Q. & A.

Trump’s Reckless Decision to Pursue Regime Change in Iran

特朗普鲁莽决定在伊朗推动政权更迭
And the risks Democrats face if they fail to strongly oppose the war.
而民主党人若未能强烈反对这场战争,也将面临风险。
Smoke rises on a city skyline after an explosion.
Photograph from AP

Early on Saturday, the United States and Israel began a military campaign to overthrow the governing regime in Iran. The strikes have already killed an unknown number of Iranian leaders and civilians; Iran has retaliated by striking American allies in the Middle East and an American naval base in Bahrain.

周六凌晨,美国与以色列发动军事行动,旨在推翻伊朗现政权。空袭已造成多名伊朗领导人与平民伤亡,具体数字尚不明确;伊朗随即展开报复,袭击了美国在中东的盟友以及驻巴林海军基地。

Hours after the war began, I spoke by phone with Matt Duss, an executive vice-president at the Center for International Policy and a former foreign-policy adviser to Senator Bernie Sanders. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed why the U.S. has decided to embark on another conflict in the Middle East, how Trump fooled voters when he declared himself the peace candidate in the 2024 Presidential election, and whether the leadership of the Democratic Party is equipped to stand up to Trump on Iran.

战争爆发数小时后,我通过电话采访了国际政策中心执行副总裁、参议员伯尼·桑德斯前外交政策顾问马特·达斯(Matt Duss)。以下为经过编辑整理的对话内容,我们探讨了美国为何决定在中东开启新一轮冲突,特朗普如何在2024年总统竞选中以“和平候选人”自诩蒙蔽选民,以及民主党领导层是否具备在伊朗问题上抗衡特朗普的能力。

What do you think has changed since June, when the Trump Administration claimed that Iran’s nuclear capacity had been totally destroyed?

自6月特朗普政府宣称伊朗核能力已被彻底摧毁以来,您认为局势发生了哪些变化?

It was clear pretty quickly that those claims of obliterating Iran’s nuclear program were false. There was even leaked information from a U.S. intelligence report that pushed back on that, and made clear that Iran’s program had been clearly set back, but not destroyed. And now, of course, one of the justifications it has given for today’s attack is that the Iranian nuclear program has become dangerous again, and that is why we’re doing what we are doing. But it’s offered multiple other justifications, which is one of the ways this is reminiscent of the lead-up to Iraq in 2002 and 2003: it’s just offered this buffet of reasons, and everyone can kind of pick the one they think tastes best. But none of these things really add up to anything close to Iran posing an imminent threat to the United States. I think the urgency here, if there is any, is that Iran has been reconstituting its missile capacity much faster than many people expected.

很快就能看出,那些关于伊朗核计划已被摧毁的说法并不属实。甚至有泄露的美国情报报告对此提出反驳,明确指出伊朗的核计划确实遭受重挫,但并未被彻底摧毁。如今,他们为此次袭击提供的理由之一,当然是伊朗的核计划再次变得危险,而这正是我们采取行动的原因。但他们还提出了其他多种理由,这让人联想到2002年和2003年伊拉克战争前夕的情形:他们就像提供了一桌自助餐式的理由,每个人都可以挑选自己认为最合口味的那一个。然而,所有这些理由加在一起,也远不足以证明伊朗对美国构成了迫在眉睫的威胁。我认为,如果真有什么紧迫性的话,那就是伊朗重建导弹能力的速度远超许多人的预期。

I heard this from Israeli analysts back in October. One thing that had really surprised them was how Iran was rebuilding its missile capacity much more quickly than expected. These missiles are defensive, and thus far have been used as retaliatory measures. You don’t have to like the Iranian regime—I don’t—to acknowledge that countries do have the right to defend themselves. Iran has used those missiles, again, in a horrible way, firing them into cities and civilian centers in Israel. That’s indefensible. But it seems like Israel’s regional security doctrine, now backed by the United States, is not just that Israel has the right to defend itself but that only Israel has the right to defend itself in the region. And now those missiles pose an unacceptable constraint on Israel’s ability to strike anywhere it wants at any time, an approach to regional security that is clearly backed by the Trump Administration.

