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Why Are We So Good at Feeling Bad?

我们为什么这么擅长让自己难受?
A behavioral economist sets out to explain why we’re so prone to overreacting and spiralling.
一位行为经济学家试图解释,我们为何如此容易反应过度、陷入情绪漩涡。
An illustration of the inside of a person's head.
Illustration by Tim Enthoven

Charles Darwin was not a well man. As a youth, he suffered from scarlet fever and eczema. He couldn’t stand the sight of blood at medical school, and his five-year voyage on the Beagle brought seasickness, headaches, and infections. After returning to England, in 1836, he developed severe anxiety and gastrointestinal issues, including bouts of vomiting and flatulence. He also suffered from insomnia, fatigue, and depression.

查尔斯·达尔文算不上一个健康的人。年轻时,他得过猩红热和湿疹。在医学院,他一见血就受不了;随“小猎犬号”航行的五年里,晕船、头痛和各种感染接踵而至。1836年回到英国后,他患上了严重的焦虑症和肠胃问题,包括一阵阵的呕吐和胀气。他还饱受失眠、疲惫和抑郁的折磨。

In 1849, ten years before he published “On the Origin of Species,” he wrote to a friend of “dreadful vomiting every week” and reported, “I was not able to do anything one day out of three.” He thought that he was “rapidly going the way of all flesh.” In fact, he lived another thirty-three years, though the ailments never left him. Giving a scientific paper, or even attending a party, could overwhelm him. By then, he had moved to a village in Kent, rarely venturing out without his wife, Emma.

1849年,也就是《物种起源》出版前十年,他在给朋友的信中提到“每周都剧烈呕吐”,并说自己“三天里有一天什么都做不了”。他觉得自己“正迅速走向所有血肉之躯的归宿”。事实上,他又活了三十三年,尽管病痛从未离开过他。宣读一篇科学论文,甚至只是参加一场聚会,都可能让他不堪重负。那时,他已经搬到肯特郡的一个村庄,没有妻子爱玛陪同,很少独自出门。

From 1849 to 1855, Darwin kept a “diary of health,” recording his conditions as “goodish,” “poorish,” and “very bad fl[atulence] with fright.” He consulted some twenty doctors and tried Victorian cures, including hydrotherapy, which offered some relief, and galvanism. Diagnoses included nervous dyspepsia, water brash (acid reflux), and “suppressed gout” (whatever that is).

从1849年到1855年,达尔文一直记着一本“健康日记”,把自己的状况记录为“尚可”“欠佳”以及“胀气严重,伴有惊恐”。他先后咨询过大约二十位医生,尝试过各种维多利亚时代的疗法,包括多少有些效果的水疗,还有电疗。医生给出的诊断包括神经性消化不良、反酸,以及“潜伏性痛风”(谁知道那是什么)。

What was the problem? Retrospective diagnoses range from Chagas’ disease, a parasitic illness he might have contracted in South America, to lactose intolerance. He may have suffered from some combination of diseases and allergies, and possibly Crohn’s. But some symptoms suggest a psychological condition. Agoraphobia with panic disorder is a plausible diagnosis.

问题到底出在哪里?事后的回溯性诊断五花八门,从恰加斯病——一种他可能在南美感染的寄生虫病——到乳糖不耐受。他可能同时患有几种疾病和过敏症,或许还有克罗恩病。但有些症状指向一种心理状况。伴有惊恐障碍的广场恐惧症,是一个说得通的诊断。

Whatever the cause or causes, Darwin must, at some point, have asked himself, I got naturally selected for this? Of course, not every affliction has an evolutionary purpose. People get sick. But our extraordinary susceptibility to misery does raise a question about what kind of creatures natural selection has made us. We get depressed when we win the lottery; we lie awake worrying about whether the car needs new tires; we feel jealous when our girlfriend talks too long with the barista.

