The Lede

What China’s Vibe-Coding Capital Can Tell Us About the A.I. Boom

中国“氛围编程”之都能告诉我们什么关于人工智能热潮的事
Tech workers have flocked to Liangzhu, a small town outside Hangzhou, looking to escape China’s corporate culture and build their future with A.I.
科技从业者纷纷涌入良渚——杭州郊外的一座小镇,希望逃离中国的企业文化,用人工智能构建自己的未来。
Colorful characters gathered around a window while drinking coffee.
Illustration by Wong Ping

In mid-May, days after Donald Trump visited Beijing, a Chinese tech founder named Levy invited me to an office party for his A.I. fortune-telling company. It’s called FateTell, and it makes an app that, in the vein of traditional Chinese astrology, reads your bazi, a chart that tracks the elemental forces associated with your birth date and time. (Levy wanted me at the event because of the makeup of my bazi. According to his invitation, my governing element, fire, would counteract the water element that Levy carries in oversupply.) So I travelled from Beijing to FateTell’s headquarters, situated on the edge of Hangzhou—one of China’s tech hubs, home to Alibaba and the insurgent Chinese A.I. company DeepSeek—in a town called Liangzhu.

五月中旬,唐纳德·特朗普访问北京几天后,一位名叫利维(Levy)的中国科技创始人邀请我参加他的人工智能算命公司的办公室派对。公司名叫 FateTell,做一款应用,按照中国传统命理的路数,解读你的八字——一张追踪你出生日期和时辰所对应五行之力的图表。(利维希望我出席,是因为我的八字构成。根据他的邀请,我的主元素火,可以克制利维体内过剩的水元素。)于是我从北京出发,前往 FateTell 总部,它坐落在杭州边缘——中国科技重镇之一,阿里巴巴和异军突起的中国人工智能公司深度求索(DeepSeek)的所在地——一个叫良渚的小镇。

Liangzhu means “beautiful waterland,” and it more than earns the name—rivers, lakes, and marshes thread through the low hills at the town’s edge. The town is hip, idyllic, contrarian, and increasingly known as an escape for workers burnt out by the grind of China’s booming tech industry. To those back in Beijing or Shenzhen, Liangzhu has become a low-cost retreat where people can afford to vibe-code—building software through conversations with A.I., as opposed to writing source code at a line-by-line level–on their own terms, without having to work what is known as the 9-9-6, an extreme schedule that is common in Chinese tech firms of working from 9 A.M. to 9 P.M., six days a week.

良渚意为“美丽的水乡”,名副其实——河流、湖泊、沼泽穿行于小镇边缘的低丘之间。这座小镇时髦、田园、反主流,越来越以中国蓬勃科技产业中倦怠打工人的避风港而闻名。对留在北京或深圳的人来说,良渚成了一个低成本退隐之地,人们在这里可以按自己的节奏“氛围编程”(vibe-coding)——通过与人工智能对话来构建软件,而非逐行编写源代码——不必再忍受所谓的“996”,即中国科技公司普遍实行的极端工作制:早九点到晚九点,每周六天。

Residents often dub themselves “villagers,” and describe Liangzhu as between rural and suburban. Between verdant parks and wide avenues, they sit on sprawling grass fields—a way of relaxing that is rare in most major Chinese cities, where lawns are usually cordoned off. Often, there is a stroller parked next to them. (China’s birth rate has plummeted to its lowest point since 1949, but, in the area where Liangzhu is, the birth rate is double the national average).

居民常自称“村民”,把良渚描述为介于乡村与郊区之间的地方。在葱郁的公园和宽阔的大道之间,他们坐在大片草地上——这种放松方式在中国大多数大城市极为罕见,那里的草坪通常被围栏隔开。身旁往往停着一辆婴儿车。(中国的出生率已跌至1949年以来最低点,但在良渚所在区域,出生率是全国平均水平的两倍。)

It didn’t take me long after my arrival in Liangzhu to stumble upon the town’s growing population of vibe-coders. Near Liangzhu’s cultural and art center, a sprawling structure designed by Tadao Ando and surrounded by cherry blossoms, I overheard young developers murmuring about Kimi, a Chinese large language model, and OpenAI’s Codex. Some had dogs at their feet. Others were coding over oat-milk lattes. The building’s nickname, I learned, is the Big Roof. Nearby stands another towering structure, called the Big Barn, which contains a vast bookstore. The structures, made of raw concrete, exuded an ostentatious form of modesty, emblematic of the town’s character.

