Open Questions

Who’s the Real Victim?

谁才是真正的受害者?
More than ever, we resort to sweeping statements about “good people” and “bad people,” the innocent and the evil. What’s lost in that process will take work to regain.
我们比以往任何时候都更惯于用“好人”与“坏人”、“无辜者”与“恶人”这样大而化之的标签来论断一切。在这个过程中失去的东西,需要付出努力才能重新找回。
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Illustration by Josie Norton

What was to be done with the collaborators? In early December, 1945, a man and a woman in their thirties stepped onto a bus in Tel Aviv. Another passenger seemed to recognize the man; he went over to speak with him. “Are you Haim Molchadsky from Będzin?” he asked. The man didn’t answer. The passenger repeated the question. More silence. Then the questioner shouted, in Yiddish, “You killed my family! You are responsible for the death of thousands of Jews!” Other passengers hit the man, and when the bus stopped and the couple fled, a crowd of riders and people from the street chased them, until they were rescued by police.

该怎么处置那些通敌者?1945年12月初,一男一女两个三十多岁的人在特拉维夫登上一辆公交车。另一名乘客似乎认出了那个男人,走过去跟他搭话。“你是本津来的哈伊姆·莫尔查德斯基吗?”他问。男人没有回答。乘客又问了一遍。仍是沉默。于是提问者用意第绪语吼道:“你杀了我的家人!你要为成千上万犹太人的死负责!”其他乘客动手打了那个男人,等公交车停下、那对男女仓皇逃走时,车上的人和街上的人一起追赶他们,直到警察赶来把他们救下。

At the police station, the man confirmed that, yes, he was Haim Molchadsky, and, yes, when the Nazis took over Będzin, a town in Poland, they appointed him head of the “social department” of the Judenrat, or Jewish council. His job required him to select who would be sent to work camps, and, as he told the police, this made him many enemies. He was later promoted to head of the entire Judenrat. Then his luck ran out, and he was sent to Auschwitz.

在警察局,男人确认了,没错,他就是哈伊姆·莫尔查德斯基,而且没错,纳粹占领波兰小镇本津后,任命他为犹太委员会“社会部”的负责人。这份工作要求他挑选谁将被送往劳改营,正如他对警察所说,这让他树敌众多。后来他被提拔为整个犹太委员会的主席。再后来他的运气耗尽了,被送进了奥斯维辛。

This episode, recounted in Dan Porat’s book “Bitter Reckoning: Israel Tries Holocaust Survivors as Nazi Collaborators” (2019), was the kind of confrontation that led Israel to put on trial Jews who were accused of collaborating with the Nazis. As Porat tells it, the process carried its own agony, with heated public debate and shifts in popular opinion. At times, these men were treated as akin to Nazis. At other times, a softer view prevailed, and the collaborators were seen as Jewish victims trying, in extremis, to save themselves and their families.

丹·波拉特在《苦涩的清算:以色列以纳粹通敌者罪名审判大屠杀幸存者》(2019)一书中记述的这一事件,正是促使以色列对涉嫌与纳粹合作的犹太人进行审判的那类冲突。按照波拉特的叙述,这一过程本身就带着痛苦,伴随着激烈的公众辩论和民意的反复摇摆。有时,这些人被视同纳粹。有时,一种更温和的看法占了上风,通敌者被视为在绝境中试图拯救自己和家人的犹太受害者。

In a classic essay, the Holocaust survivor Primo Levi explored the motives of these men—often it was self-interest, he argued, and sometimes it was a mimetic identification with their oppressors. Levi was interested in the difficulty of judging intermediate cases, those that lie in what he called the gray zone. He described how we are in the grips of a “Manichean tendency, which shuns half-tints and complexities”: a tendency reflected in Christian invocations of Judgment Day, which places the righteous here, the reprobates there, with no one in between.

