A Critic at Large

What Happened to Your Face?

你的脸怎么了?
How the human countenance became something to study, edit, optimize, and scan.
人类的面容如何变成了一件可供研究、编辑、优化和扫描的东西。
Face being arranged as a puzzle.
Illustration by Bryce Wymer

Several months ago, my partner and I bought an apartment in South London. Our previous home was a rental in which, for reasons best known to the landlord, there were mirrors everywhere. The bathroom had two; there was one outside on the terrace; in the bedroom, mirrored panels stretched across a twenty-foot-long wall. On moving day, we realized that we had a problem: the new apartment was mirror-free, and because we’d been so spoiled we weren’t bringing one of our own. We spent a few days filling our drafty rooms, decanting books, building furniture, and dressing every morning without seeing ourselves in profile. It was a couple of weeks before we bought a simple mirror, wooden and round, to hang above the bathroom sink. By then, I joked, we didn’t recognize ourselves.

几个月前,我和伴侣在伦敦南部买了一套公寓。我们之前的住处是租的,不知房东出于什么考虑,那房子里到处都是镜子。浴室里有两面;露台上也有一面;卧室里,镜面嵌板铺满了整整一面二十英尺长的墙。搬家那天,我们意识到一个问题:新公寓里一面镜子都没有,而我们之前被惯坏了,自己一面也没带。我们花了几天时间,在穿堂风阵阵的房间里归置东西,把书从箱子里拿出来,组装家具,每天早上都在看不到自己侧影的情况下穿戴整齐。过了大概两周,我们才买了一面简简单单的木框圆镜,挂在浴室洗手池上方。到那时,我开玩笑说,我们已经认不出自己了。

As my feeble quip indicates, we take for granted that we possess a steady mental image of our own faces, and that we can reconfirm these images frequently. If I asked you to picture yourself, you could almost certainly do this with ease. You might refer to the memory of how you looked in the mirror this morning, or in the selfies you took last night, or in that passport photo you hate. And if I suggested that you double-check your mental image, you could probably do so by looking in the mirror again, or at your reflection in a nearby window, or, via a camera app, using the very screen on which you may be reading this paragraph. Most of the time, we think we know how we look.

我这个蹩脚的玩笑说明,我们理所当然地认为,自己脑中持有一幅关于自己面容的稳定图像,并且可以频繁地再次确认它。如果我让你想象自己的样子,你几乎肯定能轻松做到。你可能会参照今天早上在镜子里看到的模样,或者昨晚自拍里的样子,又或者是那张你讨厌的护照照片。如果我建议你再次核实一下脑中的图像,你大概也能做到,要么再去照照镜子,要么看看旁边窗户上映出的自己,要么通过相机应用,用你正在读这段话的屏幕来看。大多数时候,我们以为自己知道自己长什么样。

Yet that’s possible only because we live in the aftermath of a revolution. In the past few centuries, the mental self-portrait has become commonplace. To be sure, the world has held pockets of reflection as long as humans have existed to see them. As a piece of technology, the mirror seems to date back several millennia. The ancient Egyptians had polished bronze, copper, and obsidian at their disposal, as did the Greeks and the Romans. But such objects were hardly ordinary, and people had to improvise: in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Narcissus, the ultimate lover of reflections, sees himself for the first time in a crystalline pool. Pausanias, writing a century later, called this scene “totally absurd,” because any young man would have seen a reflection before. Still, for thousands of years, there was an obvious gap between image and life. Now in a kitchen pot, darkly; now face to face.

然而,这之所以可能,仅仅是因为我们生活在一场革命之后。在过去几个世纪里,脑中的自我肖像才变得稀松平常。诚然,只要人类存在,能看到反光的地方,这世上就一直有反射的角落。作为一种技术,镜子的历史似乎可以追溯到几千年前。古埃及人就有抛光的青铜、黄铜和黑曜石可用,希腊人和罗马人也是如此。但这类物件远非寻常之物,人们不得不就地取材:在奥维德的《变形记》中,那位终极的倒影爱好者那喀索斯,第一次看见自己是在一汪清澈的池水中。一个世纪后,保萨尼亚斯在写作时称这一幕“荒谬至极”,因为任何年轻男子此前都该见过自己的倒影。尽管如此,几千年来,影像与生活之间始终存在明显的隔阂。那时是隔着厨房的锅,模糊不清;如今则是面对面。

The revolution came in the sixteenth century, when Venice’s glassmakers applied a tin-and-mercury alloy to their panes, producing a far clearer reflection than had previously been achieved. These artisans, with their trade secrets, were kept on Murano, a cluster of islands just across the lagoon from the city, ostensibly as a precaution against fire, though the state would also send assassins after anyone who tried to leave. Still, a few hardy glassmakers escaped to the Saint-Gobain glass workshop in Paris, which they lifted to pan-European dominance. The workshop gave us, among other monuments to subtlety, the great Galerie des Glaces in the Palace of Versailles, which contains three hundred and sixty-seven mirrors, stretching eighty yards. The technology could be replicated, spread, sold. Mirrors quickly infiltrated the private homes of the Continent, then its colonies; they became cheap and unremarkable, as they remain today, if you stop shelving your books long enough to buy one.

这场革命发生在十六世纪,威尼斯的玻璃工匠将一种锡汞合金涂在他们的玻璃板上,制造出了远比此前清晰的倒影。这些掌握着行业秘密的工匠被限制在穆拉诺岛上,那是泻湖对岸、与城市隔水相望的一群小岛,表面上是出于防火考虑,但国家也会派刺客去追杀任何试图离开的人。尽管如此,还是有几位胆大的工匠逃到了巴黎的圣戈班玻璃工坊,并将那里推向了泛欧的统治地位。这座工坊留给我们许多精妙之作,其中包括凡尔赛宫那宏伟的镜厅,里面陈列着三百六十七面镜子,绵延八十码。这项技术可以被复制、传播、售卖。镜子迅速渗入欧洲大陆的私人住宅,接着是其殖民地;它们变得廉价而寻常,至今依然如此,只要你肯停下整理书架的事,去买上一面。

In the centuries that followed, the private face became increasingly public. More people could look at their own countenances more accurately, and more often. Candlelight and gaslight gave way to electricity, an unwobbling source of interior light. Photography arrived, kindling an enthusiasm that Baudelaire, ever the cynic, compared to a lust for pornography. Cosmetics, as venerable as mirrors, boomed to an unprecedented degree. Think of Esther marinating her skin in myrrh, then of Eugène Rimmel, who introduced the first mass-produced mascara via an early mail-order catalogue. Pierre-François-Pascal Guerlain, a trained chemist, sold skin creams with such aplomb that he was hired by Napoleon III’s empress, Eugénie. Fast-forward to the twenty-first century: to fix your flesh, there’s Botox, fillers, and plastic surgery; to augment the image, there are camera-app filters and Photoshop. In 2024, according to Apple, the world’s iPhone users took five hundred billion selfies. Facial-recognition technology is used across the globe. In the span of a few centuries, the face has become inescapable. We seem to be condemned to look our best.

