Annals of War

What’s Behind Trump’s New World Disorder?

特朗普的新世界乱局背后是什么?
A foreign policy freed of liberal pretenses and imperial ambitions could lead to restraint—or, as the Iran attack shows, simply license hit-and-run belligerence.
摆脱了自由主义伪装和帝国野心的外交政策,或许会导向克制——但正如对伊朗的袭击所显示的,它也可能仅仅是为打了就跑的好斗行径颁发许可证。
Trump moving toy soldier pieces on a map.
Illustration by Emmanuel Polanco

If you’ve ever wondered what three billion dollars buys in bombs and missiles, wonder no more. In the first hundred hours of Operation Epic Fury, the United States flung munitions costing about that much at Iran, striking nearly two thousand targets. This won the U.S. and Israel nearly “complete control” of Iran’s airspace, allowing them to unleash “death and destruction from the sky all day long,” Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of Defense, crowed. “We are punching them while they’re down.”

如果你曾好奇三十亿美元能买到多少炸弹和导弹,现在不必再猜了。在“史诗狂怒行动”的头一百个小时里,美国向伊朗倾泻了价值约三十亿美元的弹药,打击了近两千个目标。美国国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯得意地宣称,这为美国和以色列赢得了对伊朗领空近乎“完全的控制权”,使他们能够“全天候从空中倾泻死亡与毁灭”。“我们正在对他们痛打落水狗。”

Why is this happening? That is a reasonable question (and, per Google Trends, a popular one in the United States). But the United States has been freaking out about Iran since 1979. That was the year revolutionaries overthrew the U.S.-backed monarch, established an Islamic republic, and took dozens of people hostage inside the U.S. Embassy. The two countries have since been locked in a standoff that has lasted longer than the Cold War. Perhaps the real question is: Why is this only happening now?

这一切为何会发生?这是个合情合理的问题(根据谷歌趋势数据,这也是美国民众普遍关心的问题)。但自1979年以来,美国对伊朗的恐慌就从未停歇。那一年,革命者推翻了美国支持的君主政权,建立了伊斯兰共和国,并将数十名人质扣押在美国大使馆内。自此,两国陷入了一场比冷战更持久的对峙。或许真正的问题在于:为何这一切直到现在才爆发?

American Presidents have had Iran in their sights for decades. When Bill Clinton warned of “rogue states” in the nineteen-nineties, Iran was the first example he gave. When George W. Bush spoke of a three-country “axis of evil” in 2002, Iran was in it. In 2019, Donald Trump designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organization, the first time another country’s military had been thus classified. Nor is it clear that Kamala Harris would have reversed that designation had she won the 2024 election. When asked to name the United States’ greatest adversary, she replied that the answer was “obvious.” Iran, she explained, has “American blood” on its hands.

几十年来,伊朗始终是美国总统们的目标。上世纪九十年代,比尔·克林顿警告“流氓国家”时,伊朗是他举出的第一个例子。2002年,乔治·W·布什谈及三国“邪恶轴心”时,伊朗位列其中。2019年,唐纳德·特朗普将伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队列为恐怖组织,这是首次有外国军队被如此定性。即便卡玛拉·哈里斯赢得2024年大选,她也未必会撤销这项认定。当被问及美国最大的对手是谁时,她的回答是“显而易见”——伊朗手上沾着“美国人的鲜血”。

Whatever has held back the dogs of war, it hasn’t been a lack of American ability. The current conflict shows how wildly mismatched the two powers are: the U.S. picking off targets at will, Iran unable to land missiles anywhere near North America. “This was never meant to be a fair fight,” Hegseth observed. That isn’t new, though. U.S. planes could have rained hell down on Iran anytime in the past decades.

无论是什么因素抑制了战争之犬的狂吠,都绝非美国能力不足。当前的冲突凸显了两国实力悬殊:美国随心所欲地锁定目标,伊朗却无法将导弹射至北美附近任何区域。“这从来就不是一场公平较量,”赫格塞斯指出。不过这种情况并不新鲜——过去数十年来,美国战机随时都能对伊朗实施毁灭性打击。

That possibility has lurked deep in the national subconscious. During the hostage crisis, it spilled out in song. “We’re gonna push the big button,” the Baritone Dwarfs sang. Dick Allen’s “Go to Hell Ayatollah” addressed Iran’s new Supreme Leader directly: “When we get through with your nation, son, ain’t gonna be nothing left but the sand.” The most enduring song, “Bomb Iran,” is set to the tune of the doo-wop classic “Barbara-Ann.” Several versions exist, one of which advocates turning Iran “into a parking lot.” In 2007, a voter asked the Presidential candidate John McCain when the United States would give up diplomacy and finally send an “airmail message to Tehran.” McCain chuckled and started singing “Bomb Iran.”

这种可能性一直潜伏在国民意识的深处。在人质危机期间,它以歌曲的形式爆发出来。“我们要按下那个大按钮,”男中音矮人乐队这样唱道。迪克·艾伦的《去死吧阿亚图拉》直接向伊朗新任最高领袖喊话:“等我们收拾完你的国家,小子,那里只会剩下沙子。”最经久不衰的歌曲《轰炸伊朗》采用了嘟·喔普经典曲目《芭芭拉·安》的旋律。这首歌有多个版本,其中一个主张将伊朗“变成停车场”。2007年,一位选民问总统候选人约翰·麦凯恩,美国何时会放弃外交手段,最终向德黑兰发送“航空邮件”。麦凯恩轻笑一声,开始唱起《轰炸伊朗》。

But this was a childish joke, the stuff of novelty songs. The United States had not, until Trump, bombed Iran. Nor had Iran directly attacked the United States. A close brush came in 1988, when, during some sea skirmishes between the two countries, a U.S. missile cruiser shot down an Iran Air flight carrying two hundred and ninety passengers and crew members. That was an accident, though, and President Ronald Reagan sent Iran’s leaders a note expressing “deep regret.” In nearly half a century of bombastic threats, the United States and Iran had never actually fought a war.