无论病因是一种还是多种,达尔文肯定在某个时刻问过自己:我被自然选择选中,就为了这个?当然,并非每一种病痛都有进化上的目的。人就是会生病。但我们对痛苦异乎寻常的易感性,确实引出一个问题:自然选择究竟把我们塑造成了什么样的生物。中了彩票会抑郁;半夜醒着担心汽车该不该换轮胎;女朋友跟咖啡师多聊了几句就心生嫉妒。

Anxiety might have adaptive utility when we are in danger of being eaten by a sabre-toothed tiger. But there are not a lot of sabre-toothed tigers around anymore, and we still get anxious, frequently for no very good reason. We don’t just react emotionally to things. We overreact. Why have genes for emotional overreaction, rather than genes for being cool, calm, and collected, been passed along? Wouldn’t we be reproductively fitter if we weren’t unhappy so much of the time?

当我们面临被剑齿虎吃掉的危险时,焦虑或许有适应性的用处。但如今剑齿虎已经不多了,我们却依然焦虑,而且常常毫无像样的理由。我们不只是对事情产生情绪反应,我们会反应过度。为什么被传递下去的是情绪过度反应的基因,而不是冷静、沉着、镇定的基因?如果我们不那么频繁地感到不快乐,繁殖适应度难道不会更高吗?

These are questions George Loewenstein tries to answer in “The Opposite of Happiness: How Bad Feelings Make and Break Us” (Harper). Loewenstein, who teaches at Carnegie Mellon, is a leader in the field of behavioral economics. Neoclassical economics relied on the fiction of the rational actor, someone who makes decisions by way of a judicious calculation of self-interest. Behavioral economics, by contrast, emphasizes the nonrational factors in economic decision-making. Whatever human beings are rational about, it’s not money. We overspend it; we under-save it; we buy stuff on impulse. We generally don’t do the math. Why it took so long for this to dawn on economists is mystifying. Didn’t those people ever read a novel? Virtually every famous nineteenth-century novel is about people behaving badly around money.

这些正是乔治·勒文斯坦在《幸福的反面:坏情绪如何成就我们,又如何摧毁我们》(哈珀出版社)一书中试图回答的问题。勒文斯坦在卡内基梅隆大学任教,是行为经济学领域的领军人物。新古典经济学依赖“理性行动者”这一虚构形象:人通过审慎计算自身利益来做决策。行为经济学则相反,强调经济决策中的非理性因素。无论人类在什么事情上称得上理性,金钱肯定不算。我们超支,储蓄不足,冲动购物。我们通常不算账。经济学家花了这么久才意识到这一点,实在令人费解。那些人难道从不读小说吗?几乎每一部著名的十九世纪小说,写的都是人在金钱面前行为失当的故事。

Still, figuring out why we act foolishly when we could, or should, or want to act otherwise is a worthy academic pursuit. Among Loewenstein’s contributions is the identification of what he calls “empathy gaps,” our inability to imagine how we would feel or behave in an emotional state different from the one we’re in. When we’re pain-free, we can’t really remember what pain feels like. When we’re angry, we can’t imagine being calm. Emotions, Loewenstein argues, can reprogram our whole psyche. He gives a personal example: learning that it is better to wait a day before responding to an annoying e-mail.

不过,弄清楚我们为什么在本可以、本应该、或本想要采取别的行动时却做出蠢事,仍是一项值得追求的学术事业。勒文斯坦的贡献之一,是识别出他所谓的“共情缺口”:我们无法想象自己处在与当下不同的情绪状态中会有什么感受、会怎么做。不疼的时候,我们很难真正记起疼痛的感觉。愤怒的时候,我们无法想象平静是什么样子。勒文斯坦认为,情绪可以重新编程我们的整个心理系统。他举了一个亲身例子:他学到,收到一封令人恼火的邮件后,最好等一天再回复。

Didn’t we know this already, though? Adam Smith made similar observations in “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” (1759). And some of Loewenstein’s work does seem to amount to a confirmation of common sense. One of his experiments, for instance, measured the effect of sexual arousal on judgment and decision-making in male students. Guess what? A sexually aroused young man reported a greater willingness to engage in morally questionable behavior to obtain sexual gratification.

可是,这些我们不是早就知道了吗?亚当·斯密在《道德情操论》(1759年)中就提出过类似的观察。勒文斯坦的某些研究,看起来确实像是在印证常识。比如,他的一项实验测量了性唤起对男大学生判断和决策的影响。你猜怎么着?性唤起的年轻男性报告说,更愿意为了获得性满足而做出道德上有问题的行为。

Explaining how feelings affect our judgment is one thing. Why so many emotions make us unhappy is another. That’s the larger question Loewenstein takes up. His thesis is that these emotions “were built to keep us alive and reproducing, not to keep us happy.”

