非常有趣的是,在真主党开辟这条战线后,黎巴嫩政府召开了紧急会议,部长会议决定将真主党的军事活动视为非法并依法追究,停止黎巴嫩与伊朗之间的免签安排,并驱逐任何在黎巴嫩境内发现的伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队成员。这是思维方式的重大转变。这些是我们从未想过会在黎巴嫩这样的国家发生的事情,因为追捕真主党——这个至少代表部分什叶派社群的武装组织——可能引发内乱。但五位什叶派部长中有三位并未反对这项决定。总统也已提出与以色列直接对话。

The Israelis have said no, correct?

以色列方面已经拒绝了,对吗?

Yeah, I don’t think Iran or Israel wants to stop the war in Lebanon.

是啊,我觉得伊朗和以色列都不希望黎巴嫩的战火停歇。

So, just to go back, then, to my question from before, what is it that you think Israel’s trying to accomplish here? And can you tell anything about their aims from the targets they’ve chosen to hit?

那么,回到我之前的问题:你认为以色列在此试图达成什么目标?从他们选择的打击目标中,你能看出他们的意图吗?

I think they’re trying to do a number of things. One, as I said, is a collective punishment for the Shia community. And we see this in many of the areas that are being targeted, because some of them include blanket-bombing the southern suburbs of Beirut. These are residential buildings. It’s not like the entire southern suburbs is one big arms depot. So many of these areas that are being targeted are really about broader collective punishment.

我认为他们试图达成多重目的。其一,正如我所说,是对什叶派社群的集体惩罚。从许多遭袭区域就能看出端倪——比如贝鲁特南郊遭受的无差别轰炸,那里都是居民楼,整片南郊并非巨型军火库。因此这些被袭击的区域,本质上都指向更广泛的集体惩罚。

The second thing they’re trying to do is spread a sense of fear and paranoia, which they’re succeeding at in Lebanon. By directly targeting individuals, especially when they’re in apartment buildings and in hotels, you place a bull’s-eye on every member of the Shia community. People are scared to take them in. There’s a lot of concern about having displaced people around you. It’s really an environment of paranoia and fear that we saw glimpses of in 2024. The Lebanese, as you know, I mean, they’re very hospitable when there’s a problem—they all jump in. When I think back to 2006, N.G.O.s opened their doors. Everyone was trying to help. This time, it’s a lot more muted.

他们试图做的第二件事是散布恐惧和偏执情绪,在黎巴嫩,他们成功了。通过直接针对个人,尤其是当他们身处公寓楼和酒店时,你就给什叶派社区的每个成员都贴上了靶心。人们害怕收留他们。对于身边有流离失所者,人们有很多担忧。这确实是一种偏执和恐惧的环境,我们在2024年已经瞥见了这种苗头。你知道,黎巴嫩人非常热情好客,遇到问题时——他们都会挺身而出。回想2006年,非政府组织敞开了大门。每个人都试图提供帮助。但这一次,情况要沉默得多。

And then the third thing is, now it looks like Israel is looking to occupy a very large part of south Lebanon. It’s not just to the Litani. We have to wait and see where this is going to end. Will they ultimately withdraw back to the border, or are they trying to renegotiate everything again? Because you had the minister of energy in Israel two days ago say, We should reconsider the maritime borders as well, the ones that were agreed to. Are they trying to maintain what they call a buffer zone, and I call occupied Lebanese territory, where you already have thirty-seven villages that have been completely vaporized, and therefore no one would be able to go back? So it’s just not clear to me where the Israeli government wants to go with this. They must want to negotiate from a position of strength, but they already have that. They have complete control over our skies.

第三点是,现在看来以色列似乎打算占领黎巴嫩南部的大片区域。其目标不仅限于利塔尼河。我们还得静观事态发展。他们最终会撤回边境线内,还是想重新谈判所有问题?因为两天前以色列能源部长公开表示,我们也应该重新考虑已经达成协议的海上边界。他们是否试图维持所谓的“缓冲区”——我称之为被占领的黎巴嫩领土——那里已有三十七个村庄被彻底夷平,导致居民无法返乡?因此我实在不清楚以色列政府究竟意欲何为。他们必然想以强势地位进行谈判,但这一优势他们早已掌握——我们的领空完全处于他们的控制之下。

But this mass expulsion of people will create tensions within Lebanon. Already, there are many tensions on the ground, and it’s going to create even greater tensions down the road. And this is why, again, the Army’s being very careful in trying to demobilize or decommission certain areas, because you can trigger these tensions at any moment.

但如此大规模的人口驱逐将在黎巴嫩内部引发紧张局势。当地已然存在诸多矛盾,未来势必催生更剧烈的冲突。正因如此,黎巴嫩军队正审慎推进特定区域的非军事化或裁撤工作——任何细微动作都可能瞬间引爆这些潜藏的危机。

No problem if you don’t feel like answering this question, but what has life been like for you recently?

如果你不想回答这个问题也没关系,不过最近你的生活过得怎么样?

Look, it’s been exhausting. It’s emotionally . . . It’s very difficult, partly because you’re seeing your country being ripped apart, and there’s a sense of helplessness. I’m in a domain where we’re supposed to be looking for creative solutions and off-ramps and thinking of all of this, but it’s very difficult to see an off-ramp in this environment, where we’re just on an escalatory path on the way to nowhere. This country is literally trapped. You have Israel on one side, Iran on the other. So, for me, it’s been very, very difficult to see all of this play out, and then you have to do stuff while you are being professional, unemotional. It’s very hard. And there’s the personal side also, where, I mean, my father’s buried in an area that I no longer can go to. So there’s a sense of . . . I get emotional about this because I’m having a hard time processing this. ♦

说实话,这太令人疲惫了。情感上……非常艰难,部分原因是眼看着自己的国家被撕裂,却有种无力感。我所在的领域本该寻求创造性的解决方案、寻找出路、思考这一切,但在当前环境下,很难看到任何出路——我们就像踏上了不断升级的自动扶梯,却不知通往何方。这个国家确实被困住了。一边是以色列,另一边是伊朗。所以,对我来说,目睹这一切上演已经非常非常艰难,而你还要在保持专业、不动感情的状态下继续工作。这太难了。还有个人层面的问题——我父亲安葬的那片土地,我已经无法再踏足。所以有种……我情绪有些激动,因为我实在难以消化这一切。♦

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