但这不过是个幼稚的玩笑,像是流行歌曲里的戏谑桥段。在特朗普之前,美国从未轰炸过伊朗。伊朗也从未直接攻击过美国。最接近的一次是在1988年,当时两国在海上发生小规模冲突,一艘美国导弹巡洋舰击落了一架载有290名乘客和机组人员的伊朗航空客机。但那只是一场意外,时任美国总统罗纳德·里根还向伊朗领导人致信表达了“深切遗憾”。在近半个世纪的虚张声势与相互威胁中,美国和伊朗从未真正开战。

The reasons for that are becoming clearer. Since the end of the Second World War, in 1945, the United States sought to oversee world affairs. This involved interpreting U.S. interests broadly, so that nearly anything, anywhere, could be seen as relevant to national security. As the 9/11 Commission Report put it, “The American homeland is the planet.”

个中缘由正逐渐明朗。自1945年第二次世界大战结束以来,美国始终试图主导全球事务。这需要从广义上界定美国利益,以至于世界任何角落发生的几乎任何事,都可能被视为关乎其国家安全。正如《9/11委员会报告》所言:“美国本土即是整个地球。”

That global mission, in turn, has required justification, of the sort that allies could accept. “The world does not organize itself,” Joe Biden offered. It needs the United States “at the head of the table” to enforce the rules. No other country can effectively champion freedom, democracy, and human rights.

这一全球使命反过来也需要一个能让盟友信服的理由。“世界不会自行组织,”乔·拜登曾这样解释。它需要美国“坐在主位”来执行规则。没有其他国家能如此有效地捍卫自由、民主和人权。

The hubris of all this became especially clear when George W. Bush, pursuing what he called a “freedom agenda,” invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein. It was against such crusading that Donald Trump campaigned. He promised to put America first, and to take the fallen world as it was. Intervention was warranted only if there was a “direct threat to our national interests,” he maintained, and, even then, “we’d better have an airtight plan to win and get out.” Until this year, it was possible to argue that this shrunken sense of mission made Trump less likely to start wars.

这一切的狂妄自大在乔治·W·布什身上体现得尤为明显——他打着所谓“自由议程”的旗号入侵伊拉克,推翻了萨达姆·侯赛因政权。唐纳德·特朗普正是针对这种十字军东征式的干涉主义展开竞选。他承诺将美国利益置于首位,坦然接受这个堕落世界的本来面目。他坚称,唯有当“我们的国家利益受到直接威胁”时才有必要干预,即便如此,“我们也必须制定万无一失的制胜方案并迅速抽身”。在今年之前,人们尚可辩称这种收缩的使命观使特朗普更不易发动战争。

Not anymore. For all the Bush-style recklessness that U.S. hegemony engendered, it also imposed limits. Past Presidents held back on attacking Iran for fear of damaging America’s legitimacy or its interests, broadly construed. Trump, caring little for either, has entered a major conflict with astonishing blitheness; the White House press secretary explained that Trump acted on a “feeling” that Iran would attack. His minimal commitments, rather than yielding a restrained foreign policy, have lowered the barrier to war.

今非昔比。尽管美国霸权曾催生出布什式的鲁莽行径,但霸权本身也设定了某种限度。历任总统都克制着不去攻击伊朗,唯恐损害美国的正当性或广义上的国家利益。特朗普对这两者都漠不关心,竟以惊人的轻率姿态卷入重大冲突;白宫新闻秘书解释称,特朗普是凭“感觉”伊朗将发动袭击而采取行动。他那近乎于无的承诺非但未能催生克制的外交政策,反而降低了发动战争的门槛。

Peter Beinart, writing in the Times, recently described Trump’s foreign policy as “imperialism.” Yet imperialism strives for empire—for control. Classic imperialism sought to bind disparate places together under a vast administrative structure, animated by a civilizing mission. It’s not hard to pin the “empire” charge on Trump’s predecessors, who have jealously guarded U.S. custody of the world system. But what’s striking about Trump is his shrugging indifference to overseas outcomes. You could call this regime-change nihilism; you can’t call it imperialism.

彼得·贝纳特(Peter Beinart)最近在《纽约时报》撰文,将特朗普的外交政策描述为“帝国主义”。然而帝国主义追求的是帝国——是掌控。经典的帝国主义试图通过庞大的行政架构将不同地域捆绑在一起,并以文明教化的使命为驱动力。将“帝国”的指控加诸特朗普的前任们并不困难,他们始终小心翼翼地维护着美国对世界体系的掌控权。但特朗普令人震惊之处在于,他对海外事态发展那种耸肩漠视的态度。你可以称之为政权更迭虚无主义,却绝不能称之为帝国主义。

When the United States attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities in June of last year, Trump posted a video of bombers releasing their payloads to the tune of “Bomb Iran.” In starting this war, Trump has not only wreaked enormous havoc; he’s also liberated himself from the burdens of empire.

去年六月美国袭击伊朗核设施时,特朗普在社交媒体上发布了一段视频,画面中轰炸机投下弹药的场景配着《轰炸伊朗》的曲调。发动这场战争不仅让特朗普造成了巨大破坏,也使他从帝国的重负中解脱出来。

Although enmity between Washington and Tehran sprang up in 1979, the seeds were planted in the nineteen-fifties. That was when Iran’s Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, made headlines by nationalizing Iran’s oil, reclaiming profits that had flowed overwhelmingly to Britain. In 1952, Time named Mosaddegh its Man of the Year.

