The Lede

Trump, Iran, and the Shadow of Suez

特朗普、伊朗与苏伊士的阴影
As Iran imposes a chokehold on the Strait of Hormuz, squeezing the global economy, Trump faces a crisis that echoes one of history’s most revealing strategic failures.
随着伊朗扼住霍尔木兹海峡的咽喉、挤压全球经济,特朗普面临的这场危机,正与历史上最具警示意义的战略失误遥相呼应。
Figures walk through wreckage with buildings visible behind them.
Photograph by David Seymour / Magnum

Israel moves fast, launching a bold military operation against a weaker Middle Eastern neighbor. It frames the campaign as a preëmptive effort to neutralize a regional threat. Israel’s Western allies join in, bombing the country in what looks like an attempt to oust its government. But things soon go awry. The embattled regime holds on, and closes off a critical shipping lane, disrupting global trade. Politically embarrassed, and economically exposed, Israel’s main Western partner in the campaign becomes overextended; they lack both wider international support and a coherent plan. Early military gains give way to a larger strategic mess.

以色列迅速行动,对中东地区一个较弱的邻国发动了一场大胆的军事行动。它将这场战役描述为一项先发制人的努力,旨在消除地区威胁。以色列的西方盟友也加入进来,对这个国家进行轰炸,看起来像是试图推翻其政府。但局势很快急转直下。陷入困境的政权坚守阵地,并封锁了一条关键的航运通道,扰乱了全球贸易。以色列在这场行动中的主要西方伙伴在政治上陷入尴尬,经济上暴露风险,战线拉得过长;他们既缺乏更广泛的国际支持,也没有一个连贯的计划。早期的军事成果让位于更大的战略混乱。

This could describe the past month of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran. But it’s also what happened nearly seven decades ago, when Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt, provoking the Egyptian government to close the Suez Canal for what ended up being a period of five months. The confrontation was set off in July of 1956, when Egypt’s ruler, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, a charismatic populist, nationalized the Anglo-French company that had operated the canal since its creation in 1869, during the colonial era. Britain and France were furious—the canal carried oil and other goods that were vital to European economies—and determined to take back control. Israel, meanwhile, saw Nasser’s rising influence across the Arab world as a danger, and wanted an excuse to cut him down, and to target Palestinian fedayeen militants who were operating in Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula, which were both controlled by Egypt at the time. While the U.S. and United Nations spent months trying to negotiate a settlement over the canal’s management, the top leaders of the British, French, and Israeli governments were secretly plotting a military intervention.

这可以用来描述过去一个月美国与以色列对伊朗的战争。但这也正是近七十年前发生的事,当时英国、法国和以色列入侵埃及,导致埃及政府关闭苏伊士运河长达五个月之久。这场冲突始于1956年7月,当时埃及统治者、富有魅力的民粹主义者贾迈勒·阿卜杜勒·纳赛尔上校将自1869年殖民时代起运营运河的英法公司收归国有。英法两国勃然大怒——运河运输的石油和其他货物对欧洲经济至关重要——决心夺回控制权。与此同时,以色列将纳赛尔在整个阿拉伯世界日益增长的影响力视为威胁,希望借机削弱其势力,并打击当时在埃及控制的加沙和西奈半岛活动的巴勒斯坦费达因(fedayeen)武装分子。当美国和联合国花费数月时间试图就运河管理问题进行谈判时,英国、法国和以色列政府的最高领导人正在秘密策划军事干预。

That operation began on October 29, 1956, when Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula and rapidly overwhelmed Egyptian forces. Britain and France then entered the war, under the guise that they were neutral parties seeking to stabilize the tensions. But few believed it, especially after the British and French demanded that the warring nations both withdraw at least ten miles away from the canal, a move that would hand Israel a vast expanse of territory. Egypt refused, and Anglo-French deployments followed with air and naval strikes against Egyptian positions; they also sent paratroopers to Port Said, at the northern end of the canal. By November 2nd, Nasser had deliberately sunk into the canal old ships full of debris, so as to block all traffic—the precise outcome that Britain and France had claimed they were trying to prevent.

