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What Is Biography For?

传记何为?
In “Transcendence for Beginners,” the philosopher Clare Carlisle suggests that any life, even an ordinary one, is a portal to divinity.
在《初学者的超越》中,哲学家克莱尔·卡莱尔提出,任何生命,哪怕是平凡的一生,都是通往神性的一扇门。
Illustration of a book and pink light
Illustration by Matt Chase; Source photograph from Shutterstock

I had occasion, a year ago, to draft my mother’s eulogy. Unable to swallow, with advanced Alzheimer’s, she was being fed by intravenous drip. The end seemed imminent. Helpless and uncertain, I set out to write her life.

一年前,我有机会为母亲起草悼词。她已无法吞咽,阿尔茨海默病已到晚期,靠静脉滴注维持。终点似乎近在眼前。无助而茫然的我,开始着手书写她的一生。

My mother grew up in Hull, on the northeast coast of England, the youngest child of a large family. She took care of her mother, who lapsed into dementia; she married my father, quit her hospital job, and raised two children, my brother and me. The outlines of her life were clear but the insides dark, lit up by vivid memories here and there. I recall a newspaper cutting from before I was born, with a glamorous black-and-white photo of my mother as a radiotherapist, beside an impressive-looking medical machine. Later, there were trips to the local library, where I inherited her love of reading, and the speech she gave at my wedding, shaking but determined. My mother never liked to be the center of attention, and those around her generally obliged. If only I’d tried harder to push through her reticence, to ask her more about her life when she still remembered it.

我母亲在英格兰东北海岸的赫尔长大,是一户大家庭中最小的孩子。她照顾过失智的母亲;后来嫁给我父亲,辞去医院的职务,养育了两个孩子——我和弟弟。她生命的轮廓清晰可辨,内里却幽暗不明,只在零星处被鲜活的记忆照亮。我记得一张我出生前的剪报,上面有一张迷人的黑白照片,母亲那时是放射治疗师,站在一台气派的医疗设备旁。再后来,是去本地图书馆的时光,我在那里继承了她对阅读的热爱;还有她在我婚礼上的致辞,声音发颤却意志坚定。我母亲向来不愿成为众人瞩目的焦点,身边的人也往往顺其自然。要是我当初再努力一些,突破她的沉默寡言,趁她还记得的时候多问问她的人生,该多好。

As it turned out, my mother’s eulogy could wait. She recovered, as she had after a similar episode once before. But the biographical imperative rankled like an unpaid debt. Why did telling her story seem so vital and so fraught? And why did my inability to do so foster so much shame?

结果,母亲的悼词可以再等等。她恢复了过来,就像之前一次类似的险情后一样。但那份为她作传的冲动,却像一笔未偿的债务,令我耿耿于怀。为什么讲述她的故事显得如此重要,又如此令人揪心?为什么我无力做到这一点,会滋生出如此多的羞愧?

Clare Carlisle writes her mother into her new book, “Transcendence for Beginners,” three times over: once while teaching her daughter how to write; once as her mother is dying; and once to mourn and memorialize her. Like me, Carlisle is a philosophy professor; unlike me, she’s an award-winning biographer, the author of a life of Søren Kierkergaard that eschews chronology for thematic immersion, as well as a philosophical “biography” of George Eliot’s relationship with her romantic partner George Henry Lewes. If anyone could explain the value of writing a life—what I owed to my mother and why—it would be her.

克莱尔·卡莱尔在新书《初学者的超越》中,三次写到自己的母亲:一次是母亲教她写作;一次是母亲临终之际;一次是悼念与追思。和我一样,卡莱尔是哲学教授;和我不一样的是,她是一位屡获殊荣的传记作家,写过一部索伦·克尔凯郭尔的传记,摒弃编年体而采用主题沉浸式的写法;还写过一部关于乔治·艾略特与其伴侣乔治·亨利·刘易斯关系的哲学“传记”。如果说有谁能解释书写一个生命的价值——我欠母亲什么,又为何亏欠——那就是她了。

“Transcendence for Beginners” is not a biography, though many lives are caught up in its weft. Instead, it’s a book about why life-stories matter. Both of Carlisle’s professions grapple with the value of human life, but philosophy veers toward the abstract, and biography toward the specific: a single individual with a mother and a given name. Whereas “Socrates went around Athens asking, ‘What is a human being?,’ ” Carlisle writes, “I want to know who this singular person is.” As a biographer, she attempts to create art, too, “to bring something new and singular into the world”—a world that “the philosophical part of us wants to declutter.”