华盛顿与德黑兰之间的敌意虽在1979年爆发,其根源却要追溯到五十年代。当时伊朗总理穆罕默德·摩萨台因将伊朗石油国有化而登上头条,此举收回了原本绝大部分流向英国的利润。1952年,《时代》周刊将摩萨台评为年度风云人物。

The British wanted Mosaddegh removed. But President Dwight Eisenhower saw Mosaddegh—a popular, Western-educated liberal who was friendly to the U.S.—as a hopeful figure. “I would like to give the guy ten million bucks,” he told Britain’s Foreign Secretary.

英国人一心要推翻摩萨台。但德怀特·艾森豪威尔总统却将这位受民众爱戴、受过西方教育、对美国友好的自由派人士视为希望人物。“我真想给这家伙一千万美元,”他对英国外交大臣这样说道。

It was only by appealing to wider concerns, to the global chessboard, that the British brought Eisenhower around. Fearing that Mosaddegh might inadvertently destabilize Iran, which would then provide the Soviets an opening, Eisenhower O.K.’d a coup in 1953. The C.I.A. planted negative stories, hired false-flag actors, and persuaded the constitutional monarch of Iran, the Shah, to arrest Mosaddegh and reassert his own royal power. The operation went off like fireworks. “I owe my throne to my God, my people, my Army, and to you!” the elated Shah told his C.I.A. handler.

英国人唯有诉诸更广泛的关切,诉诸全球棋局,才说服了艾森豪威尔。由于担心摩萨台可能无意中动摇伊朗的稳定,从而为苏联提供可乘之机,艾森豪威尔于1953年批准了政变。中央情报局散布负面报道,雇佣伪装成反对派的特工,并说服伊朗的君主制立宪国王——沙阿——逮捕摩萨台,重新确立自己的王权。这场行动如烟花般顺利引爆。“我的王位归功于我的上帝、我的人民、我的军队,还有你!”狂喜的沙阿对他的中情局联络人说道。
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This was the C.I.A.’s breakout performance. The United States had just fought a bloody, expensive, and inconclusive war to beat back Communism in Korea. Ousting Mosaddegh, by contrast, was a crisp victory for just a few sacks of cash. The agency went on a spree. The political scientist Lindsey O’Rourke has counted sixty-four occasions when the U.S. sought to secretly oust a government or tilt an election during the Cold War. More than two-thirds of these attempts were, like the Iran coup, in support of authoritarians.

这是中情局的一次突破性表现。美国刚刚在朝鲜打了一场血腥、昂贵且无果的战争来击退共产主义。相比之下,推翻摩萨台只需几袋现金就取得了干脆利落的胜利。该机构从此一发不可收拾。政治学家林赛·奥罗克统计发现,冷战期间美国曾六十四次试图秘密推翻他国政府或操纵选举。其中超过三分之二的尝试——正如伊朗政变那样——都是为了支持威权统治者。

It was crucial that this all be done in the dark. If the C.I.A.’s acts in Iran were to come to light, Eisenhower noted, the U.S. would be “embarrassed” in the Middle East, and its ability to cheaply sculpt the region’s politics “would almost totally disappear.” Secrecy was the price of legitimacy, in other words. And legitimacy was the precondition for U.S. primacy.

这一切必须在暗中进行,至关重要。艾森豪威尔指出,倘若中情局在伊朗的行动曝光,美国将在中东“颜面尽失”,其以低廉成本塑造该地区政治格局的能力“将几乎荡然无存”。换言之,保密是合法性的代价。而合法性,正是美国维持主导地位的前提。

Initially, this seemed to work. Even as U.S. meddling stoked anger abroad, the Shah stood firm and kept selling oil. The trouble was that this stance unbalanced him at home. His most nettlesome critic, an ayatollah named Ruhollah Khomeini, derided the “American Shah.” Iranian intellectuals condemned their country’s “Westoxification,” its intoxication by the West. In 1979, when this bubbling dissent finally boiled over, millions of Iranians joined the anti-Shah revolution. Khomeini seized power and denounced the United States as the “Great Satan.”

起初,这种策略似乎奏效了。尽管美国的干预在海外激起民愤,伊朗国王依然立场坚定,继续出售石油。问题在于,这种姿态使他在国内逐渐失去平衡。他最棘手的批评者——一位名叫鲁霍拉·霍梅尼的阿亚图拉——嘲讽他是“美国国王”。伊朗知识分子谴责本国“西方毒化”现象,即被西方文化麻醉的状态。1979年,当这股酝酿已久的不满情绪最终沸腾时,数百万伊朗人加入了反国王革命。霍梅尼夺取政权,并谴责美国为“大撒旦”。

Khomeini’s theology was novel, but his grievance was old. After Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, one of them told a captured diplomat, “You have no right to complain. You took our whole country hostage in 1953.”

霍梅尼的神学思想是新颖的,但他的怨愤却源远流长。当伊朗学生占领美国驻德黑兰大使馆后,其中一人对被扣押的外交官说道:“你们无权抱怨。早在1953年,你们就将我们整个国家劫持为人质了。”

In 2000, the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, publicly acknowledged that the United States had “played a significant role” in overthrowing Mosaddegh. It had done so for “strategic reasons,” but perhaps not good ones, in hindsight. “It is easy to see now,” Albright said, “why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention.”

2000年,时任美国国务卿马德琳·奥尔布赖特公开承认,美国在推翻摩萨台的过程中“扮演了重要角色”。她表示,美国这样做是出于“战略考量”,但事后看来,这种考量或许并不明智。“如今不难理解,”奥尔布赖特说,“为何许多伊朗人至今仍对这次干预耿耿于怀。”

The world is large, and it is possible for two hostile countries to coexist within it. Yet U.S. Presidents have not found the Islamic Republic easy to circumvent. One after another, they’ve barked their shins on it, cursing all the while.

