The Lede

What Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Meant to Iran, and What Comes Next

阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊对伊朗意味着什么,以及接下来会发生什么
The Supreme Leader, who ruled the Islamic Republic for nearly four decades, has been killed by Israel and the United States. Can the regime survive without him?
这位统治伊朗伊斯兰共和国近四十年的最高领袖,已被以色列和美国联手刺杀。失去他的政权还能存续吗?
A group of people holding Iranian flags and one holding an image of Irans now deceased Supreme Leader.
Photograph by Arash Khamooshi / NYT / Redux

Early Sunday morning, on a state-controlled television station, a bearded news anchor wept as he announced that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had been “martyred,” at the age of eighty-six, on the first day of the war with the U.S. and Israel. Three times, between heaving sobs, the anchor shouted “Allahu akbar,” or “God is great,” before reading the news from a white piece of paper. His hand shook. The U.S. reportedly provided the intelligence on Khamenei’s movements; Israeli fighter jets conducted the precision strike. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged that Israel had destroyed “the compound of the tyrant Khamenei” which included the top political and military offices of Iranian leaders. In a Truth Social post, President Donald Trump heralded, “one of the most evil people in History is dead.” He called it “Justice” for people and countries worldwide who had been victims of “Khamenei and his gang of bloodthirsty THUGS.”

周日清晨,在一家国营电视台,留着胡须的新闻主播含泪宣布,伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊在与美国和以色列开战的第一天“殉难”,享年八十六岁。主播在抽泣的间隙三次高喊“Allahu akbar”(意为“真主至大”),随后颤抖着双手,从一张白纸上宣读新闻。据报道,美国提供了哈梅内伊行踪的情报;以色列战斗机执行了这次精确打击。以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡承认,以军摧毁了“暴君哈梅内伊的官邸建筑群”,其中包括伊朗领导层的最高政治和军事办公室。唐纳德·特朗普总统在Truth Social上发文宣告:“历史上最邪恶的人之一死了。”他称这是对全世界遭受“哈梅内伊及其嗜血暴徒团伙”迫害的人民和国家的“正义审判”。

In 1987, I had a working breakfast with Khamenei, then the President of Iran, when he came to speak at the U.N., on his only trip to the U.S. or the West. With oversized glasses, a long graying beard, and a black turban, he struck me then as unworldly, naïvely arrogant about theocratic rule, and defensively furious at America for past interventions in Iran. At one point, a member of the Revolutionary Guard came over to cut up Khamenei’s breakfast meat. Khamenei had lost the use of his right arm after a small bomb hidden in a tape recorder, planted by an opposition group, went off as he was giving a sermon seven years earlier.

1987年,时任伊朗总统哈梅内伊赴联合国发表演讲时,我曾与他共进工作早餐。那是他唯一一次访问美国或西方国家。他戴着超大号眼镜,蓄着灰白的长须,头缠黑色头巾,当时给我的印象是不谙世事,对神权统治抱有天真的傲慢,并对美国过去干预伊朗事务怀有防御性的愤怒。席间,一名革命卫队成员过来为哈梅内伊切分早餐肉食。七年前,他在一次布道时,反对派组织藏在录音机里的小炸弹爆炸,导致他右臂功能丧失。

Khamenei was born in Mashhad, Iran’s second-largest city, as the son of a mid-ranking cleric of modest means. From a young age, he was educated in seminaries, first in Iran and then in Najaf, Iraq, at the center of Shiite learning. He became a follower of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—and an opponent of the monarchy—after he returned to Iran. He was arrested six times. When I visited the Ebrat Museum, which was formerly an intelligence prison run by the Shah’s U.S.-trained secret police, SAVAK, I saw a wax figure of Khamenei in what had been his cell. After the 1979 Revolution, Khomeini, the first Supreme Leader, appointed Khamenei to lead Friday prayers, an influential position. After one President was impeached and another killed in a terrorist attack, Khamenei was elected President in 1981. In 1989, two years after we met, he was catapulted into the Islamic Republic’s top job following Khomeini’s abrupt death. Khamenei held ultimate power over political, military, judicial and economic policy for nearly four decades. It was one of the longest contemporary reigns in the world. But at the end of his life, he was secluded or hidden underground so much that Iranians nicknamed him Moushe-Ali, or Ali the Mouse.