在随后的几个世纪里,私人的面孔变得越来越公开。更多人能够更准确、更频繁地端详自己的面容。烛光和煤气灯让位于电灯,一种不会摇曳的室内光源。摄影术出现了,点燃了一种热情,而一贯愤世嫉俗的波德莱尔将这种热情比作对色情作品的贪欲。化妆品的历史与镜子一样悠久,此时也以前所未有的规模蓬勃发展。想想以斯帖用没药浸泡肌肤,再想想尤金·芮谜,他通过早期的邮购目录推出了第一款大规模生产的睫毛膏。受过训练的化学家皮埃尔-弗朗索瓦-帕斯卡·娇兰,以十足的自信推销面霜,以至于被拿破仑三世的皇后欧仁妮聘为御用。快进到二十一世纪:要修复你的皮肉,有肉毒杆菌、填充物和整形手术;要美化影像,有相机滤镜和Photoshop。据苹果公司称,2024年,全球iPhone用户拍摄了五千亿张自拍。人脸识别技术在全球范围内得到应用。短短几个世纪间,面孔已变得无处不在。我们似乎注定要以最佳面貌示人。

Much of our social life, our ways of making and sharing a world, orbits the face. Emmanuel Levinas, the supreme theorist of facial affairs, described our fleshy ovals as the site where ethics—his “first philosophy”—begins. This rings true when it comes to everyday behavior. The phenomenon may be hardwired: babies prefer faces to other complex objects. And, for the rest of our lives, faces seem charged by something that arms or legs, however attractive, don’t have. When you talk to me, I look at your eyes, regardless of whether you’re waving your hands. If the gaze is held too long, one of us has to look away. If I can’t see your face—say, you turn aside, or you’ve called me on the phone—I can get by, can make the conversation work, but I might feel that our connection is lacking. The face’s centrality to social life is inscribed in our language, in the metaphors that betray our world view. In English, we face up to things, or face them down; we show our faces where required; we try to save face, and should that fail we make an about-face to save ourselves.

我们社会生活的很大一部分,我们构建和分享世界的方式,都围绕着面孔运转。伊曼纽尔·列维纳斯,这位面孔事务的至高理论家,将我们肉质的椭圆脸描述为伦理学——他所谓的“第一哲学”——的起点。就日常行为而言,这听起来不无道理。这种现象可能是与生俱来的:比起其他复杂物体,婴儿更偏爱面孔。而且,在我们此后的一生中,面孔似乎承载着某种手臂或腿脚——无论它们多么诱人——所不具备的东西。当你跟我说话时,我会看着你的眼睛,不管你是否在挥手。如果对视太久,我们中的一人就得把目光移开。如果我看不到你的脸——比如说,你转过身去,或者你给我打了电话——我还能应付,还能让对话进行下去,但我可能会觉得我们之间的联系有所欠缺。面孔在社会生活中的核心地位,铭刻在我们的语言中,铭刻在那些暴露我们世界观的隐喻里。在中文里,我们“面对”事情,或“正视”它们;必要时我们“露面”;我们试图“保全面子”,如果做不到,就“转身”以求自保。

Yet there’s another side to this coin. Our vocabulary also speaks of invention, even artifice. The English word “face” derives from the Latin facies, implying a created form; so does the French visage, from videre, suggesting something seen from without. “Mask,” “masque,” “mascara,” “maquillage,” and their European relations seem to be etymologically linked, and carry long-standing associations with concealment, distortion, pretense. For Socrates, the art worth prizing was the cultivation and preservation of natural beauty; we’ve happily overwritten it with what he treated suspiciously as kommōtikē, the art of changing how one looks. Even “person,” along with “impersonation” and “personae,” derives from persona, a theatrical mask through which classical actors spoke. The cultural historian Hans Belting suggested that faces and masks were conceptually inseparable: we shouldn’t think of one as “real” and the other as “fake”—one as the thing we have and the other as the thing we temporarily don. Life, he wrote, was fully “a perpetuum mobile,” an “expressive drama,” in which our faces resolve into one legible position, one legible role, then reassemble themselves into the next. We make them up, in every sense.

然而,事情还有另一面。我们的词汇也透露出发明,乃至虚饰的意味。英文单词“face”源自拉丁语“facies”,暗示着一种被创造出来的形态;法语的“visage”也是如此,源自“videre”,意指从外部看到的东西。“Mask”(面具)、“masque”(假面剧)、“mascara”(睫毛膏)、“maquillage”(化妆)以及它们在欧洲语言中的近亲,似乎在词源上相互关联,并长期带有隐藏、扭曲、伪装的意味。对苏格拉底而言,值得珍视的艺术是培养和保持自然之美;而我们却欣然用他怀疑地视之为“kommōtikē”(改变容貌之术)的东西将其覆盖。甚至“person”(人)这个词,连同“impersonation”(冒充)和“personae”(人格面具),都源自“persona”,即古典演员用来发声的戏剧面具。文化史学家汉斯·贝尔廷提出,面孔与面具在概念上是不可分割的:我们不应认为一个是“真实的”,另一个是“虚假的”——一个是我们拥有的东西,另一个是我们暂时戴上的东西。他写道,生命完全是一场“永恒的运动”,一出“富有表现力的戏剧”,在这其中,我们的面孔凝聚成一个可辨识的表情,一个可辨识的角色,然后又重新组合成下一个。我们在各种意义上“编造”它们。

The face, then, lives by its pliability. We might encounter a completed sentence or picture, but never a completed face. It can always shift into something else, pushed by personal whim or social pressure, and keep doing so until frozen into one last mask by sickness or death. This means that we live together in an interpretative flux. We constantly read other faces, and understand that ours, at the same time, will be interpreted. As T. S. Eliot put it, we prepare a face to meet the faces that we meet, and we do so knowing that they’ve been prepared as well, and that our interpretations will almost immediately become obsolete.