抵达良渚后不久,我就撞见了镇上日益壮大的氛围编程人群。在良渚文化艺术中心附近——一座由安藤忠雄设计、被樱花环绕的庞大建筑——我听到年轻的开发者们低声谈论 Kimi(一款中国大语言模型)和 OpenAI 的 Codex。有些人脚边趴着狗。还有些人一边喝着燕麦拿铁一边写代码。我得知这座建筑的绰号叫“大屋顶”。旁边矗立着另一座高耸建筑,叫“大谷仓”,里面有一家巨大的书店。这些清水混凝土建筑散发出一种张扬的朴素感,正是这座小镇气质的写照。

Everywhere I went, people were building new A.I. products. This is not unique to Liangzhu. In the past few years, as the A.I. boom went global, Beijing has made A.I. a national priority, launching a campaign known as A.I. Plus to seed it throughout the economy. China’s major tech companies are bracing for the same transformation, pouring money into semiconductors, large language models, and cloud infrastructure, as well as the consumer products that are built on top of them. But, unlike the everything apps that are favored by most of these big tech companies, much of the software built in Liangzhu is whimsical and quirky, similar in spirit to an artisanal craft you might pick up at a small-scale farmers’ market. FocusFlight, a timer that simulates an immersive flight environment to improve concentration, plays white noise while you “fly” to a city. (As I wrote this piece, I “flew” from San Francisco to Los Angeles.) YouMind, an A.I. workflow tool, bills itself as a “second brain” that helps people “create bolder” by gathering scattered reading, notes, and research in one place and turning it into finished work (one of their ads is an A.I.-generated video that tells the story of an exhausted mother with no income, trying to write as a baby cries in the background; later, she is pictured using YouMind, and becomes happy and successful). And then there is FateTell, which feeds your bazi through large language models and spits out guides “based on thousands of years of Eastern wisdom.” The app has hundreds of thousands of users, the most devoted of whom pay an annual fee to subscribe. (Levy told me they’re also exploring a hardware direction: making wooden blocks shaped like moons—traditional divination tools that are thrown to seek spiritual guidance—embedded with smart chips.)

无论走到哪里,都有人在打造新的人工智能产品。这并非良渚独有。过去几年,随着人工智能热潮席卷全球,北京已将人工智能列为国家优先事项,发起“人工智能+”行动,将其播撒到整个经济中。中国各大科技公司也在为同样的转型做准备,大举投资半导体、大语言模型、云基础设施,以及构建于其上的消费产品。但与大多数大科技公司青睐的超级应用不同,良渚开发的软件大多天马行空、古灵精怪,气质上更像你在小型农夫市集上淘到的手工艺品。FocusFlight 是一款模拟沉浸式飞行环境的计时器,用来提升专注力,在你“飞往”某座城市时播放白噪音。(写这篇文章时,我“飞”了一趟旧金山到洛杉矶。)YouMind 是一款人工智能工作流工具,自称“第二大脑”,帮助人们“更大胆地创造”,把零散的阅读、笔记和研究汇集一处,转化为成品(他们的一则广告是一段人工智能生成的视频,讲述一位精疲力竭、没有收入的母亲,在背景中婴儿啼哭时努力写作;后来画面中她使用了 YouMind,变得快乐而成功)。还有 FateTell,把你的八字输入大语言模型,输出“基于数千年东方智慧”的指南。这款应用有数十万用户,其中最忠实的用户每年付费订阅。(利维告诉我,他们还在探索硬件方向:制作形似月亮的木块——传统占卜工具,抛掷以寻求灵性指引——嵌入智能芯片。)