在一篇经典文章中,大屠杀幸存者普里莫·莱维探讨了这些人的动机——他认为往往是出于自利,有时则是对压迫者的模仿性认同。莱维感兴趣的是评判中间状态的困难,那些处于他所谓“灰色地带”的案例。他描述了我们如何被一种“摩尼教倾向”所支配,这种倾向“回避半色调与复杂性”:这一倾向体现在基督教对审判日的召唤中——义人在此,恶人在彼,中间空无一人。

That tendency has become the subject of considerable psychological research, most often on the reprobate side. Once someone is categorized as an enemy, their negative traits are exaggerated; they become a villain through and through. The pattern is most apparent in how we think about our political enemies. Surveys show that both Democrats and Republicans believe that sizable proportions of the other side favor wrongful imprisonment, tax fraud, embezzlement, adultery, animal abuse, and child pornography. (Only a few actually do.) In studies of “moral typecasting,” the psychologist Kurt Gray and his colleagues find that villains are seen as less capable of suffering; they become anti-victims of a sort. Villains like Ted Bundy are imagined to be relatively invulnerable to pain, even in a scenario as basic as stepping barefoot on a shard of glass.

这种倾向已成为大量心理学研究的主题,且大多集中在恶人一侧。一旦某人被归类为敌人,他们的负面特质就会被夸大;他们彻头彻尾地变成了恶棍。这种模式在我们如何看待政治对手时最为明显。调查显示,民主党人和共和党人都相信对方阵营中有相当大比例的人支持非法监禁、税务欺诈、挪用公款、通奸、虐待动物和儿童色情。(实际上只有极少数人如此。)在关于“道德类型化”的研究中,心理学家库尔特·格雷及其同事发现,恶棍被认为更不容易感受痛苦;他们在某种意义上成了“反受害者”。像泰德·邦迪这样的恶棍,人们会想象他相对而言对疼痛无感,即便是在光脚踩上玻璃碎片这样最基本的场景中。

There are clearly social forces at work here. Seeing complexity in villains can read as a worrisome softness, a lack of moral principle, or an indifference to victims’ suffering. Among Americans, there is little tolerance for people who talk sympathetically about the motives of the 9/11 hijackers. Likewise, anyone who talks with empathy about incels is liable to be mocked. But don’t incels also suffer? What about abusers who were themselves abused? Villain or victim? The proper response is “Why not both?” Yet such a response can feel unnatural, even repellent.

这里显然有社会力量在起作用。看到恶棍身上的复杂性,可能被解读为一种令人不安的心软、缺乏道德原则,或对受害者苦难的漠不关心。在美国人当中,很少有人能容忍有人以同情的口吻谈论9·11劫机者的动机。同样,任何以同理心谈论“非自愿独身者”的人都难免遭到嘲笑。但非自愿独身者不也在受苦吗?那些自己也曾遭受虐待的施虐者呢?恶棍还是受害者?恰当的回答是“为什么不能两者皆是?”然而这样的回答会让人觉得不自然,甚至令人反感。

We’re as uncomfortable with moral ambiguity as with an awkwardly designed chair, and we react the same way—shifting and squirming until we find relief. We struggle to make sense of the Jewish collaborator or the Nazi guard who shows mercy, and so we simplify them reflexively, sorting them into distinct categories.

我们对道德模糊性的不适,就像对一把设计别扭的椅子的不适一样,反应也相同——扭来扭去,直到找到舒服的姿势。我们难以理解那个犹太通敌者,或那个偶尔发善心的纳粹看守,于是我们条件反射式地将他们简化,分门别类地归入不同的格子。

Much psychological research has focussed on the degradation of villains, but a symmetrical force works to elevate victims. In experimental studies, when we’re told about a character’s past misdeeds, we are later more likely to forget them if the character is described as a victim. When researchers tell stories about people who are victims of crimes—ranging from having an iPad stolen to being raped—such victims are seen as virtuous, more moral and more trustworthy than comparable people who have not been victimized. The researchers Jillian Jordan and Maryam Kouchaki describe this as the “virtuous victim” effect.