这场行动始于1956年10月29日,当时以色列入侵西奈半岛,迅速击溃了埃及军队。随后英国和法国以中立调停者的名义介入战争,声称旨在缓和紧张局势。但几乎无人相信这套说辞——尤其在英法要求交战双方从运河区至少后撤十英里之后,此举将使以色列获得大片领土。埃及断然拒绝,英法随即调遣海空力量袭击埃及阵地,并向运河北端的塞得港空降伞兵。截至11月2日,纳赛尔已下令将满载碎石的旧船凿沉于运河航道,彻底阻断交通——而这正是英法此前宣称要竭力避免的局面。

The closure hit Britain especially hard, as it relied on long-standing oil arrangements in the Persian Gulf, with contracts denominated in sterling. That economic pressure was compounded by geopolitical isolation, with both the U.S. and the Soviet Union independently condemning the military campaign. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, just days away from a Presidential election, also worried that the chaos in Egypt undermined the West’s moral position against Soviet aggression and gave the Kremlin political cover to brutally crack down on an uprising in Hungary, which was happening at the same time. Britain and France ultimately withdrew from Egypt in humiliation, and the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, was forced to resign. Egypt maintained control over the canal, and Nasser emerged with a huge symbolic victory over the two European colonial powers that had lorded over the Middle East for decades.

运河关闭对英国打击尤为沉重,因为该国长期依赖以英镑结算的波斯湾石油供应体系。经济压力之外更添地缘政治孤立——美苏两国不约而同谴责此次军事行动。距离总统大选仅剩数日的德怀特·D·艾森豪威尔总统同时担忧,埃及乱局将削弱西方对抗苏联扩张的道义立场,并为克里姆林宫镇压同期发生的匈牙利起义提供政治掩护。英法最终蒙羞撤出埃及,英国首相安东尼·艾登被迫辞职。埃及保住了运河控制权,纳赛尔对这两个统治中东数十年的欧洲殖民强国取得了标志性的重大胜利。

It’s hard to know where exactly the Iran war is headed. Some reports suggest that President Donald Trump has grown “bored” of the conflict and may want an off-ramp. More signs point to the Trump Administration preparing to deploy ground troops, pulling the U.S. deeper into a war that has already killed hundreds of Iranian civilians and sprawled into a wider regional conflict, with Iran launching retaliatory strikes against its Arab neighbors and—through its closure of the Strait of Hormuz—sending energy prices soaring and disrupting global supply chains. As Trump fumbles with the Pandora’s Box he’s broken open, there’s no shortage of historical analogies to choose from. Could Iran end up like Libya, where a NATO air campaign in 2011 helped topple a decades-old dictatorship, but paved the way for the disintegration of the Libyan state into a thicket of rival factions and warring militias? Or perhaps the U.S.’s wars with Iraq are the better guide. The Gulf War left Saddam Hussein in power, but weakened and dangerous, a source of regional instability for another decade—a pattern that some fear might be playing out in Iran, if the regime emerges from the war battered but no less entrenched. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 did topple Hussein, but not without becoming a parable for American hubris and strategic folly.

伊朗战争的走向究竟如何,眼下还很难断言。有报道称,唐纳德·特朗普总统已对这场冲突感到“厌倦”,可能正在寻求脱身之策。但更多迹象表明,特朗普政府正准备部署地面部队,将美国更深地拖入这场已造成数百名伊朗平民死亡、并蔓延为更广泛地区冲突的战争——伊朗已对阿拉伯邻国发动报复性打击,并通过封锁霍尔木兹海峡导致能源价格飙升,全球供应链陷入混乱。当特朗普笨拙地摆弄着他亲手打开的潘多拉魔盒时,历史类比俯拾皆是。伊朗会重蹈利比亚覆辙吗?2011年北约空袭虽帮助推翻了长达数十年的独裁统治,却导致利比亚国家分崩离析,陷入派系林立、民兵混战的泥潭。又或许美国在伊拉克的战争是更贴切的参照:海湾战争虽未推翻萨达姆·侯赛因政权,却使其在虚弱中愈发危险,成为此后十年地区动荡的根源——有人担心,若伊朗现政权在战后虽受重创却根基未损,类似剧本或将重演。而2003年美军入侵伊拉克虽最终推翻侯赛因,却成为诠释美国傲慢与战略失策的当代寓言。

Of all the parallels to invoke, though, Suez might be the most apt, at least in this moment. Just as, in 1956, when France and Britain kept Washington in the dark about their real plans, America’s European and Arab allies say they were caught off guard by Trump’s decision to attack Iran, and have been skeptical of the intervention, instead pushing for a diplomatic solution. The clearest echo, of course, is Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which mirrors Nasser’s decision to thwart passage through the Suez Canal. In both cases, it was a foreseeable response that the attacking parties somehow failed to anticipate: “Instead of keeping the Suez Canal open, the [Anglo-French] action closed it, as the dumbest intelligence analyst, either British or American, could have predicted,” Miles Copeland, a famous C.I.A. agent working in the Middle East in the nineteen-fifties, wrote. Senator Chris Murphy, of Connecticut, recently wrote something similar, on social media, after Iran closed the strait: “This was totally predictable, but Trump has lost control of this war.”

