News

What Would a Ground Invasion of Iran Look Like?

地面入侵伊朗会是什么样子?

As a fragile ceasefire begins, Tehran is using lessons from the Iran-Iraq War to prepare for an American escalation.

随着特朗普总统要求伊朗开放霍尔木兹海峡的最后期限临近,德黑兰正借鉴两伊战争的经验,为美国的升级行动做准备。

By Sudarsan Raghavan||16 min read
地面入侵伊朗会是什么样子?

An A.I. video recently released by supporters of the Iranian government begins with a robed Shiite Muslim warrior approaching the White House on a stormy night, clutching an ornate split-bladed sword. In the next scene, the weapon slides across President Donald Trump’s cheek. Generated images depict present-day Iranian soldiers defending oil facilities under attack and capturing a U.S. aircraft carrier. Another group pays respects to the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the leading religious figure for millions of Shiites around the world, before launching what appears to be a suicide mission against enemies in Humvees. Then other soldiers attack oil tankers from speedboats as ballistic missiles launch out of a gold-domed mosque, and explosives-laden drones target Dubai. “You can’t kill people who are ready to die for their cause,” the narrator says in English, addressing the U.S. “The Shia are prepared to be martyrs in the cause of their faith. It is the Islamic Republic of Iran that they are defending—not just their land, not just their culture, not just their history, but their faith.”

伊朗政府支持者近日发布的一段人工智能视频,以这样的画面开场:风雨交加的夜晚,一位身着长袍的什叶派穆斯林战士手持装饰华丽的双刃剑,走向白宫。下一幕中,这把武器划过唐纳德·特朗普总统的脸颊。生成的图像描绘了当代伊朗士兵在遭受袭击的石油设施前进行防御,并俘获一艘美国航空母舰的场景。另一组画面中,士兵们向全球数百万什叶派最高宗教领袖大阿亚图拉阿里·西斯塔尼致敬后,似乎驾驶悍马车对敌人发动自杀式袭击。随后,其他士兵乘坐快艇攻击油轮,弹道导弹从金色穹顶的清真寺发射,装载炸药的无人机瞄准迪拜。“你们杀不死那些甘愿为信仰赴死的人,”旁白用英语向美国喊话,“什叶派已准备好为信仰殉道。他们捍卫的是伊朗伊斯兰共和国——不仅是土地、不仅是文化、不仅是历史,更是他们的信仰。”

As the Trump Administration prepares for a possible ground invasion of Iran, the Iranian regime and its loyalists are waging a propaganda war, using motifs of religion, self-sacrifice, and glory, through dozens of videos like this one that are circulating on social media. Many troll Trump and are designed to motivate Shiite Muslims in Iran and around the world. Others are in English and attempt to influence global public opinion, including in the United States, where the war is increasingly unpopular among most Americans. While these A.I. memes are built for dissemination on the modern internet, the reliance on religious iconography and references to martyrdom originate from a different era: the last time Iran was invaded by a foreign power. In the nineteen-eighties, the country fought a brutal eight-year war against Iraq, whose government was backed by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and much of the Arab world. The lessons learned from that conflict still guide the regime and its powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps more than four decades later. The Iran-Iraq War “is a vast reservoir of resilience memory from which to draw on,” Hussein Banai, an Iran expert and professor of international studies at Indiana University Bloomington, told me. Iran saw “that it could stand up to the United States, but also to other countries that are backed by American power. The narrative of that war is really what’s driven a sense of purpose, especially for the Revolutionary Guard.”

随着特朗普政府准备对伊朗发动可能的地面入侵,伊朗政权及其支持者正在发动一场宣传战,通过社交媒体上流传的数十个类似视频,利用宗教、自我牺牲和荣耀等主题。许多视频都在嘲讽特朗普,旨在激励伊朗和世界各地的什叶派穆斯林。还有一些视频是英文的,试图影响全球舆论,包括在美国——这场战争在大多数美国人中越来越不受欢迎。虽然这些人工智能生成的迷因是为在现代互联网上传播而设计的,但对宗教意象的依赖和对殉难的提及却源于一个不同的时代:伊朗上一次被外国势力入侵。上世纪八十年代,伊朗与伊拉克进行了一场残酷的八年战争,伊拉克政府得到了美国、苏联和大部分阿拉伯世界的支持。四十多年后,从这场冲突中吸取的教训仍然指导着该政权及其强大的伊斯兰革命卫队。印第安纳大学伯明顿分校国际研究教授、伊朗问题专家侯赛因·巴奈(Hussein Banai)告诉我,两伊战争“是一个巨大的韧性记忆库,可以从中汲取力量”。伊朗看到“它可以对抗美国,也可以对抗其他受美国支持的国家。那场战争的叙事确实推动了目标感,尤其是对革命卫队而言。”