大量心理学研究聚焦于对恶棍的贬低,但还有一种对称的力量在拔高受害者。在实验研究中,当我们被告知某个人物过去的劣迹后,如果这个人后来被描述为受害者,我们就更可能忘记那些劣迹。当研究者讲述犯罪受害者的故事时——从iPad被偷到遭受强奸——这些受害者被视为品德高尚的,比那些未曾受害的同类人更有道德、更值得信赖。研究者吉莉安·乔丹和玛丽亚姆·库查基将此描述为“美德受害者”效应。

Maybe this is a good thing? It’s easy to see how vilifying villains poses a problem—it can motivate violent reprisal, cruel punishment, and cycles of violence—but, by contrast, elevating victims can serve certain social goods. Indeed, Jordan and Kouchaki argue that the main reason we morally elevate victims is to restore justice. We see victims as especially moral because that perception helps motivate both the punishment of perpetrators (we’re more outraged when those being harmed seem particularly innocent) and the aid offered to victims.

这也许是件好事?不难看出,把恶棍妖魔化会带来问题——它可能激发暴力报复、残酷惩罚和暴力循环——但相比之下,拔高受害者可以服务于某些社会善益。事实上,乔丹和库查基认为,我们在道德上拔高受害者的主要原因是为了恢复正义。我们之所以认为受害者格外有道德,是因为这种认知有助于激发对施害者的惩罚(当受害者显得格外无辜时,我们会更加愤怒),也有助于激发对受害者的援助。

Yet there are downsides here, too. Once victims are imagined as near-saints, those who fail to meet the template can start to look suspect. Research on perceptions of victims of sexual assault finds that, even when there is indisputable physical resistance to an attack, people see the victim as less virtuous and less deserving of support if they had previously consented to sexual contact with their attacker, even a kiss. This perception holds even among the young and the politically and socially progressive, who would never consciously think that such acts are morally sullying. The same impulse that lifts some victims up can leave others, the imperfect ones, out in the cold.

然而这里也有弊端。一旦受害者被想象成近乎圣人,那些不符合这一模板的人就开始显得可疑。关于性侵受害者认知的研究发现,即使受害者对袭击有确凿无疑的身体反抗,如果她此前曾同意与施害者发生性接触——哪怕只是一个吻——人们也会认为她没那么有美德,没那么值得支持。这种认知甚至在年轻人以及政治和社会立场进步的人群中也存在,而这些人绝不会在有意识的层面上认为此类行为在道德上是污损的。那种拔高某些受害者的冲动,同样会把另一些不完美的受害者晾在寒风中。

If our psychological template of victimhood shapes how we judge and respond to victims, what happens in the heads of victims themselves? Many people have argued that victimhood enlightens, enriches, and improves. It toughens you up (“post-traumatic growth”) and makes you kinder (“altruism born of suffering”). On that view, the virtuous-victim effect becomes a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy: victims become virtuous.

如果我们关于受害者身份的心理模板塑造了我们如何评判和回应受害者,那么受害者自己的头脑里又发生了什么?许多人认为,受害经历会启迪人、丰富人、使人变得更好。它让你更坚韧(“创伤后成长”),让你更善良(“苦难中诞生的利他主义”)。按照这种观点,美德受害者效应就成了一种自我实现的预言:受害者真的变得有美德了。

This can certainly happen. The woman who founded Mothers Against Drunk Driving did so after losing her teen-age daughter to a drunk driver, and there are countless stories of rape survivors, or people living with spinal-cord injury or stroke, going on to work with organizations devoted to those who have faced similar adversity. Many of us carry narratives in which our own hardships helped make us the people we are today.

