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What’s Really Behind the Baby Bust?

婴儿荒背后的真正原因是什么?
People say they want more children than they’re having. Is modern life stopping them—or have our ideas about a good life changed?
人们说自己想要的孩子比实际生育的更多。是现代生活阻碍了他们——还是我们对美好生活的观念已经改变?
A person walking a dog by a body of water.
Illustration by Cristina Spanò

If you’ve followed the debate over falling birth rates in the United States, you could be forgiven for thinking that most of the fretting comes from the anti-feminist right. In recent years, Vice-President J. D. Vance has emerged as a cranky pro-natalist, deriding “childless cat ladies,” blaming “secular global liberalism” for population decline, and, in happier moments, as at an anti-abortion rally last year, declaring, “I want more babies in the United States of America” and more “beautiful young men and women” eager to make and rear them. A report from the conservative Heritage Foundation earlier this year sounded the alarm over the drop in U.S. fertility, linking it to “second-wave feminism” and other familiar culture-war culprits: “casual sex, abortion, childlessness by choice, and no-fault divorce,” all of which menaced “the natural family,” which was helmed by a heterosexual husband and wife. Many of these voices agree with the determinedly fecund Elon Musk (at least fourteen kids and counting), who has said, “Population collapse due to low birth rates is a much bigger risk to civilization than global warming.” Recent polling shows that, among the growing percentage of Americans who think we should be at least somewhat worried about the birth rate, men worry more than women, and Republicans more than Democrats.

如果你关注过美国关于出生率下降的争论,你可能会以为大部分的焦虑来自反女权主义的右翼,这情有可原。近年来,副总统J·D·万斯(J. D. Vance)成了一个脾气暴躁的生育鼓吹者,他嘲讽“无孩猫女士”,将人口下降归咎于“世俗全球自由主义”,而在更愉快的场合——比如去年的一次反堕胎集会上——他宣称“我要美利坚合众国有更多的婴儿”,还要更多“漂亮的年轻男女”渴望生育和抚养他们。保守派智库传统基金会(Heritage Foundation)今年早些时候发布的一份报告对美国生育率的下降敲响了警钟,将其与“第二波女权主义”及其他熟悉的文化战争罪魁祸首联系起来:“随意性行为、堕胎、自愿无子女、无过错离婚”,所有这些都威胁到了“自然家庭”——即由异性恋丈夫和妻子掌舵的家庭。这些声音中有许多与坚定多产的埃隆·马斯克(Elon Musk,至少十四个孩子且还在增加)意见一致,他曾说:“低出生率导致的人口崩溃对文明的威胁远大于全球变暖。”最近的民调显示,在越来越多的认为我们应该对出生率至少有些担忧的美国人中,男性比女性更担忧,共和党人比民主党人更担忧。

Running through this conversation is a theory about what people want. A big reason people have fewer children, the argument goes, is that they no longer want them enough. Feminism, secularism, individualism, and sexual freedom have weakened the old attachments to marriage and family. In this account, the explanation is largely cultural.

贯穿这场争论的是一种关于人们想要什么的理论。这种论点认为,人们生育更少孩子的一个重要原因是,他们对孩子的渴望不再那么强烈。女权主义、世俗主义、个人主义和性自由削弱了人们对婚姻和家庭的旧有依恋。在这种叙述中,解释主要是文化层面的。

Another story about falling fertility, however, begins from almost the opposite premise: plenty of people still want children, often more than they wind up having. What has changed are the social and economic conditions people need to create the families they’d hoped to have. Housing is ruinously expensive. Child care is costly, too. Jobs are demanding and insecure. Finding a reliable partner can feel harder than ever. From this perspective, the fertility slump is a record of frustrated longing.