On Sunday, Trump vowed to strike Iran’s power plants and bridges if by Tuesday night the regime doesn’t reopen the Strait of Hormuz. A defiant Iran replied that it would not open the strait, through which a fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas flows, unless the U.S. pays for war damages. And it warned that it would retaliate “much more crushingly and extensively.” The morning before the deadline, Trump posted on Truth Social that “a whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again,” adding that “we will find out tonight, one of the most important moments in the long and complex history of the World.” Meanwhile, thousands of U.S. ground forces, including U.S. Special Operations Forces, seaborne marines and élite Army paratroopers, with experience in seizing strategic terrain during rapid-response combat missions, have arrived in the Middle East. Over the weekend, the risks of operating on the ground were laid bare when Iran shot down a U.S. F-15E fighter jet, and the two airmen in the plane ejected over the southwestern part of Iran. Later, a second, low-flying U.S. warplane, an A-10 Warthog that was part of a mission to rescue the F-15E pilot, was hit multiple times, but its pilot managed to fly out of Iran and eject safely over Kuwaiti airspace before it crashed. A U.S. HH-60W Jolly Green II combat helicopter also came under heavy fire; its crew sustained minor injuries but were able to leave Iranian airspace without mishap. While the pilot of the F-15E was rescued shortly after ejecting, the second airman, an Air Force weapons officer, fled into a mountainous region, where he climbed mountain ridges several thousand feet high, despite being injured, and successfully evaded Iranian forces for more than a day. He hid in a rock crevice and activated an emergency beacon to signal his location, setting off a sprawling mission deep inside Iran which involved commandos from SEAL Team Six, hundreds of other military personnel, and a hundred and fifty-five aircraft, including sixty-four fighters, forty-eight refuelling tankers, thirteen rescue aircraft, and four bombers. After the weapons officer was located, two U.S. transport planes that had landed at a remote forward operating base inside Iran to extract the team and the airman experienced mechanical problems, and three other planes had to be dispatched to extract them hours later. Before leaving, the team blew up the immobilized aircraft to prevent sophisticated technology from falling into Iranian hands. At a White House press conference on Monday, Trump acknowledged that the operation was “a risky decision, because we could have ended up with a hundred dead, as opposed to one or two. It’s a hard decision to make, but in the United States military we leave no American behind.”

周日,特朗普誓言,如果伊朗政权在周二晚间之前不重新开放霍尔木兹海峡,他将打击伊朗的发电厂和桥梁。伊朗方面则强硬回应,除非美国支付战争赔偿,否则不会开放这条承担全球五分之一石油和天然气运输的海峡,并警告将进行“更猛烈、更广泛”的报复。最后期限到来的前一天早晨,特朗普在Truth Social上发文称“整个文明今晚将消亡,永不复返”,并补充说“我们将在今晚见证世界漫长复杂历史中最重要的时刻之一”。与此同时,数千名美国地面部队已抵达中东,其中包括美国特种作战部队、海军陆战队和陆军精英空降兵,这些部队在快速反应作战任务中具有夺取战略要地的经验。 上周末,伊朗击落一架美国F-15E战斗机,两名机组人员在伊朗西南部上空弹射逃生,地面作战的风险由此暴露无遗。随后,另一架低空飞行的美国战机——参与救援F-15E飞行员任务的A-10“疣猪”攻击机——多次被击中,但其飞行员成功飞离伊朗,在科威特领空弹射逃生,飞机最终坠毁。一架美国HH-60W“快乐绿巨人II”战斗直升机也遭到猛烈火力袭击;机组人员受轻伤,但顺利离开了伊朗领空。 F-15E飞行员在弹射后不久获救,而第二名机组成员——一名空军武器军官——逃往山区。尽管受伤,他仍攀爬了数千英尺高的山脊,成功躲避伊朗部队超过一天。他藏身于岩缝中,启动应急信标发送位置信号,从而在伊朗境内深处引发了一场大规模营救任务。参与行动的有海豹六队突击队员、数百名其他军事人员以及155架飞机,包括64架战斗机、48架加油机、13架救援机和4架轰炸机。 定位到武器军官后,两架在伊朗境内偏远前沿作战基地降落、准备接应小队和该军官的美国运输机出现机械故障,数小时后不得不另派三架飞机接应。撤离前,小队炸毁了无法移动的飞机,以防先进技术落入伊朗手中。在周一的白宫新闻发布会上,特朗普承认这次行动是“一个冒险的决定,因为我们原本可能损失一百人,而不是一两人。这是个艰难的决定,但在美国军队中,我们绝不抛弃任何一位同胞。”