世界如此广阔,两个敌对的国家本可以共存其间。然而历任美国总统都发现,这个伊斯兰共和国实在难以绕过。他们一个接一个地在小腿迎面骨上磕出淤青,边揉伤处边咒骂不休。

For Jimmy Carter, Iran was agony. The final year of his Presidency—an election year—was consumed by the hostage crisis, which played out nightly on the news. Carter knew that he “could have wiped Iran off the map,” and faced pressure to do so, but he feared the consequences, including for the hostages. He instead tried an ill-fated rescue mission. Its failure forced him to negotiate, an interminable process that he believed cost him the election. In a final humiliation, news of the hostages’ release didn’t arrive until partway through the Inaugural Address of his successor, Ronald Reagan.

对吉米·卡特而言,伊朗是一场煎熬。他总统任期的最后一年——也是大选之年——完全被这场人质危机吞噬,每晚的新闻都在上演相关报道。卡特知道自己“本可以将伊朗从地图上抹去”,也面临着采取行动的压力,但他担心后果,包括对人质的影响。他转而尝试了一次不幸的救援行动。这次行动的失败迫使他进行谈判,这场旷日持久的斡旋过程,他认为正是导致自己败选的原因。最后的羞辱是:人质获释的消息直到他的继任者罗纳德·里根发表就职演说中途才传来。

The Reagan Administration took a hard line with Iran. To Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, its leaders were “fanatical terrorists whose principal platform is vitriolic and unreasoning hostility to America.” Yet, when the Iran-connected Hezbollah organization seized U.S. captives in the Lebanese civil war, even Reagan’s men could take the broader view. They tried a complex chess combination whereby arms would go to the Islamic Republic, hostages would return home, and funds would find their way to the Contras, right-wing insurgents battling the Nicaraguan government. When these illegal maneuvers were exposed, Reagan’s poll numbers collapsed. “It was a dark and hurtful time,” Nancy Reagan remembered. “The entire government seemed to grind to a halt.”

里根政府对伊朗采取强硬路线。在国防部长卡斯珀·温伯格眼中,伊朗领导人是“狂热恐怖分子,其主要纲领就是对美国充满恶毒且非理性的敌意”。然而,当与伊朗有关联的真主党组织在黎巴嫩内战中扣押美国人质时,即便是里根团队也能采取更宏观的视角。他们尝试了一盘复杂的棋局组合:武器流向伊斯兰共和国,人质返回家园,资金则辗转流入尼加拉瓜反政府武装“康特拉”手中。当这些非法操作被揭露时,里根的支持率一落千丈。“那是一段黑暗而痛苦的时期,”南希·里根回忆道,“整个政府似乎都陷入了停滞。”

Reagan and his Vice-President, George H. W. Bush, ultimately dodged much of the blame. Still, the Iran-Contra scandal scorched the lower ranks of the Administration, including several officials who would become principals in the George W. Bush Administration. The lesson they learned, according to the journalist James Mann’s “Rise of the Vulcans” (2004), was to shun back-channel deals. Dictators must be openly confronted.

里根和他的副总统老布什最终躲过了大部分指责。不过,“伊朗门”丑闻还是烧到了政府的中下层,其中包括几位后来在小布什政府中担任要职的官员。根据记者詹姆斯·曼(James Mann)在《火神派崛起》(2004年)一书中的说法,他们从中吸取的教训是:要避开秘密渠道的交易。必须公开对抗独裁者。

The result, George W. Bush’s War on Terror, was a bellicose version of U.S. hegemony that eschewed short-term stability for long-term transformation. For the neoconservatives whose thought informed the Bush approach, remaking the Middle East was the aim, and Iran was the pinnacle. Bill Kristol, Robert Kagan, David Frum, Charles Krauthammer, Norman Podhoretz, and Richard Perle all advised overthrowing the Islamic Republic. High-ranking Administration officials also saw this as the stretch goal, it appears. After Jay Garner returned from overseeing the Iraq occupation, Bush reportedly asked him, “You want to do Iran for the next one?”

其结果是,乔治·W·布什的“反恐战争”成为美国霸权的一种好战形态——它为了追求长期改造而放弃了短期稳定。对于影响布什决策的新保守主义者而言,重塑中东是目标,而伊朗则是终极目标。比尔·克里斯托尔、罗伯特·卡根、大卫·弗鲁姆、查尔斯·克劳萨默、诺曼·波德霍雷茨和理查德·珀尔都曾建议推翻伊朗伊斯兰共和国。政府高层官员似乎也将此视为终极目标。据传,在杰伊·加纳完成伊拉克占领任务回国后,布什曾问他:“接下来要不要把伊朗也拿下?”

Bush was often criticized as lawless. In the glare of recent years, though, what stands out is how consumed with law, with process, his Administration was. The lead-up to the invasion of Iraq involved an intense public debate over reasons and evidence. Officials seeking the forceful interrogation of terror suspects scoured the globe and scanned law books to determine exactly the places and ways in which detainees could, in theory, be legally tormented. That members of the Administration lied about the war only underlines the point. To feel the need to lie is, in a perverse way, to respect the process.