十月时,我从以色列分析人士那里听到这样的说法。最令他们惊讶的是,伊朗重建导弹能力的速度远超预期。这些导弹属于防御性质,迄今为止仅作为报复手段使用。你可以不喜欢伊朗政权——我就不喜欢——但必须承认各国确实拥有自卫权。当然,伊朗再次以可怕的方式动用了这些导弹,将其射向以色列的城市和平民中心,这是不可辩驳的暴行。但问题在于,以色列的地区安全学说(如今得到美国支持)似乎不仅主张以色列拥有自卫权,更暗示只有以色列才配在该地区行使自卫权。现在这些导弹对以色列构成了难以接受的制约——它无法再随心所欲地随时打击任何目标,而这套地区安全策略显然得到了特朗普政府的背书。

You said the missiles were defensive, but they were also used to bomb civilian areas in Israel. So they were in response to Israel’s actions against Iran?

您说这些导弹是防御性的,但它们也被用于轰炸以色列的平民区。那么这是对以色列针对伊朗行动的回应吗?

Right. They were retaliatory. Again, it’s indefensible the way they were used, but let’s just acknowledge that it was a response to Israeli and U.S. attacks.

没错。这些袭击是报复性的。我必须再次强调,其使用方式无可辩驳地错误,但我们至少应当承认,这是对以色列和美国攻击行为的回应。

You mentioned the Iraq War and the justifications given. But recalling that debate, there was an effort to make the case for regime change along several different axes, no pun intended. The human-rights violations, fears about the development of weapons of mass destruction, and even the connections between Iraq and Al Qaeda, which were obviously very overblown, were utilized extensively. In this case, a bunch of justifications are occasionally being offered, but there seems to be no consistent case at all, nor is it believable that they care about these non-nuclear missiles or human rights.

你提到了伊拉克战争及其给出的理由。回想那场辩论,当时确实有人试图从多个不同维度——并非双关语——为政权更迭辩护。侵犯人权行为、对大规模杀伤性武器研发的担忧,甚至伊拉克与基地组织之间被明显夸大的关联,都被广泛用作理由。而当前的情况是,虽然偶尔会抛出一堆说辞,却似乎根本不存在连贯的论证逻辑,更难以令人相信他们真的在乎这些非核导弹或人权问题。

That is what is amazing about this: it makes the Bush Administration’s run-up to the Iraq War look better in comparison. The Trump Administration has barely made any attempt to make a coherent case to the American public, let alone to Congress or the United Nations, which the Bush Administration did. There’s not really even an acknowledgment that Trump should need congressional authorization to take the U.S. into another war. Certainly, there is no acknowledgment that the U.S. would need any international or multilateral support to do this. So, yeah, I would say that the differences between the lead-up to the Iraq War and this are very important.

令人惊叹之处在于:相比之下,这竟让布什政府发动伊拉克战争前的舆论铺垫显得更为周全。特朗普政府几乎未曾尝试向美国公众——更遑论国会或联合国——提出任何具有说服力的论证,而当年布什政府确实这样做了。他们甚至不承认特朗普需要国会授权才能将美国拖入另一场战争,更不用说承认美国需要国际或多边支持才能采取行动。因此,我认为伊拉克战争前夕与当前局势的差异确实至关重要。

Over the past several months, there has been incredible repression by the Iranian regime against Iranians. We don’t know how many people have been killed, but it’s in the many thousands. The Trump Administration has occasionally threatened Iran, saying that it can’t kill protesters, and has occasionally made noises about caring about the welfare of the Iranian people, but the Administration has obviously allowed the regime to continue killing protesters. What do you think would be a sane posture for America to take toward Iran, and does the repression that we’ve seen over the past few months change how you think about it?

过去几个月,伊朗政权对本国人民实施了令人震惊的镇压。我们尚不清楚具体死亡人数,但规模已达数千之众。特朗普政府虽曾多次警告伊朗不得杀害抗议者,也时常表态关注伊朗民众福祉,但显然纵容该政权持续镇压示威者。您认为美国对伊朗应采取何种明智立场?近几个月的镇压事件是否改变了您对此问题的看法?

Clearly, this is a bad regime. It’s a repressive regime. It uses enormous violence against its own people, which we’ve seen horrific examples of over the past few weeks. I think the approach to Iran that makes the most sense was the one that President Barack Obama had, which was to acknowledge that Iran poses a challenge on a number of fronts, the most important of which was the possibility of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon. That’s why he pursued diplomacy to deal with that challenge aggressively. He did so with close international partners, and got what, I think, was clearly a pretty strong nonproliferation agreement that established heavy inspections and surveillance of Iran’s nuclear program. That dealt with that one challenge, but it also created the opportunity to begin to deal with the other challenges Iran posed.