然而,关于生育率下降的另一种说法,出发点几乎完全相反:很多人仍然想要孩子,而且往往想要比最终拥有的更多。改变的是人们创建他们曾希望拥有的家庭所需的社会和经济条件。住房贵得离谱。托儿服务同样昂贵。工作压力大且不稳定。找到一个可靠的伴侣似乎比以往任何时候都难。从这个角度看,生育率的低迷是一份受挫渴望的记录。

Anna Louie Sussman, the author of “Inconceivable: The Impossibility of Family in an Age of Uncertainty” (Dey Street), forcefully makes this second case. She is not a social conservative or a soapbox pro-natalist. The censorious baby boosters at Heritage would not be fans of the way she chose to reproduce. Sussman, a single journalist in New York, travelled to Bologna to retrieve eggs that she’d frozen there six years earlier, when she was thirty-four (egg freezing was cheaper in Europe), then flew to another European city, charged about three thousand dollars to her credit card for an embryo-transfer procedure (it would have cost about fifteen thousand dollars in the U.S.), and got pregnant. Her gay best friend, Anthony, became her daughter’s adoptive father, and his parents joined a small, devoted community of caregivers for their child.

安娜·路易·萨斯曼(Anna Louie Sussman)是《不可思议:不确定时代中家庭的不可可能性》(Inconceivable: The Impossibility of Family in an Age of Uncertainty,Dey Street出版社)一书的作者,她有力地论证了第二种观点。她不是社会保守派,也不是站在肥皂箱上鼓吹生育的人。传统基金会那些爱指手画脚的婴儿鼓动者不会喜欢她选择生育的方式。萨斯曼是纽约的一名单身记者,她前往博洛尼亚取回六年前、三十四岁时在那里冷冻的卵子(在欧洲冻卵更便宜),然后飞到另一个欧洲城市,用信用卡支付了大约三千美元的胚胎移植手术费用(在美国这项手术大约要花一万五千美元),并成功怀孕。她的同性恋挚友安东尼(Anthony)成了她女儿的养父,安东尼的父母也加入了这个小小的、尽心尽力的育儿共同体。

Sussman nevertheless shares Vance and Musk’s conviction that something has gone seriously wrong when so few babies are being born. She just views the shortage as symptomatic of societal woes that conservatives have little to say about: the costs of housing, health care, and higher education; fear of a climate-changed future; feelings of precarity, immediate and anticipated; and obstacles to finding a potential co-parent. She largely attributes these phenomena to the workings of modern capitalism on our bank accounts and psyches. She is less concerned with the birth rate per se than with the experience of forgoing children. She is not, she writes, “arguing for people to have more or fewer children, or about the importance of children for economic purposes”—shoring up tax bases, saving pension systems, and the like.

尽管如此,萨斯曼与万斯和马斯克一样确信,当出生的婴儿如此之少时,一定出了严重的问题。她只是将这种短缺视为社会弊病的症状,而保守派对这些弊病几乎无话可说:住房、医疗和高等教育的成本;对气候变化未来的恐惧;当下和预期中的不稳定感;以及寻找潜在共同抚养人的障碍。她将这些现象主要归因于现代资本主义对我们银行账户和心灵的运作。她关心的与其说是出生率本身,不如说是放弃生育的体验。她写道,她并不是“在主张人们应该多生或少生孩子,也不是在强调孩子对经济目的的重要性”——比如巩固税基、拯救养老金体系之类。

What troubles Sussman is the gap between how many kids people say they want and how many are born. A 2025 U.N. study asked fourteen thousand people across fourteen countries how many children they wanted and how many they expected to have. Most wanted two; not even four in ten expected to achieve that. A Gallup poll that year showed something similar among Americans surveyed: forty per cent said that having two children was optimal, and twenty-seven per cent said three. (That’s roughly in line with results from previous decades.) But at current rates many families won’t get there.

让萨斯曼感到不安的,是人们说想要的孩子数量与实际出生数量之间的差距。2025年联合国的一项研究调查了十四个国家的一万四千人,问他们想要几个孩子、预计会有几个。大多数人想要两个;预计能实现这一目标的人不到四成。同年盖洛普的一项民调在美国受访者中显示了类似的结果:百分之四十的人说生两个孩子最理想,百分之二十七的人说三个。(这与前几十年的结果大致相符。)但按照目前的生育率,许多家庭无法达到这个数字。

“When so many people hesitate to have children,” Sussman writes, “what is lost is not simply future taxpayers or consumers. We miss out on the rich relationships that bond us across generations, on the flood of love and tenderness that caring for children, or simply being around them, can unleash.” She adds that the “retreat from parenthood also encapsulates a dissatisfaction with our present so extreme it has become a vote against the future.”