布什常被批评为目无法纪。但在近年来的聚光灯下,引人注目的反而是他的政府如何被法律与程序所吞噬。入侵伊拉克前的准备阶段,围绕理由与证据展开了激烈的公开辩论。寻求对恐怖嫌犯进行强力审讯的官员们搜遍全球、翻遍法典,只为从理论上确定在哪些地点、以何种方式折磨囚犯才算合法。政府成员对战争撒谎的事实恰恰凸显了这一点——这种扭曲的撒谎需求,恰恰是对程序的一种“尊重”。

Bush rationalized his way into invading Iraq. But his determination to be seen as acting within bounds appears to have checked his Iran ambitions. He regarded the Islamic Republic as an existential threat and considered military strikes. (“The president made it very clear that all options were on the table,” his Vice-President, Dick Cheney, wrote.) Yet Bush recalled worrying that attacking Iran might create “serious problems” for Iraq, which he was struggling to pacify. Then came the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, which, having collected the work of sixteen agencies, concluded with “high confidence” that Iran had halted its nuclear program years ago. This had a “big impact—and not a good one,” Bush fumed. It “tied my hands on the military side,” and made bombing Iran impossible to justify.

小布什曾为自己的伊拉克入侵行动寻找理由。但他希望被视为在界限内行事的决心,似乎抑制了他对伊朗的野心。他将伊朗伊斯兰共和国视为生存威胁,并考虑过军事打击。(“总统明确表示,所有选项都摆在桌面上,”他的副总统迪克·切尼写道。)然而,布什回忆说,他担心攻击伊朗可能会给伊拉克带来“严重问题”,而他当时正努力稳定伊拉克局势。随后,2007年美国国家情报评估出炉,这份汇集了16家机构工作的报告以“高度信心”得出结论:伊朗早在数年前就已停止其核计划。这产生了“巨大影响——而且不是好的影响”,布什愤怒地说。它“在军事方面束缚了我的手脚”,使得轰炸伊朗无法自圆其说。

Bush also lacked the resources to invade. He was already heavily engaged in Iraq, where, obeying what members of his Cabinet called the “Pottery Barn rule”—you break it, you own it—he kept extending the exhausting occupation. Trump, watching from the sidelines, couldn’t understand why Bush was intent on imposing order on a faltering Iraq. Bush should just “declare victory and leave,” Trump huffed in 2007. “I think Bush is probably the worst President in the history of the United States.”

布什也缺乏入侵的资源。他早已深陷伊拉克泥潭——遵循其内阁成员所谓的“陶器仓规则”(打碎就要负责),他不断延长这场令人筋疲力尽的占领。特朗普作为旁观者,始终无法理解布什为何执意要为摇摇欲坠的伊拉克强加秩序。2007年,特朗普曾愤愤不平地表示,布什就该“宣布胜利然后撤军”,并断言“布什恐怕是美国历史上最糟糕的总统”。

Bush’s successor, Barack Obama, had little taste for Bush’s adventurism. But this wasn’t a retreat from hegemony so much as a preference for a more calmly managed form of it. “America must always lead on the world stage,” he insisted. “If we don’t, no one else will.”

布什的继任者巴拉克·奥巴马对布什的冒险主义兴致索然。但这并非霸权主义的退却,而更像是对一种更从容的霸权形式的偏好。“美国必须在世界舞台上保持领导地位,”他坚称,“如果我们不领导,就没有其他国家能领导。”

It was partly to regain squandered influence that, twelve and a half minutes into his first Inaugural Address, Obama turned to “the Muslim world.” In a message aimed at Tehran, he said, “We will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.” Two months later, Obama released a video celebrating the Persian New Year, in which he expressed hope for “mutual respect” with the “Islamic Republic of Iran.” As John Ghazvinian notes in his absorbing history “America and Iran” (2021), this was the first time a U.S. President had been willing to use the country’s official name.

在就职演说进行到十二分半钟时,奥巴马转向“穆斯林世界”,部分原因是为了挽回被挥霍殆尽的影响力。他向德黑兰传递信息说:“如果你们愿意松开拳头,我们将伸出援手。”两个月后,奥巴马发布庆祝波斯新年的视频,表示希望与“伊朗伊斯兰共和国”建立“相互尊重”的关系。正如约翰·加兹维尼安在其引人入胜的历史著作《美国与伊朗》(2021年)中指出的,这是美国总统首次愿意使用该国的官方名称。

The needle appeared to move. While giving a speech, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, quieted his audience during its ritual chant of “Death to America.” “We do not have any experience with this new American President,” he explained. “We will observe and judge.” He had a message for Obama, too: “You change, and our behavior will change as well.” To an outsider, this might have sounded piddling. But, Ghazvinian writes, “for anyone who had followed Iran closely over the past thirty years, it was nothing short of a historic opening.”

指针似乎开始移动。伊朗最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊在一次演讲中,当听众按惯例高呼“美国去死”时,他示意众人安静。“我们对这位新任美国总统尚无了解,”他解释道,“我们将观察并判断。”他同时向奥巴马传递了讯息:“你们改变,我们的行为也会随之改变。”在外界听来,这或许微不足道。但正如加兹维尼安所写:“对于过去三十年密切关注伊朗局势的人来说,这无异于一个历史性的开端。”

If Obama was hoping for a Nixon-in-China moment, however, he’d have to fight the U.S. political establishment. Even his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented engagement with Tehran to Congress as mainly a pretext that would place Washington on “much stronger international footing,” presuming talks fell through, to impose “crippling sanctions.” Under enormous political pressure, including from supporters of Israel, Obama let the broad negotiations he’d envisaged shrink into a brusque take-it-or-leave-it proposition regarding Iran’s uranium stockpile.