显然,这是一个糟糕的政权。一个压迫性的政权。它对本国人民施加了巨大的暴力,过去几周我们已经看到了骇人听闻的例证。我认为对伊朗最明智的处理方式,是巴拉克·奥巴马总统曾采取的那种——承认伊朗在多个领域构成挑战,其中最重要的是伊朗可能获得核武器。正因如此,他积极通过外交手段应对这一挑战。他与紧密的国际伙伴合作,最终达成了一项在我看来显然相当有力的防扩散协议,对伊朗核计划建立了严格的核查与监控机制。这不仅解决了核挑战,也为着手应对伊朗构成的其他挑战创造了契机。

At the end of Obama’s Presidency, right before Trump took office, there were a number of American sailors seized by Iran in the Gulf, creating a situation that could have escalated easily and ended very badly. But because there was a line of communication that had been built up between the U.S. and Iran over the course of negotiating the Iran nuclear deal, that situation was de-escalated and ended without real incident. The nuclear deal was an opportunity to begin to deal with issues like Iran’s support for regional extremist groups and questions of Iran’s internal repression. That opportunity was squandered when Trump withdrew from the agreement during his first term. It showed Iran, and frankly showed the world, that you cannot trust the United States. And I have to say, Joe Biden squandered an opportunity to rejoin that agreement and to re-start that channel. I would add this: historically, Iran’s internal repression has gotten worse when it feels threatened externally. I’ve heard this from Iranian activists. And when you dial down tension between the U.S. and Iran, space for reform begins to open up.

在奥巴马总统任期即将结束、特朗普即将就职之际,伊朗在波斯湾扣押了多名美国水兵,局势一触即发,很可能以悲剧收场。但由于美伊在伊朗核协议谈判过程中建立了沟通渠道,这场危机最终得以化解,没有酿成实际冲突。核协议本是一个契机,可以着手处理伊朗支持地区极端组织、伊朗国内镇压等问题。然而特朗普在第一任期内退出协议,白白浪费了这个机会。这向伊朗——坦白说也向全世界——表明,美国不可信任。我必须指出,乔·拜登也错失了重新加入协议、重启沟通渠道的良机。需要补充的是:从历史经验看,当伊朗感受到外部威胁时,其国内镇压往往会加剧。这是伊朗活动人士亲口告诉我的。而当你降低美伊之间的紧张关系时,改革的空间就会开始出现。

Now I think given the level of the Iranian government’s violence against protesters, my understanding, again, from talking to Iranian colleagues, is that we are in a different situation. There’s much less hope now, if any hope, that the current government could be reasonably reformed, but, still, the idea that we can change the Iranian government for the better through a violent regime-change operation, like the one we’re witnessing right now, has a very bad historical track record.

就目前伊朗政府对示威者的暴力程度而言,根据我与伊朗同行的交流,我认为我们正面临一个不同的局面。如今,人们对现政府能够进行合理改革的希望已十分渺茫——如果还存在任何希望的话。然而,通过暴力政权更迭行动来改善伊朗政府的想法——正如我们眼下所目睹的——在历史上有着非常糟糕的纪录。

I know there were attempts during the Biden Administration to rejoin the Iran deal, and there were some talks with the Iranian government, but they didn’t go anywhere. Do you think that the Biden Administration made some errors in how it pursued that?

我知道拜登政府曾试图重返伊朗核协议,并与伊朗政府进行过一些谈判,但这些努力最终无果而终。您认为拜登政府在推进此事的过程中是否犯了一些错误?

I think they made an enormous error. Biden himself promised pretty unequivocally that he was going to rejoin the nuclear agreement. He published a piece in October of 2020, laying out exactly what he was going to do. Then he came into office and his Administration decided to slow-walk negotiations with Iran in this fantasy that, “Oh, we’re going to play it slow and get a longer and stronger deal.” This suggests that Biden was never really invested in Obama’s achievement, and certain members of his team were certainly hawkish about Iran. And then you had a number of Democrats on the Hill who were more hawkish. So, yeah, I think there were efforts later on in the Biden Administration to negotiate, but that was after a much more hawkish, hard-line government came to power. So I feel like an opportunity to re-start dialogue with Iran was lost at the beginning of Biden’s Administration.