因此,面孔的生命力在于其可塑性。我们可能会遇到一个完成的句子或一幅完成的画,但永远不会遇到一张完成的面孔。它总能转变为别的东西,被个人的一时兴起或社会压力所推动,并持续如此,直到被疾病或死亡冻结成最后一副面具。这意味着我们共同生活在一股阐释的洪流中。我们不断地解读他人的面孔,同时也明白,我们自己的面孔在同一时间也会被解读。正如T. S. 艾略特所言,我们准备好一副面孔去迎接我们将要遇到的那些面孔,而我们这样做时,心知它们也已被准备好,并且我们的解读几乎立刻就会过时。
Man wrapping up meeting.
“O.K., great—let’s break for now and continue the indecision, procrastination, and blame-shifting over e-mail.”
“好,很好——我们先暂停一下,然后通过电子邮件继续犹豫不决、拖延和推卸责任。”
Cartoon by Tom Toro
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Levinas tends to be the philosophical lodestar here, with his near-mystical love of the face-to-face encounter. He wrote that the face was “a living presence,” that “the Other faces me and puts me in question and obliges me.” Obliged him to do what? This may not be clear. Encountering a face means reëncountering the world: it is a silent epiphany about the fact that other people are radically outside of you, maybe unknowable in a final sense, and yet you must engage with them anyway.

列维纳斯往往是这方面的哲学指路明灯,他对面对面相遇怀有近乎神秘的热爱。他写道,面孔是“一种活生生的在场”,“他者面对着我,将我置于疑问之中,并赋予我责任”。赋予他做什么的责任?这可能并不清晰。遭遇一张面孔,意味着重新遭遇这个世界:这是一种无声的顿悟,让你意识到他人从根本上外在于你,或许在终极意义上是不可知的,然而你却无论如何都必须与他们打交道。

At the same time, I prefer Ludwig Wittgenstein. He was more impish than people remember, and he liked to draw little faces when he was teaching or writing, sketching each one in a few strokes and usually making it smile. Such doodles recur in his manuscripts from the early nineteen-thirties until shortly before his death, in 1951; he used them to illustrate a battery of subtle points, one of which was how misleading our language could be. Here’s one he drew for his students:

与此同时,我更喜欢路德维希·维特根斯坦。他比人们记忆中的要顽皮,在教书或写作时喜欢画些小脸,寥寥几笔勾勒出一个,通常还让它面带微笑。这类涂鸦反复出现在他从二十世纪三十年代初直到1951年去世前不久的手稿中;他用它们来说明一系列微妙的问题,其中之一是我们的语言可能具有多大的误导性。这是他给学生们画的一张:
Image may contain Stencil

After which he said:

接着他说:

Let this face produce an impression on you. You may then feel inclined to say: “Surely I don’t see mere strokes. I see a face with a particular expression.” . . . We might give such a description and say, e.g., “It looks like a complacent business man, stupidly supercilious, who though fat, imagines he’s a lady killer.” But this would only be meant as an approximate description of the expression. “Words can’t exactly describe it,” one sometimes says. And yet one feels that what one calls the expression of the face is something that can be detached from the drawing of the face. . . . The delusion is assisted by our using the verb “to have,” saying “The face has a particular expression.” Things look different when, instead of this, we say, “This is a peculiar face.” (What a thing is, we mean, is bound up with it; what it has can be separated from it.)

让这张脸给你留下一个印象。你可能会倾向于说:“我当然看到的不仅仅是几笔线条。我看到一张带着特定表情的脸。”……我们可能会给出这样的描述,比如说,“它看起来像一个自鸣得意的商人,愚蠢而傲慢,虽然胖,却自以为是情场杀手。”但这只能算是对表情的一个大致描述。“言语无法确切描述它,”人们有时会这么说。然而,人们又觉得,所谓脸的表情,是某种可以从脸的图画中分离出来的东西。……这种错觉因为我们使用动词“有”而加剧,我们说“这张脸有一种特定的表情”。如果我们换种说法,说“这是一张奇特的脸”,事情看起来就不同了。(我们的意思是,一个东西是什么,与它本身密不可分;而它有什么,则可以与之分离。)

One of the things Wittgenstein implies is that we don’t theorize the faces we see. I might talk of “reading” your face, but it isn’t like reading a code or a map: I don’t look at you, add together your liquid eyes and droopy mouth, and pronounce my final judgment that you’re sad. I simply look at your face, apprehend its gestalt as a unity, and go from there. Recent neuroscientific research has shown that we process whole faces more readily than mere parts; we aren’t adding the bits up. We look, and we speak, and we look again: that’s life.

维特根斯坦暗示的一点是,我们并不对自己看到的面孔进行理论化。我可能会说在“解读”你的脸,但这不像解读密码或地图:我并非看着你,把你水汪汪的眼睛和耷拉的嘴巴加在一起,然后宣布我的最终判断——你很悲伤。我只是看着你的脸,将其格式塔作为一个整体来把握,然后由此出发。最近的神经科学研究表明,我们处理整张面孔比处理局部要容易得多;我们并不是把各个部分加起来。我们看,我们说话,然后再看:这就是生活。