解释情绪如何影响判断是一回事。为什么这么多情绪让我们不快乐,是另一回事。这才是勒文斯坦要探讨的更大问题。他的论点是:这些情绪“被塑造出来,是为了让我们活下去并繁衍后代,而不是为了让我们快乐”。

Loewenstein is hardly alone in proposing evolutionary explanations for misery. Randolph M. Nesse, a psychiatrist, made a similar case in “Good Reasons for Bad Feelings: Insights from the Frontier of Evolutionary Psychiatry” (2019), a work Loewenstein discusses. Such arguments recall the “selfish gene” model. Evolution is not about the reproduction of persons, is the idea. It’s about the reproduction of genes. And, from a gene’s point of view, the body is just a disposable gene container. It can fret about the tires, climb the Matterhorn, write “On the Origin of Species”—whatever, as long as the genes keep getting passed along. Darwin may have been wretched much of the time, but he had ten children. He checked the evolutionary box. Was he also farting and throwing up a lot? Sure. His genes didn’t care.

用进化论解释痛苦,勒文斯坦绝非孤例。精神病学家兰道夫·M·内斯在《坏情绪的好理由:进化精神病学前沿的洞见》(2019年)一书中提出了类似观点,勒文斯坦在书中也讨论了这部作品。这类论证让人想起“自私的基因”模型。其核心思想是:进化无关个体的繁殖,而是基因的繁殖。从基因的角度看,身体不过是一次性的基因容器。它可以为轮胎操心,去攀登马特洪峰,写出《物种起源》——随便做什么,只要基因能继续传递下去就行。达尔文大半生可能过得相当凄惨,但他有十个孩子。他在进化上达标了。他是不是也经常放屁、呕吐?当然。他的基因不在乎。
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“We’re offering you the promotion, on the condition that you won’t take a trip back to your home town, fall in love with the local baker, and learn that the true meaning of Christmas is family.”
“我们打算给你升职,条件是:你不能回老家一趟,爱上当地的面包师,然后领悟到圣诞节的真正意义是家庭。”
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But Loewenstein thinks that negative emotions aren’t simply a design flaw or a regrettable by-product of natural selection. On the contrary, he thinks that we have good evolutionary reasons for being able to feel bad. Our ancestors would have been less “fit” to pass their genes along if they hadn’t been equipped with negative emotions. Fear could save us from predators; guilt could help us maintain the social bonds on which survival depended.

但勒文斯坦认为,负面情绪并非单纯的设计缺陷,也不是自然选择令人遗憾的副产品。相反,他认为我们有充分的进化理由去拥有感受痛苦的能力。如果我们的祖先没有配备负面情绪,他们传递基因的“适应度”就会更低。恐惧能让我们避开捕食者;内疚能帮助我们维系赖以生存的社会纽带。

Knowing this, Loewenstein warns, won’t make us feel any less unhappy. “I offer in these pages no tips and precious little advice,” he writes. “This is not a self-help book.” (I wonder whether his publishers tried to talk him out of that.) Loewenstein describes the book as, instead, “one scientist’s bird’s-eye view of the subject, shaped by broad reading, personal experience, and, in many cases, my own research.”

勒文斯坦提醒说,知道这些并不会让我们感到少一点不快乐。“在这本书里,我不提供任何窍门,也几乎没有建议,”他写道,“这不是一本自助书。”(我怀疑他的出版商是否曾试图劝他别这么说。)勒文斯坦把这本书描述为“一位科学家对这个主题的鸟瞰式观察,由广泛的阅读、个人经历,以及在许多情况下我自己的研究所塑造”。

“The Opposite of Happiness” is fairly nontechnical. There is no talk of neurotransmitters, and Loewenstein, who has himself conducted brain-imaging research, thinks that the interpretation of functional-MRI scans is often “not much more reliable than reading tea leaves.” The book is also quite personal, although selectively so. Loewenstein lets us know, for example, that he suffers from paruresis (shy-bladder syndrome) but neglects to mention that he is a great-grandson of Sigmund Freud, whose theories of unconscious drives bear some family resemblance to Loewenstein’s account of our emotional programming.