我认为他们犯了一个巨大的错误。拜登本人曾相当明确地承诺要重新加入核协议。他在2020年10月发表文章,详细阐述了自己的计划。然而上任后,他的政府却决定以“慢慢来,争取达成更持久、更强有力的协议”这种幻想为由,拖延与伊朗的谈判。这表明拜登从未真正重视奥巴马的这项外交成果,而他团队中的某些成员对伊朗本就持鹰派立场。再加上国会山一些民主党人态度更为强硬。因此,尽管拜登政府后期确实尝试过谈判,但那是在伊朗更强硬、更保守的政府上台之后才进行的。在我看来,与伊朗重启对话的良机在拜登政府上任之初就已错失。

What do you think about how Democrats in Congress have responded to Trump’s strikes against Iran? I’m looking now at a new statement from House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries that demands the Trump Administration “explain itself” and involve Congress. Is the main issue here really procedural?

你如何看待国会民主党人对特朗普打击伊朗的反应?我现在看到众议院少数党领袖哈基姆·杰弗里斯的一份新声明,要求特朗普政府“作出解释”并让国会参与。这里的主要问题真的是程序性的吗?

I think responses like that are pathetic. This isn’t a mystery that needs to be solved. This is not the case of the missing casus belli. We understand what’s going on here. There is no imminent threat against the United States from Iran. Certainly not one that would justify the President going to war without congressional authorization. There is a legal side to it, that Trump is doing this without authorization from Congress, which is important, but it’s also just a bad idea substantively. And the Democratic leadership, Jeffries and Chuck Schumer, have broadly responded to the Iran stuff with, “We need to have a briefing.” You have others out there, like Tim Kaine and Ro Khanna, who have been stronger in their criticism, and it is good that we have more of these voices in Congress than we have had in a long time. But unfortunately, the leadership of the Democratic Party remains completely out of touch.

我认为这种回应很可悲。这并非什么需要破解的谜团,也不是开战理由失踪案。我们清楚正在发生什么——伊朗根本不存在对美国的紧迫威胁,更不足以让总统绕过国会授权发动战争。从法律层面看,特朗普未经国会授权采取行动已属越界,但更重要的是,这本质上就是个糟糕的决策。而民主党领导层,杰弗里斯和查克·舒默,对伊朗问题的回应大体停留在“我们需要听取简报”的层面。倒是蒂姆·凯恩和罗·卡纳等人提出了更尖锐的批评,国会里能听到比以往更多的反对声音是件好事。但令人遗憾的是,民主党领导层依然与民意完全脱节。

As someone who’s worked on the Hill, does this approach by Democratic leadership stem from political caution or an ideological difference with more antiwar Democrats?

作为一名曾在国会山工作过的人,您认为民主党领导层的这种做法是出于政治上的谨慎,还是与反战立场更鲜明的民主党人存在意识形态分歧?

I think it’s both political and ideological. And in both cases it’s completely detached from the expressed views of the majority of Democratic voters, who are pretty overwhelmingly antiwar with regard to Iran. So, again, it’s fine for different Democrats to have different views on foreign policy. Some of them are more hawkish. I would say the more hawkish Democrats are part of a small and thankfully dwindling minority, and yet they are overrepresented in the leadership of the Party. That needs to change.

我认为这既是政治问题,也是意识形态问题。而在这两方面,都与绝大多数民主党选民明确表达的立场完全脱节——他们对伊朗问题持有压倒性的反战态度。所以,我重申,不同民主党人在外交政策上持有不同观点本无可厚非。其中一些人确实更偏向鹰派。但我想说,这些鹰派民主党人只是少数群体的一部分——值得庆幸的是这个群体正在日益萎缩——然而他们在党内领导层中的比例却高得不成正比。这种状况必须改变。

But what is the substantive difference in policy between Democrats on Iran?

但在伊朗问题上,民主党人之间的政策实质差异究竟何在?