One oddity, given all this, is that, although humans have made pictures of faces for as long as we’ve represented anything, realism has only recently become the norm. As the scholar Fay Bound-Alberti points out in “The Face: A Cultural History” (Grand Central), between the thirty-thousand-year-old figures on the walls of the Chauvet-Pont d’Arc cave and ancient Cycladic statuary, from the fourth to second millennium B.C., human figures rarely showed recognizable facial features. There were exceptions. In Egypt, certain pharaohs seemed, for reasons still debated, to tilt their own representations from the ideal to the natural. Senusret III, the most outlandish example, had temples filled with statues of himself, his gigantic faces lined and grim and aged, though set atop a young and muscular body. Centuries later came an interlude in Greece and Rome, beginning with the so-called Severe style of Greek sculpture, in which faces gained clearer features and bodies sharper definition. Socrates’ ugliness can be reliably inferred from his many unsexy sculptural representations; the statues and busts of individual Caesars, though they blend truth and propaganda, remain easy to distinguish. But this facial gallery closed with the Western Roman Empire and the rise of Christianity, which inherited a suspicion of idolatry from the Old Testament and Judaism. David Le Breton points out in “Faces” (Polity) that the Apostolic Constitutions, a fourth-century collection of Christian ecclesiastical laws, recommended that painters be exiled altogether from Christendom, just as poets would have been from Plato’s ideal state. They stayed, but, rather than memorializing individual heroes, they largely devoted themselves to religious imagery, in which realism was again forgone in favor of iconic value. The old order had resumed.

考虑到这一切,一个奇特之处在于,尽管人类自有再现事物以来就一直在绘制面孔,但写实主义直到最近才成为常态。正如学者费伊·邦德-阿尔伯蒂在《面孔:一部文化史》中指出的,从肖维-蓬达尔克洞穴墙壁上三万年前的图像,到公元前四千纪至两千纪的古代基克拉迪雕像,人像很少展现出可辨认的面部特征。也有例外。在埃及,某些法老似乎——原因仍在争论中——将自己形象的表现从理想化倾向自然化。最极端的例子是辛努塞尔特三世,他的神庙里摆满了自己的雕像,那些巨大的面孔布满皱纹、神情严峻而苍老,却安放在年轻健壮的身体上。几个世纪后,希腊和罗马出现了一段插曲,始于希腊雕塑中所谓的“严谨风格”,面孔获得了更清晰的特征,身体有了更分明的轮廓。苏格拉底的丑陋可以从他众多不性感的雕塑形象中可靠地推断出来;诸位凯撒的雕像和半身像,虽然融合了真实与宣传,但仍然易于区分。但这座面孔画廊随着西罗马帝国的灭亡和基督教的兴起而关闭了,基督教从《旧约》和犹太教那里继承了对偶像崇拜的怀疑。大卫·勒布雷东在《面孔》一书中指出,四世纪的基督教教会法汇编《使徒宪典》建议将画家完全逐出基督教世界,就像诗人会被逐出柏拉图的理想国一样。画家们留了下来,但他们没有去纪念个别的英雄,而是主要致力于宗教图像,在其中,写实主义再次被让位于象征价值。旧秩序恢复了。

Only with the Renaissance would it break again, with the fifteenth-century blossoming of the naturalistic portrait: van Eyck, Campin, Piero della Francesca. The archetype of painted interiority may still be the good old “Mona Lisa,” known in Italian as “La Gioconda”—the face that launched a thousand conjectures. Bound-Alberti brings her in, dutifully, to say how “enigmatic” her smile is, though Wittgenstein, again, made more of the cliché: “When we speak of the enigmatic smile of the Mona Lisa, that may well mean that we ask ourselves: In what situation, in what story, might one smile like that?” To talk of stories, he means, is to talk of time; you need the before and the after, the rounded sense of a life. After all, some people laugh in anger and weep with joy. If I read your smile as happiness, I’m drawing on a fluid sense of the character I know, and on our place in an emotional culture. One reason Leonardo’s painting has endured in the popular imagination is straightforward: we want to ask questions of her—how she feels, what she’s thinking—and though we don’t believe she’s alive any more than we believe Hamlet or James Bond to be alive, we can’t help responding to her face as if she were.

直到文艺复兴时期,这种秩序才再次被打破,伴随着十五世纪自然主义肖像画的蓬勃发展:凡·艾克、康平、皮耶罗·德拉·弗朗切斯卡。描绘内心世界的肖像画原型,或许仍是那幅古老的《蒙娜丽莎》,在意大利语中被称为《乔孔达夫人》——那张引发了千般猜测的面孔。邦德-阿尔伯蒂尽职地将她引入,谈论她的微笑是多么“神秘莫测”,然而维特根斯坦又一次对这个陈词滥调做了更多阐发:“当我们谈论蒙娜丽莎神秘的微笑时,那很可能意味着我们问自己:在什么情境下,在什么故事里,一个人会那样微笑?”他的意思是,谈论故事,就是谈论时间;你需要前因后果,需要对一个生命完整的感知。毕竟,有些人愤怒时大笑,快乐时哭泣。如果我把你的微笑解读为幸福,我依据的是我对所认识的这个角色的流动感知,以及我们在一种情感文化中的位置。列奥纳多的这幅画之所以能在大众想象中经久不衰,一个直接的原因是:我们想向她提问——她感觉如何,她在想什么——尽管我们并不相信她还活着,就像我们不相信哈姆雷特或詹姆斯·邦德活着一样,但我们还是忍不住对她的面孔做出反应,仿佛她是活生生的。

One unexpected consequence of the return of realism was a renewed attention to anatomy. Take dissection, which was mostly in abeyance through the medieval era, though by the thirteenth century in Europe it was beginning to appear in university curricula. During the Renaissance, it flourished again, and became a routine part of an artist’s studies, as Leonardo’s sketches attest. At the same time, another art returned, equally venerable and equally obsessed with the human form: physiognomy. The thinking, from the Greeks onward, was that you could, if sufficiently skilled, read people’s inward rottenness from their outward appearance. They might alter their behavior or speech, but a nose could never lie. Physiognomic treatises reappeared in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, then took off in the eighteenth and nineteenth. The star was Johann Kaspar Lavater, a Swiss poet and philosopher, whose “Physiognomische Fragmente,” a complete manual of flesh-reading, was published in four volumes between 1775 and 1778, featuring illustrations by Henry Fuseli and William Blake of faces and other body parts. It was successful enough to be abridged in multiple forms—“The Portable Lavater,” “Ladies’ Lavater”—and by the end of the century, Le Breton writes, “a visit to Lavater, complete with a physiognomy consultation with the master, was a must for anyone travelling to Switzerland.” The fashion spread. George Sand was a Lavater fan. So was Honoré de Balzac, who called physiognomy “prophetic.” Balzac used Lavater’s work in devising his own characters, who are practically lashed to destiny; Samuel Beckett would deride them as “clockwork cabbages.” One eighteenth-century chief justice of Naples took aside convicted prisoners who still refused to confess and personally examined their heads. If he found proof of inbuilt depravity, he would approve their execution; if he didn’t, he’d set them free.