萨斯曼写道:“当如此多的人对生育犹豫不决时,失去的不仅仅是未来的纳税人或消费者。我们错过了将我们跨代联结在一起的丰富关系,错过了照顾孩子——或者仅仅是和他们在一起——所能释放的爱与温柔的洪流。”她补充说,“从为人父母中退缩,也浓缩了我们对当下的一种极端不满,这种不满已经变成了对未来的否决票。”

The scale of the fertility decline makes the issue hard to dismiss. Global fertility rates fell from an average of about five births per woman in the nineteen-sixties to 2.2 in 2024. Most countries, representing about seventy per cent of the world’s population, have rates below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman. In the United States, the rate is now 1.6. In South Korea—where dog strollers outsell baby strollers, and playgrounds and elementary-school classrooms can be eerily empty—it is below one. In the U.S., almost half of women aged thirty are childless, compared with eighteen per cent in 1976.

生育率下降的规模使这个问题难以被忽视。全球生育率从二十世纪六十年代平均每名妇女约五胎下降到2024年的2.2胎。大多数国家——约占世界人口的百分之七十——的生育率低于每名妇女2.1胎的更替水平。在美国,这一比率目前为1.6。在韩国——那里的宠物狗推车销量超过婴儿推车,游乐场和小学教室可能空得令人毛骨悚然——这一数字低于1。在美国,三十岁女性中近一半没有孩子,而1976年这一比例为百分之十八。

So who has the better analysis of what is happening? Have people’s priorities changed, or has building the families they hoped for become more onerous? If millions still want children but are discouraged from having them, then the fertility slump marks a substantial social failure. And there is plenty in contemporary life to bolster Sussman’s case.

那么,谁对正在发生的事情分析得更好?是人们的优先事项改变了,还是建立他们曾希望拥有的家庭变得更加艰难?如果数百万人仍然想要孩子却因种种阻碍而放弃生育,那么生育率的低迷标志着一场重大的社会失败。当代生活中有大量事实可以支持萨斯曼的论点。

Consider what parenthood now asks of people. A big part of the story is the shift toward what the economists Melissa Kearney and Phillip Levine describe as “much more resource and time-intensive” parenting. Many young adults who started families in the past twenty years were raised this way, which shaped their own conceptions of how to rear children. If families want to invest in extracurriculars and a college education for their children, while lavishing time and attention on them, then doing so for five, rather than, say, one or two, may seem impossible.

想想如今为人父母对人们的要求。故事的一个重要部分是向经济学家梅丽莎·卡尼(Melissa Kearney)和菲利普·莱文(Phillip Levine)所描述的“资源投入和时间投入大得多”的育儿方式的转变。在过去二十年里组建家庭的许多年轻成年人就是这样被抚养长大的,这塑造了他们自己对如何养育子女的观念。如果家庭想为孩子的课外活动和大学教育投资,同时在他们身上倾注大量时间和关注,那么为五个孩子——而不是一两个——这样做似乎是不可能的。

Time-use studies have shown a steady increase since the nineteen-seventies in the hours that parents in rich countries devote to child care. Millennial mothers and fathers in the United States spend more time tending to their offspring than Gen X-ers did. Recently, as I was reading research papers on declining birth rates, an unfamiliar finding glinted up at me like a penny on the sidewalk. In countries where male involvement in child care and housework is highest—Norway, for example—male parents tend to oppose having additional children. You might see this as a bummer: Mr. Moms overwhelmed by ordinary domestic duties. Or you might see it, as I did, as evidence that men who participate more actively in such tasks develop a healthy respect for what they require.

时间使用研究显示,自二十世纪七十年代以来,富裕国家的父母用于育儿的时间稳步增加。美国的千禧一代父母比X世代父母花更多时间照顾子女。最近,当我在读关于出生率下降的研究论文时,一个不熟悉的发现像人行道上的一枚硬币一样在我眼前闪亮:在男性参与育儿和家务程度最高的国家——例如挪威——男性家长往往反对再要孩子。你可能会把这看作一件令人沮丧的事:全职爸爸们被日常家务压垮了。或者你也可以像我一样,把它看作证据:更积极参与这些事务的男性对育儿所需付出的一切产生了健康的尊重。

Turning to South Korea, contemporary demographers’ favorite example of a reproductive desert, Sussman examines one particularly punishing form of souped-up child rearing: the culture of hagwon, or afternoon and evening cram schools. These institutions are de rigueur for children hoping to reach university in a hypercompetitive system, and they require parents, almost exclusively mothers, to collect their exhausted, fact-stuffed kids late at night, up to six days a week. People in Seoul told Sussman that the system had turned them against parenting: they felt unable to avoid hagwon and unwilling to subject future children to it.

