Books

Who Bankrolled the American Revolution?

谁为美国革命提供了资金?
Our history too often sidesteps the question of finances. But sonorous ideals don’t keep an army supplied with uniforms, guns, and grub.
我们的历史常常回避财政问题。然而,再崇高的理想也无法为军队提供军装、枪械和口粮。
Collage of Washington photo with holes.
Photo illustration by Mike McQuade; Source photographs from Getty

“Money makes the world go round,” the cynical old maxim, and Broadway show tune, runs. “Follow the money,” a maxim minted in the film “All the President’s Men,” has become just as familiar. Yet in practice we rarely follow the money far enough to discover how it actually moved, or who set it in motion. The financing of the material conditions of history—how buses are hired for a great march; who pays for the guerrillas’ guns and grub—mostly remains opaque in our chronicles. When we look at the famous painting of Washington crossing the Delaware, the last question we ask is the first one we should: Who paid for the boat?

“金钱让世界运转”,这句愤世嫉俗的老话,也是百老汇的经典唱词。“跟着钱走”,这句出自电影《总统班底》的格言,如今同样耳熟能详。然而现实中,我们很少真正追踪金钱的流向,去发现它究竟如何流转,又是谁在幕后推动。历史重大事件的物质条件如何获得资金支持——游行队伍的巴士由谁租赁,游击队员的枪支粮食由谁买单——在我们的历史记载中大多仍是未解之谜。当我们凝视华盛顿横渡特拉华河的名画时,最该问的第一个问题往往被我们忽略:那艘船,究竟是谁付的钱?

One reason for this absence is that economic history seems boring when compared with military history, and that economic forces are hard to dissolve into a stream of stirring, distinct individual choices. Money flows more than it leaps; that’s why we follow economic change in charts, with slow, incremental movements up and down, and arrows telling us what is really going on behind the jumpy shadow puppets of politics. Who won the battle? can be simplified, dramatically, into strategic decisions and pivotal moments. Who paid for the soldiers to get there?—and thus made it possible for the battle to be fought at all—usually involves a long-distance jumble of government bonds, loans, and guarantees complex enough to send us back to the battle itself. “One if by land, and two if by sea” is a memorable phrase as we picture Paul Revere on his midnight ride; learning that the British were coming by sea because, so to speak, shifts in Amsterdam bond markets affected British decisions about financing ships feels too remote and intricate to capture our attention.

经济史之所以缺席,原因之一在于它相比军事史显得乏味,经济力量很难分解成一系列激动人心、界限分明的个人抉择。金钱的流动更多是涓涓细流而非惊涛骇浪;正因如此,我们通过图表追踪经济变迁,看着缓慢渐进的涨跌曲线,依靠箭头标识来理解政治皮影戏背后真实的脉动。“谁赢得了战役?”这个问题可以被戏剧性地简化为战略决策与关键瞬间。“谁为士兵支付了军饷?”——从而使得战役得以发生——却往往牵扯到政府债券、贷款与担保构成的远距离乱麻,其复杂程度足以让我们宁愿回头研究战役本身。“陆路一盏灯,海路两盏灯”是镌刻在民族记忆中的诗句,我们仿佛看见保罗·里维尔在午夜策马疾驰;而要说英国人选择海路进攻是因为阿姆斯特丹债券市场的波动影响了英国舰队的融资决策——这种解释既迂回又繁复,实在难以抓住我们的注意力。

Any number of good books and studies aim to remedy this gap in our understanding, and one of the best ways of doing it, paradoxically, is to fix complicated impersonal finances into a figure of a single person who can be thought to have made military-style strategic decisions. In Richard Vague’s new book, “The Banker Who Made America: Thomas Willing and the Rise of the American Financial Aristocracy, 1731-1821” (Polity), we have a hero worthy of the enterprise. Indeed, it is telling that Willing’s name is presented only in the subtitle, on the understandable ground that, without giving the role he played top billing, his name would mean nothing.

市面上不乏旨在弥补这一认知空缺的优秀著作和研究,而其中一种最佳方式,说来矛盾,恰恰是将复杂非人格化的金融体系,凝聚成某个可被视为作出军事化战略决策的个体形象。理查德·维格的新著《缔造美国的银行家:托马斯·威林与美利坚金融贵族的崛起(1731-1821)》(政体出版社)便为我们呈现了这样一位配得上这番事业的英雄。耐人寻味的是,威林的名字仅出现在副标题中——这完全可以理解,若非将其扮演的角色置于首要位置,这个名字本身将毫无意义。

Willing, it turns out, was the very model of a successful Colonial merchant. Born in Philadelphia but trained in law at the Inns of Court in London, he returned home in the late seventeen-forties to become a leading citizen in what was then the unquestioned capital city of the new continent. Philadelphia was founded by the Quakers as a utopian project, but thrived as a commercial port—as a city of merchants, printers, bankers, and speculators. Willing, an Anglican, kept a sharp, cool mind sheathed in a convivial exterior, and moved easily between commerce and politics. He was readily elected mayor in 1763, and took pains to insure that he and his family intermarried with the other stalwarts of his class.