写实主义回归的一个意想不到的后果,是对解剖学的重新关注。以解剖为例,它在中世纪时期大多处于停滞状态,尽管到了十三世纪的欧洲,它开始出现在大学课程中。文艺复兴期间,解剖学再次繁荣,并成为艺术家研习的常规部分,列奥纳多的素描就是明证。与此同时,另一门同样古老、同样痴迷于人体形态的艺术也回归了:相面术。自古希腊以来,这种想法就是,如果你技艺足够精湛,就能从人们的外表读出他们内在的腐朽。他们或许能改变自己的行为或言辞,但鼻子永远不会撒谎。相面术论著在十六、十七世纪重新出现,然后在十八、十九世纪蓬勃发展起来。其中的明星人物是约翰·卡斯帕·拉瓦特尔,一位瑞士诗人兼哲学家,他的《相面术断片》是一部完整的读肉手册,于1775年至1778年间分四卷出版,配有亨利·富塞利和威廉·布莱克绘制的面孔及其他身体部位的插图。这本书大获成功,被缩编成多种版本——《便携拉瓦特尔》、《女士拉瓦特尔》——勒布雷东写道,到该世纪末,“拜访拉瓦特尔,并由大师亲自进行一次相面咨询,是任何去瑞士旅行的人的必做之事。”这股风潮传播开来。乔治·桑是拉瓦特尔的粉丝。奥诺雷·德·巴尔扎克也是,他称相面术为“预言性的”。巴尔扎克利用拉瓦特尔的著作来构思他自己的人物,这些人物几乎被命运牢牢捆绑;塞缪尔·贝克特后来嘲笑他们是“上了发条的卷心菜”。十八世纪那不勒斯的一位首席法官,会把那些仍拒绝认罪的已决犯叫到一边,亲自检查他们的头颅。如果他发现了内在堕落的证据,就会批准处决;如果没有,就放了他们。

Such thinking had serious critics. If you judged someone’s soul from his appearance, Montaigne noted, it would be curtains for Socrates. The entry for “physionomie” in Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie described it as “imaginary” and “ridiculous.” Hegel compared physiognomists to a merchant who complains that it rains whenever the fair comes to town. But the belief died hard, and photography spurred its adherents on. Once faces had been “captured,” as we still say, they could be put into giant comparative systems, proto-databases of facial types. Francis Galton, the father of eugenics, used superimposed portrait photos in his hunt for “deviant” traits that criminals supposedly shared. His friend Cesare Lombroso, an Italian criminologist, agreed, suggesting that the signs of a “born criminal” included a receding brow and a heavy jaw.

这种思想遭到了严肃的批评。蒙田指出,如果你根据外表来判断一个人的灵魂,那苏格拉底就完蛋了。狄德罗和达朗贝尔的《百科全书》中“相面术”的词条将其描述为“想象的”和“荒谬的”。黑格尔将相面术士比作一个抱怨每逢集市就下雨的商人。但这种信念根深蒂固,而摄影术更是激励了它的信徒。一旦面孔被“捕捉”——我们现在仍这么说——它们就可以被放入庞大的比较系统,即面部类型的原始数据库中。优生学之父弗朗西斯·高尔顿,使用叠加的肖像照片来寻找罪犯据称共有的“越轨”特征。他的朋友、意大利犯罪学家切萨雷·龙勃罗梭也同意这一点,并提出“天生罪犯”的标志包括后缩的额头和沉重的下巴。

As genetics, psychology, and neuroscience ascended, the twentieth century sent physiognomy back into disrepute, and today, from Lavater to Lombroso, its promoters may seem a racist shade of quaint. Yet the conviction that your face will, if read skillfully, betray your hidden qualities has never gone away. The most influential facial theorist of the late twentieth century was the psychologist Paul Ekman, who argued that seven “universal emotions”—happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, disgust, fear, and contempt—recur across all cultures. Their display, he argued, can be too fleeting to control. Spot these “microexpressions” and map them, perhaps through Ekman’s proprietary Facial Action Coding System, and you’ll have a key to the human soul. Ekman’s ideas travelled unusually well: he wrote popular books, worked on the Pixar film “Inside Out” and the Fox series “Lie to Me,” and provided training to Scotland Yard, the T.S.A., the F.B.I., and the C.I.A. The appeal is plain enough. It promises a portable science of human disclosure. The trouble is that there is no context-free understanding of a social phenomenon; every use of a word like “anger” is imbricated in its past and helps shape its future. Ekman’s seven-point system, however useful as a package, leans toward rigidity, turning the face once again into a surface to be decoded.

随着遗传学、心理学和神经科学的兴起,二十世纪将相面术重新打入冷宫,而今天,从拉瓦特尔到龙勃罗梭,其鼓吹者可能看起来像是带有种族主义色彩的古怪遗老。然而,那种认为你的面孔——如果被巧妙解读——会泄露你隐藏品质的信念,从未消失。二十世纪末最具影响力的面孔理论家是心理学家保罗·艾克曼,他论证了七种“基本情绪”——快乐、悲伤、愤怒、惊讶、厌恶、恐惧和轻蔑——在所有文化中反复出现。他认为,这些情绪的表现可能转瞬即逝,难以控制。识别这些“微表情”并加以映射,或许通过艾克曼专有的面部动作编码系统,你就能获得一把打开人类灵魂的钥匙。艾克曼的思想传播得异常广泛:他撰写通俗读物,参与皮克斯电影《头脑特工队》和福克斯剧集《别对我说谎》的制作,并为苏格兰场、美国运输安全管理局、联邦调查局和中央情报局提供培训。其吸引力显而易见。它承诺提供一套便携的人类自我暴露科学。问题在于,对社会现象不存在脱离语境的理解;像“愤怒”这样的词,每一次使用都与其过去层层交织,并帮助塑造其未来。艾克曼的七点系统,无论作为一个工具包多么有用,都倾向于僵化,再次将面孔变成了一种待解码的表面。

The drive to define the face as a data point, something to be grasped and controlled, underpins the bureaucracy of the modern nation-state, in which faces are surveyed, categorized, and stored in digital banks. We show our faces when crossing the border, whether by holding out our passports or by staring into a digital camera. We carry papers that show our faces. Not coincidentally, plastic surgery has been advanced in part by governments: its pioneer, Sir Harold Gillies, fixed the faces of British soldiers who had been disfigured in the First World War, and today the U.S. Department of Defense funds face-transplant research in the United States.