In fact, a throwback to traditional Chinese spirituality and Western New Age practices pervades much of the town. I checked a local event guide during my visit; it included an I Ching guide to dressing for luck, a Zen sutra reading, and an essential-oils workshop for healing. A singing-bowl sound-therapy studio sat beside a boutique that sold only linen and silk clothing, cut loose and draping enough to make the wearer look faintly monk-like. Crystals were in one shop window; tarot upstairs. Astrology, consumerism, and A.I. were folded into one another as though they had always belonged together—reminiscent of an older era of Silicon Valley when spirituality and personal computing grew out of the same countercultural milieu. I asked Ian Johnson, a Canadian-American reporter who won a Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of Chinese religious life in the early two-thousands, about the way spirituality was manifesting among young people in the A.I. generation. “They’re like the Woodstock generation in the West,” he told me. Johnson explained that the previous generation in China underwent rapid economic development and huge leaps in the availability of material goods. For their children, existential questions have emerged, and in the fast-moving, chaotic tech world, he added, uncertainty feels especially acute. “Why one company succeeds and another fails can seem almost metaphysical,” Johnson said.

事实上,回归中国传统灵性和西方新时代实践的气息弥漫在这座小镇的许多角落。到访期间,我翻看了一份本地活动指南,内容包括:用《易经》指导穿衣开运、禅经诵读、精油疗愈工作坊。一家颂钵音疗工作室旁边,是一家只卖亚麻和丝绸服装的精品店,剪裁宽松垂坠,穿上后颇有几分僧侣气质。一家店铺橱窗里摆着水晶;楼上在算塔罗。占星、消费主义和人工智能彼此交融,仿佛它们从来就属于一体——令人想起硅谷更早的时代,那时灵性与个人计算从同一种反文化土壤中生长出来。我问伊恩·约翰逊(Ian Johnson)——一位美籍加拿大记者,因报道二十一世纪初中国宗教生活而获普利策奖——灵性在人工智能一代年轻人中的表现方式。“他们就像西方的伍德斯托克一代,”他对我说。约翰逊解释说,中国上一代人经历了快速经济发展和物质商品供应的巨大飞跃。对他们的子女来说,存在主义问题浮现了,而在快速变动、混乱的科技世界里,他补充道,不确定性显得格外尖锐。“为什么一家公司成功而另一家失败,几乎像是形而上的问题,”约翰逊说。

Levy, the founder of FateTell, is a star in Liangzhu. A graduate of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, he once worked at ByteDance, the company that created TikTok. He is lean, with a slight frame and a calculating gaze—though he speaks softly and contemplatively. He told me he has long been interested in how technology intersects with spirituality, referencing both the I Ching and Frank Herbert’s “Dune,” and, after I told him that I live in the Bay Area, he said, with a small conspiratorial grin, that he had cast the bazi of every major A.I. leader. His reading of Sam Altman’s bazi: “a mercenary accountant.” Elon Musk, he said, “will have a very bumpy few years.” He had almost named the company Muad’Dib, after the nickname that the character Paul Atreides takes among the Fremen in “Dune,” but FateTell had the benefit of being slightly more literal.

利维,FateTell 的创始人,是良渚的明星。他毕业于香港科技大学,曾在字节跳动——创造 TikTok 的公司——工作过。他身形清瘦,目光审慎——不过说话轻声细语,带着沉思。他告诉我,他长期以来对科技与灵性的交汇感兴趣,既提到《易经》,也提到弗兰克·赫伯特的《沙丘》。当我告诉他我住在湾区时,他带着一丝心照不宣的微笑说,他给每一位人工智能领域的领军人物都排过八字。他对山姆·奥特曼八字的解读是:“一个唯利是图的会计。”埃隆·马斯克,他说,“接下来几年会非常坎坷。”他差点把公司命名为 Muad’Dib——取自《沙丘》中保罗·厄崔迪在弗雷曼人中的绰号——但 FateTell 的好处是意思更直白一些。

At the party, Levy introduced me to the FateTell team, a group of eight people, among whom almost no moment goes un-astrologized. One engineer took a two-week vow of silence because his bazi had warned him that he was losing his sense of self by excessively describing his life—an increasingly common affliction for a generation immersed in Chinese social media. All eight employees had had their charts checked for compatibility before being hired. The C.O.O. treated my bazi as if it were as important as my last name and warned me, “The Year of the Fire Horse might bring you fame, but also exhaustion and illness.”