《初学者的超越》不是一部传记,尽管许多生命被织入它的经纬之中。它是一本探讨生命故事为何重要的书。卡莱尔的两种职业都在追问人类生命的价值,但哲学趋向抽象,传记则趋向具体:一个有名有姓、有母亲的独特个体。卡莱尔写道,苏格拉底“在雅典四处追问‘人是什么?’”,而她“想知道的是,这个独一无二的人是谁”。作为传记作家,她也试图创造艺术,“为世界带来某种新的、独一无二的东西”——而这个世界,“我们身上哲学的那部分却想要清空它”。

Some philosophers will balk at that diminutive “declutter,” as though the great thinkers who built visions of the world were nothing more than metaphysical Marie Kondos. Not me. Carlisle is entitled to make fun of her colleagues for overestimating the power of rational argument and for preferring false simplicity to complicated truth. Her contrast is, in any case, provisional: she’s open both to moral philosophy that makes use of the individual and to art that does philosophical work.

有些哲学家会对“清空”这个轻描淡写的词大为不满,仿佛那些构建世界图景的伟大思想家不过是形而上学界的近藤麻理惠。我倒不这么看。卡莱尔完全有资格取笑她的同行们高估了理性论证的力量,偏爱虚假的简洁甚于复杂的真相。无论如何,她的对比是暂时性的:她既接纳运用个体经验的道德哲学,也接纳从事哲学工作的艺术。

But there’s a residual tension in Carlisle’s book, and it has to do with her touchstone, the seventeenth-century philosopher Baruch Spinoza. To those who know his ideas, the notion of a Spinozist biographer will seem about as logical as a vegan butcher or a pacifist contract killer. For Spinoza, there is one substance only, a depersonalized God, and everything else is simply a “mode,” or modification, of that substance, a ripple in the ocean of being. We are all ontological froth. As Carlisle argues:

但卡莱尔的书中仍有一种挥之不去的张力,这与她的思想基石——十七世纪哲学家巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎有关。对于了解斯宾诺莎思想的人来说,“斯宾诺莎主义传记作家”这个说法,其逻辑大约等同于“素食屠夫”或“和平主义职业杀手”。在斯宾诺莎看来,实体只有一个,即一个非人格化的上帝,其余一切都不过是这一实体的“样式”或变状,是存在之海中的一道涟漪。我们都是本体论意义上的泡沫。正如卡莱尔所论述的:

Spinoza’s conception of a human being is much more dynamic and fluid, its boundaries more porous and provisional, than the everyday notion of selfhood embedded in our grammar, which distinguishes the ‘subject’ from its own actions and properties as well as from the ‘objects’ it encounters.

斯宾诺莎对人的构想远比我们语法中蕴含的日常自我观念更具动态性和流动性,其边界更加多孔、更具临时性;日常语法将“主体”与其自身的行为和属性区分开来,也与其遭遇的“客体”区分开来。

On its face, biography is the genre of the integral subject—a person interacting with others but distinct from them, not dissolving in a sea of substance. For Carlisle, though, the “metaphysical selfishness” of a world composed of discrete human beings “reinforces moral selfishness, and vice versa.” Spinoza is an antidote to self-conceit. But what room is left, in his metaphysics, for the value of an individual life?

从表面上看,传记是完整主体的体裁——一个人与他人互动,却与他们截然有别,不会消融于实体的汪洋之中。然而在卡莱尔看来,一个由彼此分离的人类个体所构成的世界,其“形而上学的自私”“强化了道德上的自私,反之亦然”。斯宾诺莎是治疗自负的解药。但在他的形而上学中,个体生命的价值还剩下什么空间?

Carlisle finds an answer in the microcosm. If everything is an aspect of God, we can divine the value of the whole—the divine itself—within a single person. This way of looking at human life is radically democratic. Carlisle’s book begins halfway up a mountain in Dharamshala, India, in her twenties, when she meets a man who makes his home in a small cave, tending a stone shrine, selling concessions to tourists for a living. At sixteen or seventeen, he left the temporal world behind for a life of ascetic devotion. What moves Carlisle most is how ordinary he seems. “Over the years I’ve met a few people who exuded a palpable spiritual quality, some rare insight or depth or stillness you could feel in their presence,” she notes. “The man on the mountain was not like that.” Later in the book, we meet another ascetic, Ramana Maharshi, who spent his life on a sacred Himalayan mountain named Arunachala. Maharshi became a renowned spiritual guide, fictionalized by Somerset Maugham in “The Razor’s Edge.” Both lives are noble, both beautifully evoked: for the Spinozist biographer, it makes no sense to prize one over the other, the famous over the nameless, since they are merely different faces of a single peak.