将面孔定义为一个数据点,一个需要被掌握和控制的东西,这种驱动力支撑着现代民族国家的官僚体制,在其中,面孔被监视、分类并存储在数字库中。我们在过境时出示面孔,无论是递出护照,还是盯着数码相机。我们携带显示我们面孔的证件。并非巧合的是,整形外科的发展部分得益于政府:其先驱哈罗德·吉利斯爵士曾为在第一次世界大战中毁容的英国士兵修复面孔,而今天,美国国防部资助着美国的面部移植研究。

Facial-recognition systems are now operative in moments big and small, whether you’re activating your Apple device or being watched as you march against the regime. Some defend the practice, and others shrug. But the biases of these systems suggest that physiognomy has taken a new, less explicit form. Police facial-recognition systems in the U.S. have had a disproportionately high error rate among Black people. Black Americans are also disproportionately likely to be subjected to such systems; they are overrepresented in the prison population, and in recorded recidivism rates. Their faces, in other words, can be drawn into a technologically enhanced ouroboros. And my own home, the U.K., always seems to follow its cousin’s lead. Between 2024 and 2025, our police forces almost doubled their use of the technology on pedestrians; on the day I write this sentence, there are two huge marches in London, one pro-Palestine and one anti-immigration, and both are being actively surveilled by facial-recognition technology. Since 2013, Britain has had an independent Biometrics Commissioner, and every holder of the post has called for greater oversight of these systems, but privacy advocates have argued in court that there are “no meaningful limits” on what the police can do.

人脸识别系统如今在或大或小的时刻运行着,无论你是在激活你的苹果设备,还是在游行抗议政权时被监视。有人为此辩护,也有人耸耸肩不以为意。但这些系统的偏见表明,相面术已采取了一种新的、不那么露骨的形式。美国警方的人脸识别系统对黑人的错误率异常地高。美国黑人也更有可能成为此类系统的目标;他们在监狱人口和记录的再犯率中所占比例过高。换句话说,他们的面孔可能被卷入一个技术增强的自我循环中。而我自己的国家,英国,似乎总是步其表亲的后尘。在2024年至2025年间,我们的警察部队对行人使用该技术的次数几乎翻了一番;在我写下这句话的当天,伦敦有两场大规模的游行,一场支持巴勒斯坦,一场反移民,两者都正受到人脸识别技术的主动监控。自2013年以来,英国设立了一位独立的生物识别专员,每一任专员都呼吁对这些系统加强监督,但隐私倡导者在法庭上辩称,对警方的行为“没有有意义的限制”。

Many of the tech behemoths, too, have invested in facial recognition, and, for a while, they augmented it with emotion-detecting tools. Amazon, for instance, announced in 2019 that its system Rekognition could more accurately identify “all 7 emotions”—namely “Happy,” “Sad,” “Angry,” “Surprised,” “Disgusted,” “Calm,” and “Confused”—and had added a new one, “Fear.” This diverges a little from Ekman’s schema; perhaps the publicity chiefs found “Contemptuous” too unpleasant to sell. Rekognition has a broad spectrum of clients, from ticketing platforms to credit bureaus. It once sought to sell its services to Immigration and Customs Enforcement, though ICE plumped for a rival firm, Clearview AI, which is less interested in emotion than in flat identification. Clearview scrapes facial data from the web on a mass scale—at one point, it absorbed ten billion social-media photos—and has faced dozens of lawsuits and regulatory actions from American states and European countries. The future of emotion recognition, meanwhile, seems uncertain: Microsoft and Google both developed such tools but have since limited or ditched them. Maybe, outside the F.B.I.’s interrogation rooms, knowing how someone feels isn’t proving that valuable.

许多科技巨头也投资了人脸识别,并且在一段时间内,他们还用情绪检测工具对其加以增强。例如,亚马逊在2019年宣布,其系统Rekognition能够更准确地识别“全部七种情绪”——即“快乐”、“悲伤”、“愤怒”、“惊讶”、“厌恶”、“平静”和“困惑”——并新增了一种,“恐惧”。这与艾克曼的图式略有出入;也许是公关主管们觉得“轻蔑”太不讨喜,难以推销。Rekognition拥有广泛的客户群,从票务平台到信用机构。它曾试图向美国移民和海关执法局出售其服务,不过ICE最终选择了竞争对手Clearview AI,后者对情绪的兴趣不如对直接识别的兴趣大。Clearview从网络上大规模抓取面部数据——曾一度吸收了上百亿张社交媒体照片——并已面临来自美国各州和欧洲国家的数十起诉讼和监管行动。与此同时,情绪识别的未来似乎不确定:微软和谷歌都开发过此类工具,但后来限制或放弃了它们。也许,在联邦调查局的审讯室之外,知道某人的感受并不像想象的那么有价值。

The trend toward standardization and control has become coldly clear. And as with bureaucrats, so with beauticians: we can capture faces, sort them, approve them, reject them, modify them, and rejuvenate them. What you can measure you can try to perfect. The ancient approach to cosmetics seems like frippery next to the “looksmaxxers” of today, led by Clavicular, a razor-jawed American influencer whose commitment to surgery extends to smashing his own bones, and who has said that beauty isn’t “about sexual attraction, it’s about mathematics.”