这种情况确实可能发生。“母亲反对酒驾”组织的创始人,就是在十几岁的女儿被酒驾司机撞死之后创立了这个组织;还有无数关于强奸幸存者、脊髓损伤或中风患者的故事,他们后来投身于帮助那些遭遇类似逆境之人的组织。我们许多人心中都怀有这样的叙事:正是我们经历的苦难,帮助塑造了今天的我们。

But it’s far from the rule. In a new book, “Is There Always Value to Adversity?,” the researcher Eranda Jayawickreme notes that, once you move beyond anecdote, the empirical support for such claims looks shaky. Some research even suggests that being victimized can make people mean. Individuals who were prompted to think about a time they had been victimized were less likely to offer help in an unrelated context. Moreover, people reminded of their own group’s victimization often show less sympathy for the suffering of other groups.

但这远非常态。研究者埃兰达·贾亚维克拉梅在新书《逆境总是有价值的吗?》中指出,一旦你越过轶事层面,这些说法的实证支持就显得相当薄弱。一些研究甚至表明,受害经历会让人变得刻薄。被引导去回想自己受害经历的人,在不相关的情境中更不愿意提供帮助。此外,被提醒自己群体受害经历的人,往往对其他群体的苦难表现出更少的同情。

In a set of studies from Michael Wohl and Nyla Branscombe, Jewish Canadians tended to report a sense of collective guilt about the plight of Palestinians, but it diminished when they were reminded of the Holocaust. Another study found that Americans felt less collective guilt about harm done to Iraqis when they were reminded of 9/11—and even when they were reminded of Pearl Harbor. Primo Levi described how, in concentration camps, those who had suffered the longest sometimes met newcomers with something closer to cruelty than solidarity. The newcomers were derided and subjected to malicious pranks, resented for the lives they had led until their detention, for still having “the smell of home.” The logic seems to be: We have suffered, so why should we be obliged to care about anyone else?

在迈克尔·沃尔和奈拉·布兰斯科姆的一组研究中,犹太裔加拿大人倾向于对巴勒斯坦人的困境产生某种集体内疚感,但当他们被提醒想起大屠杀时,这种内疚感就减弱了。另一项研究发现,当美国人被提醒想起9·11时——甚至当被提醒想起珍珠港事件时——他们对伊拉克人所受伤害的集体内疚感会减轻。普里莫·莱维描述过,在集中营里,那些受苦最久的人有时对待新来者的态度更接近残忍而非团结。新来者遭到嘲笑,被施以恶意的恶作剧,人们怨恨他们入营前的生活,怨恨他们身上还带着“家的味道”。其逻辑似乎是:我们已经受了这么多苦,凭什么还要去关心别人?

Victimhood, then, offers two coveted benefits: moral absolution and moral license. By securing the role of victim in other people’s minds, we are absolved of perceptions of villainy. By securing it in our own minds, we license ourselves to act in ways we would condemn in others. Victimhood becomes a valuable moral currency, and the scramble for this privileged status is visible in debates over immigration and crime, free speech and “cancellation,” diversity policies and #MeToo. As Gray, the psychologist, has long argued, many of our culture-war battles can be read as fights over who counts as the real victim. Research suggests that some people are especially prone to this kind of “competitive victimhood,” including those with a stronger desire for power and less concern for others. In practice, though, it is a game anyone can play. As members of once privileged groups feel their status slipping, it is a short step to claiming victimhood themselves, sometimes to comic effect, as with talk of “white genocide” after a “Star Wars” film failed to cast white men in leading roles.

于是,受害者身份提供了两项令人垂涎的好处:道德豁免和道德许可。通过在他人心中确立受害者的角色,我们免于被视作恶棍。通过在自己心中确立这一角色,我们给自己发放了许可,去做那些放在别人身上我们会加以谴责的事。受害者身份成为一种宝贵的道德货币,对这种特权地位的争夺在关于移民与犯罪、言论自由与“取消文化”、多元化政策与#MeToo的辩论中随处可见。正如心理学家格雷长期以来所主张的,我们的许多文化战争都可以被解读为关于谁才算真正受害者的争斗。研究表明,有些人特别容易陷入这种“竞争性受害者身份”,包括那些对权力有更强渴望、对他人更少关心的人。但在实践中,这是一场任何人都可以参与的游戏。当曾经享有特权的群体感到自己的地位在滑落时,他们离自己宣称受害者身份只有一步之遥,有时甚至到了滑稽的地步,比如一部《星球大战》电影没有选用白人男性担任主角后,就有人谈论起“白人种族灭绝”。

The inflation of victimhood comes at a cost. When we see victims, we start looking for villains. As we have widened the circle of people we feel bound to defend, we have also, as a consequence, swelled the ranks of those we seek to condemn.