事实证明,威林正是殖民地成功商人的典范。他出生于费城,却在伦敦的律师学院接受法律训练,于十八世纪四十年代末回到家乡,成为当时无可争议的新大陆首府——费城——的领袖人物。费城由贵格会信徒以乌托邦理想建立,却作为商业港口蓬勃发展,成为商人、印刷商、银行家和投机者的城市。身为圣公会信徒的威林,在随和的外表下保持着敏锐冷静的头脑,在商业与政治之间游刃有余。他于1763年顺利当选市长,并费心确保自己家族与本阶级其他中坚力量联姻。

Like Antonio in “The Merchant of Venice,” however, Willing had all his fortune out upon the water. Along with his younger partner, Robert Morris, he traded in wheat and sugar and rum and, occasionally, enslaved Africans. Though the business appeared to be a simple exchange of hard goods for hard money—wheat delivered from America in return for pounds paid in England—the shipping trade was, in fact, the cradle of the market in financial “paper.” The long voyage from home port to market created seemingly endless intervals of uncertainty, often stretching to months and sometimes years. With your goods out on the water, you had to wait ages to be paid and to take your profit. The ocean is an illiquid place.

然而,与《威尼斯商人》中的安东尼奥一样,威林(Willing)的全部身家都押在了海上。他与年轻的合伙人罗伯特·莫里斯(Robert Morris)一起,经营小麦、糖、朗姆酒,偶尔也贩卖被奴役的非洲人。尽管这生意看起来只是硬货与硬通货的简单交换——从美国运来小麦,在英国收取英镑——但航运贸易实际上是金融“票据”市场的摇篮。从母港到市场的漫长航程造成了看似无休止的不确定期,往往长达数月,有时甚至数年。货物在海上漂泊,你必须等待很久才能收到货款、获得利润。海洋是个缺乏流动性的地方。

And so merchants like Willing would draw up what were, in effect, I.O.U.s anticipating their sale. These “bills of exchange” turned goods still on the water into paper that could be traded and discounted as investments in their own right. Like the banks that treat bundles of mortgages as assets to be sliced, parlayed, and traded independently of the condition of the underlying loans, Philadelphia’s maritime merchants could transform cargo at sea—and conceivably already beneath it—into financial instruments with a speculative life of their own. This was, of course, highly risky: there was no guarantee that the goods would ever arrive; if the ships didn’t sink, they could be taken by “privateers,” semi-official pirates licensed by rival European powers. That risk, in turn, generated a parallel market in maritime-insurance policies, which eventually acquired as remote a connection to the actual cargo as the bills of exchange themselves. “Derivatives” were the lifeblood of American commerce from the very beginning.

于是,像威林这样的商人会开出本质上相当于借据的票据,预期未来的销售。这些“汇票”将仍在海上的货物转化为可交易、可贴现的独立投资品。正如银行将抵押贷款组合视为可分割、增值和独立交易的资产,而不再关注底层贷款的实际状况,费城的海运商人也能将海上——甚至可能已沉入海底——的货物转化为具有独立投机属性的金融工具。这当然风险极高:货物能否抵达毫无保障;即便船只不沉没,也可能被“私掠船”劫持——那些获得欧洲敌对势力许可的半官方海盗。这种风险又催生了海运保险的平行市场,最终这些保单与实际货物的关联也变得和汇票一样疏离。“衍生品”从一开始就是美国商业的命脉。

Willing, though in one sense a cold-blooded, high-stakes gambler, played a cautious, centrist part in pre-Revolutionary Pennsylvania politics. And those politics prove far more intricate than the patriotic, tricornered-hat history a child growing up in Philadelphia today might encounter in the ubiquitous sound-and-light shows outside Independence Hall. Quakers still held a special role in the city’s and the colony’s politics, yet they had mainly been crowded out of power by a new merchant élite, largely Anglican or Presbyterian, and by the ascendant farming class in western Pennsylvania. The Quakers, though they would become the beating heart of the American abolitionist movement and, later, the civil-rights movement, were fiercely anti-patriotic; their principled ban on violence of any kind made them wary of even implicit military fervor. Libertarian in their quietist way—people should be free to think their own thoughts—they were not about to pick up a gun for any cause, however estimable.