派对上,利维向我介绍了 FateTell 团队,一共八个人,在他们中间几乎没有哪个时刻不被占星化。一位工程师进行了为期两周的禁语,因为他的八字警告他,过度描述自己的生活正在让他丧失自我——对于沉浸在中国社交媒体中的一代人来说,这是一种日益普遍的困扰。八名员工在入职前都做过八字合盘。首席运营官对待我的八字就像对待我的姓氏一样郑重,并警告我:“火马年可能给你带来名声,但也会带来疲惫和疾病。”

Before entering the tech world, Levy had considered becoming a Taoist monk. “Years ago, a great master told me I had a gift for the spirit,” he said. “He nearly took me up into the mountains to cultivate the Tao.” But Levy’s love of A.I. proved the stronger pull, and he instead attempted to merge Taoism with that. “I’ve wanted to build a Taoist app since 2017,” he explained. “The years since have been preparation—I met hundreds of practitioners and diviners, and read my way through the classical scriptures.” Then, after DeepSeek launched, he was convinced that the time had finally come.

在进入科技行业之前,利维曾考虑过当道士。“多年前,一位大师告诉我,我有修行的天赋,”他说。“他差点把我带上山去修道。”但利维对人工智能的热爱最终占了上风,他转而尝试将道教与人工智能融合。“我从2017年就想做一款道教应用,”他解释道。“这些年一直在准备——我见了数百位修行者和占卜师,通读了经典典籍。”后来,DeepSeek 发布后,他确信时机终于到了。

It was late 2024, a year after Xi Jinping had named A.I. an essential engine for China’s “new quality productive forces,” when the country’s tech companies began releasing, one after another, open-weight models that stunned Silicon Valley. DeepSeek, working with scarce compute, came within reach of the world’s most capable A.I. models at a fraction of the cost of American firms like OpenAI and Anthropic; behind it, other Chinese labs—Moonshot AI, MiniMax, Z.ai—seemingly sprang up overnight and seized global headlines. Chinese users noticed something that ChatGPT had never offered them: DeepSeek R1’s culturally attuned intelligence and elegant Chinese prose, both the fruit of a high-quality Chinese-language pre-training base and reinforcement learning layered on top. Until then, the A.I. most Chinese people had used felt imported and translated. R1 was the first that sounded native to China. DeepSeek’s founder, Liang Wenfeng—who is mysterious and largely absent from public view—seemed to arrive out of nowhere. In some corners of the Chinese internet, DeepSeek has even been touted as proof that China’s “national destiny” has arrived. Netizens posted their exchanges with it, awed by its philosophical depth. Then came the deluge: R1-powered fortune-telling swept the Chinese internet.

那是2024年末,习近平将人工智能命名为中国“新质生产力”重要引擎一年之后,中国的科技公司开始接连发布开源权重模型,令硅谷震惊。DeepSeek 在算力稀缺的条件下,以远低于 OpenAI、Anthropic 等美国公司的成本,逼近了世界最强人工智能模型的水平;在其身后,其他中国实验室——月之暗面(Moonshot AI)、MiniMax、Z.ai——仿佛一夜之间冒了出来,抢占全球头条。中国用户注意到了 ChatGPT 从未给过他们的东西:DeepSeek R1 具有文化适配的智能和优雅的中文表达,这既得益于高质量的中文预训练语料,也得益于在其上叠加的强化学习。在此之前,大多数中国人使用的人工智能总感觉是舶来品、翻译腔。R1 是第一个听起来像中国本土的模型。DeepSeek 的创始人梁文锋——神秘莫测,几乎不出现在公众视野中——仿佛从天而降。在中国互联网的某些角落,DeepSeek 甚至被吹捧为中国“国运”到来的证明。网民们纷纷晒出与它的对话,惊叹于其哲学深度。随后是洪流般的浪潮:基于 R1 的算命席卷了中国互联网。

As reasoning models matured, Levy decided it was time to build his own company. “Fortune-telling is like food and shelter,” he told me. “It’s a real human need, thousands of years old.” His logic runs like this: the better a model gets at coding and math, the better it must get at fortune-telling, as he believes that bazi is itself a rigorous system of statistical decision-making. He often repeats a claim by Song-chun Zhu, who heads Peking University’s School of Intelligence Science and Technology: I Ching, the divination system behind bazi, may be humanity’s earliest exercise in statistical decision modelling, its first data set for deciding how to act.