然而,若奥巴马期待创造“尼克松访华式”的外交突破,他必须与美国政治体制展开角力。就连他的国务卿希拉里·克林顿向国会阐述与德黑兰接触政策时,也将其主要定位为策略性铺垫——倘若谈判破裂,美国将站在“更坚实的国际立场”上实施“毁灭性制裁”。在包括以色列支持者在内的巨大政治压力下,奥巴马最终让原本设想中的广泛谈判,收缩成针对伊朗铀库存的粗暴“要么接受要么放弃”式最后通牒。

As Clinton had anticipated, the talks fell through. The Administration then orchestrated what Vice-President Joe Biden trumpeted as “the most crippling sanctions in the history of sanctions, period.” Ghazvinian explains that Iran’s oil production cratered, its currency tanked, and doctors scrambled to provide care with expired drugs and faltering equipment.

正如克林顿所料,谈判破裂了。随后,美国政府策划了被副总统乔·拜登高调称为“史上最严厉的制裁,没有之一”的行动。加兹维尼安解释道,伊朗的石油产量暴跌,货币崩盘,医生们只能争分夺秒地用过期药品和故障设备提供医疗服务。

Obama tried negotiations again in his second term, with a more enthusiastic Secretary of State, John Kerry. Still, he was paddling upstream. As a deal took shape that would lift some sanctions in exchange for limits on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, a skeptical Congress invited the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to speak against it. The deal would legitimatize Iran’s nuclear program and, by alleviating sanctions, help a “genocidal” country flourish, Netanyahu believed. “We must all stand together to stop Iran’s march of conquest, subjugation, and terror,” he said to applause.

奥巴马在第二任期再次尝试谈判,这次他有一位更热心的国务卿约翰·克里(John Kerry)。然而他依然逆水行舟。当一项以解除部分制裁换取伊朗核能力受限的协议初具雏形时,持怀疑态度的国会邀请以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡前来发表反对意见。内塔尼亚胡认为,该协议将使伊朗的核计划合法化,并通过减轻制裁帮助这个“实施种族灭绝”的国家繁荣起来。“我们必须团结一致,阻止伊朗征服、奴役和制造恐怖的步伐,”他的发言赢得了掌声。

Obama secured the accord, in 2015, only by threatening to veto Congress. The Iran deal was the “Obamacare of foreign policy,” the political scientist Dalia Dassa Kaye writes in her new book, “Enduring Hostility,” and it left the same bitter aftertaste. It was the “worst deal ever,” Trump insisted. And Obama was “perhaps the worst president in the history of the United States.”

2015年,奥巴马以否决国会决议相威胁,才确保了协议的达成。政治学家达莉亚·达萨·凯(Dalia Dassa Kaye)在其新书《持久敌意》(Enduring Hostility)中写道,伊朗核协议堪称“外交政策领域的奥巴马医改”,同样留下了苦涩的余味。特朗普坚称这是“史上最糟糕的协议”,而奥巴马“或许是美国历史上最糟糕的总统”。

Trump, running for office, promised to rip up the deal. If so, then Iran would set fire to it, Ayatollah Khamenei responded. It seemed, Kaye writes, that the only force holding the omnidirectionally imperilled deal together after Trump’s 2016 election was the so-called axis of adults in his White House: National-Security Adviser H. R. McMaster, Defense Secretary James Mattis, and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. John Bolton, brought in to help fight that axis, remembered the Iran deal being the “most palpable manifestation” of the Administration’s internal divisions. The adults won the first round, but the fight wasn’t finished. “I’m never signing one of these certifications again,” Trump seethed, after endorsing one of the accord’s routine documents. “I can’t believe I’m signing this one.”

特朗普竞选时曾扬言要撕毁协议。最高领袖哈梅内伊回应称,若真如此,伊朗将一把火烧了它。凯写道,2016年大选后,维系这份四面楚歌的协议的唯一力量,似乎来自白宫内部所谓的“成人轴心”——国家安全顾问麦克马斯特、国防部长马蒂斯和国务卿蒂勒森。被请来对抗这个轴心的博尔顿回忆称,伊朗协议是本届政府内部分歧“最显著的体现”。成人派赢了第一回合,但斗争并未结束。“我再也不会签这种认证了,”特朗普在签署协议例行文件后怒不可遏,“真不敢相信我居然签了这个。”

In retrospect, it’s impressive that Trump made it to 2018 before abandoning the accord. Ripping up deals was his hallmark. The most fundamental deal—that the United States should govern world affairs—looked no better to him. “We are in countries most people haven’t even heard of. Frankly, it’s ridiculous,” he complained, in a speech to service members in Iraq. “The United States cannot continue to be the policeman of the world.” To rally the troops, he offered this: “We’re no longer the suckers, folks.”

回想起来,特朗普能坚持到2018年才退出协议,已经令人刮目相看。撕毁协议是他的标志性动作。在他看来,连最根本的协议——即美国应当主导全球事务——也毫无吸引力。“我们驻扎在大多数人闻所未闻的国家。坦白说,这太荒唐了,”他在伊拉克对美军发表讲话时抱怨道,“美国不能再继续当世界警察了。”为了鼓舞士气,他这样说道:“我们不再是冤大头了,各位。”

It was a sharp turn. In place of global hegemony, Trump offered narrow self-interest. In place of principles, threats. Asked to define the Trump Doctrine, a senior Administration official put it curtly: “We’re America, bitches.”

这是一个急转弯。特朗普用狭隘的自我利益取代了全球霸权,用威胁取代了原则。当被要求定义“特朗普主义”时,一位政府高级官员直截了当地说:“我们是美国,混蛋。”
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“艺术市场不景气,我真不知道这还值不值得。”
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Having rejected the need to carry allies along, Trump saw little point in concealing U.S. power. In 2019, he tweeted a detailed photo of an Iranian missile launchpad, demonstrably taken by an advanced U.S. spy satellite. When officials rushed to redact the classified details, Trump protested, “That’s the sexy part.” His aides learned to steer sensitive materials around him.