威林虽然从某种意义上说是个冷血的高风险赌徒,但在革命前的宾夕法尼亚政坛却扮演着谨慎的中间派角色。这些政治现实远比今天在费城长大的孩子可能在独立宫外随处可见的声光秀中接触到的爱国三角帽历史复杂得多。贵格会教徒在费城乃至整个殖民地的政治中仍扮演着特殊角色,但他们大多已被新的商人精英(主要是圣公会或长老会信徒)以及宾夕法尼亚西部崛起的农场主阶层排挤出权力中心。贵格会教徒尽管后来成为美国废奴运动乃至民权运动的核心力量,当时却激烈反对爱国运动;他们基于原则禁止任何形式的暴力,甚至对隐性的军事狂热也保持警惕。他们以寂静主义的方式秉持自由意志——人们应当自由思考——却不愿为任何事业拿起武器,无论那事业多么崇高。

The farmers and small merchants of western Pennsylvania, meanwhile, were egalitarian in affect, at least, but also, shaped by their evangelical faith, far more religiously conservative than the often British-educated Philadelphians, whose Anglicanism could tilt toward an abstract Enlightenment deism. The Pennsylvania farmers and pioneers wanted to be free from domination by condescending city people; the city people wanted to be free to make money and speak their minds without the farmers’ prejudices. The populist farmers believed in equality and called it liberty; the educated élite believed in liberty and called it equality. It was a divide that would never really end.

与此同时,宾夕法尼亚西部的农民和小商贩至少在气质上是平等主义者,但受福音派信仰影响,他们的宗教观念远比常受英式教育的费城人保守——后者信奉的圣公会教义往往倾向于抽象的启蒙自然神论。宾州农民与拓荒者渴望摆脱傲慢都市人的支配;都市人则希望自由赚钱、畅所欲言,不受农民偏见的束缚。民粹派农民信奉平等,称之为自由;知识精英信奉自由,称之为平等。这道裂痕从未真正弥合。

Vague is especially good at explaining why the British demanded the notorious “taxation without representation,” and why the colonists responded so furiously. British banks—and, with them, the British government—had, after fighting wars in Europe, sunk into an almost absurd level of debt, producing bank failures and, in 1772, something like a Great Recession at home. In effect, the mother country turned to its thriving colonies to pay the bill for its European wars. The so-called Intolerable Acts, as well as the Stamp Act and the tax on tea that enraged Boston’s patriots, were efforts by the British government to claw back money from the colonies to cover the imperial deficit. The colonists shrieked at being asked to pay in ways they never had before, but the British believed that this was precisely the point of having colonies: like dutiful children, they were meant to acquire, in maturity, the ability to settle accounts when the parents faltered. As Samuel Johnson, a paid propagandist for imperial authority, put it, “We do not put a calf into the plow; we wait till he is an ox.”

韦格尤其擅长解释,为何英国人会提出臭名昭著的“无代表权征税”要求,而殖民地居民又为何反应如此激烈。英国银行——以及随之而来的英国政府——在欧洲战事结束后,陷入了近乎荒谬的债务深渊,导致银行接连倒闭,并在1772年引发了类似“大衰退”的国内危机。实际上,这个宗主国转而向繁荣的殖民地索取资金,以填补其欧洲战事造成的亏空。所谓的《不可容忍法案》,以及激怒波士顿爱国者的《印花税法》和茶叶税,都是英国政府试图从殖民地榨取资金以弥补帝国赤字的手段。殖民地居民对前所未见的征税方式发出激烈抗议,但英国人认为这正是拥有殖民地的意义所在:如同孝顺的子女,当父母步履蹒跚时,长大成人的他们理应具备清偿债务的能力。正如帝国当局的御用宣传家塞缪尔·约翰逊所言:“我们不会让牛犊拉犁,要等它长成壮牛。”

This ox was gored, or felt itself to be. Yet the proper response was endlessly debated, with agrarian radicals pressing for immediate independence, city-bound conservatives searching for ways to placate London without surrendering Colonial rights or money, and a smaller group remaining loyal to the King. Vague makes much of the inherent civil conflict within Pennsylvania. Perhaps he makes too much of it. What is impressive is not that the American Revolution in Pennsylvania, as elsewhere, was more divided than later patriotic histories and pageants suggest—what else would one expect?—but that, unlike the coming French Revolution, or indeed the earlier English one, it somehow avoided sliding into a mutual massacre or an authoritarian party seizing control. Sectarian disputes were annealed by cultural habits of consensus-building and grudging coexistence, possibly rooted in the thinness of Colonial society and the brevity of its history, with the brutal frontier and the Indigenous “enemy” a constant presence.