转向韩国——当代人口学家最常引用的“生育荒漠”例子——萨斯曼考察了一种特别折磨人的强化版育儿方式:补习班(hagwon)文化,即下午和晚上的课外辅导学校。在一个极度竞争的体系中,这些机构对于希望考上大学的孩子来说是必不可少的,它们要求家长——几乎完全是母亲——每周多达六天在深夜接回精疲力竭、被塞满知识的孩子。首尔的人告诉萨斯曼,这个制度让他们对为人父母望而却步:他们觉得自己无法避开补习班,也不愿意让未来的孩子承受这一切。

For many would-be parents, the demands of child rearing are not the first hurdle. Before having kids, they want to find someone to raise them with. Here, too, Sussman assembles a formidable catalogue of impediments. Dating apps are too much like online shopping. (There’s some overlap here with the Heritage Foundation’s critique of dating apps, which similarly targets their profit-driven, algorithmic incentives for “continuous scrolling and swiping,” as its family report puts it.) Plastic surgery and inflationary beauty standards impose dizzying upkeep. A surfeit of online porn scrambles young men’s expectations of sex. And social media encourages “relentless packaging and marketing of the self.” A 2020 Pew Research Center survey found that thirty-five per cent of never married, single American adults hadn’t ever been in a committed romantic relationship. In a 2024 survey, eighty per cent of singles reported “emotional fatigue or burnout” from online dating. The research shows, Sussman says, that the biggest reason women choose to freeze their eggs is that they haven’t found the right partner. “At a time when we have more social and sexual freedom than at any point in history,” she writes, “it can feel harder than ever to find genuine connection.”

对许多想成为父母的人来说,育儿的要求并不是第一道障碍。在生孩子之前,他们想找到一个共同抚养孩子的人。在这方面,萨斯曼同样汇集了一份令人望而生畏的障碍清单。约会应用太像网上购物了。(这里与传统基金会对约会应用的批评有些重叠,后者同样针对其利润驱动、算法激励的“持续滚动和滑动”,正如其家庭报告所言。)整形手术和不断膨胀的审美标准带来了令人眩晕的维护成本。过量的网络色情搅乱了年轻男性对性的期待。社交媒体鼓励“对自我的无休止包装和营销”。皮尤研究中心2020年的一项调查发现,从未结婚的美国单身成年人中有百分之三十五从未有过认真的恋爱关系。在2024年的一项调查中,百分之八十的单身人士报告称因在线约会而感到“情绪疲劳或倦怠”。萨斯曼说,研究表明女性选择冻卵的最大原因是她们还没有找到合适的伴侣。她写道:“在我们拥有比历史上任何时候都更多的社交和性自由的时代,找到真正的连接却感觉比以往任何时候都更难。”

Sussman’s portraits both illustrate and complicate these diagnoses, as individuals tend to. In a chapter about dating, she introduces Michaela, who, in her late thirties, is dating “more diligently than anyone I know,” mostly through apps. Michaela is multilingual, outgoing, and, Sussman tells us, “tall and voluptuous, with lush, dark eyelashes.” She is an Ivy League graduate and business owner who wants a partner and a child but has gone on some two hundred dates without luck. By the book’s end, though, she does find a partner, IRL, and has a baby with him. She told a stranger on a train that she was single, and the woman introduced her to an American living in the South of France. It would have been fan service to tell us more about the romance, but this is all we get. Another subject in the book, Marwan, also wants to be a parent, and gets many online matches when he lists his job as a McKinsey consultant. But when he quits to start his own firm and makes time for friends, reading, sports, and volunteering, his profile draws much less interest. He is still “tall and handsome, with a gregarious smile,” and an Oxford Ph.D., according to Sussman—but “self-employed” is evidently a turnoff. (Message to Marwan: I know some delightful women for whom “McKinsey” would be the turnoff.)

