The Lede

Why Have Liberals Abandoned a Moral Reading of the Constitution?

自由派为何抛弃了对宪法的道德解读?
From slavery to abortion, conservatives and liberals alike have reached for “natural law” to resolve many of the country’s most important cases. But, in recent years, the balance has shifted.
从奴隶制到堕胎,保守派与自由派都曾诉诸“自然法”来解决美国许多最重要的案件。但近年来,天平发生了倾斜。
Illustration of a gavel and dove.
Illustration by Matt Chase

What is law and where does it come from? Several years ago at Harvard Law School, where I am a professor, L.G.B.T.Q. student groups reported that, at an event that hundreds of students attended, a student made “patently homophobic and transphobic comments rooted in ‘natural law.’ ” The organizations published a statement demanding that the school treat the incident as misconduct or hate speech, explaining that “the antiquated and parochial belief in a so-called ‘naturally ordered society’ has long been used to justify and allow the deprivation of certain groups from access to meaningful human experiences and participation in public life.” It then dawned on me that, among a swath of our country’s future lawyers, endorsement of “natural law” was viewed as a form of hate. How had we managed to so narrow and antagonize a concept that had underwritten our country’s most important rights to equality and liberty?

法律是什么,它又源自何处?几年前,在我任教的哈佛法学院,L.G.B.T.Q.学生团体报告称,在一次有数百名学生参加的活动中,一名学生发表了“根植于‘自然法’的公然恐同和恐跨性别言论”。这些组织发表声明,要求学校将此事件视为不当行为或仇恨言论,并解释说,“那种对所谓‘自然有序社会’的陈旧狭隘信念,长期以来一直被用来正当化并纵容对特定群体获取有意义人生体验和参与公共生活的剥夺。”那一刻我忽然意识到,在我们国家相当一部分未来的律师眼中,对“自然法”的认同已被视为一种仇恨。我们究竟是如何将一个曾支撑起我国最重要的平等与自由权利的概念,变得如此狭隘且令人反感的?

The Declaration of Independence presupposes a notion of divinity; it asserts that the point of government is to secure rights ordained by “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.” The oft-recited passage “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” was the premise for breaking with a government that became “destructive of these ends,” so that a new one might be formed, with consent of the governed, to implement these higher principles. The purpose of a man-made government was to enforce God-given rights.

《独立宣言》预设了一种神性观念;它断言,政府的宗旨在于保障“自然法则和自然之上帝”所赋予的权利。那段常被引用的名句——“我们认为这些真理是不言而喻的:人人生而平等,造物主赋予他们若干不可剥夺的权利,其中包括生命权、自由权和追求幸福的权利”——正是与一个变得“旨在摧毁这些目标”的政府决裂的前提,以便在得到被统治者同意的基础上,组建一个新政府来贯彻这些更高原则。人造政府的目的是执行上帝赋予的权利。

More than a decade later, the charter creating that new government lacked mention of natural law and God, stating that it is “We the People of the United States” who “do ordain and establish this Constitution.” Disagreement about whether the Constitution should be taken to presuppose the authority of natural law, or to displace it, emerged among early Supreme Court Justices. In the 1798 case Calder v. Bull, Justice Samuel Chase, a Declaration signer, said that any legislation violating “the great first principles of the social compact” would not be a law at all. Chase’s position was backed by a long tradition of natural justice, stretching to Aristotle’s advice to “appeal to the law of nature” if there was “no case according to the law of the land.” Justice James Iredell, however, rejected the notion that the Court could declare a law void “merely because it is in its judgment contrary to the principles of natural justice.” His concern was that “the ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard”—unlike the “precision” and “settled boundaries” of the written Constitution. Iredell’s position that courts could not use natural law to invalidate statutes was consonant with the philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s view that natural law was nonsense and an excuse “to rise up in arms against any law whatever that he happens not to like.” The Constitution’s language ruled out neither of those understandings. The Chase-versus-Iredell debate embodied an instability, from the beginning of the country, regarding the fundamental question of what law is, which has never been fully resolved.