While no U.S. service members died in the rescue, the chaos of operating inside Iran’s border is just a preview of what a full-scale ground invasion, or even limited incursions, would look like—and the Iran-Iraq War can offer a blueprint. U.S. troops could quickly find themselves fighting a guerrilla conflict against Iranian forces who deploy tactics and strategies developed during Iraq’s invasion and further honed in succeeding regional and internal conflicts. That war’s extreme death toll and the lingering memories of being occupied by a foreign force have established a mind-set that could galvanize more Iranians to support a war against an invading American force, including those who were opposed to the regime before the U.S.-Israel attack. “Those affiliated with the state know that the one thing that united everybody in post-revolutionary moments was the Iraqi invasion of Iran,” Amir Moosavi, a professor at Rutgers University-Newark who specializes in the cultural history of the Middle East, told me. The regime, Moosavi said, uses “this language of resistance to cultivate a culture of remembrance about that conflict,” which was “the first act of resistance that Iran had against the U.S. and its regional allies. It’s an evolving language that is now being used and updated for the current conflict.”

虽然美军在救援行动中无人伤亡,但在伊朗境内展开行动时的混乱局面,恰恰预示了全面地面入侵甚至有限军事介入可能面临的景象——而两伊战争可以提供一份蓝图。美军可能很快会发现自己陷入与伊朗军队的游击战,对方采用的战术策略曾在伊拉克入侵期间发展成型,并在随后的地区冲突和内部冲突中进一步磨砺。那场战争造成的惊人伤亡,以及被外国军队占领的持久记忆,已经形成了一种思维定式,可能激励更多伊朗人支持抗击入侵美军的战争,其中甚至包括那些在美以袭击前反对现政权的人。“与政权有关联的人都明白,在后革命时期,唯一能让所有人团结起来的事件就是伊拉克入侵伊朗,”罗格斯大学纽瓦克分校研究中东文化史的教授阿米尔·穆萨维(Amir Moosavi)告诉我。穆萨维说,伊朗政权运用“这种抵抗话语来培育关于那场冲突的纪念文化”,而那场战争正是“伊朗对抗美国及其地区盟友的首次抵抗行动。这是一种不断演变的话语体系,如今正被运用于当前冲突并得到更新。”

In the propaganda video, the narrator mentions the core Shiite religious figures Ali and Hussein, the first and third Shiite Imams, respectively, as well as the Battle of Karbala, a seventh-century uprising by Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, against a tyrant named Yazid. During the confrontation, Hussein and his followers were massacred, but the imam’s quest for justice became a defining value of Shiite identity, fostering a sense of revolutionary duty to fight oppressors at any cost. Even the split-bladed sword the A.I. warrior carries outside of the White House, known as the sword of Zulfiqar, has religious connotations: it belonged to Imam Ali and symbolizes resistance and martyrdom. Trump, the narrator claims, “has no clue” about the Battle of Karbala or Shiite philosophies or their imprint on the current war. “The Islamic Republic is invincible at this moment,” he declares as the video ends with an apocalyptic scene of missiles raining chaos down on central Tel Aviv.

在这段宣传视频中,旁白提及了什叶派核心宗教人物阿里与侯赛因——他们分别是什叶派的第一任与第三任伊玛目,同时提到了卡尔巴拉战役。这场七世纪的起义由先知穆罕默德之孙侯赛因发起,旨在反抗暴君叶齐德。在那场对决中,侯赛因及其追随者惨遭屠杀,但这位伊玛目对正义的追求,自此成为什叶派身份认同的核心价值,孕育出不惜一切代价反抗压迫者的革命使命感。就连视频中人工智能战士在白宫外手持的双刃剑——祖尔菲卡尔之剑,也承载着宗教意涵:它曾是伊玛目阿里的佩剑,象征着抵抗与殉道。旁白宣称,特朗普对卡尔巴拉战役、什叶派哲学及其对当前战争的影响“一无所知”。“此刻的伊斯兰共和国是不可战胜的,”视频在宣告声中落幕,画面定格在导弹如雨般倾泻在特拉维夫市中心、引发末日般混乱的场景。

On September 23, 1980, one day after launching airstrikes on Iran, Iraqi ground forces crossed into Khuzestan, a strategic western province that contained Iran’s largest oil field and a considerable number of Iranian Arabs, a minority in the country. The previous year, the Islamic Revolution had deposed Iran’s Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and installed the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and an ultraconservative Shiite theocracy. From the very start of the attack by the U.S. and Israel in February, there were striking parallels to Iraq’s invasion. Before Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s dictator, declared war on Iran, he feared that the fledgling theocracy next door would export its hard-line ideology and marshal Iraq’s Shiite majority to topple his Sunni-dominated Baathist regime. Like Trump, he viewed crushing Iran as a great service to the region—in his case, by shielding the Sunni Arab world from Shiite expansionism. Iraq took advantage of the Iranian military’s disarray in the aftermath of the Revolution. It launched air strikes on Iranian airbases, fired hundreds of Scud missiles at Iranian cities, including Tehran, and targeted Iran’s oil-and-energy infrastructure, in moves reminiscent of today’s extensive U.S.-Israeli campaign to degrade the regime’s military capabilities and resilience. The U.S., the Soviet Union, and France would eventually provide intelligence and advanced weaponry to Iraq. Iran’s Air Force and military fought back, but isolated by the world and under U.S. and international sanctions, they had to scramble for spare parts for its warplanes and military equipment. Like Trump, Saddam Hussein expected a quick, decisive victory. He believed that by imposing large numbers of casualties on Iran, including chemical attacks on civilians, he could break the regime’s morale and force it to agree to his demands. He urged Iranians to rise against the government. Instead, they remained loyal to the Ayatollah. Saddam, like Trump, underestimated Iran’s fierce response and its determination to survive at any cost.