萨斯曼笔下的人物肖像既印证了这些诊断,又使其复杂化——正如个体往往会做的那样。在关于约会的一章中,她介绍了米凯拉(Michaela),三十八九岁的她正在“比我认识的任何人都更勤奋地约会”,主要通过交友应用。米凯拉精通多种语言,性格外向,萨斯曼告诉我们,她“高挑丰满,长着浓密乌黑的睫毛”。她是常春藤盟校毕业生,经营着自己的公司,想要一个伴侣和一个孩子,但已经约会了大约两百次仍未如愿。不过,到书末,她确实找到了伴侣——在现实生活中——并和他生了孩子。她在火车上告诉一个陌生人自己单身,那位女士把她介绍给了一个住在法国南部的美国人。如果能多告诉我们一些这段恋情的故事,那会是给读者的福利,但我们就只能知道这些了。书中的另一个人物马尔万(Marwan)也想当父亲,当他把自己的职业列为麦肯锡顾问时,在网上获得了很多匹配。但当他辞职创办自己的公司、腾出时间给朋友、阅读、运动和志愿服务后,他的个人资料吸引力大减。据萨斯曼描述,他仍然“高大英俊,笑容开朗”,还拥有牛津大学博士学位——但“自雇”显然让人望而却步。(给马尔万捎句话:我认识一些可爱的女性,对她们来说“麦肯锡”才是让人望而却步的。)

Yet the closer you look at the gap between desired and actual fertility, the harder it is to know what it measures. Some parents probably change their minds without much regret after one or two children—content with the family they’ve created, persuaded by the solidity and particularity of its configuration that it, not some theoretical alternative, is right, or sobered by child rearing’s demands (perhaps a child has special needs). The South Korean example suggests a related possibility. Hagwon culture is a grim version of a more benign, mutually rewarding form of cultivated, small-batch parenting—one in which adults and children know one another well because they’ve spent time trying to, parents foster their kids’ interests and eccentricities, and people find in family life what the historian and social critic Christopher Lasch called a haven from the heartless world.

然而,你越仔细审视期望生育率与实际生育率之间的差距,就越难确定它到底衡量了什么。有些父母在一两个孩子之后可能毫无遗憾地改变了主意——满足于他们创建的家庭,被其稳固性和独特配置所说服,认为这个家庭而非某个理论上的替代方案才是对的,或者被育儿的现实要求所警醒(也许孩子有特殊需求)。韩国的例子暗示了一种相关的可能性。补习班文化是一种更良性、互惠互利的精耕细作式小规模育儿的残酷版本——在这种育儿方式中,成人和孩子因为花时间努力了解彼此而相互熟悉,父母培养孩子的兴趣和怪癖,人们在家庭生活中找到了历史学家和社会评论家克里斯托弗·拉什(Christopher Lasch)所说的“无情世界中的避风港”。

More tellingly, wanting two or three children already represents a domestic vision far removed from the teeming households of pioneer families, “Cheaper by the Dozen,” or even “The Brady Bunch.” The fact that people want smaller families than they once did isn’t necessarily a vote against the future. It’s a vote against past family sizes, from eras when more people relied on children for labor, expected extras to make up for ravening child mortality, or felt religiously bound to multiply bountifully. (These motivations persist even in affluent countries, such as among Orthodox Jewish families in the United States and Israel. But Mormons are having fewer children; Utah’s birth rate has declined more than any other state’s, by thirty-seven per cent since 2007.) In the 2025 Gallup poll, only eleven per cent of Americans surveyed said that four kids was ideal, and just four per cent said five.