十多年后,创建那个新政府的宪章却未提及自然法和上帝,而是声明“我们合众国人民”“特此制定并确立这部宪法”。关于宪法究竟应被理解为预设了自然法的权威,还是取代了它,早期最高法院大法官之间就出现了分歧。在1798年的“考尔德诉布尔案”中,《独立宣言》签署人之一、大法官塞缪尔·蔡斯(Samuel Chase)表示,任何违反“社会契约伟大首要原则”的立法,根本不能称之为法律。蔡斯的立场背后有着悠久的自然正义传统,可追溯至亚里士多德的建议:若“依国法无例可循”,则应“诉诸自然法”。然而,大法官詹姆斯·艾尔德尔(James Iredell)却反对法院可以“仅仅因为其判断认为某法律违背自然正义原则”就宣布其无效的观点。他担心的是,“自然正义的观念并无固定标准可循”——这与成文宪法的“精确性”和“既定边界”不同。艾尔德尔认为法院不能运用自然法来推翻制定法的立场,与哲学家杰里米·边沁(Jeremy Bentham)的观点一致,后者认为自然法纯属无稽之谈,不过是“对他碰巧不喜欢的任何法律,都可以揭竿而起”的借口。宪法的措辞并未排除上述任何一种理解。蔡斯与艾尔德尔之争,体现了自建国之初便存在的、关于“法律是什么”这一根本问题的不稳定性,而这个问题从未得到彻底解决。

Lon Fuller, a legal philosopher and a prominent proponent of a secular form of natural law, observed in 1948 that “for many the term ‘natural law’ still has about it a rich, deep odor of the witches’ caldron, and the mere mention of it suffices to unloose a torrent of emotions and fears.” That is still true today. For many liberals, those fears are provoked by an apprehension that “natural law” may be a way to justify homophobia, promote religious nationalism, or subordinate women. But liberals should have confidence in meeting those fears with arguments about natural-law principles of equality and dignity underpinning our legal tradition. The content of natural law has been contested throughout our history, but, over the long haul, liberals have fared well in reading the Constitution in light of the higher principles of fundamental justice. The semiquincentennial of our country is the perfect time for liberals to reclaim natural law and not cede it to their antagonists.

法律哲学家朗·富勒(Lon Fuller)是世俗化自然法的著名倡导者,他在1948年观察到,“对许多人来说,‘自然法’这个词仍带着一股女巫大锅里浓郁而深沉的气味,仅仅提及它,就足以引发汹涌的情绪和恐惧。”这话至今依然适用。对许多自由派而言,这些恐惧源于一种担忧,即“自然法”可能被用来为恐同正名、宣扬宗教民族主义或让女性处于从属地位。但自由派应有信心,用支撑我们法律传统的平等与尊严等自然法原则的论证,来应对这些恐惧。自然法的内涵在我国历史上一直存在争议,但从长远来看,自由派在依据根本正义的更高原则来解读宪法方面,表现相当出色。我国建国二百五十周年,正是自由派重拾自然法,而非将其拱手让给对手的最佳时机。

Whatever the most contested issue is in a particular time—slavery, segregation, miscegenation, gender equality, abortion, gay sex, same-sex marriage—the clash regarding natural law and positive law, or, to put it another way, our unwritten and written constitutions, has tended to resurface. It is a skeleton key to each era’s culture wars. The most unbearable clash was between the Declaration’s principle of equality and the Constitution’s provisions on slavery—the three-fifths clause, the fugitive-slave clause, and the slave-trade clause. The ubiquity of natural-law thinking soon led to both antislavery and pro-slavery arguments invoking it. In 1841, John Quincy Adams, a President turned congressman and Supreme Court advocate, appeared before the Court, seeking the freedom of people kidnapped from Africa who mutinied en route to America on the slave ship Amistad. Adams argued to the Justices, “I know of no other law that reaches the case of my clients, but the law of nature and of Nature’s God on which our fathers placed our own national existence”; the Court explicitly relied on natural law in deciding in favor of the captives.

无论特定时代最具争议的议题是什么——奴隶制、种族隔离、异族通婚、性别平等、堕胎、同性性行为、同性婚姻——关于自然法与实证法,或者换句话说,关于我们不成为文宪法与成文宪法的冲突,总会重新浮现。这是打开每个时代文化战争的一把万能钥匙。最令人无法忍受的冲突,发生在《独立宣言》的平等原则与宪法中关于奴隶制的条款——五分之三条款、逃奴条款和奴隶贸易条款——之间。自然法思想的盛行,很快导致蓄奴与废奴双方都援引它。1841年,曾任总统、后转为国会议员和最高法院出庭律师的约翰·昆西·亚当斯(John Quincy Adams)在最高法院出庭,为那些在从非洲被绑架、并在驶往美国的奴隶船“阿米斯塔德号”上起义的人们寻求自由。亚当斯向大法官们陈词:“据我所知,除了我们先辈赖以建立我们国家生存根基的自然法则和自然之上帝的法律外,没有其他法律能适用于我的当事人的案件”;最高法院在做出有利于这些被俘者的裁决时,明确依赖了自然法。