1980年9月23日,在发动对伊朗的空袭一天后,伊拉克地面部队越过边境,进入伊朗西部战略省份胡齐斯坦。该省拥有伊朗最大的油田,以及相当数量的伊朗阿拉伯人——他们是伊朗的少数民族。前一年,伊斯兰革命推翻了伊朗国王穆罕默德·礼萨·巴列维,建立了由阿亚图拉·鲁霍拉·霍梅尼领导的极端保守的什叶派神权政体。从今年2月美以发动袭击之初,就能看到与当年伊拉克入侵惊人的相似之处。伊拉克独裁者萨达姆·侯赛因在对伊朗宣战前,曾担心这个初生的神权政体会输出其强硬意识形态,并动员伊拉克占多数的什叶派民众,推翻他由逊尼派主导的复兴党政权。与特朗普一样,萨达姆认为击垮伊朗是对地区的重大贡献——在他看来,这能保护阿拉伯逊尼派世界免受什叶派扩张主义的侵蚀。伊拉克利用了伊朗革命后军队的混乱局面,对伊朗空军基地发动空袭,向包括德黑兰在内的伊朗城市发射了数百枚飞毛腿导弹,并瞄准伊朗的石油和能源基础设施。这些举措令人联想到当前美以旨在削弱伊朗政权军事实力和韧性的广泛行动。美国、苏联和法国最终向伊拉克提供了情报和先进武器。伊朗空军和军队进行了反击,但由于被世界孤立并受到美国和国际制裁,他们不得不四处搜罗战机和军事设备的零部件。与特朗普一样,萨达姆·侯赛因期待一场迅速而决定性的胜利。他相信,通过给伊朗造成大量伤亡(包括对平民使用化学武器),可以击垮该政权的士气,迫使其同意他的要求。他敦促伊朗人起来反抗政府,但伊朗人依然忠于阿亚图拉。与特朗普一样,萨达姆低估了伊朗的激烈反应及其不惜一切代价求生存的决心。

Lacking conventional military resources to fight Saddam’s army, Iran turned to asymmetric warfare, fighting back through low-cost methods. Its strategy was clear: to endure and survive, it needed to prolong the war and gradually wear down Iraq and its allies. This meant conducting guerrilla attacks and cobbling together missiles and warplanes to shell Iraqi cities. And when Iraq bombed Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil-export hub, the regime retaliated, bombing Iraqi oil facilities and later using improvised mines and missiles to target ships carrying Iraqi crude in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran also spied on Iraqi positions with rudimentary precursors to drones, an early use of one of the regime’s most effective weapons in its attempt to blockade the strait. The rhetoric used by the regime was telling: fighting the invaders was not just a matter of national defense but a pre-ordained religious mandate. Iranians called the war the “sacred defense,” or the “imposed war,” and the conflict was framed as a modern-day Battle of Karbala. The religious branding of the war motivated hundreds of thousands of Iranians to join the Basij, or “mobilization” in Farsi, a volunteer militia that is now one of the most powerful paramilitary forces in the country, and made martyrdom an honor.

由于缺乏对抗萨达姆军队的常规军事资源,伊朗转向了非对称作战,通过低成本手段进行反击。其战略很明确:为了生存和坚持,必须延长战争,逐渐消耗伊拉克及其盟友。这意味着开展游击袭击,拼凑导弹和战机炮击伊拉克城市。当伊拉克轰炸伊朗主要石油出口枢纽哈尔克岛时,伊朗政权采取了报复行动,轰炸伊拉克石油设施,随后又用简易水雷和导弹袭击霍尔木兹海峡运输伊拉克原油的船只。伊朗还使用早期简陋的无人机雏形侦察伊拉克阵地,这是该政权后来用以封锁海峡的最有效武器之一的早期运用。伊朗政权使用的言辞颇具深意:抗击侵略者不仅是国防问题,更是预先注定的宗教使命。伊朗人称这场战争为“神圣防御”或“强加战争”,并将其塑造为现代版的卡尔巴拉战役。战争的宗教化包装激励了数十万伊朗人加入“巴斯基”(波斯语“动员”之意)——这支志愿民兵组织如今已成为该国最强大的准军事力量之一,也使殉道成为一种荣誉。