这头牛被刺伤了,或者说它自认为如此。然而何为恰当回应却引发了无休止的辩论:激进的农业派主张立即独立,城市保守派则寻求既能安抚伦敦又不牺牲殖民地权利与金钱的折中方案,另有少数人始终效忠英王。瓦格(Vague)着力渲染宾夕法尼亚内部固有的民间冲突,或许有些过度渲染了。真正令人惊叹的并非宾夕法尼亚——与其他殖民地一样——在美国革命中的分裂程度远超后世爱国史书与庆典所呈现的模样(这本在预料之中),而在于这场革命竟能避免滑向相互屠杀或某个专制派系夺权的深渊,这与后来的法国革命乃至更早的英国革命形成鲜明对比。宗派分歧被殖民地社会根深蒂固的文化习惯所消融——那些致力于建立共识、勉强共存的传统,或许源于殖民地社会的稀薄人口与短暂历史,也离不开始终横亘在边疆的残酷现实与“原住民敌人”的持续威胁。

So the real political question was whether maritime merchants like Willing—outraged by British bullying but with little appetite for political revolution—would ultimately throw in their lot with the radicals and the idealists. Vague is clear that Willing was unwilling. A reluctant delegate to the Continental Congress in 1775 and 1776, he voted against the Declaration of Independence and then retreated into private life in Philadelphia. And yet, over the next several years, he and his firm continued to play a central role in financing the rebels, even while cagily keeping their distance from the revolutionary cause. When the British invaded Philadelphia during the war, most patriots fled; Willing stayed behind, negotiating—and even working closely—with the occupying British authorities.

因此,真正的政治问题在于:像威林(Willing)这样的海商——他们虽对英国的霸凌行径义愤填膺,却对政治革命兴致索然——最终是否会与激进派和理想主义者同舟共济。瓦格明确指出,威林并不情愿。作为1775至1776年大陆会议的勉强与会代表,他投票反对《独立宣言》,随后便退隐费城,不问政事。然而,在接下来的数年里,他和他的公司继续在为反叛者提供资金方面扮演关键角色,同时却精明地与革命事业保持距离。战争期间英军攻占费城时,大多数爱国者纷纷逃离;威林却留了下来,与占领费城的英国当局周旋谈判,甚至密切合作。

Yet even as he played it close to the vest he was throwing tricorne hats to the Army. Willing and Morris could ship goods in demand—tobacco, flour, rice—to Europe on consignment, while converting the anticipated profits of those voyages into bills of exchange, the proceeds of which they passed on to George Washington to buy uniforms, guns, and horses for his army. Throughout the war, the good word of Willing and Morris was enough to keep the system afloat.

然而,即便行事谨慎如他,也向大陆军抛出了三角帽的象征。威林与莫里斯公司可将紧俏物资——烟草、面粉、大米——以寄售方式运往欧洲,同时将这些航程的预期利润转化为汇票,再将汇票收益转交乔治·华盛顿,为他的军队购置军服、枪械与马匹。整场战争期间,仅凭威林与莫里斯公司的信誉就足以维系这套体系的运转。

How did this work? It is startling for a reader to discover that, fully fifteen years ago, the late California journalist Charles Rappleye wrote a biography of Morris that essentially claimed for him the role Vague reserves for Willing—as the “financier of the American Revolution,” to use the earlier book’s subtitle. Although Rappleye & Vague sounds like a Colonial law firm dreamed up by Henry James, it is nonetheless odd that two books about two conjoined partners should make such different cases. Nor does Vague—himself a career financier and once the secretary of banking and securities for Pennsylvania—mount any assault on Rappleye’s interpretation. Apart from one cryptic aside noting that Morris was always in a subordinate role, Vague simply tells his own story, without contesting the truth of the earlier one.

这究竟是怎么回事?读者会惊讶地发现,早在整整十五年前,已故加州记者查尔斯·拉普利(Charles Rappleye)就为莫里斯写过传记,其副标题“美国革命的金融家”所赋予莫里斯的角色,与维格为威林保留的角色如出一辙。尽管“拉普利与维格”听起来像是亨利·詹姆斯虚构的殖民地律师事务所,但关于这对合伙搭档的两部著作竟提出如此迥异的论断,终究令人费解。而身为职业金融家、曾任宾夕法尼亚州银行与证券部长的维格,也并未对拉普利的解读提出任何质疑。除了一句隐晦的旁白指出莫里斯始终处于从属地位外,维格只是平静地讲述着自己的故事,全然未对前作的真实性提出异议。

It would appear, in synthesis and to borrow a pleasing opposition of human types from John Milton, that Morris was the active Allegro principle of the firm, while Willing was the more withdrawn but vigilant Penseroso. Morris evidently took the lead during the war in supplying Washington’s troops; Willing remained the presiding presence and, not surprisingly, emerged financially intact, even as Morris ended up in bankruptcy.