Defenders of slavery claimed that the institution was required by the natural hierarchy of humans reflected in the Constitution’s provisions. A wing of abolitionists, including Frederick Douglass, invoked the Declaration to assert that, properly interpreted in light of natural justice, the Constitution was really an antislavery document, notwithstanding its terrible compromises. Resistance to that reading animated the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, which concluded that the Constitution meant that Black men could not be citizens and that Congress could not disallow slavery in federal territories. The opinion pointed out that the Declaration’s signatories, most of whom enslaved people, would have been rank hypocrites had the document’s principle of equality included those whom they enslaved. Blasting the Court’s conclusions, Abraham Lincoln explained that the proposition that all men are created equal with God-given rights had been placed in the Declaration “for future use.” On the eve of the Civil War, Lincoln wrote that this principle was an “apple of gold” for which the Constitution, the “picture of silver” framing it, had been made, and not the other way around. His address at Gettysburg, in November, 1863, opening with “Four score and seven years ago,” referred not to the Constitution but to the Declaration.

奴隶制的辩护者声称,宪法条款所反映的人类自然等级秩序要求实行奴隶制。包括弗雷德里克·道格拉斯(Frederick Douglass)在内的一派废奴主义者则援引《独立宣言》主张,若依据自然正义正确解读,尽管宪法做出了可怕的妥协,它实质上仍是一部反奴隶制的文件。对这种解读的抵制,激发了最高法院在“德雷德·斯科特诉桑福德案”中的判决意见,该意见得出结论:宪法意味着黑人不能成为公民,国会也无权在联邦领土上禁止奴隶制。该意见指出,《独立宣言》的签署者大多蓄奴,如果该文件的平等原则涵盖了他们所奴役的人,那他们就是十足的伪君子。亚伯拉罕·林肯(Abraham Lincoln)抨击了法院的结论,并解释说,“人人生而平等,享有上帝赋予的权利”这一主张被写入《独立宣言》,是“留待将来之用”的。内战前夕,林肯写道,这项原则是一颗“金苹果”,而宪法则是为其打造的“银画框”,主次不能颠倒。1863年11月,他在葛底斯堡的演说以“八十七年前”开篇,所指的并非宪法,而是《独立宣言》。

One way of thinking about the post-Civil War amendments—which banned slavery, guaranteed equal protection of the laws, and prohibited denial of the vote based on race—is that they wrote into the Constitution the natural-law principles for which the war had been fought. But the written text did not halt passionate disagreement about what natural law required pertaining to racial equality. The Supreme Court, in Plessy v. Ferguson, upheld segregation, reasoning that, “in the nature of things,” the Fourteenth Amendment “could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based on color.” Advocates for and against women’s equality similarly argued in terms of natural law. The Seneca Falls declaration deemed all laws that place women in an inferior position to men “contrary to the great precept of nature.” But, in a case upholding the exclusion of women from the practice of law, an infamous concurring opinion by Justice Joseph Bradley (which law students might cite to condemn natural law) claimed that “nature herself” recognized “different spheres and destinies for man and woman.”

思考内战后修正案——它们废除了奴隶制,保障法律平等保护,并禁止基于种族剥夺投票权——的一种方式是,它们将内战为之奋斗的自然法原则写入了宪法。但成文文本并未阻止关于种族平等要求何种自然法的激烈争论。最高法院在“普莱西诉弗格森案”中维持了种族隔离,其理由是,“从事物的本性来看”,第十四修正案“不可能意在废除基于肤色的区别”。倡导和反对女性平等的人,同样以自然法为依据进行辩论。塞内卡福尔斯宣言宣称,所有将女性置于男性从属地位的法律,都“违背了自然的伟大法则”。但在一个支持禁止女性从事法律职业的案件中,大法官约瑟夫·布拉德利(Joseph Bradley)撰写了一份臭名昭著的协同意见书(法科学生可能会引用来谴责自然法),声称“自然本身”就承认了“男女不同的领域和命运”。

In his 2021 book, “The Decline of Natural Law,” the legal historian Stuart Banner observed that the recruitment of natural law by opposing sides on contentious social issues contributed to increasing doubt about its existence. By the early twentieth century, lawyers and judges considered natural law to be irrelevant to the legal system, and the language all but disappeared from legal arguments and decisions. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., bitingly mocked people’s belief in natural law as a “naïve state of mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be accepted by all men everywhere.” But the rise of totalitarianism and fascism in Europe in the nineteen-thirties, in constitution-bound states, provoked American lawyers to revisit the question of whether an unjust law was to be considered law at all. Many reflected, in particular, on the evil that Nazi Germany had accomplished through legalism. Lon Fuller argued, after the Second World War, that the Nazi regime’s violation of law’s “inner morality” had made it cease to be a true legal system.