I think some are just more traditional, hawkish Democrats. They believe that the U.S. has the right and the necessity to use force aggressively. But, like I said, it’s both ideological and political. Others believe that having that position is just the safest place to be politically. I think they are wrong on both counts. I think you can look at polls of Democrats and polls of Americans and see that antiwar candidates do very well. Since the end of the Cold War, in every election, with the one exception of 2004, the more antiwar candidate has won. Now, I’m not going to pretend that that’s the reason they won every time.

我认为,其中一些人只是更传统、更鹰派的民主党人。他们相信美国有权利、也有必要积极使用武力。但正如我所说,这既是意识形态问题,也是政治问题。另一些人则认为,持有这种立场在政治上最为安全。我认为这两种想法都是错误的。你可以看看民主党人和美国民众的民调,会发现反战候选人的支持率相当高。自冷战结束以来,除了2004年那次例外,每次选举中反战立场更鲜明的候选人都获胜了。当然,我不会假装这是他们每次获胜的唯一原因。

Are you including Trump?

您是在问是否包括特朗普吗?

Yes, that’s how he ran.

是的,他就是这样跑的。

I wouldn’t say he was less militaristic. In 2016, he was talking about going to Iraq and stealing their oil.

我不会说他变得不那么好战了。2016年时,他还在谈论要去伊拉克偷石油呢。

He clearly ran to Hillary Clinton’s left. He was lying, of course, and he ran against Kamala Harris’s hawkishness. He and Vance leaned into a pro-peace message in the last months of the 2024 election. Again, no one should have believed him. He was clearly lying.

他显然跑在了希拉里·克林顿的左侧。当然,他在撒谎——他一边攻击卡玛拉·哈里斯的鹰派立场,一边与万斯在2024年大选最后几个月里打出“亲和平”的旗号。再说一次,本不该有人相信他。他显然在撒谎。

This is a guy who had talked about taking the Panama Canal. There was plenty for everyone to see.

此人曾扬言要夺取巴拿马运河。他的野心早已昭然若揭。

Totally agree. I’m just saying he understood, because he does have a level of political intelligence, that there is a constituency that is attracted to that message. What I’m getting at is that there is a strong antiwar constituency in this country. Democrats need to figure that out.

完全同意。我只是说,他明白这一点——因为他确实具备某种程度的政治智慧——确实有选民群体会被这种信息吸引。我想说的是,美国国内存在一股强大的反战力量。民主党人需要认清这个现实。

I have some skepticism that the Trump voters who ostensibly said that they liked his antiwar message were really expressing an opposition to bombing countries or conducting regime-change operations. They may have just not liked us spending money on things in other parts of the world.

我有些怀疑,那些表面上声称喜欢特朗普反战立场的选民,是否真的反对轰炸他国或推动政权更迭的行动。他们可能只是不喜欢我们把钱花在世界其他地方的事务上。

I probably don’t disagree, but what I’m arguing is that there are a lot more voters receptive to an antiwar message than the Democratic leadership seems to have figured out. They seem locked into this eternal post-9/11 moment where they’re constantly afraid of getting outflanked on the right. Schumer was attacking Trump from the right for being too weak on Iran. That’s absurd.

我大概不是不同意你的观点,但我想说的是,对反战信息持开放态度的选民数量,远比民主党领导层所意识到的要多得多。他们似乎永远困在9/11事件后的思维定式里,时刻担心被右翼势力抢占上风。舒默(Schumer)最近竟从右翼立场攻击特朗普对伊朗不够强硬——这简直荒谬。

Right, and the irony for the Party establishment is that there’s been so much discontent from the Democratic base over the lack of leadership standing up to Trump and differentiating themselves from him that they have given a lot of energy and will continue to give a lot of energy to left-wing candidacies and primaries, which is a real threat to the establishment of the Party.

没错,对民主党当权派而言,讽刺之处在于:由于党内基层对缺乏敢于对抗特朗普、又能与特朗普划清界限的领导人深感不满,这股怨气已为左翼候选人和初选注入大量动能,未来还将持续如此——这对党内建制派构成了切实的威胁。

Yes.

是的。

Going forward, can Congress do anything to rein in Trump?

未来,国会还能采取什么措施来约束特朗普?