By December, 1980, these tactics had stalled Iraq’s advance. And by June, 1982, Iran had pushed Iraqi forces back across the border. But the war lasted six more years, much of it in a military stalemate. In 1988, with Iran facing battlefield setbacks, a lack of military resources, and economic ruin, Khomeini was forced to sign a U.N.-brokered ceasefire. As many as six hundred thousand Iranians had died in the conflict. He famously described the decision as “more deadly than drinking from a poisoned chalice.” But the regime survived, and Iran avoided losing any of its territory. It declared a moral and religious victory. This past Sunday, Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based in Washington, D.C., wrote in a post on X that, at that time, “Iran faced existential economic pressure and was offered a concrete diplomatic exit that did not require it to abandon its revolutionary identity. Trump has offered the pressure without a clear exit.”

到1980年12月,这些战术已成功阻滞了伊拉克的推进。至1982年6月,伊朗已将伊拉克军队逼退至边境线外。但战争又持续了六年之久,大部分时间陷入军事僵局。1988年,伊朗面临战场失利、军事资源匮乏和经济崩溃的困境,霍梅尼被迫签署了联合国斡旋达成的停火协议。这场冲突中,有多达六十万伊朗人丧生。霍梅尼曾有名言,称这一决定“比饮下毒酒更为致命”。但政权得以存续,伊朗也避免了领土损失,并宣称取得了道义与宗教上的胜利。上周日,驻华盛顿的卡内基国际和平研究院高级研究员、伊朗问题专家卡里姆·萨德贾普尔在X平台发文指出,当时“伊朗面临关乎存亡的经济压力,而外交途径提供了明确的退出机制,且无需其放弃革命身份认同。特朗普如今施加了压力,却未给出清晰的出路。”

The relative success of the war elevated the Revolutionary Guard from a small, street-level militia, initially created to protect Khomeini and the other clerics at the forefront of the Islamic Revolution, into the symbolic defenders of the theocracy. “The Iran-Iraq War was what the Great Patriotic War was for the Soviet Union and for Russia,” Michael Connell, an analyst who specializes in the Iranian military at C.N.A., a D.C.-based nonprofit research organization, told me, referring to the Soviet Union’s fight against Nazi Germany. “It was a coming of age, really, for the I.R.G.C., and for the regular military in Iran, because so many of the leaders that have shaped those organizations for the past few decades got their start during the war.”

这场战争的相对成功,将革命卫队从一个最初为保护霍梅尼及其他伊斯兰革命前沿的教士而成立的小型街头民兵组织,提升为神权政体的象征性捍卫者。“两伊战争之于伊朗,正如卫国战争之于苏联和俄罗斯,”华盛顿非营利研究机构C.N.A.的伊朗军事专家迈克尔·康奈尔向我解释道,他指的是苏联对抗纳粹德国的战争。“这确实是革命卫队乃至伊朗常规军队的成年礼——过去几十年塑造这些组织的众多领导人,都是在战争中崭露头角的。”

These leaders spent the next four decades preparing for another major invasion, specifically one by the United States. The regime had never portrayed the war with Iraq as a bilateral fight but, rather, as a proxy war led by the U.S. and its Arab allies. I.R.G.C. commanders became Iran’s most powerful generals—many are still leading the war today—and the Iranian military focussed on improving its asymmetric war capabilities and building its own defense industry. That included ballistic missiles, in addition to low-cost mines and drones. To project power and deterrence, the regime also launched a nuclear program and influenced regional wars with a network of proxy forces in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Gaza. As Iransaw it, “The only existential threat to the Iranians was the U.S., and secondarily Israel,” Connell said. They spent decades studying “how the U.S. operates, looking for vulnerabilities, looking for ways that they could invest resources into things that would deliver more bang for the buck.”

此后的四十年里,伊朗领导人一直在为应对下一次大规模入侵做准备,特别是来自美国的入侵。伊朗政权从未将两伊战争描绘为双边冲突,而是将其描述为美国及其阿拉伯盟友主导的代理人战争。伊斯兰革命卫队指挥官成为伊朗最有权势的将领——其中许多人至今仍在指挥作战——伊朗军队则专注于提升非对称作战能力,并建立自主国防工业体系。除了低成本水雷和无人机外,该体系还包括弹道导弹。为投射力量并形成威慑,伊朗政权还启动了核计划,并通过在黎巴嫩、伊拉克、叙利亚、也门和加沙的代理人网络介入地区冲突。正如康奈尔所言:“在伊朗看来,唯一对其生存构成威胁的是美国,其次是以色列。”他们耗费数十年时间研究“美国的运作方式,寻找其薄弱环节,探索如何以最小成本实现最大威慑效果的投资方向。”

Today, the soldiers killed in the Iran-Iraq War are still memorialized in town and city squares across the country. Every September, the regime celebrates “Sacred Defense Week” to commemorate the start of the war and honor the dead with military parades. In schools, the war is taught in such a way as to instill the values of resistance and martyrdom in children, as well as a distrust of America and the West.