法律史学家斯图尔特·班纳(Stuart Banner)在其2021年的著作《自然法的衰落》中指出,对立双方在有争议的社会议题上都援引自然法,这加剧了人们对其存在的怀疑。到二十世纪初,律师和法官们认为自然法与法律体系无关,这一语言几乎从法律论证和判决中消失了。小奥利弗·温德尔·霍姆斯(Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.)大法官辛辣地嘲讽人们对自然法的信仰是一种“天真的心态,将自己及邻人熟悉并接受的东西,当作普天之下所有人都必须接受的东西”。但二十世纪三十年代,极权主义和法西斯主义在那些有宪法的欧洲国家兴起,促使美国法律人重新审视一个问题:不公正的法律是否根本不应被视为法律?许多人特别反思了纳粹德国通过法律主义所成就的恶行。朗·富勒在二战后指出,纳粹政权因违反了法律“内在的道德性”,已使其不再是一个真正的法律体系。

When the Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board of Education, unanimously reversed Plessy, in 1954, it conspicuously avoided mentioning natural justice, higher principles, or moral values. Yet it admitted that Brown’s central holding, that “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal” and thus unconstitutional, did not flow from the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning. The same Congress had approved both the amendment’s text and the segregated schools of Washington, D.C. The civil-rights struggle was shot through with natural-law thinking, as Martin Luther King, Jr., made clear in his “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” He identified Thomas Aquinas as his source for the idea that “an unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law,” and that “a just law is a man made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God.”

1954年,当最高法院在“布朗诉教育委员会案”中一致推翻“普莱西案”时,它刻意避免提及自然正义、更高原则或道德价值。然而,它承认布朗案的核心判决——“隔离的教育设施本质上是不平等的”,因而违宪——并非源自第十四修正案的原始含义。批准该修正案文本的同一届国会,也批准了华盛顿特区的种族隔离学校。民权斗争充满了自然法思想,正如马丁·路德·金(Martin Luther King, Jr.)在《伯明翰监狱来信》中阐明的那样。他指出,托马斯·阿奎那(Thomas Aquinas)是他思想的来源,即“不公正的法律,是一种并非植根于永恒法和自然法的人定法”,而“公正的法律,则是一部与道德法或上帝之法相符的人造法典”。

As Congress passed landmark civil-rights legislation in the nineteen-sixties, the contest in the Supreme Court over natural law moved to concepts of autonomy and privacy. In 1965, the Court held, in Griswold v. Connecticut, that the application to married couples of a criminal ban on contraceptives was unconstitutional because of a fundamental right to privacy that was not laid out in specific words of constitutional text. Justice William O. Douglas, largely regarded as one of the most liberal Justices in history, wrote for the Court, which found the right in “penumbras, formed by emanations” from a number of Bill of Rights provisions. His fellow-liberal Justice Arthur Goldberg pointed to the Ninth Amendment, which provides that “the enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” Justice John Marshall Harlan II, a conservative, took a more moral-philosophical approach, saying that a law that “violates basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ ” violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s due-process clause. In an earlier case, Harlan had explained that “due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code.” The meaning of “liberty,” he wrote, “cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees.” The meaning of the Constitution, in his view, was found in its broader purposes, not its text.