随着推理模型日趋成熟,利维决定是时候创建自己的公司了。“算命就像吃饭和住房,”他对我说。“它是真实的人类需求,有几千年的历史。”他的逻辑是这样的:一个模型在编程和数学上越强,它在算命上也必然越强,因为他相信八字本身就是一套严密的统计决策系统。他经常引用北京大学智能学院院长朱松纯的说法:《易经》,八字背后的占卜体系,可能是人类最早的统计决策建模实践,是人类决定如何行动的第一套数据集。

And the business is lucrative. In China, the A.I. fortune-telling industry passed a hundred and twenty billion yuan in 2025, growing nearly forty-four per cent a year, faster than most enterprise A.I. The West is experiencing a version of this, too: the same human need for spiritual guidance brought an explosion of A.I.-companion apps and therapy chatbots in America. In a recent essay in the Times, the author Yi-Ling Liu argued that people in both China and the U.S. are “turning toward the spiritual for solace and agency in a world accelerating out of their control.”

而且这门生意利润丰厚。在中国,人工智能算命产业在2025年突破了一千二百亿元人民币,年增长率接近百分之四十四,快于大多数企业级人工智能。西方也在经历类似的情况:同样的灵性指引需求催生了美国人工智能伴侣应用和治疗聊天机器人的爆发。在《纽约时报》最近的一篇文章中,作者刘怡龄(Yi-Ling Liu)认为,中美两国的人们都在“转向灵性,在一个加速失控的世界中寻求慰藉和能动性”。

Liangzhu’s role as a hot spot for A.I. innovation is not random. Strolling through the empty, gleaming streets of the town, I saw a sign describing Liangzhu, in the enormous blocky gold characters favored by the Chinese Communist Party:

良渚成为人工智能创新热土并非偶然。漫步在小镇空旷闪亮的街道上,我看到一块牌子,用中国共产党偏爱的那种巨大方正的金色字体描述良渚:

A proven ground of five thousand years of Chinese civilization, a vanguard of the Chinese nation’s modern civilization, a demonstration zone for cultural empowerment and common prosperity.

中华五千年文明的实证之地,中华民族现代文明的先锋,文化赋能共同富裕的示范区。

Many key words from the slogan are coded deep in Xi Jinping Thought, the official political doctrine of China’s ruler. Xi-isms combine Maoist Marxism with what the President has dubbed “The Road to National Rejuvenation.” This means binding pride in China’s five-thousand-year civilization to technological supremacy and “common prosperity,” presenting them as parts of the same national revival.

标语中的许多关键词深深嵌入习近平思想——中国最高领导人的官方政治学说——的编码之中。习式表述将毛主义马克思主义与这位国家主席所称的“民族复兴之路”相结合。这意味着把对中华五千年文明的自豪感与科技霸权、“共同富裕”绑定在一起,将它们呈现为同一场民族复兴的组成部分。

In 2003, a then obscure provincial Party secretary—Xi, who was fifty years old and was running Zhejiang Province—visited Liangzhu. Back then, the town was a rural, rapidly industrializing fringe of Hangzhou with a largely undeveloped archaeological site that featured Neolithic tombs and settlements buried deep beneath farmland. Dozens of industrial quarries dotted the surrounding hills; the blasting and dust was so constant that one renowned archaeologist had described the area as resembling “a war zone.”According to the Party’s official history, Xi ordered the last few quarries shut down, imagining that this sparse landscape could be a prime location for a shared spiritual home of the Chinese nation. That same year, Xi launched “Digital Zhejiang,” an initiative that promoted information technology as the engine of the province’s industrialization, and made high-tech development a central part of his governing agenda.