如今,伊朗各地城镇广场上仍矗立着两伊战争阵亡将士的纪念碑。每年九月,伊朗政权都会举行“神圣防御周”活动,通过阅兵仪式纪念战争爆发并缅怀逝者。在学校教育中,战争历史被塑造成向儿童灌输抵抗精神、殉道思想以及对美国和西方世界不信任感的载体。

The U.S. Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, has said that the U.S. can achieve its objectives in Iran without using ground troops. But Trump has sent mixed signals and has publicly said he likes to keep opponents guessing about his intentions. In either case, the Iranian regime seems to be prepared, militarily and in its messaging. In a social-media post in late March, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of Iran’s parliament, wrote, “How can the US, which can’t even protect its own soldiers at its bases in the region and instead leaves them stashed away in hotels and parks, protect them on our soil?” For decades, the I.R.G.C. and other forces have regularly conducted military exercises and drills to prepare for a ground invasion. Today, Iran has roughly six hundred and ten thousand active-duty soldiers, including a hundred and ninety thousand I.R.G.C. members, and it can draw upon approximately another million Basij fighters. There are reports that the I.R.G.C. is sending reinforcements to Kharg Island, through which ninety per cent of Iran’s oil exports flow, and bolstering its defenses, including planting sea mines to slow down an amphibious landing. Other U.S. targets could potentially include territory in or near the Strait of Hormuz, with the aim of ending Iran’s closure of economically vital shipping lanes, and also sites where Iran has stockpiled its enriched uranium.

美国国务卿马可·卢比奥表示,美国无需动用地面部队即可实现在伊朗的目标。但特朗普发出了矛盾的信号,并公开表示他喜欢让对手猜不透他的意图。无论哪种情况,伊朗政权似乎都已做好准备,无论是在军事上还是在舆论宣传上。伊朗议会议长穆罕默德·巴吉尔·卡利巴夫在三月下旬的一篇社交媒体帖子中写道:“美国连自己在该地区基地的士兵都保护不了,只能把他们藏在酒店和公园里,又怎么可能在我们的领土上保护他们呢?”几十年来,伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队和其他部队定期举行军事演习和训练,为地面入侵做准备。如今,伊朗约有61万现役军人,其中包括19万名伊斯兰革命卫队成员,还可以调动大约100万巴斯基民兵。有报道称,伊斯兰革命卫队正在向哈尔克岛增派兵力,并加强防御,包括布设水雷以延缓两栖登陆。伊朗90%的石油出口都经由该岛。其他美国目标可能还包括霍尔木兹海峡内或附近的领土,目的是结束伊朗对经济上至关重要的航道的封锁,以及伊朗储存浓缩铀的地点。

In 2003, during the U.S. invasion of Iraq, American combat troops slipped over remote borders without stiff resistance and struck the military’s nerve center in Baghdad, debilitating Saddam’s command-and-control systems. In Iran, a similar scenario is unlikely. The regime has set up a decentralized “mosaic” defense system with I.R.G.C. and regular Army command posts spread out across the country, replete with their own intelligence capabilities and supplies of missiles, drones, and other advanced weaponry. Lower-level commanders have the authority to conduct certain types of operations without approval from central command, if contact with Tehran is disrupted or lost–an operational guideline stemming from Iran’s observations of how the US attacked Iraq. Multiple Iranian units, including the Basij, could be used to swarm U.S. troops. “Let’s say you were invading the South, it’s not kids from Tehran or some other place that are manning bases,” Afshon Ostovar, the author of “Wars of Ambition: The United States, Iran, and the Struggle for the Middle East” told me. “It’s all kids from the local neighborhoods. They know the terrain, they know the valleys, they know the caves, they know the roads. That gives them a certain advantage. And Iran has also learned, not just from the Iran-Iraq War, but from the Iraq War during the U.S. occupation, some of the vulnerabilities of U.S. ground forces.”