随着国会在二十世纪六十年代通过具有里程碑意义的民权立法,最高法院内围绕自然法的争论转向了自主权和隐私权概念。1965年,法院在“格里斯沃尔德诉康涅狄格州案”中裁定,将避孕的刑事禁令适用于已婚夫妇是违宪的,因为存在一项基本隐私权,而该权利并未以具体文字载于宪法文本。大法官威廉·O·道格拉斯(William O. Douglas),被普遍认为是历史上最自由派的大法官之一,代表法院撰写了判决书,从多项《权利法案》条款的“半影,由放射形成”中找到了这项权利。他的自由派同僚、大法官阿瑟·戈德堡(Arthur Goldberg)则指向第九修正案,该修正案规定:“宪法对某些权利的列举,不得被解释为否认或贬损由人民保留的其他权利。”保守派大法官约翰·马歇尔·哈兰二世(John Marshall Harlan II)则采取了一种更偏向道德哲学的方法,称一部法律若“违反了‘有序自由概念中隐含的基本价值’”,即违反了第十四修正案的正当程序条款。在更早的一个案件中,哈兰曾解释说,“正当程序并未被简化为任何公式;其内容无法参照任何法典来确定。”他写道,“自由”的含义“不能从具体保障条款的精确措辞中找到,也不受其限制”。在他看来,宪法的含义存在于其更广泛的宗旨中,而非其文本。

In the Griswold majority, the splits among Justices about the legal basis for the right to privacy revealed how contested it was from the start. In a dissent, the liberal Justice Hugo Black, who had prefigured modern originalism by several decades by championing plain text and original intent, rebuked his colleagues for relying on a “mysterious and uncertain natural law concept”—much as Justice Iredell had critiqued Justice Chase in the eighteenth century. But the right to privacy flourished. Justice Harlan’s approach to substantive due process became the foundation for Roe v. Wade, which declared that, although “the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy,” the right in the Fourteenth Amendment was “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”

在“格里斯沃尔德案”的多数意见中,大法官们对隐私权法律基础的分歧,揭示了它从一开始就充满争议。在一份反对意见中,自由派大法官雨果·布莱克(Hugo Black)——他比现代原旨主义早了几十年,就倡导简明文本和原初意图——斥责他的同僚们依赖一个“神秘莫测的自然法概念”——这与十八世纪艾尔德尔大法官批评蔡斯大法官的情形如出一辙。但隐私权蓬勃发展。哈兰大法官关于实体性正当程序的方法,成为“罗伊诉韦德案”的基础,该案宣布,尽管“宪法没有明确提及任何隐私权”,但第十四修正案中的权利“范围足够宽泛,足以涵盖妇女决定是否终止妊娠的权利”。

The conservative legal movement’s reaction to the fundamental-rights decisions of the sixties and seventies was to cry foul—accusing the Court of declaring those rights to be based on judges’ moral values rather than a neutral and fair reading of law. The concern was not limited to conservatives. One of the most important liberal constitutional scholars, John Hart Ely, who was pro-choice, called Roe “a very bad decision” because “it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be”—a line that became useful fodder for Justice Samuel Alito in overruling Roe, in 2022.

保守派法律运动对六七十年代基本权利判决的反应是大声指责犯规——指控法院宣布这些权利是基于法官的道德价值观,而非对法律的中立公正解读。这种担忧并不限于保守派。最重要的自由派宪法学者之一约翰·哈特·伊利(John Hart Ely)是支持堕胎选择权的,他称“罗伊案”是“一个非常糟糕的判决”,因为“它不是宪法法律,而且几乎让人感觉不到有任何试图成为宪法法律的义务”——这句话后来成为大法官塞缪尔·阿利托(Samuel Alito)在2022年推翻“罗伊案”时的有用素材。

During his 1991 confirmation hearings, Clarence Thomas—who had trained for the Catholic priesthood and praised the use of natural law to support a fetal right to life—told the Senate Judiciary Committee that he did not “see a role for the use of natural law in constitutional adjudication.” Senator Joseph Biden, the Democratic chair of the committee, and also a Catholic, said the quiet part out loud, stating approvingly that the Supreme Court’s due-process cases protecting rights to contraception and interracial marriage were natural law. Those cases exemplified what the liberal legal theorist Ronald Dworkin defended as a “moral reading of the Constitution.” Though natural law was considered a “particularly dreaded” label, Dworkin wrote, he admitted that if “any theory which makes the content of law sometimes depend on the correct answer to some moral question is a natural law theory, then I am guilty of natural law.”