2003年,一位当时还默默无闻的省委书记——五十岁的习近平,正在主政浙江省——到访良渚。彼时,这座小镇还是杭州边缘一片快速工业化的乡村地带,有一处基本未开发的考古遗址,新石器时代的墓葬和聚落深埋在农田之下。周围山丘上散布着数十个工业采石场;爆破和粉尘持续不断,一位著名考古学家曾形容该地区“像战场”。据党的官方历史记载,习近平下令关闭了最后几座采石场,设想这片荒疏的景观可以成为中华民族共同精神家园的理想之地。同年,习近平启动了“数字浙江”倡议,推动信息技术成为全省工业化的引擎,并将高科技发展作为其施政议程的核心。

Two decades later, China’s tech sector was entering its deepest crisis. After China lifted “Zero COVID” at the end of 2022, and after the financial crisis that followed, an industry that was once defined by high salaries, lavish hiring, and vertiginous growth turned grim. In 2022 alone, Alibaba, Meituan, Tencent, and Baidu shed nearly forty thousand jobs between them. One company after another entered “structural adjustment” and “workforce optimization,” euphemisms for mass layoffs and wage freezes. Alibaba’s stock has lost around two-thirds of its value after the “disappearance” of Jack Ma, the company’s former C.E.O. Amid deflation and a stalling economy, the tech gold rush seemed to many to be over. Then came the A.I. boom. All of a sudden, almost everyone began vibe coding, and one person with an idea could build software that once required a team of engineers. For China’s battered tech workers and newly unemployed graduates, the conclusion was almost a no-brainer: A.I. offered them a sense of agency, and their best remaining chance to build something successful.

二十年后,中国科技行业正陷入最深的危机。2022年底中国解除“动态清零”之后,以及随后的金融危机中,一个曾经以高薪、大规模招聘和高速增长为标志的行业变得黯淡。仅2022年一年,阿里巴巴、美团、腾讯和百度合计裁员近四万人。一家又一家公司进入“结构性调整”和“人员优化”——大规模裁员和冻结薪资的委婉说法。在前首席执行官马云“消失”后,阿里巴巴的股价蒸发了约三分之二。在通缩和经济停滞之中,科技淘金热在许多人看来已经结束。然后人工智能热潮来了。突然间,几乎所有人都在氛围编程,一个人凭一个想法就能构建出过去需要一整个工程师团队才能做出的软件。对于中国饱受打击的科技从业者和新近失业的毕业生来说,结论几乎不言自明:人工智能给了他们一种能动性,也是他们打造成功事业所剩的最好机会。

Around this time, a product manager at a tech company in Beijing, known as Master Qi, decided to leave his role. “I have A.D.H.D. and dyslexia,” Qi told me, “My body couldn’t take a demanding tech job anymore.” He began developing apps on his own, and eventually moved to Liangzhu. He and many others would call themselves North Defectors. The term usually refers to North Koreans who have fled to South Korea. In Liangzhu, a warm and humid southern city, “North” means Beijing. Here, Qi explained, you could rent a place with a living room for cheap. (A two-bedroom apartment in Liangzhu is between three to four thousand yuan a month, roughly the cost of a single bedroom in Beijing.) Finally, Qi had a spacious apartment of his own. “Somewhere to invite people in, like in ‘Friends’ ” he said on an A.I.-focussed podcast he started. And he did invite people in—hundreds of them. Qi turned his spare room into a gathering spot in town for coders, aspiring founders, and investors looking for promising projects. Soon, Master Qi’s living room became a local sensation; before long, he was capping attendance and charging at the door. He also moved the “living room” to someone’s back yard, which had more space. The sessions have brokered more than a few deals between founders and investors. (Levy met one of FateTell’s first employees in Qi’s living room.)