卡莱尔在微观世界中找到了答案。如果一切都是上帝的一个面向,那么我们就能在一个人身上洞见整体的价值——即神性本身。这种看待人类生命的方式具有激进的民主性。卡莱尔的书开篇于印度达兰萨拉半山腰,那时她二十多岁,遇见一个以山洞为家的男人,他照看一座石砌神龛,靠向游客兜售小商品为生。十六七岁时,他便抛下尘世,过上了苦修奉献的生活。最令卡莱尔动容的,是他看起来多么平凡。“这些年来,我遇到过少数几个人,他们身上散发着一种可感的精神气质,某种罕见的洞见、深度或沉静,你在他们身边就能感受到,”她写道。“山上的那个人不是这样。”在书中稍后部分,我们遇见了另一位苦修者拉玛那·马哈希,他在喜马拉雅圣山阿鲁那佳拉住了一辈子。马哈希后来成为著名的灵性导师,毛姆在《刀锋》中将他写进了小说。两种人生都高贵,都被描绘得优美动人:对于斯宾诺莎主义的传记作家来说,厚此薄彼——推崇名人而轻视无名者——毫无意义,因为他们不过是同一座山峰的不同侧面。

Carlisle argues, then, for the value of unheroic lives. The argument is most overt in relation to works of art: George Eliot’s heroines, for example, or Celia Paul’s attentive portraits of her mother. Eliot, who produced the first English translation of Spinoza’s “Ethics,” lived in a time that idolized “great men”: in 1841, Thomas Carlyle wrote “On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History,” and Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “Representative Men” was published in 1850. Eliot’s riposte was “Middlemarch,” in which Dorothea Brooke devotes herself to her self-deluding husband Edward Casaubon, before discovering that his great work is a fraud. Dorothea lives a smaller life than she had hoped, but her life still matters, as the final lines of “Middlemarch” sing out: “For the growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that things are not so ill with you and me as they might have been, is half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs.”

因此,卡莱尔为非英雄的人生辩护。这一论点在与艺术作品的关联中最为鲜明:比如乔治·艾略特笔下的女主人公们,或者西莉亚·保罗为母亲所画的那些专注的肖像。艾略特完成了斯宾诺莎《伦理学》的首个英译本,她生活在一个崇拜“伟人”的时代:1841年,托马斯·卡莱尔写下《论英雄、英雄崇拜与历史上的英雄》;拉尔夫·沃尔多·爱默生的《代表人物》则出版于1850年。艾略特的回应是《米德尔马契》,书中多萝西娅·布鲁克先是献身于自欺欺人的丈夫爱德华·卡苏朋,继而发现他的巨著不过是一场骗局。多萝西娅的人生比她期望的要小,但她的人生依然重要,正如《米德尔马契》结尾几行所咏唱的:“因为世间日益增长的善,部分有赖于那些不见经传的行为;而你我的境遇之所以没有坏到本可能坏到的地步,一半要归功于那些忠实地过着隐秘生活、安息在无人凭吊的坟墓中的人们。”

Daringly, Carlisle reads even Eliot’s more morally ambiguous protagonists as “a manifestation of God. . . . a glimpse of something shining, perhaps not far away at all.” Carlisle guides us to a metaphysical summit from which we survey human lives “under the aspect of eternity,” in Spinoza’s phrase, filled with love for them as facets of a divine reality. It’s a breathtaking prospect, and “Transcendence for Beginners” is both moving and profound. But is its vision true? Or, to make this personal, how far does it illuminate the need I felt to write my mother’s life and the pain of being unable to do it well?

卡莱尔大胆地将艾略特笔下道德上更为暧昧的主人公也解读为“上帝的一种显现……对某种闪光之物的一瞥,也许并不遥远”。卡莱尔引领我们登上一座形而上学的峰顶,从那里,我们以斯宾诺莎所说的“永恒的形式”俯瞰人类生命,满怀爱意地将它们视为神圣实在的各个切面。这是一幅令人屏息的景象,《初学者的超越》既动人又深刻。但它的愿景是真实的吗?或者,说得更切身一些,它在多大程度上照亮了我所感受到的那种需要——为母亲书写一生的需要,以及无力写好它的痛苦?

“Above all, Eliot was interested in the moral power of ordinary lives, like Dorothea’s,” Carlisle writes, “whose effects are ‘not widely visible’, though nevertheless ‘diffuse.’ ” My mother died soon after I tried, and failed, to write her eulogy. Like Dorothea Brooke, she lived an unhistoric life, and that things are not so ill with me as they might have been is at least half owing to her. I am grateful for that. Yet to value my mother in these terms, for her diffuse effects on me, or on other people, is not to value her for herself. For the Spinozist, the value of a life is the value of a sequence of events—waves in God’s ocean—not the value of the person living through them. “Even if the self dissolves, or never existed in the first place,” Carlisle insists, “the life remains vivid, its story compelling.” But my mother’s life—everything she did and everything that happened to her—only matters because she matters. The fundamental value of the subject: this is what the Spinozist cannot see.