There is a push for a vote on a war-powers resolution in both the House and Senate. The original law was passed in 1973 in the wake of Vietnam, as a way to try to formalize and reassert Congress’s authority over matters of war. It allows any member to introduce this bill and a vote for Congress to authorize a war will get on the floor. It’s a way of sidestepping the formal committee process and just putting a resolution on the floor because this issue is so important. So it’s a way of Congress creating an opportunity for it to say to a President, “You are acting outside the bounds of the Constitution. You are acting illegally. We do not support what you’re doing. You need to withdraw U.S. forces from this conflict.” Now as we saw last year, when Senator Kaine filed the war-powers resolution, it did not pass.

国会两院正推动就一项战争权力决议案进行投票。这项最初于1973年越战结束后通过的法律,旨在以制度化形式重申国会在战争事务上的权威。它允许任何议员提出该议案,并推动国会就授权战争进行全体表决。由于议题至关重要,这种机制能绕开正式的委员会流程,直接将决议案提交全体会议。这实质上是国会创造机会向总统宣告:“你的行为已超越宪法授权范围,属于非法行动。我们不支持你的所作所为,必须从这场冲突中撤出美军部队。”但正如去年所见,当参议员凯恩提出战争权力决议案时,该案并未获得通过。

When I was working with Senator Sanders, we passed one calling on the Trump Administration to withdraw from the Saudi-Emirati war in Yemen, and it did pass the Senate and the House. Trump vetoed it and Congress did not have the necessary numbers to overrule that veto, unfortunately, but it was a significant effort as these current war-powers resolutions are an important way of getting members of Congress on record. It creates opportunities for education. Anytime a member of Congress has to vote yes or no, they tend to pay closer attention to the issue at hand. But ultimately, even if a resolution about Trump’s latest attack on Iran did pass, which I don’t think it will, given that Trump has such total control over his party and they’re in the majority, the deeper problem is just the political consensus around the use of force. So there is not a legal fix here. We need a political fix. Our politics is broken and the fact that the Presidents, not just this President, but multiple Presidents have gotten much more comfortable using violence around the world on very flimsy legal pretexts is a reflection of that broken politics.

我在桑德斯参议员手下工作时,曾推动一项决议,要求特朗普政府从沙特-阿联酋的也门战争中撤出。这项决议确实在参众两院获得通过。可惜的是,特朗普行使了否决权,而国会未能凑足推翻否决所需的票数。但这是一次重要的努力,因为这类战争权力决议案是让国会议员表明立场的有效途径。它创造了教育的机会。每当国会议员必须投下赞成或反对票时,他们往往会更关注手头的议题。但归根结底,即便关于特朗普最新对伊朗袭击的决议案获得通过——考虑到特朗普对共和党的绝对控制及其多数党地位,我认为这不太可能——更深层的问题在于动用武力的政治共识。所以这里没有法律层面的解决方案。我们需要的是政治层面的修正。我们的政治体系已经失灵,而总统们——不止这一位,而是多位总统——越来越习惯于以牵强的法律借口在全球动用武力,正是这种政治失灵的体现。

I was wrong about something, which is that he actually did not start making threats against the Panama Canal until after he won the election. But the idea that an extremely aggressive nationalist who’s made threats against other countries for years has now started getting us enmeshed in multiple wars and aggressive military actions seems like something that should not be surprising.

我此前说错了一点——他其实是在赢得大选之后,才开始对巴拿马运河发出威胁的。但一个多年来不断威胁他国的极端民族主义者,如今正将我们拖入多场战争和军事冲突,这难道不是意料之中的事吗?

I think that’s right. As he showed us in his first term very clearly, Trump is not antiwar. Again, the fact is that Congress passed a war-powers resolution against Trump on Yemen and then later, after the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, on Iran as well, and he vetoed both. That tells you that his approach is a very militaristic one. So I agree with you. There are multiple arguments that Democrats need to be making, including the fact that he’s acting illegally, and the fact that he’s acting strategically stupidly. So make all of those arguments. Don’t just ask for a briefing. ♦

我认为你说得对。正如他在第一任期里清楚展示的那样,特朗普并非反战。事实是,国会曾就也门问题通过一项针对特朗普的战争权力决议,后来在卡西姆·苏莱曼尼遇刺后,又就伊朗问题通过决议,而他将两项决议都否决了。这足以说明他的行事方式极具军国主义色彩。所以我同意你的看法。民主党人需要提出多重论据,包括他行事违法,以及他在战略上极其愚蠢。这些论点都应当摆出来。不能仅仅要求听取简报。♦

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