哈梅内伊出生于伊朗第二大城市马什哈德,父亲是一位家境普通的普通教士。他自幼在神学院接受教育,先是在伊朗,后来前往什叶派学术中心伊拉克纳杰夫。回到伊朗后,他成为阿亚图拉鲁霍拉·霍梅尼的信徒,并开始反对君主制。他曾六次被捕。当我参观埃布拉特博物馆时——这里曾是巴列维王朝受美国训练的秘密警察组织“萨瓦克”的情报监狱——看到了哈梅内伊的蜡像,正陈列在他当年被关押的囚室里。1979年革命后,首任最高领袖霍梅尼任命哈梅内伊主持周五礼拜,这是一个颇具影响力的职位。在一位总统遭弹劾、另一位总统遇刺身亡后,哈梅内伊于1981年当选总统。1989年,在我们见面两年后,随着霍梅尼突然离世,他被推上了伊斯兰共和国最高领导人的位置。近四十年来,哈梅内伊始终掌握着政治、军事、司法和经济政策的最终决定权,这是当代世界持续时间最长的统治之一。但在他生命尽头,他深居简出乃至隐身地下的程度,让伊朗人给他起了个绰号叫“穆舍-阿里”,即“老鼠阿里”。

Iran has moved quickly to start the succession process. On Sunday, a new three-man leadership council began work on the transition. “We will continue with all our strength along the path set by Imam Khomeini” who led the revolution in 1979, President Masoud Pezeshkian said, in a prerecorded message aired on state television. The council includes Pezeshkian, the judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, and Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, one of the eighty-eight members of the popularly elected Assembly of Experts, which is empowered to select the next Supreme Leader. Abbas Araghchi, the foreign minister, who had just days earlier held indirect talks with U.S. officials in Geneva, told Al Jazeera that a new leader would be announced in “one day or two.”

伊朗已迅速启动继任程序。周日,一个新的三人领导委员会开始着手权力交接工作。总统马苏德·佩泽希基扬在国营电视台播出的预先录制讲话中表示:“我们将全力以赴,继续沿着伊玛目霍梅尼指引的道路前进。”1979年革命领袖霍梅尼的精神遗产仍是伊朗政治的核心坐标。该委员会由佩泽希基扬、司法总监古拉姆侯赛因·莫赫辛尼·埃杰伊,以及民选机构专家会议成员阿亚图拉阿里礼萨·阿拉菲组成——拥有八十八名成员的专家会议被宪法赋予推选最高领袖的权力。外交部长阿巴斯·阿拉格希在接受半岛电视台采访时透露,新领袖人选将在“一两天内”公布。就在数日前,他刚在日内瓦与美国官员举行了间接会谈。

Khamenei’s death triggered a profound but bifurcated reaction inside Iran. News and videos on social media showed Iranians cheering, honking horns, and dancing in the streets of Tehran and other cities to celebrate his death—all actions unthinkable days earlier, amid the government’s ongoing and ruthless crackdown on protesters. But other pictures showed tens of thousands gathering in the capital in sorrow. They struck their hands hard against their chests—a Shiite custom known as matam, or latm—to express intense grief and solidarity. The practice dates to the seventh century, when Imam Hussein, a grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and the son of the founder of Shiism, died in Karbala. Beating chests also signals ongoing belief in Shiite principles.

哈梅内伊之死引发了伊朗国内深刻而分裂的反应。社交媒体上的新闻和视频显示,伊朗人在德黑兰和其他城市的街道上欢呼、鸣笛、跳舞,庆祝他的去世——这些行为在几天前还是不可想象的,当时政府正在对抗议者进行持续无情的镇压。但其他图片显示,数万人在首都悲痛地聚集。他们用力捶打自己的胸膛——这是一种被称为“马塔姆”(matam)或“拉特姆”(latm)的什叶派习俗——以表达强烈的悲痛和团结。这种习俗可以追溯到七世纪,当时先知穆罕默德的孙子、什叶派创始人之子伊玛目侯赛因在卡尔巴拉去世。捶打胸膛也象征着对什叶派原则的持续信仰。

The disparate responses to Khamenei’s assassination reflect foundational questions about Iran’s future. Since the 1979 Revolution, Iranian political factions have argued—ferociously and sometimes fatally—about whether the Islamic Republic is foremost Islamic or primarily a republic. Is God’s law, or Sharia, as embodied in the Quran, the basis of the regime’s rule, with the Supreme Leader having the last word? Or is man’s law, as outlined in Iran’s constitution, the basis of government, with elected leaders in the Presidency and parliament shaping the country’s policy? For almost half a century, these questions have pitted so-called principlists against various groups of reformists or centrists. In 1981, Khomeini warned the quarrelling political factions to stop “biting one another like scorpions.”