在1991年的确认听证会上,克拉伦斯·托马斯(Clarence Thomas)——他曾受训成为天主教神父,并赞扬运用自然法来支持胎儿的生命权——告诉参议院司法委员会,他“不认为自然法在宪法裁判中有用武之地”。委员会的民主党主席、同为天主教徒的参议员约瑟夫·拜登(Joseph Biden)则直言不讳,赞许地指出,最高法院保护避孕权和异族通婚权的正当程序案件,就是自然法。这些案件正是自由派法律理论家罗纳德·德沃金(Ronald Dworkin)所捍卫的“对宪法的道德解读”的例证。德沃金写道,尽管自然法被视为一个“特别可怕”的标签,但他承认,如果“任何使法律的内容有时取决于对某个道德问题的正确答案的理论,都是自然法理论,那么我犯了自然法之罪”。

Liberals kept faith with the Court’s unfolding progression of liberal rights, but they grew more defensive about trafficking in natural law. This was aggravated by the florid language of Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Republican-appointed Justice who authored decisions which often sounded mystical, metaphysical, or downright cheesy. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which reaffirmed the core of the abortion right, a line attributed to Justice Kennedy waxed: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” In Lawrence v. Texas, striking down a law criminalizing gay sex, Kennedy extolled the “liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.” In Obergefell v. Hodges, which required states to recognize same-sex marriage, he leaned even more heavily on language resembling nineteenth-century opinions expounding the nature of things. “The nature of marriage is that, through its enduring bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and spirituality,” he wrote, adding, “Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one there.” In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia assailed Kennedy’s “showy profundities” as “profoundly incoherent,” and declared that “the world does not expect logic and precision in poetry or inspirational pop-philosophy; it demands them in the law.”

自由派始终信任法院不断推进的自由派权利进程,但他们在涉足自然法时变得更加谨慎防备。大法官安东尼·肯尼迪(Anthony Kennedy)华丽铺陈的语言加剧了这一点。这位由共和党任命的大法官撰写的判决,常常听起来神秘、玄奥,甚至俗气十足。在重申堕胎权核心的“计划生育联盟诉凯西案”中,一句被认为出自肯尼迪大法官之手的判词感叹道:“自由的核心,是界定自己关于存在、意义、宇宙和人类生命奥秘之概念的权利。”在推翻将同性性行为定罪的法律的“劳伦斯诉德克萨斯州案”中,肯尼迪颂扬了“个人在空间和更超越维度上的自由”。在要求各州承认同性婚姻的“奥贝格费尔诉霍奇斯案”中,他更加倚重那种类似十九世纪阐述事物本质的意见的语言。他写道:“婚姻的本质在于,通过其持久的纽带,两个人可以共同找到其他自由,如表达、亲密和精神性,”并补充道,“婚姻回应了一种普遍的恐惧,即一个孤独的人可能呼喊却无人回应。”在反对意见中,大法官安东宁·斯卡利亚(Antonin Scalia)抨击肯尼迪的“花哨的深奥”是“极其不连贯的”,并宣称“世界不指望在诗歌或励志流行哲学中看到逻辑和精确;但在法律中,它要求这些”。

Justice Scalia’s defining “shtick” (as he called it) was the original public meaning of the plain text of the law. In one of his last speeches, in 2016, Scalia alleged that Justices in the Obergefell majority were acting as they believed natural law required. A famous Catholic, Scalia attacked the Catholic theologian Aquinas’s statement that, “if the written law contains anything contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and has no binding force.” “Horrors!” Scalia said. He recoiled at “human judges setting aside positive law because they believe it contradicts natural law”—precisely what he thought the Court did in striking down democratically enacted laws as violating fundamental rights not in the written Constitution.

斯卡利亚大法官的标志性“噱头”(如他自己所称)是法律简明文本的原初公共含义。在2016年的一次最后演讲中,斯卡利亚声称,“奥贝格费尔案”的多数大法官是按照他们相信的自然法要求行事。身为著名天主教徒的斯卡利亚,攻击了天主教神学家阿奎那的说法,即“如果成文法包含任何违背自然权利的内容,它就是不公正的,没有约束力”。“太可怕了!”斯卡利亚说。他对“人类法官因相信实证法违背自然法而将其搁置一旁”的做法感到惊骇——而这正是他认为法院在推翻民主制定的法律,理由是它们侵犯了成文宪法中未载明的基本权利时所做的事。