既然特朗普认为没必要顾及盟友,也就觉得没必要掩饰美国的实力。2019年,他在推特上发布了一张伊朗导弹发射场的详细照片,显然是由美国先进间谍卫星拍摄的。当官员们急忙对机密细节进行编辑处理时,特朗普抗议道:“那才是性感的部分。”他的助手们学会了如何绕过他处理敏感材料。

Trump also dispensed with the notion that U.S. interests were everywhere at stake. He floated allowing Japan and South Korea to develop nuclear arsenals to wean them from U.S. protection. And if this triggered war between Japan and North Korea? “If they do, they do,” he said. “Good luck, folks. Enjoy yourself.”

特朗普还摒弃了美国利益处处攸关的观念。他提出允许日本和韩国发展核武库,使其摆脱美国的保护。如果这引发日本和朝鲜之间的战争呢?“打就打吧,”他说,“祝你们好运,各位。好好享受。”

Perhaps they would. Iran, under renewed sanctions and no longer feeling fully bound by the nuclear deal, began enriching uranium at a higher level, closer to the point of developing nuclear weapons. Although Joe Biden promised to reverse this with a “longer and stronger” deal, he delayed and eventually did nothing. Instead, “Iran essentially became a nuclear threshold state,” Kaye writes. And then Trump was reëlected.

或许会。伊朗在重新受到制裁、且不再觉得自己完全受核协议约束后,开始以更高浓度进行铀浓缩活动,更接近发展核武器的临界点。尽管乔·拜登曾承诺通过一项“更长、更强”的协议来扭转这一局面,但他拖延了,最终什么也没做。凯写道,结果“伊朗实质上成了一个核门槛国家”。接着,特朗普再次当选。

Could he abide the Islamic Republic? In June, 2025, Trump joined an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Yet the attack did not flare into a wider war, and Trump’s National Security Strategy, released months later, suggested that it might never. The document railed against the “foreign policy elites” who had “convinced themselves that permanent American domination of the entire world was in the best interest of our country.” With Iran’s nuclear program knocked back by the air strikes, “the days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy” were “thankfully over.”

他能容忍伊斯兰共和国吗?2025年6月,特朗普参与了以色列对伊朗核设施的袭击。然而这次袭击并未演变成更大规模的战争,数月后公布的特朗普《国家安全战略》暗示,或许永远不会。这份文件猛烈抨击那些“自以为美国永久主宰整个世界最符合我国利益”的“外交政策精英”。随着伊朗核计划因空袭而受挫,“中东主导美国外交政策的日子”“幸好已经结束”。

This was the promise of Trump’s outlook: that indifference might bring peace. But the other possibility lingered: that indifference might remove guardrails. At a National Security Council meeting in his first term, John Bolton recounted, Trump was asked by aides about his tolerance for risk in foreign affairs. “I have an almost unbelievable capacity for risk,” Trump answered. “Risk is good.” He then proposed ousting Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela to take the country’s oil.

这正是特朗普世界观的承诺:漠不关心或许能带来和平。但另一种可能性始终萦绕:漠不关心或许会拆除护栏。据约翰·博尔顿回忆,在特朗普第一任期的一次国家安全委员会会议上,助手们询问他对处理外交事务风险的容忍度。“我拥有近乎不可思议的承受风险的能力,”特朗普答道,“风险是好事。”他随即提议推翻委内瑞拉的尼古拉斯·马杜罗政权,以夺取该国的石油资源。

Early this year, U.S. planes opened fire on Venezuelan targets while commandos captured Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. Trump made desultory mention of ideals (“peace, liberty, and justice for the great people of Venezuela”) but within moments started speaking of oil markets. It sounded like George W. Bush without the pretense, though Trump’s speech also lacked Bush’s sweeping ambitions. Maduro had trafficked “gigantic amounts of illegal drugs” and sent “savage and murderous gangs” into the United States, Trump claimed, but his Vice-President, Delcy Rodríguez, was “quite gracious,” so perhaps she could stay.

今年早些时候,美军战机向委内瑞拉境内目标开火,突击队则抓获了马杜罗及其妻子西莉亚·弗洛雷斯。特朗普漫不经心地提及理想(“为伟大的委内瑞拉人民带来和平、自由与正义”),但转眼就开始谈论石油市场。这听起来像是卸下伪装的乔治·W·布什,不过特朗普的演讲也缺乏布什那种宏大的野心。特朗普声称马杜罗贩运“数量惊人的非法毒品”并派遣“野蛮凶残的犯罪团伙”进入美国,但马杜罗的副总统德尔茜·罗德里格斯“相当优雅得体”,或许可以留任。

In fact, she did. “Everybody’s kept their job except for two people,” a satisfied Trump explained. It was as if this had been an episode of “The Apprentice”: not a military strike so much as a round of layoffs.

事实上,她确实这么做了。“除了两个人,其他人都保住了工作,”特朗普满意地解释道。这仿佛《飞黄腾达》的剧情重演:与其说是军事打击,不如说是一轮裁员。

It’s not clear how long Delcy Rodríguez, now Venezuela’s Acting President, will be able to both meet U.S. demands and ward off internal opposition. The Shah managed that balancing act, though not forever. Still, in the short run, Venezuela put gas in Trump’s tank, and he has sped headlong into war with Iran. This is “going to work very easily,” he assured CNN. “It’s going to work like in Venezuela.”