受害者身份的膨胀是有代价的。当我们看到受害者时,就开始寻找恶棍。随着我们扩大了认为自己有义务捍卫的人群范围,我们也随之扩大了想要谴责的人群队伍。

How beholden are we to the pull of a villain-victim dichotomy? One can treat it as an indelible feature of human psychology, an unavoidable by-product of our appetite for simplicity and affiliation. Yet one of the revolutions in psychological research over the past decade or so has been a reluctance to treat localized observations as universal patterns, and a renewed attention to how much our psyche is shaped by cultural and historical context. Our typecasting may have a particular history.

我们在多大程度上受制于“恶棍—受害者”二分法的牵引?人们可以把它当作人类心理中不可磨灭的特征,当作我们对简单化和归属感之渴求的不可避免的副产品。然而,过去十多年心理学研究的一场革命,恰恰在于不再愿意把局部观察当作普遍规律,并重新关注我们的心理在多大程度上是由文化和历史语境塑造的。我们的类型化思维可能有着特定的历史。

The popular historian Tom Holland, in “Dominion: How the Christian Revolution Remade the World,” notes how novel it was for Christians to worship someone who suffered a humiliating death on the cross: “That a man who had himself been crucified might be hailed as a god could not help but be seen by people everywhere across the Roman world as scandalous, obscene, grotesque.” Friedrich Nietzsche blamed Christianity for the modern exaltation of victimhood, part of our “slave morality,” at the expense of what he took to be a more natural moral default: the celebration of mastery and power.

通俗历史学家汤姆·霍兰德在《统治:基督教革命如何重塑世界》中指出,基督徒崇拜一个在十字架上屈辱而死的人,这在当时是多么新奇:“一个自己曾被钉十字架的人竟被尊为神,这在罗马世界的各地人民看来,只能是骇人听闻的、淫秽的、怪诞的。”弗里德里希·尼采将现代人对受害者身份的推崇归咎于基督教,认为这是我们“奴隶道德”的一部分,牺牲了他所认为的更自然的道德默认值:对主宰与权力的颂扬。

Whether or not Nietzsche was right about Christianity’s influence, the contemporary problem may be less about which moral categories we favor than about how crudely we apply them. In a recent article, the psychologist Joshua Conrad Jackson and his colleagues argue that the coarsening of moral categorization reflects the social dynamics of modern life, in which we deal so often with strangers and near-strangers, and lack the information for fine-grained judgment. In large correlational surveys in the United States, Singapore, Germany, and Brazil, they find that community size correlates with the bluntness of moral evaluation. The researchers also suggest a historical shift. An analysis of books over the past two centuries finds that judgments of moral character become more generalized; even in the course of the past two decades, blanket statements about “good people” and “bad people” have become more common.

无论尼采关于基督教影响的判断是否正确,当代的问题或许不在于我们偏爱哪些道德范畴,而在于我们运用这些范畴时有多么粗糙。心理学家约书亚·康拉德·杰克逊及其同事在最近的一篇文章中提出,道德分类的粗化反映了现代生活的社会动态——我们如此频繁地与陌生人和准陌生人打交道,缺乏进行精细判断所需的信息。在美国、新加坡、德国和巴西进行的大型相关性调查中,他们发现社区规模与道德评价的粗钝程度相关。研究者还提出了一个历史性转变。对过去两个世纪书籍的分析发现,对道德品格的判断变得越来越笼统;即便是在过去二十年里,关于“好人”和“坏人”的大而化之的论断也变得更加普遍。

Our social networks have expanded throughout history, moving from nomadic bands to agricultural villages to crowded cities to the disembodied multitudes of the internet. With so many people to evaluate—co-workers, politicians, historical figures, influencers, random people on social media—it’s hard to avoid moral shortcuts. Giving three dimensions to that many people asks more of our attention than we can reliably spare. Is it any wonder our moral culture drifts toward black and white, good and bad, victim and villain?