《幸福的反面》相当通俗,没有谈论神经递质。勒文斯坦本人做过脑成像研究,但他认为功能性核磁共振扫描的解读往往“并不比读茶叶占卜可靠多少”。这本书也相当个人化,尽管是有选择地个人化。比如,勒文斯坦让我们知道他患有排尿恐惧症(害羞膀胱综合征),却没有提及他是西格蒙德·弗洛伊德的曾外孙,而弗洛伊德关于无意识驱力的理论,与勒文斯坦对我们情绪编程的论述,颇有几分家族相似之处。

The problem with a lot of evolutionary psychology is that its explanations are hard to verify. It undertakes to explain an observable fact (we fret about bald tires) with an unobservable one (cavemen worried that a mastodon might trample them). Loewenstein is alert to the danger of producing “just-so” stories, accounts of human attributes based on unconfirmable hunches about what life was like in the Paleolithic era. But they’re hard to avoid.

许多进化心理学的问题在于,其解释难以验证。它试图用一个可观察的事实(我们担心轮胎磨平)去解释一个不可观察的事实(穴居人担心猛犸象会踩死他们)。勒文斯坦警惕着制造“想当然”故事的危险——那些基于无法证实的、关于旧石器时代生活的猜测来解释人类特性的叙述。但这类故事很难避免。

Even if we accept these evolutionary explanations, they leave a further puzzle. Why do negative emotions so often persist long after they’ve served their purpose? Like the earworms of cheesy pop songs, they can get stuck in our heads. Our brains continue pumping them out even when the occasions for them have passed.

即便我们接受这些进化论解释,仍有一个更大的谜团:为什么负面情绪常常在完成使命之后还久久不散?就像烂俗流行歌的“耳虫”一样,它们会卡在我们脑子里。即使触发它们的时机早已过去,我们的大脑仍不断制造这些情绪。

We also have the unfortunate ability to reëxperience some negative feelings just by remembering the occasions for them. We may find it hard to recall what physical pain felt like once it has stopped, but, when we remember something shameful we did, we can feel the shame all over again. Most of us could use an empathy gap there.

我们还有一种不幸的能力:仅仅通过回忆触发负面情绪的场景,就能重新体验那些感受。身体上的疼痛一旦停止,我们可能很难回忆起当时的感觉;但当我们记起自己做过的某件丢人的事,却能重新感受到那种羞耻。在这方面,大多数人倒是巴不得有个共情缺口。

“At the heart of so many of our miseries,” Loewenstein says, “is not the fact that we feel bad, but the belief that we should feel otherwise.” Our brains fight with themselves. We feel ashamed of our shame, angry about our anger. The wish to escape an unpleasant emotion becomes another source of misery. Who’s running the show in there?

“我们诸多痛苦的核心,”勒文斯坦说,“不在于我们感觉糟糕,而在于我们相信自己本不该有这种感觉。”我们的大脑在与自己搏斗。我们为自己的羞耻感到羞耻,为自己的愤怒感到愤怒。想要摆脱一种不愉快情绪的愿望,本身又成了痛苦的来源。到底是谁在里面掌舵?

Not “us.” We may resolve, after firing off an intemperate e-mail, to respond more calmly the next time. But, when the next provocation arrives, our anger can make the resolution seem lame. As Loewenstein explains, we are adept at psychological self-sabotage. Sometimes our very efforts to gain control make things worse, as when athletes concentrate too intently on not trying so hard.

不是“我们”。发完一封言辞激烈的邮件后,我们可能下定决心,下次要更冷静地回应。但当下一次挑衅来临时,愤怒会让那个决心显得苍白无力。正如勒文斯坦所解释的,我们擅长心理上的自我破坏。有时候,我们努力获得控制的举动反而让事情更糟,就像运动员过于专注地告诫自己“别太用力”,结果适得其反。

In the second half of “The Opposite of Happiness,” Loewenstein lets unhappiness sufferers speak for themselves. He has gathered their stories through what he calls the Misery Survey, in which more than five hundred respondents were asked about their experiences of negative emotions. Each was assigned an emotion at random and asked whether it had caused them misery. If it had, they were invited to describe the experience; if not, they were assigned another emotion. The stories make for fun reading (more or less), not so much because they hold surprises but because we recognize ourselves in so many of them. Misery, it turns out, loves company.