对哈梅内伊遇刺事件的不同反应,折射出关于伊朗未来的根本性问题。自1979年革命以来,伊朗各政治派别一直在激烈争论——有时甚至以流血告终——伊斯兰共和国究竟是伊斯兰属性优先,还是共和政体优先。究竟是以《古兰经》为载体的神圣律法(沙里亚)构成政权统治的基石,由最高领袖掌握最终话语权?还是以伊朗宪法为框架的人间法律构成治国根基,由民选产生的总统和议会决定国家政策?近半个世纪以来,这些问题使所谓“原则主义者”与各派改革主义者或中间派系持续对立。早在1981年,霍梅尼就曾警告争执不休的政治派系停止“像蝎子般互相撕咬”。

The Iranian people, too, have fought over these questions. Since 2009 and more intensely since 2017, nationwide protests have sporadically challenged Islamic rule. Many Iranians want either major political reform or an end to the Velayat-e Faqih—the rule of the Islamic jurist—altogether. Tens of thousands have died along the way. The regime has been fragile and fractured for years. The late Harvard historian Crane Brinton, in his classic “The Anatomy of a Revolution,” writes that the final stage of a revolution is “convalescence,” when a society becomes so exhausted that it seeks stability. In these early days, it’s still unclear what potential convalescence might look like—or what kind of stability the people seek.

伊朗人民同样为这些问题而斗争。自2009年起,特别是2017年以来,全国范围的抗议活动不时挑战着伊斯兰统治。许多伊朗人要么希望进行重大政治改革,要么希望彻底终结“法基赫监护”(Velayat-e Faqih)——即伊斯兰法学家的统治。这条道路上已有数万人付出生命。多年来,伊朗政权一直脆弱而分裂。已故哈佛历史学家克兰·布林顿在其经典著作《革命剖析》中写道,革命的最后阶段是“康复期”,此时社会已精疲力竭,开始寻求稳定。在这些早期阶段,尚不清楚潜在的康复期会是什么模样——也不确定人民寻求的是何种稳定。

What’s left of the Iranian regime is now even more vulnerable, as many top political and military leaders have been assassinated in the first two days of war. “Khamenei’s death creates a moment of genuine uncertainty, but it does not automatically translate into immediate regime collapse,” Hamidreza Azizi, an Iranian political scientist at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, in Berlin, told me. “The Islamic Republic anticipated a day-after scenario for a long time and built overlapping institutions capable of maintaining continuity, particularly within the security and military establishment.” Khamenei’s bayt, a term used among Shiites to describe a cleric’s religious and political “house,” employed more than four thousand people; his affiliated institutions employed more than forty thousand. These are separate from the executive, legislative, parliamentary, and military branches, and from other civil-service jobs.

伊朗政权如今愈发脆弱,战争头两天已有许多高层政治和军事领导人遇刺身亡。“哈梅内伊之死确实带来了不确定性,但这并不必然意味着政权会立刻崩溃,”柏林德国国际与安全事务研究所的伊朗政治学者哈米德雷扎·阿齐兹(Hamidreza Azizi)告诉我,“伊斯兰共和国早已预料到'后哈梅内伊时代'的到来,建立了多重交叠的机构以确保延续性,尤其在安全与军事体系内。”哈梅内伊的“拜特”——什叶派用以指称宗教领袖政教合一“府邸”的术语——拥有超过四千名雇员;其附属机构雇员更逾四万人。这些体系独立于行政、立法、议会及军事部门,也不同于其他文职系统。

Iran’s military, the largest in the Middle East, is estimated to have more than six hundred thousand members on active duty. “The rapid activation of a transitional leadership structure and the continuation of military operations suggest that authority in Iran has already shifted toward collective decision-making bodies and security actors able to operate under crisis conditions,” Azizi said. “In the near term, this makes systemic survival more likely than sudden political transformation, especially while the country remains engaged in active conflict.”

伊朗拥有中东地区规模最大的军队,据估计现役人员超过六十万。“过渡领导结构的迅速激活和军事行动的持续表明,伊朗的权力已经转向能够在危机条件下运作的集体决策机构和安全部门,”阿齐兹(Azizi)表示,“短期内,这使得体制存续的可能性远大于突然的政治转型,尤其是在该国仍处于积极冲突状态的情况下。”

Iran’s political future becomes far more complicated in the longer term, Azizi noted. Khamenei functioned “as the ultimate mediator among competing factions. Without that arbiter, succession becomes a negotiation among élites taking place under wartime pressure,” he said. One possible scenario is “consolidation around a more security-dominated leadership.” Another is “gradual erosion if prolonged conflict weakens state control,” although, Azizi continued, that “would not necessarily be a clean transition.” And the transition might not play out only in Tehran. The country has a decentralized landscape of security forces that “raises the risk that instability could produce fragmentation or localized violence rather than orderly regime change,” Azizi told me.