大约在这个时候,北京一家科技公司的产品经理,人称“奇师傅”(Master Qi),决定离职。“我有注意力缺陷多动障碍和阅读障碍,”奇告诉我,“我的身体再也承受不了高强度的科技工作了。”他开始独立开发应用,最终搬到了良渚。他和许多其他人自称“脱北者”。这个词通常指逃往韩国的朝鲜人。在良渚这座温暖湿润的南方城市,“北”指的是北京。奇解释说,在这里你可以便宜地租到带客厅的房子。(良渚一套两居室月租三千到四千元,大约相当于北京一间卧室的价格。)奇终于有了自己宽敞的公寓。“一个可以请人来做客的地方,就像《老友记》里那样,”他在自己创办的一档人工智能主题播客上说。他确实请人来了——来了几百人。奇把闲置房间改造成了镇上程序员、准创业者和寻找好项目的投资人的聚会场所。很快,奇师傅的客厅成了本地热门;没过多久,他就开始限制人数、门口收费了。他还把“客厅”搬到了某人的后院,那里空间更大。这些聚会促成了不少创始人与投资人之间的交易。(利维就是在奇的客厅里遇到了 FateTell 最早的一名员工。)

In the years since he first arrived, Qi has become Liangzhu’s chaotic, unofficial village head. His approach to A.I. was quasi-therapeutic; his goal is to battle and tend to an imperfect self. His first app was a minimalist white-noise tool for insomnia; his second, a to-do list for forgetful people. Like every builder who is apologetic about his executive function, he has countless half-finished app prototypes, he told me, while drawing a long breath.

自初到良渚以来,奇已经成了良渚混乱而非正式的“村长”。他对人工智能的态度近乎治疗性的;他的目标是与自己不完美的自我搏斗并照料它。他的第一款应用是极简白噪音助眠工具;第二款是给健忘者用的待办清单。像每一个对自己的执行功能心怀歉意的开发者一样,他有无数半成品应用原型,他告诉我,同时长长地吸了一口气。

In Liangzhu’s tech scene, Master Qi’s living room has plenty of competition, including “Crazy Thursday,” a similar type of gathering hosted by Tualatrix, a tech influencer. The name is taken from a meme about “Crazy Thursday”—derived from KFC’s advertising for a popular weekly discount day in China—which later evolved into a self-deprecating joke about desperate young people obsessed with cheap fried chicken and free money. Both Crazy Thursday and Master Qi’s living room have become modestly known scenes in Chinese tech. People fly in from Beijing, Shenzhen, even Silicon Valley, to sit in. “The place is full of hidden dragons and crouching tigers,” one visitor to Qi’s living room told me. “You could be mid-demo, and there are billionaires in the audience!”

在良渚的科技圈,奇师傅的客厅有不少竞争者,包括“疯狂星期四”——由科技博主 Tualatrix 主办的类似聚会。这个名字取自“疯狂星期四”的梗——源于肯德基在中国广受欢迎的每周折扣日广告——后来演变成一个自嘲式的笑话,关于痴迷廉价炸鸡和免费钱的绝望年轻人。疯狂星期四和奇师傅的客厅都已在中国科技圈小有名气。人们从北京、深圳,甚至硅谷飞来参加。“这地方藏龙卧虎,”一位奇客厅的访客告诉我。“你可能正在演示,观众里就坐着亿万富翁!”

In March, 2025, Tim Cook made a surprise appearance in Liangzhu, and later dropped in on Mediastorm and HTX Studio, two of China’s most-followed tech vloggers, both of whom had relocated their headquarters to Liangzhu. He signed people’s MacBooks and posed for photos with Mediastorm’s hundred-person staff. A local outlet reported the visit with glee: “Was Tim Cook eyeing our Liangzhu living room?”

2025年3月,蒂姆·库克突然现身良渚,随后拜访了影视飓风(Mediastorm)和 HTX Studio——中国最受关注的两位科技视频博主,两人都已将总部迁至良渚。他给人们的 MacBook 签名,并与影视飓风的百人团队合影。一家本地媒体兴高采烈地报道了这次访问:“库克是不是看上了我们的良渚客厅?”

Then, last September, the local government launched what is known in English as “Seeker One” (a more literal translation might be “Digital Habitat Bay”): an A.I. incubator offering subsidized office space, venture-capital matchmaking, and a mission statement that reads like recycled Xi-era boilerplate—continuously attracting talents for “new quality productive forces.” Qi was invited to cut the ribbon of Digital Habitat Bay’s grand opening as one of the six “honorary hosts.” In a photo from the ceremony, Qi is standing stiffly beside a Party official, his hands pressed tightly against his sides. Officials also courted Tualatrix, urging him to relocate Crazy Thursday from a coffee shop to a government-backed event space. He refused; the geek atmosphere of Crazy Thursday was not something that could be reverse engineered.