在《幸福的反面》的后半部分,勒文斯坦让饱受不快乐之苦的人们自己发声。他通过所谓的“痛苦调查”收集了他们的故事,五百多位受访者被问及自己经历负面情绪的情况。每个人被随机分配一种情绪,并被问及这种情绪是否给他们带来过痛苦。如果有,就请他们描述那段经历;如果没有,就再分配另一种情绪。这些故事读起来相当有趣(或多或少),倒不是因为它们有什么出人意料之处,而是因为我们在其中太多故事里认出了自己。原来,痛苦也喜欢有人作伴。

Loewenstein devotes a chapter to each of twelve varieties of misery. It’s a bit like Dante’s Inferno if Dante had modelled his work on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders rather than the “Summa Theologiae” of Thomas Aquinas. The first two circles in Loewenstein’s hell are Impatience and Boredom, followed by Anger, Envy, Jealousy, Rejection, Guilt, Shame, Anxiety, Regret, Loneliness, and, in the last circle, Depression, which he deems “a fitting finale to this Hieronymus Bosch underworld of psychic torments—not just because it is so supremely awful, but because nearly all the other miseries, when they persist and accumulate, can give rise to it.” (Hate, a resurgent political emotion across much of the planet, did not make the list. Neither did grief.)

勒文斯坦用一章的篇幅分别讨论十二种痛苦。这有点像但丁的《地狱篇》,只不过但丁的范本是托马斯·阿奎那的《神学大全》,而勒文斯坦的范本是《精神障碍诊断与统计手册》。勒文斯坦地狱的前两圈是“不耐烦”和“无聊”,接着是愤怒、嫉妒、醋意、被拒、内疚、羞耻、焦虑、后悔、孤独,最后一圈是抑郁。他认为抑郁“作为这座博斯式精神折磨地狱的压轴之作再合适不过——不仅因为它极其可怕,更因为几乎所有其他痛苦,一旦持续并累积,都可能催生抑郁”。(仇恨——这种在当今世界许多地方重新抬头的政治情绪——没有入选。悲伤也没有。)

Loewenstein suspects that depression, unlike some other negative emotions, has no adaptive function of its own. It arises, he thinks, as a by-product of other psychological systems in distress. That’s close to what Peter D. Kramer concluded in his 2005 book, “Against Depression,” where he defines depression as “a disease in which a host of injuries combine to cause a common downstream process that becomes self-sustaining.” It is hard to see how suicidality conduces to reproductive success. And depression can create what Loewenstein terms “the ultimate empathy gap”: people in its grip find it almost impossible to imagine what life without it would feel like.

勒文斯坦推测,与其他一些负面情绪不同,抑郁本身并没有适应性功能。他认为,抑郁是其他心理系统陷入困境时产生的副产品。这与彼得·D·克莱默在2005年出版的《反对抑郁》一书中的结论相近。克莱默将抑郁定义为“一种疾病,其中众多伤害共同作用,引发一个共同的、能够自我维持的下游过程”。很难看出自杀倾向如何有助于繁殖成功。而且,抑郁可以制造勒文斯坦所谓的“终极共情缺口”:深陷其中的人几乎无法想象没有抑郁的生活会是什么感觉。

At the other end of his inferno is boredom. We might not think of boredom as an emotion. It seems more like the absence of emotion. But, in a study tracking the daily feelings of some four thousand adults, Loewenstein and his colleagues found that boredom frequently accompanied strong negative feelings, including anger and anxiety. “We found that boredom was 4.2 times more likely to occur in the presence of another negative emotion than a positive one,” he says.