纵观历史,我们的社交网络不断扩张,从游牧部落到农业村落,再到拥挤的城市,直至互联网上无实体的海量人群。有这么多人需要评估——同事、政客、历史人物、网红、社交媒体上的随机路人——很难避免道德上的捷径。给那么多人赋予立体的维度,所要求的注意力超出了我们能够可靠付出的范围。我们的道德文化漂向非黑即白、好与坏、受害者与恶棍的二元对立,这有什么好奇怪的呢?

Yet we can push back and grant even strangers the nuance they deserve. Fiction provides one of the best laboratories for seeing how flexible our moral psychology can be. Some stories can harden moral perception, of course, pushing us to dichotomize the purely good and the purely evil, as in the moral pornography of superhero comics and revenge flicks. Writing in Aeon, the critic Catherine Nichols argues that this simplification is common in modern popular culture, which can end up “flattening all the deliberation and imagination of ethical action into a single thumbs up or thumbs down.”

然而我们可以反推回去,即便是对陌生人,也给予他们应得的细微差别。小说提供了最好的实验室之一,让我们看到道德心理可以有多么灵活。当然,有些故事会硬化道德感知,迫使我们把纯粹的好与纯粹的恶截然二分,比如超级英雄漫画和复仇电影中的那种道德色情。评论家凯瑟琳·尼科尔斯在《Aeon》杂志上撰文指出,这种简化在现代流行文化中很常见,它最终可能“把伦理行动的所有深思熟虑和想象,压扁成一个简单的竖大拇指或倒竖大拇指”。

But Nichols also asserts that older oral traditions often did better: Homer’s epics weren’t about good guys and bad guys. Plenty of fiction, across eras, does better, too, pushing us toward complex victims and villains, from the protagonists of Shakespeare’s tragedies to the classic antiheroes of cable TV. The worlds of Tony Soprano, Walter White, and Cersei Lannister become more compelling once we grant them the moral complexity we often refuse to grant the people on our side of the screen.

但尼科尔斯也断言,更古老的口头传统往往做得更好:荷马史诗讲的不是好人和坏人的故事。各个时代的许多小说也做得更好,推动我们去面对复杂的受害者和恶棍,从莎士比亚悲剧的主人公到有线电视上的经典反英雄。托尼·索普拉诺、沃尔特·怀特和瑟曦·兰尼斯特的世界之所以更加引人入胜,正是因为我们赋予了他们那种我们常常拒绝赋予屏幕这一侧之人的道德复杂性。

We should try harder. The truth is that we all live in the gray zone, a psychologically awkward reality in which villainy, victimhood, and heroism can mingle in a single person. In the turbulence of the real world, we will not find perfectly monstrous people or perfectly sympathetic ones. Not among our political enemies, not among our historical heroes, not among our martyrs, not among the incels, and not among the collaborators. They are as messy, as gray, and as imperfect as the people who judge them. ♦

我们应该更努力一些。事实是,我们都生活在灰色地带,这是一种在心理上令人别扭的现实:恶棍、受害者与英雄可以在同一个人身上交织并存。在真实世界的动荡中,我们找不到完美无缺的怪物,也找不到完美无缺的可怜人。在我们的政治敌人中没有,在我们的历史英雄中没有,在我们的殉道者中没有,在非自愿独身者中没有,在通敌者中也没有。他们和评判他们的人一样,混乱、灰暗、不完美。♦

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