Scalia and other conservatives’ insistence that a sine qua non of legal interpretation was leaving moral values at the door made many lawyers loath to admit that morality was central to legal interpretation, lest they confirm allegations of lawlessness and illegitimacy. Some prominent liberal legal scholars even attempted to defend substantive-due-process rights using originalist and textualist methods. In a speech in 2010, Justice David Souter (for whom I clerked) rightly emphasized how “egregiously it misses the point to think of judges in constitutional cases as just sitting there reading constitutional phrases fairly and looking at reported facts objectively to produce their judgments.” But performing fealty to that naïve and impoverished picture of judging had become nearly de rigueur for both liberals and conservatives. Elena Kagan stated, during her Supreme Court confirmation hearing later that year, “We’re all originalists now”—signalling at least some acceptance of conservatives’ preferred judicial constraints. In 2023, Justice Kagan disclaimed the line as a “stupid sound bite” that had been taken out of context; she hadn’t meant that the Constitution should be forever bound to the original meaning of its plain text, but rather that the view that “constitutional meaning evolves is consistent with the actual, original meaning of what the document is meant to do.” Kagan went on to say, in 2015, “I think we’re all textualists now,” but, in 2022, wrote, “I was wrong,” in a dissent in West Virginia v. E.P.A, chastising the conservative Court for being “textualist only when being so suits it.” Many liberals had been disciplined to adopt methods that purported to strictly confine legal interpretation, only to discover that their most prominent adherents, whether covertly or unconsciously, had other plans.

斯卡利亚和其他保守派坚持认为,法律解释的必要条件是将道德价值观拒之门外,这使得许多法律人极不情愿承认道德是法律解释的核心,以免坐实了关于无法无天和不合法的指控。一些著名的自由派法律学者甚至试图运用原旨主义和文本主义方法来捍卫实体性正当程序权利。在2010年的一次演讲中,大法官戴维·苏特(David Souter)(我曾为他担任法官助理)正确地强调,“认为法官在宪法案件中只是坐在那里,公正地解读宪法短语,客观地看待报道的事实,然后得出判决,这种想法大错特错。”但表现出忠于那种天真贫乏的司法裁判图景,几乎已成为自由派和保守派都必须遵守的规矩。埃琳娜·卡根(Elena Kagan)在当年晚些时候的最高法院确认听证会上说,“我们现在都是原旨主义者了”——这至少表明她部分接受了保守派偏好的司法约束。2023年,卡根大法官否认了这句话,称其为被断章取义的“愚蠢的只言片语”;她的意思并非宪法应永远受其简明文本原初含义的束缚,而是说“宪法含义会演变”的观点,与“该文件旨在达成的实际、原初含义”是一致的。卡根在2015年接着说,“我认为我们现在都是文本主义者了”,但在2022年“西弗吉尼亚州诉环保署案”的反对意见中,她写道,“我错了”,并斥责保守派法院“只在对自己有利时才做文本主义者”。许多自由派曾被规训去采纳那些声称要严格限制法律解释的方法,结果却发现,这些方法最著名的拥护者,无论是暗中还是无意,另有打算。

So, it was deeply refreshing when, in his 2020 essay “Beyond Originalism,” and his 2022 book, “Common Good Constitutionalism,” Adrian Vermeule (a colleague of mine at Harvard Law School, and a friend) urged conservatives to ditch originalism and embrace the classical legal tradition of Aquinas; he made no bones about the central role of natural law in legal interpretation. Now that legal conservatism has “the upper hand” in the courts and is no longer “a beleaguered and eccentric view,” he deems originalism to have “outlived its utility,” and calls for a constitutionalism “less tied to tendentious law-office history and endless litigation of dubious claims about events centuries in the past.” Vermeule—a former clerk for Scalia—proposes that conservatives should read the Constitution’s ambiguous phrases and general structure in an openly moral way, drawing on principles grounded in the nature and purposes of government.

因此,当阿德里安·弗穆勒(Adrian Vermeule)(我在哈佛法学院的同事兼朋友)在2020年的文章《超越原旨主义》和2022年的著作《共同善宪政主义》中,敦促保守派抛弃原旨主义,拥抱阿奎那的古典法律传统时,这令人深感耳目一新;他毫不讳言自然法在法律解释中的核心作用。既然法律保守主义在法院已“占据上风”,不再是“一种四面楚歌的古怪观点”,他认为原旨主义已“用尽了它的效用”,并呼吁一种“不那么受制于有倾向性的法律事务所式历史,以及围绕几个世纪前事件的可疑主张进行无休止诉讼”的宪政主义。弗穆勒——曾是斯卡利亚的法官助理——提议,保守派应依据植根于政府本质和目的的原则,以一种公开的道德方式,来解读宪法中模糊的短语和总体结构。

Vermeule draws, in part, on Dworkin’s view that constitutional standards are explicitly moral, and that phrases like “liberty,” “due process,” and “equal protection” should be interpreted in light of moral principles of justice and fairness embedded in the law. What Dworkin called a “moral reading of the Constitution” has upheld principles of privacy and autonomy and justified rights to abortion and same-sex intimacy, as requirements of fundamental justice. But in “Common Good Constitutionalism,” Vermeule rejects the “conventionally left-liberal and individualist bent” of those liberal commitments. His constitutional interpretation opposes what he called “the relentless expansion of individualistic autonomy” represented in the cases championed by liberals; it supports unborn children’s right to life and recognizes that marriage is only between a man and a woman. Under Vermeule’s vision, he writes, Casey’s right to “define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life” would be “stamped as abominable, beyond the realm of the acceptable forever after.”