2003年美军入侵伊拉克期间,美国作战部队在未遭遇顽强抵抗的情况下越过偏远边境,直捣巴格达的军事神经中枢,瘫痪了萨达姆的指挥控制系统。而在伊朗,类似的情景不太可能上演。伊朗政权建立了一套去中心化的“马赛克”防御体系,伊斯兰革命卫队和正规军的指挥所遍布全国,各自配备独立的情报能力以及导弹、无人机和其他先进武器的储备。如果与德黑兰的联络中断或失联,下级指挥官有权在未经中央指挥部批准的情况下执行某些类型的行动——这一作战指导原则源于伊朗对美国攻打伊拉克方式的观察。包括巴斯基民兵在内的多个伊朗部队可用于围攻美军。“假设你入侵南方,驻守基地的可不是来自德黑兰或其他地方的孩子,”《野心之战:美国、伊朗与中东争夺战》作者阿夫申·奥斯特瓦尔告诉我,“全是当地街区的孩子。他们熟悉地形,熟悉山谷,熟悉洞穴,熟悉道路。这赋予他们特定优势。伊朗不仅从两伊战争中汲取经验,更从美国占领期间的伊拉克战争学到了美军地面部队的某些弱点。”

American ground units could face battlefield scenarios similar to those they faced in Iraq. Qasem Soleimani, the former head of the Quds Force, a wing of the I.R.G.C., who was assassinated by the U.S. in 2020, was the primary architect of the offensives used by Iran-backed Shiite militias to kill hundreds of American troops during the Iraq War. This included planting powerful bombs known as Explosively Formed Penetrators that can rip through U.S. armored vehicles on roads. “Iran has these in abundance. Iran knows how to place them on roadsides. Iran knows how to activate them remotely,” Ostovar told me. The Iranians can also deploy small kamikaze drones called F.P.V.s on surveillance missions or to crash into U.S. troops. The F.P.V.s are controlled by incredibly long fibre-optic cables, preventing attempts to jam their frequencies with radio signals. “Those aren’t super helpful when attacking things very far away, but within a twenty-mile, or fifteen-mile, kind of zone, they could be used pretty effectively,” Ostovar said. “We haven’t seen Iran use them, to my knowledge, at least in this conflict, but they could be saving for a later fight.” The I.R.G.C. also has fleets of fast-attack boats, some of them armed with mines and missiles, and others that can be laden with explosives and used to stage suicide attacks against naval vessels. The regime knows that it doesn’t need to outgun U.S. ground forces to achieve its strategic objectives. It only needs to be successful in occasionally killing American troops to make the war even more unpopular back home, a vulnerability for Trump ahead of the midterm elections. Referring back to the Iran-Iraq War, Connell, the Iranian military expert, said, “If you’re looking at Iranian military writings in the subsequent decades, there’s always that emphasis on, we can take hits.” He explained the Iranian perspective: “We’re willing to die. You are not. You’re going to take a few hits, and then you’re going to say it’s too risky.’ ” Last week, Ebrahim Azizi, the head of the Iranian parliament’s national-security committee, warned that “the soldiers of Iran have long been waiting for this historic confrontation with the U.S. military forces,” adding that “the battle on the ground will be more terrifying for you than anywhere else.”

美国地面部队可能遭遇与伊拉克战场相似的场景。已故伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队下属“圣城旅”指挥官卡西姆·苏莱曼尼(Qasem Soleimani)——他于2020年被美军刺杀身亡——曾主导设计伊朗支持的什叶派民兵在伊拉克战争期间使用的战术,造成数百名美军士兵死亡。其中包括在道路上布设威力巨大的“爆炸成型穿甲弹”(Explosively Formed Penetrators),这种炸弹能轻易击穿美军装甲车辆。“伊朗拥有大量此类武器,精通如何在路边布设,也掌握远程引爆技术,”奥斯特瓦尔告诉我。伊朗人还能部署名为FPV的小型自杀式无人机执行侦察任务或撞击美军。这些FPV无人机通过超长光纤电缆控制,能有效抵御无线电信号干扰。“虽然攻击远距离目标效果有限,但在二十英里或十五英里范围内,它们可以发挥相当有效的杀伤力,”奥斯特瓦尔说,“据我所知,伊朗尚未在此次冲突中使用这类武器,或许是在为后续战斗储备力量。” 伊斯兰革命卫队还拥有快速攻击艇舰队,部分装备水雷和导弹,另一些则可装载炸药用于对海军舰艇实施自杀式袭击。德黑兰政权深知,要实现其战略目标无需在火力上压倒美军地面部队,只需偶尔成功造成美军伤亡,就足以让这场战争在美国国内更不得人心——这对面临中期选举的特朗普而言正是软肋。伊朗军事专家康奈尔回溯两伊战争时指出:“如果查阅伊朗此后数十年的军事著作,总能发现这种强调——我们能承受打击。”他阐释了伊朗的视角:“我们不惜牺牲,你们却做不到。你们遭受几次打击后就会说风险太高。”上周,伊朗议会国家安全委员会主席易卜拉欣·阿齐兹警告称:“伊朗士兵长久以来一直在等待这场与美军的历史性对决,”并补充道,“地面战斗对你们而言将比任何战场都更恐怖。”