更能说明问题的是,想要两三个孩子本身已经代表了一种家庭愿景,与拓荒者家庭的拥挤大家庭、《儿女一箩筐》(Cheaper by the Dozen)甚至《布雷迪一家》(The Brady Bunch)相去甚远。人们想要比过去更小的家庭,这未必是对未来的否决票。这是对过去家庭规模的否决票——在那些时代,更多人依赖儿童劳动,期望多生孩子来弥补猖獗的儿童死亡率,或者感到宗教上有义务多多繁衍。(这些动机即使在富裕国家也依然存在,比如美国和以色列的正统犹太家庭。但摩门教徒生育的孩子在减少;犹他州的出生率下降幅度超过任何其他州,自2007年以来下降了百分之三十七。)在2025年的盖洛普民调中,只有百分之十一的美国受访者说四个孩子是理想的,只有百分之四说五个。

“Inconceivable” is not a policy book; it’s a reported social critique sauced with stories. Inevitably, though, Sussman touches on what societies might do, or have tried to do, in order to arrest falling fertility. As she suggests, and as recent studies demonstrate, interventions aimed at boosting birth rates—such as tax credits or baby bonuses—tend to have modest or short-term effects. Eleven Swiss cantons have introduced birth allowances over the years, and one study found that the payments increased fertility, mainly among lower-income immigrants, but the effect quickly faded. When Hungary, under Viktor Orbán, devoted about five per cent of its G.D.P. to an elaborate system of family subsidies, the spending seemed to stabilize the average age at which women first gave birth. But it had little effect on over-all fertility; mainly, it nudged people into having the children they would have had anyway, just a little earlier.

《不可思议》不是一本政策书;它是一部带有故事调味的社会批判报道。不过,萨斯曼不可避免地触及了社会可能采取或已经尝试采取的措施,以阻止生育率下降。正如她所暗示的,也正如最近的研究所证明的,旨在提高出生率的干预措施——如税收抵免或婴儿奖金——往往效果温和或短暂。瑞士有十一个州多年来推出了生育津贴,一项研究发现这些补贴提高了生育率,主要是在低收入移民群体中,但效果很快消退。当匈牙利在欧尔班·维克托(Viktor Orbán)领导下将大约百分之五的GDP投入一套精心设计的家庭补贴体系时,这笔支出似乎稳定了女性首次生育的平均年龄。但对总体生育率几乎没有影响;主要是促使人们提前一点生了本来就会生的孩子。

Other policies that might be expected to hike the birth rate by making it easier to combine work and family life often have transitory or relatively small effects, too. In the nineteen-eighties, Sweden extended a provision in its family-leave system that rewarded parents for having another child relatively soon after the previous one, and many did so. The result, as the economists Kearney and Levine report, was “a temporary baby boom, that was subsequently offset by a baby bust.” Of all the family-friendly policies, spending on early-childhood education and child care appears to do the most to goose birth rates—especially when aligned with the right leave policies. But, according to a U.N. report, child-care provision is “more likely to influence the fertility behavior of highly educated women, who are more active in the labor market.” And, for those of us still capable of being surprised at how hard and costly it can be to budge human behavior, the numbers are a little underwhelming: in one study, every extra percentage point of G.D.P. spent on early-childhood education and child care was “associated with 0.2 extra children per woman.”

其他可能通过让工作与家庭生活更容易兼顾来提高出生率的政策,其效果往往也是短暂的或相对较小的。二十世纪八十年代,瑞典延长了家庭休假制度中的一项规定,奖励在前一个孩子出生后较快再生育的父母,许多人确实这样做了。结果,正如经济学家卡尼和莱文所报告的,是“一波暂时的婴儿潮,随后被一波婴儿荒所抵消”。在所有家庭友好政策中,对幼儿教育和托儿服务的支出似乎最能提振出生率——尤其是与合适的休假政策相配合时。但根据联合国的一份报告,托儿服务的提供“更有可能影响高学历女性的生育行为,她们在劳动力市场中更为活跃”。而且,对于我们这些仍然会对改变人类行为之艰难和昂贵感到惊讶的人来说,这些数字有点令人失望:在一项研究中,GDP中每多投入一个百分点用于幼儿教育和托儿服务,“每名妇女仅多生0.2个孩子”。

The unfettered free market of the U.S. certainly hasn’t boosted birth rates—but neither have Scandinavia’s generous social guarantees. Birth rates have plunged in social democracies and capitalist autocracies alike. Norway and the U.S. are about equally fecund. “Strong family policies and social supports,” Sussman writes, “are just a baseline. They should ensure that if and when someone would like to become a parent, they do not face job loss, financial ruin, or catastrophic health bills, and that children and their parents have enough to eat and quality child care if parents want to work. But they are no longer themselves capable of producing the conditions under which people want to, or choose to, have children.”