趋向标准化和控制的潮流已变得冰冷而清晰。与官僚们一样,美容师们也是如此:我们可以捕捉面孔,分类面孔,认可面孔,拒绝面孔,修改面孔,让面孔恢复青春。你能衡量的东西,你就能试图去完善。与今天的“颜值最大化者”相比,古代的美容方法简直像是小打小闹,其领军人物是Clavicular,一位下巴线条如刀削般的美国网红,他对整形的执着延伸到了敲碎自己的骨头,他曾说过,美“与性吸引力无关,它关乎数学”。
Casper The Friendly Ghost and friends play a trick on Hamlet.
“Hamlet! I am thy father’s ghost. Avenge me!”
“哈姆雷特!我是你父亲的鬼魂。为我报仇!”
Cartoon by David Borchart
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Clavicular, though, represents merely the crunchy end point of a logic that has taken hold of affluent life. The same mathematical approach underpins platforms such as Instagram, a wet market for faces, on which users self-brand and sell themselves—and on which the most successful products are those which top the algorithmic charts. Hence the rise, in the twenty-tens, of the so-called Instagram face, on which so many visages slowly converged, altered by fillers and the like to become ethnically nebulous, big-lipped, and often, as videos indicated, hard to move. Last year, an ITV survey suggested that among Brits between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five—a group with near-total smartphone and social-media penetration—one in five had some form of tweakment. Le Breton, with some justification, compares the plastic surgeon to “a psychiatrist advising a paranoid patient to be more wary of his enemies.”

不过,Clavicular代表的,仅仅是一种已掌控富裕生活的逻辑的极端终点。同样的数学方法支撑着Instagram这样的平台,这是一个面孔的湿货市场,用户在上面自我品牌化、推销自己——而最成功的产品,是那些在算法排行榜上名列前茅的。因此,在二十一世纪一十年代,所谓的“Instagram脸”兴起,无数面容在其上慢慢趋同,通过填充物等手段变得种族特征模糊、嘴唇丰满,而且如视频所示,常常难以活动。去年,ITV的一项调查显示,在18至25岁的英国人——这个群体几乎完全普及了智能手机和社交媒体——中,五分之一的人接受过某种形式的微整形。勒布雷东不无道理地将整形外科医生比作“一个建议偏执狂患者要更加提防敌人的精神科医生”。

Social media needs the face because it burns attention for fuel, and the face is where I go when I look for you. But I can’t look to these platforms. I find it all so unsatisfying: the resculpted faces, the curated lives, the naked grabbing of my gaze. Something uncertain, something human, has been drained like blood from this world. There’s evidence that Botoxed people become worse at reading other people’s emotions, because when you engage with others you simulate their expressions in your own facial musculature. It’s as if we were commodifying the face, putting it under glass, turning it into a transactional token rather than a pliable living thing.

社交媒体需要面孔,因为它以注意力为燃料,而面孔是我寻找你时所看向的地方。但我无法看向这些平台。我觉得这一切都如此令人不满:那些重塑过的面孔,那些精心策划的生活,那种对我目光赤裸裸的攫取。某种不确定的、人性的东西,像血液一样从这个世界上被抽干了。有证据表明,注射了肉毒杆菌的人会变得更不善于解读他人的情绪,因为当你与他人互动时,你会在自己的面部肌肉中模拟他们的表情。就好像我们正在将面孔商品化,把它放进玻璃罩里,把它变成一种交易筹码,而不是一个柔韧的、活生生的东西。

That little half smile you see could be smug or coy, or even lady-killing; you need to ask which, and why, and in doing so you’re doing moral work, because you’re treating the smiler as an autonomous being whose form of life you need to grasp, however provisionally. But think of the faces we now trade most readily, in the billions every day: emoji, complete and prepackaged, limited in number, coined and issued by a consortium of leading tech companies. I can never shake the sense that they’re fatally cheap. If I saw a friend post about this piece, or send me a message about it, and use an emoji in doing so, I might first envision the real face of that friend, or try to, but then I would feel unmoored. No true face is as standardizable as the image the person has sent in its stead, and another friend, my partner, even my boss might have sent me the exact same little face earlier. It can’t represent them all. It’s like canned laughter, like a cliché. Yes, we know that emoji are useful lies, saving us time and dodging the difficulty of putting emotions into words; still, in so dodging, we falsify something essential about what our real faces can do. The emoji could be the culmination of everything we’ve done to the face over the centuries, all the multiplication and commodification and repacking. We’ve made it trivial.

你看到的那一抹似笑非笑,可能是自鸣得意,也可能是故作羞怯,甚至可能是情场杀手;你需要问是哪种,以及为什么,而在这样做的过程中,你就在从事道德工作,因为你在将微笑者视为一个自主的存在,你需要去把握他的生命形式,哪怕只是暂时性的。但想想我们现在最轻易交换的那些面孔,每天数以十亿计:表情符号,完整且预先打包好的,数量有限,由一家领先科技公司组成的联盟铸造和发行。我始终无法摆脱一种感觉,那就是它们廉价得要命。如果我看到一个朋友发帖谈论这篇文章,或给我发来一条关于它的消息,并在其中用了一个表情符号,我可能首先会想象那位朋友真实的面孔,或者试图去想象,但随后我会感到无所适从。没有一张真实的面孔能像对方发来代替它的那个图像那样标准化,而另一个朋友、我的伴侣、甚至我的老板,可能早些时候也给我发过完全一样的小脸。它不可能代表他们所有人。它就像罐头笑声,像一个陈词滥调。是的,我们知道表情符号是有用的谎言,节省了我们的时间,避开了将情绪付诸语言的困难;然而,在如此回避的过程中,我们伪造了关于我们真实面孔所能做之事的一些本质性的东西。表情符号可能是几个世纪以来我们对面孔所做的一切——所有的倍增、商品化和重新包装——的顶峰。我们把它变得微不足道了。

This isn’t what I want for faces. I want them to shift, to resist, to allure. I find myself thinking of a photograph taken by Peter Hujar in 1975: a black-and-white portrait of the poet and dance critic Edwin Denby, at the age of seventy-two. His eyes are shut, his mouth neither smiling nor frowning.