阿齐兹指出,伊朗的长期政治前景将变得更为复杂。哈梅内伊曾“充当各竞争派系间的最终调解人”。他表示:“失去这位仲裁者后,继任问题将成为战时压力下的精英谈判。”一种可能的情形是“围绕更强调安全主导的领导层形成共识”。另一种可能是“若长期冲突削弱国家控制力,将出现渐进式侵蚀”,不过阿齐兹补充道,这“未必会是平稳过渡”。且权力过渡可能不仅限于德黑兰。伊朗安全力量呈现去中心化格局,阿齐兹告诉我,这种结构“增加了不稳定风险——可能导致割据或地方性暴力,而非有序的政权更迭”。

On Sunday, Patrick Clawson, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, wrote that “a wide spectrum of powerful figures will soon be jockeying for control even as they try to evade military strikes. Yet supposing the regime does manage to survive and designate a new Supreme Leader, no such individual will start out with the same deference given to Khamenei.” Some of the surviving leaders, notably among the Revolutionary Guard, he said, may feel that “they should run the show, with the next Supreme Leader playing a modest role.”

周日,华盛顿近东政策研究所研究员帕特里克·克劳森撰文指出:“即便试图躲避军事打击,众多实权人物也将很快展开对控制权的角逐。但即便政权得以幸存并指定了新一任最高领袖,此人也绝无可能从一开始就获得与哈梅内伊同等的尊崇。”他表示,幸存领导人中——尤其是革命卫队内部——或许会有人认为“应当由他们来主导大局,而新任最高领袖只需扮演次要角色”。

For the entire Middle East, the changes wrought by this new war and the convulsions precipitated by the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, underscore the failures of Iran’s strategy to transform itself and the region. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has sought to build an alliance that would protect its interests and influence other Shiite communities. “We shall export our revolution to the whole world, until the cry ‘There is no god but Allah’ resounds over the whole world,” Khomeini, the first Supreme Leader, vowed. Graffiti on the former U.S. Embassy, which was stormed by students ten months after the Revolution, said, “God willing, this century will be the period of victory for the oppressed over the oppressors.”

对整个中东地区而言,这场新战争带来的剧变,以及2023年10月7日哈马斯袭击引发的震荡,凸显了伊朗试图改造自身与地区战略的失败。自1979年以来,这个伊斯兰共和国始终致力于构建一个能保护其利益、并能影响其他什叶派社群的联盟。首任最高领袖霍梅尼曾立誓:“我们将把革命输出到全世界,直到'万物非主,唯有真主'的呼喊响彻寰宇。”革命爆发十个月后遭学生冲击的美国旧使馆墙上,涂写着这样的标语:“若蒙天佑,本世纪将成为被压迫者战胜压迫者的时代。”

Iran has certainly failed the oppressed within its own borders. Today, daily life in the country is rife with challenges. When I first went to Iran, in 1973, one dollar bought seventy rials. On the eve of this current war, a dollar bought 1.3 million rials. Basic food supplies are exorbitantly expensive. Water and electricity are in short supply. And, regionally, Iran’s “axis of resistance”—Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Kataeb Hezbollah in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen—has been seriously weakened, though far from eliminated. A striking feature of the first days of the war is that Tehran’s allies—founded, funded, and armed by the Islamic Republic—have not intervened on behalf of their sponsor.

伊朗无疑辜负了其国内的受压迫者。如今,这个国家的日常生活充满挑战。1973年我第一次去伊朗时,一美元能兑换七十里亚尔。而在此次战争前夕,一美元可兑换一百三十万里亚尔。基本食品供应价格高得离谱。水电供应短缺。在地区层面,伊朗的“抵抗轴心”——黎巴嫩的真主党、加沙地带的哈马斯和巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战组织、伊拉克的真主党旅以及也门的胡塞武装——已遭到严重削弱,尽管远未被消灭。这场战争头几天的一个显著特点是,德黑兰的盟友——由伊斯兰共和国建立、资助和武装——并未代表其支持者进行干预。

Almost fifty years ago, Iran’s revolutionaries introduced a militant brand of Shiite Islam as a viable medium of political opposition and governance. Their ideology spilled across countries and continents and even reached other Islamic sects, including rival Sunnis. The extremism they pushed, in its many manifestations, has been considered a top security threat around the world. The fate of Iran—and its leadership—could ripple across the world once again, too. ♦

近五十年前,伊朗的革命者们将一种激进的什叶派伊斯兰主义引入政治领域,使之成为可行的反对力量与治理模式。他们的意识形态跨越国界与大陆,甚至渗透到包括逊尼派在内的其他伊斯兰教派。他们所推行的极端主义,以其多种表现形式,已被全球视为首要安全威胁。而伊朗及其领导层的命运,或将再次在世界范围内激起涟漪。♦

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