美国不受约束的自由市场当然没有提高出生率——但斯堪的纳维亚慷慨的社会保障也没有。出生率在社会民主主义国家和资本主义威权国家同样暴跌。挪威和美国的生育率大致相当。萨斯曼写道:“强有力的家庭政策和社会支持只是一个底线。它们应该确保当一个人想要成为父母时,不会面临失业、财务破产或灾难性的医疗账单,确保孩子和父母有足够的食物,如果父母想工作,有优质的托儿服务。但它们本身已经不再能够创造出人们想要或选择生育的条件。”

That qualification seems significant. If making parenthood materially easier does little to restore birth rates, perhaps some part of the fertility decline reflects a change in what people want from their lives. Fewer people consider marriage and children indispensable to a rewarding adulthood. In a 2023 Pew poll, seventy-one per cent of American adults said that an enjoyable job or career was very important to a fulfilling life, whereas only twenty-six per cent said children and twenty-three per cent marriage. (Sixty-one per cent said close friends.)

这个限定条件似乎意义重大。如果让为人父母在物质上更容易对恢复出生率作用甚微,那么生育率下降的某些部分也许反映了人们对生活期望的变化。更少的人认为婚姻和孩子是充实成年生活不可或缺的。在2023年皮尤的一项民调中,百分之七十一的美国成年人说一份令人愉快的工作或职业对充实的生活非常重要,而只有百分之二十六的人说孩子很重要,百分之二十三的人说婚姻很重要。(百分之六十一的人说亲密的朋友很重要。)

Sussman is inclined to see such preferences as further evidence of capitalism’s moral failings. I’m sympathetic. Loving your work is great, but career obsession can be its own form of sterility; corporations aren’t people, and most employers would sooner lay you off than understand your ineffable you-ness. Sussman cites one study in which women who had substantial student-loan debt were around forty per cent less likely to have kids than those who didn’t carry debt. That seems bleak, too.

萨斯曼倾向于将这类偏好视为资本主义道德失败的进一步证据。我对此有同感。热爱工作是好事,但职业痴迷本身可能就是一种不育;公司不是人,大多数雇主宁愿裁掉你,也不愿理解你那不可言说的“你之为你”。萨斯曼引用了一项研究,其中背负大量学生贷款的女性生育孩子的可能性比没有债务的女性低约百分之四十。这看起来也很令人沮丧。

But the poll’s answers can also point to a genuinely enlarged sense of what a satisfactory life might contain. People can experience love and tenderness for younger generations without biological parenthood, as any devoted aunt or teacher can attest. They can build lives around friendship, work, art, travel, activism, or community, in ways less constrained by old ideas about virtuous adulthood. Some changes associated with lower fertility are plainly gains. Teen-pregnancy rates have dropped dramatically, women have far more educational and professional opportunities, and social norms that stigmatized childlessness have loosened. (For a horrified laugh, check out a 1968 episode called “Spinsters” from the BBC documentary series “Man Alive,” on YouTube. Sample line of narration, about an unmarried woman in her thirties: “She fills her life with activities which some might call substitutes—she paints and is learning the classical guitar.”)

但民调的答案也可以指向一种真正扩展了的关于满意生活可能包含什么的认知。人们可以在没有生物学意义上的为人父母的情况下,体验对年轻一代的爱与温柔,任何尽心尽力的阿姨或老师都可以证明这一点。他们可以围绕友谊、工作、艺术、旅行、行动主义或社区来构建生活,不再像过去那样受制于关于有德行的成年生活的旧观念。一些与低生育率相关的变化显然是进步。少女怀孕率大幅下降,女性拥有远为更多的教育和职业机会,污名化无子女的社会规范已经松动。(想发出一声惊恐的笑,可以去YouTube上看BBC纪录片系列《活着的人》(Man Alive)1968年的一集,叫《老处女》(Spinsters)。其中一句旁白样本,关于一位三十多岁的未婚女性:“她用一些有人可能称之为替代品的活动填满生活——她画画,还在学古典吉他。”)