然后,去年九月,当地政府启动了英文名为“Seeker One”(更直白的翻译或许是“数字栖居湾”)的项目:一个人工智能孵化器,提供补贴办公空间、风险投资对接,以及一份读起来像习时代陈词滥调回收再利用的使命宣言——持续为“新质生产力”吸引人才。奇受邀作为六位“荣誉主理人”之一,为数字栖居湾的盛大开幕剪彩。在仪式照片中,奇僵硬地站在一位党的官员身旁,双手紧贴身体两侧。官员们还游说 Tualatrix,希望他把疯狂星期四从咖啡馆搬到政府支持的活动空间。他拒绝了;疯狂星期四的极客氛围不是可以逆向工程复制的东西。

One founder, who asked not to be named, told me he was worried that the local government’s embrace of Liangzhu’s tech scene meant its relevance might be on the wane. In fact, he was already scouting new locations, preparing for the next exodus, saying that the increased attention toward the town meant it only had a few years before it became something else entirely.

一位不愿具名的创始人告诉我,他担心当地政府对良渚科技圈的拥抱意味着它的黄金期可能正在消退。事实上,他已经在物色新地点,为下一次出走做准备,他说,对这座小镇日益增长的关注意味着,用不了几年,它就会变成完全不同的东西。

Back at the FateTell party, Levy greeted his guests with practiced ease, though I could tell he was terrified that something might go wrong. FateTell is one of the few A.I. companies in Liangzhu that is actually making money, and making money in China, in 2026, is often grim, hopeless work.

回到 FateTell 的派对,利维以娴熟的从容迎接宾客,尽管我能看出他非常担心出什么岔子。FateTell 是良渚少数几家真正在赚钱的人工智能公司之一,而在2026年的中国赚钱,往往是令人沮丧、看不到希望的事。

The app’s office sits a stone’s throw away from the Liangzhu ruins, on the second floor of a gray building that used to be an elementary school in the village. The land was requisitioned a few years back, and the building was repurposed as the Liangzhu Youth Commune—one of the many incubators that have sprung up across the region. The office itself was once a classroom. Two long blackboards remain, and the office-warming guests had covered them in blessings. I wrote mine in red chalk, playing my part as the token Fire person: May FateTell blaze red and prosper, may all things go well.

这款应用的办公室距离良渚遗址仅一步之遥,在一栋灰色建筑的二楼,那里曾是村里的一所小学。几年前土地被征用,建筑被改造为良渚青年公社——该地区涌现的众多孵化器之一。办公室本身曾是一间教室。两块长长的黑板还在,暖房派对的宾客们在上面写满了祝福。我用红色粉笔写下了我的祝福,扮演好我“火命人”的角色:祝 FateTell 红红火火,万事顺遂。

In the middle of the party, Levy led me up to the top floor and pointed toward the fire escape. Sometimes, he said, he climbs out onto the roof at night. The stars are bright there—brighter than you’d expect this close to Hangzhou, which adds to the town’s pastoral feel. He wonders if shamans in Liangzhu, many thousands of years ago, were doing something similar to what he is doing now—whether their ancient star maps were a way of saying that the world, however chaotic and confusing, contained a pattern that humans could predict. He told me that his relationship to A.I. feels something like that, a predictive instrument for a world that won’t hold still. ♦

派对进行到一半时,利维带我上了顶楼,指向消防通道。他说,有时候他会在夜里爬上屋顶。那里的星星很亮——比你以为的离杭州这么近的地方要亮,这更增添了小镇的田园气息。他想知道,几千年前良渚的巫师们是否也在做类似他现在做的事——他们古老的星图是否在表达:这个世界无论多么混乱、令人困惑,都包含着人类可以预测的模式。他告诉我,他与人工智能的关系感觉有点像那样——一种预测工具,用于一个不肯静止的世界。 ♦

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