在他地狱的另一端是无聊。我们可能不觉得无聊是一种情绪,它更像是情绪的缺失。但在一项追踪约四千名成年人日常感受的研究中,勒文斯坦和同事们发现,无聊常常伴随着强烈的负面情绪,包括愤怒和焦虑。“我们发现,无聊与另一种负面情绪同时出现的概率,是与正面情绪同时出现的4.2倍,”他说。

Two places where people commonly report being bored are doctors’ waiting rooms and airport terminals. We sit there fiddling with our smartphones, and with nothing else to do, running scary or angry scenarios through our heads—the medical news will not be good, the flight will be cancelled, they will close the gate while I’m in line at Starbucks—and composing powerfully cogent letters to the airline about the incompetence of the gate crew. We get mad when we are forced to wait for something for which there are no substitutes, and then we complain that we’re bored. (In a section titled “Why Are Dreams So Boring?,” Loewenstein says that one of the most “excruciatingly boring” things we can do is listen to someone describe a dream they had. This reads like a barely veiled put-down of his famous forebear.)

人们常说感到无聊的两个地方,是候诊室和机场航站楼。我们坐在那里摆弄手机,无事可做,脑子里却上演着种种可怕或愤怒的场景——检查结果不会好,航班会被取消,我在星巴克排队时他们会关舱门——同时构思着一封措辞犀利、逻辑严密、控诉登机口工作人员无能的投诉信。当我们被迫等待某样没有替代品的东西时,我们会恼火,然后抱怨自己无聊。(在一节题为“为什么梦这么无聊?”的文字中,勒文斯坦说,听别人描述自己做过的梦,是世界上最“无聊到令人痛苦”的事情之一。这读起来像是对他那位著名先辈毫不掩饰的暗讽。)

But how did we acquire the capacity for boredom? There don’t seem to have been airports or doctors’ offices back in Paleolithic times, when men just hunted and gathered (and, we hope, partied). Loewenstein suggests that the ability to become bored developed as a way of budgeting attention. “If early humans didn’t feel the urge to redirect their attention when staring at the same patch of woods,” he says, “they might have missed important opportunities—a rustle in the bush that signaled prey, or an approaching threat. Our ancestors who were better at reallocating attention had an adaptive advantage: they probably avoided more predators, found more food, and pursued more socially or intellectually engaging activities.” This might be a little just-so-y. It’s hard to see how the humans or proto-humans who never got bored were the ones who got selected out. Maybe sabre-toothed tigers ate them all.

但我们是如何获得感受无聊的能力的?旧石器时代似乎没有机场,也没有诊所,那时候男人只管打猎和采集(我们希望还有聚会)。勒文斯坦提出,无聊的能力是作为一种注意力分配机制演化而来的。“如果早期人类盯着同一片树林时没有重新转移注意力的冲动,”他说,“他们可能会错过重要的机会——灌木丛中一阵预示猎物或威胁逼近的响动。那些更善于重新分配注意力的祖先拥有适应性优势:他们可能避开了更多捕食者,找到了更多食物,并从事了更多具有社交或智力吸引力的活动。”这听起来有点“想当然”的味道。很难想象那些从不感到无聊的人类或原始人类是被淘汰掉的那批。也许剑齿虎把他们全吃光了。

Other evolutionary explanations seem more persuasive. Loewenstein agrees with many people who have written about negative emotions that feelings like shame and guilt perform a regulatory social function. They help enforce the norms of the group. Shame, in particular, encourages submission rather than confrontation, a response “designed to protect us from one of the greatest threats to our survival—being cast out.”

其他进化论解释似乎更有说服力。勒文斯坦同意许多研究负面情绪的学者的观点:羞耻和内疚这类情绪发挥着社会调节功能。它们有助于维护群体规范。尤其是羞耻,它鼓励顺从而非对抗,这种反应“旨在保护我们免受生存的最大威胁之一——被逐出群体”。

Explaining why negative emotions might have evolved, though, still leaves that problem of why they can become so consuming, so hard to toggle off. Why do we spiral? Is it because we inherited emotions like anxiety which evolved in response to genuine threats to survival and can now be triggered by the prospect of missing the bus? Or were our emotions always liable to become excessive? Did our Stone Age ancestors lie awake wondering whether they had remembered to put out the fire pit?

然而,解释负面情绪为何可能演化出来,仍然没有解决那个问题:为什么它们会变得如此吞噬人心,如此难以关掉?我们为什么会陷入恶性循环?是因为我们继承的焦虑等情绪,原本是对真实生存威胁的反应,如今却能被错过公交车的可能性触发?还是说,我们的情绪从来就容易走向过度?石器时代的祖先会不会也半夜躺着,担心自己忘了熄灭火坑?