综合来看,借用约翰·弥尔顿笔下那对令人愉悦的人格对照——莫里斯无疑是商号中活跃的“欢乐颂”原则,而威灵则是更为内敛却时刻警醒的“沉思者”。战争期间,莫里斯显然在供应华盛顿军队方面担当主导;威灵始终是坐镇全局的存在,也难怪他最终能全身而退,财务毫发无损,而莫里斯却落得破产收场。

What exactly did they do? The answer seems to be that they took advantage of their reputation as solid conservative men of business to finance a radical cause. Scaling up the established practice of issuing lines of credit for ships out on the water, they took bills of exchange, payable in the ports of France and Amsterdam, and sold them, or borrowed against them, in the colonies, to pay for uniforms, guns, and horses. They basically took the credit they held abroad—Amsterdam being the Hong Kong of the period—and redeployed it locally to support Washington’s army.

他们究竟做了什么?答案似乎是:他们利用自己作为可靠保守派商人的声誉,为一个激进事业提供资金支持。他们将“为远航船只提供信用额度”这一成熟业务规模化运作,把可在法国和阿姆斯特丹港口兑付的汇票拿到殖民地出售或抵押借款,用以支付军装、枪支和马匹的费用。他们本质上将自己在海外——阿姆斯特丹堪称当时的香港——持有的信用,重新调配到北美本土,用以支持华盛顿的军队。
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The paradox was that their credit as merchants was sounder than the new country’s credit as a state. Morris later began issuing what amounted to a private currency: personal notes, denominated in sums of twenty, fifty, and eighty dollars. “My personal credit,” he explained, “has been substituted for that the country has lost.” And in the back of the minds of all wide-awake merchants was the shared understanding that the King of France, England’s great enemy, would ultimately stand behind the bills of exchange, even if the ships were sunk or the bills themselves went unpaid. Under the combined pressure of Benjamin Franklin’s diplomacy and the sympathies of Enlightenment-minded French courtiers, he did.

吊诡之处在于,这些商人的信用比这个新生国家的国家信用更为可靠。莫里斯后来开始发行一种近乎私人货币的票据:面额为二十、五十和八十美元的个人本票。“我的个人信用,”他解释道,“已经取代了这个国家丧失的信用。”而在所有精明商人的潜意识里,都存在着一种共识:即便船只沉没或汇票本身无法兑付,法国的国王——英国的头号敌人——最终会为这些汇票提供担保。在本杰明·富兰克林的外交斡旋与启蒙思想熏陶下的法国朝臣们的共同推动下,法国国王确实这样做了。

Yet one need not imagine Willing and Morris as proto–Bruce Wayne figures, secret radicals in conservative clothing. It seems more likely that they were making a complicated, coolheaded hedge on the outcome of the war. Even if the conflict appeared to favor British arms and the Royal Navy, it must have been clear that this David, though armed only with a slingshot, stood a real chance of felling Goliath, however large he loomed.

不过,我们也不必把威林和莫里斯想象成布鲁斯·韦恩式的人物,披着保守主义外衣的秘密激进分子。更可能的情况是,他们是在对战争结果进行一场复杂而冷静的对冲。即便战局看似有利于英军和皇家海军,他们想必也清楚,这个手持弹弓的大卫,面对再高大的歌利亚,也确有将其击倒的可能。

What gave weight to the slingshot, in this case, were two realities. First was the simple fact, common to all Colonial conflicts, that the colonized were in the colonies, while the colonizer was not, or at least not in sufficient numbers. The war, financed by the Americans on hope and a shoestring, was even more unaffordable for the British. Franklin made the grisly point in his correspondence with the London radical Joseph Priestley that the cost of killing an American soldier ran to some twenty thousand pounds per Yankee. Even if the British had prevailed in the immediate fighting, some form of national independence was bound to follow: there was no army large enough to pacify the rebels permanently.

赋予弹弓威力的,是两种现实。首先是一个简单事实——所有殖民冲突的共性——被殖民者身处殖民地,而殖民者不在,至少数量不足。这场由美国人靠希望和微薄资金支撑的战争,对英国人而言更是难以承受。富兰克林在与伦敦激进派约瑟夫·普里斯特利的通信中提出了一个骇人的观点:杀死一名美国士兵的成本高达每名扬基佬两万英镑。即使英国人能在眼前的战斗中获胜,某种形式的民族独立也必将随之而来:没有一支军队足够庞大,能永久平定叛乱者。

And Willing and Morris must have known that, if the rebels lost, it was extremely unlikely that the British—whatever they did to military or political leaders—could, or would, hang or banish the merchants who had backed the rebels. Life, and business, would go on. And if the rebels won? Then the rewards would be immense for those who had financed the victory. When Philadelphia’s merchants finally banded together to form the Pennsylvania Bank, consolidating their credit, as Morris had earlier done on behalf of the new country, it was because they had come to see this as a sound wager. James Madison wrote that “our greatest hopes are founded on a patriotic scheme of the opulent merchants of this city.” Patriotic it was, but, by 1780, with Washington still in the field, having weathered even the loss of Charleston, the war’s worst defeat, it was also shrewd. This was the greatest consolidated special-purpose vehicle in American history: “opulent merchants” pooling their credit to take a chance on a high-risk new startup, the United States.