卡莱尔写道:“最重要的是,艾略特感兴趣的是平凡生命——如多萝西娅那样的生命——的道德力量,其影响‘并不广为人见’,却依然‘弥散开来’。”我母亲在我尝试撰写悼词而未果之后不久去世了。像多萝西娅·布鲁克一样,她过的是不见经传的一生;而我的境遇之所以没有坏到本可能坏到的地步,至少有一半要归功于她。我为此心怀感激。然而,以这样的标准来衡量母亲的价值——看重她对我或他人弥散的影响——并不是为她本身而珍视她。对于斯宾诺莎主义者来说,一个生命的价值是一连串事件的价值——上帝之海中的波浪——而不是经历这些事件的那个人的价值。卡莱尔坚持说:“即使自我消解了,或者从一开始就不存在,生命依然鲜活,其故事依然引人入胜。”但我母亲的生命——她所做的一切、发生在她身上的一切——之所以重要,仅仅是因为她重要。主体的根本价值:这正是斯宾诺莎主义者所看不见的。

If what we’re interested in are events, we will gravitate toward dramatic ones, and, though Spinoza reassures us that a small, flawed life is as much an expression of God as a heroic one, that doesn’t mean our interest is misplaced. It’s not an accident that Carlisle has published biographies of Kierkegaard and Eliot, not of her mother or mine: as a rule, we are more intrigued by bigger lives. There’s nothing wrong with that—unless we lose track of the fact that every person has a value independent of the life they happen to live. The “metaphysical selfishness” that Spinoza disdains—the world of discrete human beings—makes room for moral selfishness, true; but it makes room, too, for the dignity of the singular person.

如果我们感兴趣的是事件,我们就会倾向于戏剧性的事件;尽管斯宾诺莎向我们保证,一个渺小而有缺陷的生命与一个英雄般的生命同样是上帝的表达,但这并不意味着我们的兴趣放错了地方。卡莱尔出版过克尔凯郭尔和艾略特的传记,而不是她母亲或我母亲的传记,这并非偶然:一般而言,我们总是对更宏大的人生更感兴趣。这本身没有错——除非我们忽略了这样一个事实:每个人都有一种独立于其实际所过生活的价值。斯宾诺莎所鄙夷的“形而上学的自私”——那个由彼此分离的人类个体构成的世界——确实为道德上的自私留出了空间;但它也为独一无二之人的尊严留出了空间。

For Carlisle, the artist Celia Paul’s repeated portraits of her mother celebrate the episodes in which they were created, “the beauty of those hours in which two human beings gave one another time.” But what is made in those beautiful hours is not a biography, nor the painting of a chapter in a life, but a picture of a person in time. Painting is not a narrative art in the way that life-writing is. The value of a portrait lies less in telling a life story, or part of one, than in sustained attention to a particular human being, the individual whose substance Carlisle and Spinoza dissolve. “My mother was never properly seen in her daily life,” Paul writes to Carlisle. “She found the attention I gave her healing in some way. She didn’t mind what I made of her, she just needed to be looked at.”

在卡莱尔看来,艺术家西莉亚·保罗反复为母亲画像,是在颂扬那些创作发生的时刻,“两个人类彼此给予时间的那些美好时光”。但在那些美好时光中创造出来的,不是一部传记,也不是对人生某一章节的描绘,而是一幅时间中的人的画像。绘画不像生命书写那样是一种叙事艺术。一幅肖像的价值,与其说在于讲述一个生命故事或其中的片段,不如说在于对某一个特定的人的持续注视——这个人,正是卡莱尔和斯宾诺莎所消解的那个个体。“我母亲在日常生活中从未被真正看见过,”保罗写信给卡莱尔说。“她觉得我给予她的关注在某种程度上是一种疗愈。她不在乎我把她画成什么样,她只是需要被注视。”

“I’ll see you when I see you”: the last full sentence my mother said to me, over the phone from the hospital, several years ago, before her power of speech fragmented. You could hear it as self-deprecation: I don’t matter so much, no need to rush to my side. You could also hear it as a vow of loving attention. We love people, first, and not their lives; but when we love them well, we look toward them, wanting to see them better. The shame of knowing so little about my mother’s life was not the shame of being blind to the value of a life story, but the shame of failing in love. ♦

“该见的时候自然会见”——这是我母亲几年前从医院打来电话时,对我说的最后一个完整句子,此后她的语言能力便支离破碎了。你可以把它听作自谦:我没那么重要,不必急着赶来。你也可以把它听作一个充满爱意的注视的誓言。我们爱的是人,首先不是他们的人生;但当我们爱得足够好时,我们会朝他们望去,想要把他们看得更清楚。对母亲的一生所知甚少所带来的羞愧,不是看不见一个生命故事之价值的羞愧,而是爱得不够的羞愧。 ♦

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