弗穆勒部分借鉴了德沃金的观点,即宪法标准是明确道德的,像“自由”、“正当程序”和“平等保护”这样的短语,应根据法律中蕴含的正义与公平的道德原则来解释。德沃金所谓的“对宪法的道德解读”,曾支撑了隐私和自主原则,并论证了堕胎和同性亲密行为的权利,将其视为根本正义的要求。但在《共同善宪政主义》中,弗穆勒拒绝了那些自由派承诺中“传统的左翼自由派和个人主义倾向”。他的宪法解释反对他所谓的、在自由派拥护的案件中所体现的“个人主义自主权的无情扩张”;它支持未出生胎儿的生命权,并承认婚姻仅限于一男一女之间。弗穆勒写道,在他的愿景下,“凯西案”中“界定自己关于存在、意义、宇宙和人类生命奥秘之概念”的权利,将被“打上可憎的烙印,永远被排除在可接受的范围之外”。

The stark disagreements over the moral values underlying our legal tradition are no reason for liberals to disavow a moral approach to legal interpretation. Quite the opposite. Liberals should take a page from Vermeule just as he has taken a page from Dworkin, and reclaim the interpretation of law explicitly in terms of moral values. Despite the abundant criticism of the Trump Administration’s actions as unconstitutional, many of the Administration’s most disturbing policies have conformed to the law. Claims about unconstitutionality are often arguments about what the law should be in light of our legal tradition’s higher principles of justice. This is not a time for liberals to cede the field of disputation over natural law’s meaning or “the common good.” A moral reading of legal obligations and rights should not become a conservative monopoly, any more than it was ever alleged to be a liberal one.

围绕我们法律传统所依据的道德价值观的尖锐分歧,绝不是自由派放弃道德化法律解释方法的理由。恰恰相反。自由派应该效仿弗穆勒,正如他效仿德沃金那样,重新明确地以道德价值观来主张法律解释。尽管对特朗普政府行为的违宪性有大量批评,但该政府许多最令人不安的政策其实是符合法律的。关于违宪的主张,常常是依据我们法律传统中更高的正义原则,论证法律应当如何的论点。现在不是自由派放弃围绕自然法含义或“共同善”进行论辩领域的时候。对法律义务和权利的道德解读,不应成为保守派的专利,正如它从未被指为自由派的专利一样。

In April, in a speech in honor of the two-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration, Justice Thomas laid claim to the document’s foundation of natural, unalienable rights, “the moral principles by which Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther King, Jr., could criticize the institutions of slavery and segregation.” We should remember that the American natural-law tradition belongs to all of us—including progressives and conservatives, religious and secular readers of Aquinas, advocates and skeptics of liberal rights. Our struggles for justice, from the Declaration to today, have been fights over natural-law principles. That is the ghost in the machine. Whether or not we acknowledge it, the nation’s birthday is a timely celebration of natural law. Reading words in legal texts divorced from fundamental moral values will not save us from tyranny. ♦

今年四月,在为纪念《独立宣言》二百五十周年而发表的一次演讲中,托马斯大法官宣称该文件奠定了自然的、不可剥夺的权利基础,即“弗雷德里克·道格拉斯、亚伯拉罕·林肯和马丁·路德·金能够批判奴隶制和种族隔离制度所依据的道德原则”。我们应该记住,美国的自然法传统属于我们所有人——包括进步派和保守派,阿奎那的宗教与世俗读者,自由派权利的倡导者与怀疑者。从《独立宣言》至今,我们为正义而进行的斗争,一直都是围绕自然法原则的斗争。那是机器中的幽灵。无论我们承认与否,国家的诞辰都是对自然法的一次恰逢其时的庆祝。脱离基本道德价值去解读法律文本中的词句,无法将我们从暴政中拯救出来。 ♦

2 free previews left — register to get 30 translations a month