威尔和莫里斯想必也明白,如果叛军失败,无论英国人对军事或政治领袖采取何种手段,他们几乎不可能——也不会——处决或流放那些支持叛军的商人。生活与生意仍将继续。而如果叛军获胜呢?那么为胜利提供资金支持的人将获得巨大回报。当费城的商人们最终联合起来组建宾夕法尼亚银行、整合他们的信贷时——正如莫里斯早先代表这个新生国家所做的那样——是因为他们已将这视为一笔稳妥的赌注。詹姆斯·麦迪逊写道:“我们最大的希望寄托于这座城市富商们的爱国计划。”这确实是爱国之举,但到了1780年,华盛顿仍在战场上坚持,甚至熬过了查尔斯顿陷落这场战争中最惨痛的失败,此时这种举动更显精明。这是美国历史上最宏大的整合型特殊目的载体:“富有的商人们”汇集他们的信用,押注于一个高风险的新兴初创企业——美利坚合众国。

Both Vague and Rappleye, despite much research, have a hard time giving us an idea of what the daily lives and inner conflicts of their heroes were like. The usual material of political biography—the turbulent whirlpools these men survived, the emotional crises they surmounted—is largely absent. We learn of dynastic marriages, marooned brothers, house purchases, and expanded properties, but we never quite feel for our heroes as they struggle.

尽管瓦格和拉普利都做了大量研究,却很难让我们了解主人公的日常生活与内心冲突。政治传记常见的素材——这些人物如何挺过政治漩涡、如何克服情感危机——在书中几乎不见踪影。我们读到的是王朝联姻、被流放的兄弟、购置的房产、扩张的产业,却始终无法真切感受到主人公在挣扎时的内心波澜。

This is partly because neither man left behind intimate diaries or much by way of personal correspondence—but one reason they did not is that shrewd bankers and speculators tend toward a necessary caution and conformism, reserving their daring for their ledgers rather than their letters. To be a good poet or pamphleteer, like Thomas Paine or Samuel Johnson, requires a kind of day-to-day daring, with triumphs made in conversation and correspondence; a good banker or stockbroker makes his in columns of numbers. Money is earned by sensing where the collective mind will be six months from now, not by imagining what the world might look like in sixty years. The men who guessed right about “the big short,” in 2008, did not profit because they possessed a grand theory of capitalist collapse; they profited because they bet on November rather than on the following April. On this point, Ayn Rand could not have been more wrong. The successful men of money are not those who refuse to run with the herd but those who run just alongside it, alert to where it is likely to turn next.

部分原因在于,两人都未曾留下私密日记或大量私人信件——而他们之所以没有,是因为精明的银行家和投机者往往倾向于必要的谨慎与从众,将胆识留给了账本而非书信。要成为像托马斯·潘恩或塞缪尔·约翰逊那样的优秀诗人或政论家,需要一种日复一日的勇气,在交谈与书信中成就胜利;而优秀的银行家或股票经纪人则在数字的列阵中赢得胜利。财富的积累靠的是感知集体意识六个月后的走向,而非想象六十年后的世界模样。2008年那些押中“大空头”的人获利,并非因为他们掌握了资本主义崩溃的宏大理论;他们获利是因为赌对了十一月而非次年四月。在这一点上,安·兰德错得不能再错。成功的金融巨子并非那些拒绝随波逐流的人,而是那些紧贴羊群奔跑、敏锐预判其下一步转向的人。

Though many enterprising merchants can fairly be cast as corsairs or buccaneers, a surprising number are, as people, curiously pallid. J. P. Morgan and August Belmont are surrounded by drama, yet remain, in their own lives, as hooded as cobras. It is telling that the most successful speculator of our time, Warren Buffett, insists on his own drab normalcy (and attributes his fortune primarily to luck), and that the books about him, even when they strain to puncture this modesty, mostly confirm it. Like Gustave Flaubert’s ideal artist, who lives as a dull bourgeois in order to be radical on the page, great merchant bankers and speculators of this sort tend to keep their secrets hidden, becoming radical only on their own pages, those of their account books. The fruits of finance are not boring, but the facts of finance often are, involving fewer bold visions of posterity than subtle gradations of possibility.