Loewenstein thinks that it’s at least partly the latter. Our emotional system, he says, “is prone, almost by design, to malfunction.” To protect us against threats, it has to be highly sensitive, prone to false alarms rather than risk missing a real danger. But this sensitivity also makes the system unstable. He believes our psyches are poised on a “razor’s edge” between negative feedback, which allows an emotion to subside when the threat has passed, and positive feedback, in which an emotion amplifies itself. Anxiety, for example, makes us more alert to threats, which can make us perceive more threats, which heightens our anxiety. It’s like driving on an icy road: the harder we brake, the more we lose control of the car.

勒文斯坦认为,至少部分是后者。他说,我们的情绪系统“几乎从设计上就倾向于失灵”。为了保护我们免受威胁,它必须高度敏感,宁可频繁误报,也不愿错过真正的危险。但这种敏感性也让系统变得不稳定。他认为,我们的心理悬在“剃刀边缘”:一边是负反馈,让情绪在威胁过去后消退;另一边是正反馈,让情绪自我放大。比如,焦虑让我们对威胁更加警觉,这又让我们感知到更多威胁,从而进一步加剧焦虑。就像在结冰的路面上开车:刹车踩得越狠,车子越失控。

Of course, an emotion that makes us miserable is not necessarily an irrational response to our circumstances. One question we can ask about psychological diagnoses is whether some states we classify as symptoms of mental disorders are responses to a world that’s genuinely frightening or depressing. What if life really is meaningless? What if other people really are out to get us? What if the barista really is hitting on our girlfriend? Then feelings like sadness, anger, and jealousy might be perfectly understandable, and the emotions that need to be explained are optimism, tolerance, and a sense of humor. Maybe it’s the optimists who are the crazy ones.

当然,一种让我们痛苦的情绪,未必是对自身处境的非理性反应。关于心理诊断,我们可以问一个问题:某些被我们归类为精神障碍症状的状态,是否其实是对一个确实令人恐惧或沮丧的世界的合理回应?如果人生真的没有意义呢?如果别人真的想害我们呢?如果那个咖啡师真的在撩我们的女朋友呢?那么悲伤、愤怒和嫉妒这些情绪就完全可以理解,而需要解释的反而是乐观、宽容和幽默感。也许乐观的人才是疯了的那群。

In the list of books that helped replace a theological understanding of the universe with a secular one, “On the Origin of Species” is near the top. One theory about Darwin’s poor health, in fact, was that he was horrified by the implications of his own discoveries—that our species was not a special creation and that no providence dictated its characteristics. Natural selection is a blind process. There is no being out there or up there that oversees its course.

在那些帮助人们用世俗世界观取代神学世界观的著作中,《物种起源》名列前茅。事实上,关于达尔文健康状况不佳的一种说法就是:他被自己发现的含义吓坏了——我们这个物种并非特殊的造物,也没有任何天意在规定它的特征。自然选择是一个盲目的过程。外面或上面没有任何存在在监督它的进程。

Still, there is a way in which evolutionary psychology belongs to a religious tradition, the tradition of theodicy. This was the effort of theologians to explain why, given an omnipotent and beneficent God, there is evil in the world. Transposed to a Darwinian world view, this becomes the question: If natural selection has equipped us to survive and reproduce, why has it burdened us with so much misery? There is a temptation to assume that every form of suffering must have served some evolutionary purpose, just as God must have had a reason for earthquakes in Lisbon. The problem of why bad things happen kept intellectuals busy for centuries. The problem of unhappiness promises to do the same. It may be that both depend on a shared illusion: that it all makes sense. ♦

不过,从某种意义上说,进化心理学仍属于一个宗教传统,即神义论的传统。神学家们曾努力解释:既然上帝全能且仁慈,世间为何还有邪恶?把这个问题移植到达尔文主义的世界观中,就变成了:如果自然选择赋予了我们生存和繁衍的能力,为什么还要让我们背负如此多的痛苦?有一种诱惑,让人假定每一种苦难都必定服务于某个进化目的,正如上帝必定有理由让里斯本发生地震。为什么会有坏事发生,这个问题让知识分子忙碌了几个世纪。不幸福的问题,看来也会如此。也许两者都依赖于一个共同的幻觉:这一切都有其道理。♦

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