这不是我期望面孔所成为的样子。我希望它们变化,抵抗,诱惑。我发现自己想起彼得·休贾在1975年拍摄的一张照片:诗人兼舞蹈评论家埃德温·登比的黑白肖像,时年七十二岁。他双眼紧闭,嘴巴既非微笑也非皱眉。

The picture tempts you to suppose that you can read Denby’s face, that he’s experiencing fatigue, or stress, or agitation. Or maybe he’s just world-weary. But if you learn that Denby suffered, in his later years, from depression, and would kill himself some years later, you might see something like pain. Then you might learn a little about Hujar, too, and about the way he liked to concentrate on the emotions of his subjects. You might be less inclined to assume that a feeling has been casually captured, as it might be in a family snap. By this point, the question the image first posed, “What is this man feeling?,” seems as urgent as ever, perhaps even more charged. Yet every attempt to answer it has led nowhere. Denby sits there forever; his troubles are radiant.

这张照片诱使你假定自己能读懂登比的脸,认为他正经历疲惫、压力或烦躁。或者他只是厌倦了世事。但如果你了解到登比晚年饱受抑郁症之苦,并在几年后自杀,你可能会看到某种类似痛苦的东西。然后你或许也会对休贾有所了解,了解他喜欢专注于拍摄对象情绪的方式。你可能就不那么倾向于认为,一种情感被随意捕捉了下来,就像在家庭快照中那样。到这时,这幅影像最初提出的问题——“这个男人感觉如何?”——似乎一如既往地紧迫,甚至可能更加充满张力。然而,每一次试图回答它的尝试都无果而终。登比永远坐在那里;他的困扰熠熠生辉。

Here’s another way of approaching that image. Denby, as a critic, was fascinated by the great dancer Vaslav Nijinsky, as much for his expressions as for his torso, arms, or legs. “The manner in which Nijinsky’s face changes from role to role is immediately striking,” Denby wrote, in 1943. “It is enhanced by makeup, but not created by it. In fact, a friend pointed out that the only role in which one recognises Nijinsky’s civilian face is that of Petrouchka, where he is most heavily made up.” It was as if the images held several traits in suspense. Many people who met Nijinsky were enthralled by that curious face. Stravinsky recalled that it “could become the most powerful actor’s mask I have ever seen.” It was part of Nijinsky’s weird magic, whether he was embodying a sex-hungry faun or a wooden puppet come to life: he drew other personae out of himself.

这是接近那幅影像的另一种方式。作为评论家,登比对伟大的舞者瓦斯拉夫·尼金斯基着迷,既为他的表情,也为他的躯干、手臂或腿。“尼金斯基的面孔从一个角色变换到另一个角色的方式,立刻引人注目,”登比在1943年写道。“化妆增强了它,但并非创造了它。事实上,一位朋友指出,唯一能让人认出尼金斯基便装面孔的角色是彼得鲁什卡,而他在那个角色中化妆最浓。”仿佛这些影像将几种特质悬置了起来。许多见过尼金斯基的人都为他那张奇特的面孔所倾倒。斯特拉文斯基回忆说,它“可以变成我所见过的最强大的演员面具”。这是尼金斯基奇异魔力的一部分,无论他是在化身一个性欲旺盛的牧神,还是一个活过来的木偶:他从自身中牵引出其他人格面具。

After Nijinsky began to show signs of schizophrenia, this mask, or persona, grew disturbed. He seemed to recede into his eyes. His diary, written during two feverish months in 1919, teems with scribbled drawings of eyes, giant and black. He believed that he was being watched, which for most of his life had been true. One winter night, in the late nineteen-twenties, he was taken out of an asylum in Paris by his former boss, the Ballets Russes’ Serge Diaghilev, to attend a production of “Petrouchka,” in which the title role was now performed by a younger man, Serge Lifar. Throughout the evening, Nijinsky barely spoke. He just stared. The diplomat Harry Kessler, who was there, said that his “big eyes” were like those of “a sick animal”; the dancer Tamara Karsavina caught him straining to look at her face, then, when she met his gaze, he “turned his head like a child that wants to hide tears.”

在尼金斯基开始显现精神分裂症迹象后,这副面具,或人格面具,变得紊乱了。他似乎退缩到了自己的眼睛里。他在1919年两个狂热月份里写下的日记,充满了潦草画下的眼睛,巨大而漆黑。他相信自己正被监视,而这在他生命的大部分时间里都是事实。二十世纪二十年代末的一个冬夜,他被他的前老板、俄罗斯芭蕾舞团的谢尔盖·佳吉列夫从巴黎的一家精神病院带出来,去观看一场《彼得鲁什卡》的演出,剧名角色现在由一位更年轻的男子谢尔盖·利法尔扮演。整个晚上,尼金斯基几乎没说话。他只是凝视着。在场的外交官哈里·凯斯勒说,他的“大眼睛”像“一只生病的动物”的眼睛;舞者塔玛拉·卡尔萨文娜发现他努力想看清她的脸,然后,当她迎上他的目光时,他“像一个想藏起眼泪的孩子那样转过头去”。

A photograph of the group survives from that night. Although Lifar was the star of the show, all the faces are turned to Nijinsky, whose gaze is directed offstage. His eyes and smile are too wide, and his right hand grasps the air. This face conveys a need, but a need that eluded everyone; it eludes me now, as I look at the picture, though I know it’s there. And, looking again at Hujar’s portrait of Denby, I see something similar. Another man, engulfed in feelings, shows his face to the world. His eyes are closed; his expression seems charged. I wish I knew how he felt. It seems important that I do. All I know is that I cannot look away. ♦

一张当晚的合影留存了下来。尽管利法尔是演出的明星,但所有的面孔都转向了尼金斯基,他的目光则投向舞台之外。他的眼睛和微笑都张得太开了,右手抓着空气。这张面孔传达出一种需要,但那是一种所有人都无法理解的需要;现在,当我看着这张照片时,它同样让我无法理解,尽管我知道它就在那里。而且,再次看着休贾为登比拍摄的肖像,我看到了某种相似的东西。另一个男人,被情感吞没,向世界展示着他的面孔。他双眼紧闭;他的表情似乎充满张力。我多希望我知道他的感受。这似乎很重要。我所知道的是,我无法将目光移开。 ♦

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