尽管许多有魄力的商人确实可被视作海盗或冒险家,但令人惊讶的是,其中相当多的人物本身却出奇地苍白。J·P·摩根与奥古斯特·贝尔蒙周身环绕着戏剧性,但在他们自己的生活中,却如眼镜蛇般藏匿于兜帽之下。耐人寻味的是,我们这个时代最成功的投机者沃伦·巴菲特坚持自己平庸如常(并将财富主要归因于运气),而关于他的书籍,即便竭力试图刺穿这种谦逊,也大多印证了这一点。正如古斯塔夫·福楼拜心目中理想的艺术家——在生活中是乏味的中产者,才能在纸上展现激进——这类伟大的商人银行家与投机者往往将秘密深藏,只在自己的账本页面上才变得激进。金融的果实并不乏味,但金融的事实常常如此,其中关乎未来的大胆愿景寥寥,更多的却是可能性的微妙渐变。

It was after the war that Willing became central as an agent of the Hamiltonian vision. He and the Treasury Secretary became close allies, with Willing serving as the first chief of the Bank of North America, briefly conceived as a national bank. And, where Willing had stood off from the Continental Congress that produced the Declaration of Independence, he played an active, superintending role at the Constitutional Convention of 1787.

战争结束后,威林(Willing)作为汉密尔顿愿景的推动者开始崭露头角。他与财政部长结为亲密盟友,并担任北美银行首任行长——该银行曾一度被构想为国家银行。当威林曾对起草《独立宣言》的大陆会议保持距离时,却在1787年的制宪会议上扮演了积极的主导角色。

Vague reads the Constitution as a businessman’s document above all, only lightly amended by a last-minute agrarian-derived individualism; it’s a charter drawn up with a merchant’s hopeful gleam, uneasily matched by a farmer’s doubtful frown. The Bill of Rights, Vague reminds us, was tacked on at the end as a kind of grumbling, Southern, libertarian insurance policy against the centralizing, capitalist drift of the rest. It is Vague’s aim, as the book’s subtitle suggests, to show how the pro-business side produced a “financial aristocracy,” though the language of aristocracy made the new Constitution seem more monolithic than it was. Vague calls this a “counter-revolution,” but it looks less like a reversal than like a continuation of the Revolution’s own divided, grudgingly conciliatory spirit, carried forward by other means. The same uneasy coalition of democratic egalitarians and libertarian élites that made the Revolution also sustained it afterward, and remained in place, until our own time.

在瓦格看来,《宪法》首先是一份商人文件,只是在最后关头被源自农业传统的个人主义稍作修正;它是一份带着商人满怀希望的闪光起草的宪章,却与农民疑虑的皱眉不安地匹配。瓦格提醒我们,《权利法案》是在最后附加的,作为一种南方自由主义者对中央集权、资本主义倾向的抱怨式保险政策。正如本书副标题所示,瓦格旨在展示亲商业的一方如何催生了“金融贵族”,尽管“贵族”的措辞使新宪法显得比实际情况更为铁板一块。瓦格称此为“反革命”,但这看起来与其说是逆转,不如说是革命本身分裂的、勉强妥协精神的延续,只是以其他方式进行。正是民主平等主义者与自由派精英之间这种不安的联盟,既促成了革命,也在革命后维系了它,并一直延续至今。

Both Vague and Rappleye do the good work of reminding readers of the financial current flowing into an ideological revolution. It is astounding to see that the habits of finance which we think of as recent and decadent—all that paper, all that venture capital, all that uninsured risk—were present at the creation. There is even a scent of crypto in the ease with which Willing and Morris circulated paper currency backed by nothing more than their backing.

瓦格和拉普利都出色地提醒读者,一场意识形态革命背后涌动着怎样的金融暗流。令人震惊的是,那些我们以为属于近期金融堕落风气的操作——那些票据、那些风险投资、那些无担保的风险——其实在建国之初就已存在。威灵和莫里斯仅凭自身信用就能让纸币流通无阻,这种操作甚至隐隐透出加密货币的气息。

Yet one comes away, in the end, more inclined than ever to respect the ideas that drove the interest rates more than the interest rates that drove the ideas. To say that the big question is who could afford to pay for the guns is to be reminded that the guns are where the power lies. Alexander Hamilton insisted that “tis by order of our finances—by restoring public credit—not by gaining battles, that we are finally to gain our object,” but finances mattered chiefly because they helped sew uniforms and supply arms, not because they made men fight. One reason we do not always follow the money is that it isn’t always decisive. Washington’s army remained a makeshift force, supported by matériel but sustained by morale.