Taking extreme risks, though, could prove disastrous for the regime and its forces, especially the I.R.G.C. During the Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini and the I.R.G.C. overplayed their hand and rejected all attempts to end the conflict, even after pushing Iraqi forces from Iranian soil in 1982. Driven by revolutionary zeal, they vowed to keep fighting until Saddam was ousted from power. As the war dragged on, Iran’s military and economy were decimated. To preserve its power and ideology, the I.R.G.C. sent tens of thousands of Iranians to their death in so-called human-wave operations to overwhelm Iraq’s front lines. Last week, the regime launched a similar nationwide recruiting drive called “Janfada,” or “sacrificing life,” seeking volunteers to defend the country against American ground forces, including children as young as twelve, who will operate checkpoints and serve as spies. This time around, though, heavy casualties risk triggering internal mass unrest in a nation where a sizable portion of the population is anti-regime, regardless of their religious embrace of martyrdom. And after the Iran-Iraq War, the I.R.G.C. prioritized the buildup of its asymmetric-war capabilities so much that Iran’s conventional Army, known as the Artesh, was neglected; its infrastructure has atrophied. Iran’s air-defense systems remain weak, allowing U.S. and Israeli warplanes to dominate Iran’s skies in the current conflict. (Of course, the regime still poses a threat to U.S. and Israeli aircraft, as last weekend’s incident reveals.) “At least rhetorically, in terms of propaganda, they’ve been preparing for this for decades,” Ostovar told me, referring to a U.S. invasion. “But there’s also an element of hubris that drives the I.R.G.C., and it’s unclear to me how much that hubris may have undermined their military planning.”

然而,采取极端冒险行动可能给伊朗政权及其武装力量——尤其是伊斯兰革命卫队——带来灾难性后果。两伊战争期间,霍梅尼与革命卫队就曾高估自身实力,拒绝一切结束冲突的尝试,甚至在1982年将伊拉克军队逐出伊朗领土后仍不收手。在革命热情的驱使下,他们誓言要继续战斗直至萨达姆下台。随着战争旷日持久,伊朗的军事力量与经济遭受重创。为维护政权与意识形态,革命卫队以所谓“人海战术”将数万伊朗人送上战场,用血肉之躯冲击伊拉克防线。上周,该政权再次发起全国性征兵运动“贾法达”(意为“献出生命”),招募志愿者抵御美国地面部队,其中甚至包括年仅十二岁的儿童,他们将负责检查站执勤与情报搜集工作。 但这一次,惨重伤亡很可能在这个有大量反政权人口的国家引发大规模内部动荡——无论民众对殉道精神抱有怎样的宗教热忱。两伊战争后,革命卫队过度侧重发展非对称作战能力,导致伊朗常规军队“阿尔泰什”长期被忽视,其基础设施已严重萎缩。伊朗防空系统依然薄弱,使得美以战机在当前冲突中掌控了伊朗领空(当然,正如上周末事件所揭示的,该政权仍对美以机构构成威胁)。“至少在宣传辞令上,他们为应对美国入侵已准备了几十年,”奥斯特瓦尔告诉我,“但革命卫队行事中存在着傲慢自大的成分,这种傲慢在多大程度上损害了他们的军事规划,目前尚不清楚。”

To mobilize Iranians in support of an extended war against the U.S. and Israel, the regime has triggered the memories of Iraq’s invasion that it has nurtured for the past four decades. Over the past month, officials have referred to this war by again using the terms “sacred defense” or as the “imposed war.” Pro-regime Shiites inside and outside Iran have branded Trump as a modern-day “Yazid,” and references to the Battle of Karbala have flooded social media in Iran. Moosavi, the professor of Iranian cultural history, pointed me to an A.I.-generated animation made by an Iranian rapper which has gone viral in the country. It starts with Trump tossing dice at a roulette table, and ends with him crying over American-flag-draped coffins. The lyrics go:

为动员伊朗民众支持对美国和以色列的长期战争,伊朗政权激活了四十年来精心培育的伊拉克入侵记忆。过去一个月间,官员们再度以“神圣防御”或“强加战争”指称这场战争。伊朗境内外的亲政权什叶派人士将特朗普比作当代“叶齐德”,卡尔巴拉战役的意象在伊朗社交媒体上泛滥成灾。伊朗文化史教授穆萨维向我展示了一段由伊朗说唱歌手制作的AI生成动画——该视频已在伊朗国内病毒式传播。画面以特朗普在轮盘赌桌前掷骰子开场,以他对着覆盖星条旗的棺木哭泣收尾。歌词唱道:

Sacred Defense, we protecting the soil
While you sacrifice soldiers to pay for your spoil
You thought you ran the globe sitting on your throne
Now we turning every base into a bed of stone. ♦

神圣防卫,我们守护故土,而你们牺牲士兵换取战利品。你们曾以为高踞王座便能主宰世界,如今我们要让每座基地化为石砾之床。

2 free previews left — register to get 30 translations a month