So it makes sense to be cautious about treating peoples’ stated preferences about children as a kind of buried truth, and the gap between what people say they want and what they wind up having as chiefly a measure of the obstacles placed in their way. Having a child is the most overdetermined of choices: intimate, nearly instinctual, and yet deeply embedded in cultural norms and social structures. That makes the birth rate a particularly inadequate barometer of whether a given family policy is worthwhile. The reason to institute strong family supports—for example, to have a national policy offering paid leave for new mothers and fathers in the United States, the one wealthy country that does not do so—isn’t because they act like levers to push out more babies. It’s because they make people’s lives better, and societies kinder, more equitable, and more forbearing.

因此,谨慎对待人们关于孩子的陈述性偏好、不将其视为某种被掩埋的真相,并且不将人们说想要的与实际拥有的之间的差距主要视为障碍的衡量标准,是合理的。生孩子是最多重决定的选择:私密的、近乎本能的,却又深深嵌入文化规范和社会结构之中。这使得出生率成为衡量某项家庭政策是否值得的特别不充分的晴雨表。建立强有力的家庭支持的理由——例如,在美国这个唯一不提供新生儿父母带薪假的富裕国家制定一项全国性政策——不是因为它们像杠杆一样能推出更多婴儿。而是因为它们让人们的生活更好,让社会更友善、更公平、更宽容。

Every time I read about declining fertility—whether it’s a right-wing pro-natalist screed about permissive, secular culture; an earnest, progressive account of how contemporary capitalism constrains our most fundamental choices while presenting a simulacrum of infinite options; or, for that matter, a sober statistical analysis from the O.E.C.D.—I realize that I can’t quite imagine the combination of forces that would reverse the worldwide trend toward fewer babies and smaller families. So many modern humans seem to want many things at once: children, autonomy, absorbing work, a certain standard of parenting, and a particular sort of romantic partner. The fertility rate reflects the priorities that emerge when decisions have to be made. Economic factors play a role, but culture plays a larger one and is less amenable to policy interventions. Culture encompasses ideas about what adulthood should entail, what parents owe their children, how much sacrifice family should require, how parents and other caregivers should divide their child-rearing duties, and whether having children makes a life bigger or smaller.

每次我读到关于生育率下降的文章——无论是右翼生育鼓吹者关于放纵世俗文化的檄文,还是进步派关于当代资本主义如何在呈现无限选择假象的同时约束我们最基本选择的真诚论述,抑或是经合组织的一份冷静的统计分析——我都意识到,我很难想象有什么力量组合能够逆转全球范围内婴儿减少、家庭缩小的趋势。如此多的现代人似乎同时想要很多东西:孩子、自主、投入的工作、某种育儿标准,以及某种特定类型的浪漫伴侣。生育率反映的是当必须做出决定时浮现出来的优先次序。经济因素起作用,但文化因素作用更大,而且更不容易受政策干预的影响。文化包含关于成年应该包含什么、父母欠孩子什么、家庭应该要求多少牺牲、父母和其他照护者应该如何分担育儿责任、以及生孩子是让生活变大还是变小的种种观念。

Those ideas can’t be legislated into existence, yet institutions, social movements, customs, and habits can shape them over time. Norms do shift, sometimes unpredictably, as people watch one another live. If smaller families arose partly from changing ideas about a good life, we can’t assume that those ideas have reached their final form. The postwar American baby boom itself reversed a century-long decline in family size. Whether or not we see another baby boom, my vote is for giving up on policies aimed at coaxing or prodding people into having children, and for making family life easier for the people—and they will always be with us—who dearly want them. ♦

这些观念无法通过立法来创造,但制度、社会运动、习俗和习惯可以随着时间推移塑造它们。规范确实会转变,有时不可预测,因为人们会观察彼此的生活。如果小家庭的兴起部分源于关于美好生活的观念变化,我们不能假定这些观念已经达到了最终形态。战后美国的婴儿潮本身就逆转了一个世纪以来家庭规模缩小的趋势。无论我们是否会看到另一波婴儿潮,我的投票是放弃那些旨在哄劝或推动人们生育的政策,转而让那些——他们永远都会存在——深切渴望孩子的人的家庭生活变得更容易一些。♦

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