目前尚不清楚委内瑞拉代总统德尔茜·罗德里格斯(Delcy Rodríguez)能在多大程度上同时满足美国的要求并抵御内部反对势力。伊朗国王当年也曾玩过这种平衡术,尽管未能持久。但就短期而言,委内瑞拉确实为特朗普的油箱加满了油,让他得以全速冲向与伊朗的战争。“这会非常容易搞定,”他向美国有线电视新闻网保证,“就像在委内瑞拉那样顺利。”

That confidence has a familiar ring. Writing in the Times, Ross Douthat has argued that the spirit of Bush “broods over the Trump administration.” Yet what’s missing, as Douthat acknowledges, is any vision for controlling the Middle East. The Bush Administration’s names for two of its major actions in the region, Operation New Dawn and Operation Enduring Freedom, evoked wide horizons and deep transformations, ones that might secure U.S. influence for generations. Compare those with the names of Trump’s Iran actions: Operation Midnight Hammer and Operation Epic Fury.

这番自信听来耳熟。罗斯·多塞特在《纽约时报》撰文指出,布什的幽灵“正笼罩着特朗普政府”。但正如多塞特所言,如今缺失的是掌控中东的任何愿景。布什政府在该地区的两大军事行动——“新黎明行动”与“持久自由行动”——其命名本身就昭示着广阔的地平线与深刻的变革,这些行动或许能确保美国影响力延续数代。再看特朗普对伊朗行动的命名:“午夜铁锤行动”与“史诗狂怒行动”。

The difference between dawn and midnight, between freedom and fury, is hegemonic aspiration—or the lack thereof. It’s not just that Trump is rash and reckless. It’s that he has rejected the overarching systematic concerns that both pushed his predecessors forward and at times held them back. The world’s most powerful military exists in his hands not to impose order but to lash out. This isn’t hegemony; it’s a hit-and-run.

黎明与午夜、自由与暴怒之间的分野,在于霸权抱负的有无。问题不仅在于特朗普的鲁莽轻率,更在于他摒弃了那种既推动前任前行、又时常制约他们的宏观体系关切。世界最强大的军队在他手中,不是为了建立秩序,而是为了肆意宣泄。这不是霸权,而是肇事逃逸。

Having helped Israel kill Iran’s Supreme Leader, Trump has only the vaguest notion of what should come next. Perhaps the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps should hand over its weapons and “surrender to the people,” or perhaps the Corps and the people should make a revolution together. Alternatively, the defanged Islamic Republic could remain intact and Trump could choose a leader from its ranks. He mentioned “three very good choices,” though it now seems that these candidates may have been killed. “Everybody that seems to want to be a leader, they end up dead,” Trump mused, with unconcealed relish. Iran’s government, meanwhile, has made its own choice: Mojtaba Khamenei, the dead Ayatollah’s son, who was himself reportedly wounded by the air strikes. Trump called this choice “unacceptable” and warned the new Supreme Leader that he would not last long without Washington’s approval. Which is to say, Trump has no plan but reserves the right to reject everyone else’s.

在协助以色列刺杀伊朗最高领袖后,特朗普对后续安排只有最模糊的构想。或许伊斯兰革命卫队应当缴械“向人民投降”,又或许革命卫队能与人民共同发起革命。另一种可能是,被拔除獠牙的伊斯兰共和国保持完整,由特朗普从其阵营中挑选新领袖。他提及“三位绝佳人选”,尽管这些人选如今似乎都已丧生。“每个想当领袖的人最后都死了,”特朗普毫不掩饰幸灾乐祸地沉吟道。与此同时,伊朗政府已作出自己的选择:已故最高领袖之子穆杰塔巴·哈梅内伊——据传他本人在空袭中受伤。特朗普称这个选择“不可接受”,并警告新任最高领袖若未获华盛顿首肯将难以长久。换言之,特朗普虽无具体方案,却保留否决所有人选的权利。

Past Presidents, for all their destructive crusades and covert actions, stopped short of invading Iran out of regard for the global chessboard. They worried about Iran blocking oil flows, attacking allies, or imploding and sending refugees streaming through the region. Trump has unburdened himself of such concerns. He’s not playing chess and doesn’t ultimately mind if pieces are captured.

历任总统尽管发动过破坏性的征伐和秘密行动,却始终未敢入侵伊朗,因为他们顾及全球棋局。他们担心伊朗会封锁石油运输、袭击盟友,或是政权崩溃导致难民潮席卷该地区。特朗普则卸下了这些顾虑。他根本不在下棋,也不在乎棋子是否被吃掉。

After Trump seized Maduro, Defense Secretary Hegseth summed up Maduro’s story: “He effed around and he found out.” In a larger sense, though, it’s Trump who effs around. His life has been an unbroken string of outrageous “what if?” experiments. What if I stiff this contractor? Pocket this cash? Reject this election?

特朗普拿下马杜罗后,国防部长赫格塞斯总结马杜罗的故事:“他惹是生非,自食其果。”但从更宏观的角度看,惹是生非的其实是特朗普。他的人生就是一连串肆无忌惮的“要是……会怎样”实验:要是我赖掉承包商的账呢?要是我私吞这笔现金呢?要是我拒绝承认选举结果呢?

Or bomb this country? Trump effed around, and we’re all finding out. He has shrugged off the imperial mantle, the force that propelled his predecessors into ruinous meddling. From another President, that could have been welcome, but from a wrathful tyrant like Trump it’s terrifying. Because the quest for global control was never just a compulsion. It was also, in hindsight, a constraint. ♦

还是轰炸这个国家?特朗普胡作非为,如今我们都在承受后果。他卸下了帝国斗篷——那曾驱使他的前任们陷入灾难性干涉的力量。若换作另一位总统,这本可令人欣慰,但出自特朗普这样一位暴戾的独裁者之手,却令人胆寒。因为对全球掌控的追求从来不只是某种执念。如今回望,它也是一种制约。♦

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