然而最终,人们更倾向于尊重驱动利率的理念,而非驱动理念的利率。若说核心问题是谁能负担得起军费,那便提醒我们,权力正系于枪杆之上。亚历山大·汉密尔顿坚称“我们最终实现目标,靠的是整顿财政、恢复公信,而非赢得战役”,但财政之所以重要,主要在于它能缝制军装、供给武器,而非直接激励士兵战斗。我们之所以不总追索金钱的流向,是因为金钱并非总是决定性因素。华盛顿的军队始终是一支临时拼凑的力量,物资支撑其存在,士气却维系其生命。

It is true that bankruptcy can break a country on the battlefield—but almost invariably the battlefield defeat comes first, with the recognition of bankruptcy following in its wake. That was the pattern in France’s defeat by Prussia, in 1871, and in Russia against Germany in 1917: military collapse forced a belated reckoning with the depth of national debt. Even absolute immiseration has ambiguous effects. As W. H. Auden, one of the members of the American mission sent to assess the consequences of Allied bombing after the Second World War, discovered, the unimaginably brutal air campaign did little to erode German faith in the Third Reich. Communal commitment, national myth, shared passions—all the things we group under the heading of “ideology”—often prove more powerful than narrowly defined material “interests.” Washington seems to have grasped this intuitively. As long as he avoided outright defeat and kept his men sufficiently inspired to carry on, while waiting for the French Navy to arrive, he and his new country could survive.

诚然,财政破产足以让一个国家在战场上崩溃——但几乎总是军事失利在先,财政破产的认知随之而来。1871年法国败于普鲁士、1917年俄国败于德国皆是如此:军事溃败迫使战败国迟来地清算国债的深渊。即便是极端的贫困,其影响也充满矛盾。正如战后被派往评估盟军轰炸效果的美国使团成员W·H·奥登所发现的,那场难以想象的残酷空袭几乎未能削弱德国人对第三帝国的信念。集体奉献、民族神话、共同激情——所有我们归为“意识形态”的事物——往往比狭义的物质“利益”更具力量。华盛顿似乎凭直觉领悟了这一点。只要避免彻底溃败,让士兵们保持足够斗志坚持战斗,同时等待法国海军的驰援,他和他的新生国家就能存活下去。

For it turns out that the question of who rented the boat has an easy, if surprising, answer: nobody. Washington simply took it. He commandeered small crafts along the Delaware, seizing them under the claim of military necessity, and so won a “battle” at Trenton that was scarcely more than a skirmish but could be advertised as a victory. Once he had his men in camp, he neither paid nor clothed them particularly well, but he had Paine’s latest pamphlet read aloud to keep their spirits up. Willing and Morris helped to pay for horses and uniforms. Yet these were worthless unless the men on the horses and inside the uniforms believed that they were fighting for one another and for an ideal. They might grumble about the lack of boots and beer, but they stayed because they recognized the uncommon sense of “Common Sense.” It takes money to pay for uniforms, but it takes belief to keep them buttoned.

因为事实证明,谁租了船这个问题有个简单却出人意料的答案:根本没人租。华盛顿直接征用了它。他沿着特拉华河强征小型船只,以军事需要为由将其扣押,从而赢得了特伦顿那场“战役”——那几乎只能算小规模冲突,却能被宣传为一场胜利。当他把士兵安顿在营地后,既没有给予丰厚军饷,也没有提供像样军装,但他让人大声朗读潘恩的最新小册子来鼓舞士气。威林和莫里斯出资购买了马匹和军装。然而,如果骑在马上、穿着军装的人不相信他们是在为彼此、为一个理想而战,这些物资便毫无价值。士兵们或许会抱怨缺少靴子和啤酒,但他们留了下来,因为他们从《常识》中认清了那种非凡的洞见。购置军装需要金钱,但让军装纽扣系紧的,是信念。

In reality, those American money maxims contain only partial truths. “Follow the money” was a poor guide to understanding Watergate, which arose not from motives of recognizable greed but to the still puzzling paranoia of a popular President who could not accept that he was popular. Interests may be downstream of ideology, but money is downstream of both. Bankers can rationally gamble on the consequences of events, but the events themselves are shaped by mysterious and often irrational forces—which is why the speculator needs to stay so close to the fine turnings. That old song may face the wrong way: the world goes round, and makes money go around it. ♦

事实上,那些美国式的金钱箴言只道出了部分真相。“跟着钱走”这句口号在理解水门事件时显得苍白无力——那场丑闻并非源于可辨识的贪婪动机,而是源于一位深得民心的总统令人费解的偏执,他始终无法相信自己真的广受欢迎。利益或许流淌在意识形态的下游,但金钱则漂浮在两者的更下游。银行家们可以理性地押注事件后果,但事件本身往往由神秘且非理性的力量塑造——这正是投机者必须紧贴微妙动向的原因。那首老歌或许唱反了方向:是世界在转动,驱使着金钱围绕它旋转。♦

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