然而,在所有可援引的类比中,苏伊士运河危机或许是最贴切的——至少在此刻如此。正如1956年法国和英国向华盛顿隐瞒真实计划那般,美国的欧洲与阿拉伯盟友表示,他们对特朗普袭击伊朗的决定措手不及,并对此次军事干预持怀疑态度,转而推动外交解决方案。最明显的呼应当然是伊朗封锁霍尔木兹海峡,这正与纳赛尔当年阻断苏伊士运河通航的决定如出一辙。两起事件中,这都是攻击方本可预见却未能预料的反应:“(英法)此举非但未能保持苏伊士运河开放,反而导致其关闭——这是连英美最愚钝的情报分析员都能预见的。”上世纪五十年代活跃于中东的著名中情局特工迈尔斯·科普兰曾如此写道。康涅狄格州参议员克里斯·墨菲近日在伊朗封锁海峡后,于社交媒体上发表了相似言论:“这完全在意料之中,但特朗普已对这场战争失去控制。”

The grimmer parallel is what all this may reveal about American power. By 1956, Britain and France were already empires in decline: Britain had let go of its major colonial possessions in the Indian subcontinent, while France had suffered major losses in Indochina and was in the throes of an era-defining battle to hold Algeria, where Nasser’s anti-colonialist message was proving persuasive. Their failure to retake the canal underscored their diminished status on a world stage. In the wake of the Second World War, Britain had still been considered a third superpower, alongside the Soviet Union and the United States, Alex von Tunzelmann, a British historian and the author of “Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and Eisenhower’s Campaign for Peace,” explained. “After Suez,” she continued, “that just drops,” and we hear “more about a binary, bipolar world. What became obvious is that Britain couldn’t act expressly against the will of the U.S.”

更令人不安的相似之处在于,这一切可能揭示出美国力量的某种真相。到1956年,英国和法国已是衰落中的帝国:英国已放弃印度次大陆的主要殖民地,法国则在印度支那遭受重创,并深陷决定时代命运的阿尔及利亚争夺战——纳赛尔的反殖民主义主张在那里正显现出强大感召力。两国夺回运河的失败,凸显了它们在世界舞台上地位的衰落。英国历史学家、《血与沙:苏伊士、匈牙利与艾森豪威尔的和平之战》作者亚历克斯·冯·滕泽尔曼指出,二战后英国仍被视为与苏联和美国并列的第三大超级力量。“苏伊士事件后,”她接着说,“这种地位骤然跌落”,我们开始“更多听到二元两极世界的论述。显而易见的是,英国已无法公然违背美国的意志行事。”

Now the U.S.’s own ability to exercise its will as a paramount hegemon is in question, according to Rosemary Kelanic, the director of the Middle East program at Defense Priorities, a Washington think tank that advocates policy restraint. Trump’s mistaken belief that the campaign against Iran could be done swiftly and neatly, Kelanic said, “shows that the United States doesn’t have the strategic advantages and power that it thought it had, and that it maybe previously did possess.” Despite U.S.-Israeli military dominance, Trump is struggling to beat back Iranian reprisals and prevent the conflict from spiralling wider. Satellite imagery suggests that various U.S. bases in the Middle East have had to be evacuated in the face of Iranian strikes, and Tehran now appears to believe that it can effectively veto shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, even though it shares the channel with its Gulf neighbors. (In fact, Iran is now earning nearly twice as much from daily oil sales than it did before the war began, according to The Economist.) This raises troubling questions about the efficacy and role of U.S. forces in the region. As Stephen Wertheim, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, put it: “What is the point of the entire U.S. military role in the Middle East? If it has any point, it should be to prevent something like the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Yet U.S. military action has only brought about the very problem it’s supposed to prevent.”

美国智库“防务优先”的中东项目主任罗丝玛丽·凯拉尼克指出,美国作为首要霸权国家施展意志的能力正受到质疑。该智库主张政策克制。凯拉尼克表示,特朗普误以为对伊朗的打击行动能迅速利落地完成,“这表明美国并不具备它自以为拥有、或许曾经确实拥有的战略优势和力量”。尽管美以两国占据军事优势,特朗普仍在竭力抵挡伊朗的报复行动,防止冲突扩大。卫星图像显示,面对伊朗的袭击,美国在中东的多个基地不得不进行疏散。德黑兰方面现在似乎认为,即便霍尔木兹海峡是与海湾邻国共用的航道,它也能有效否决船只通行权。(事实上,《经济学人》数据显示,伊朗目前的日均石油销售收入已达战前近两倍水平。)这引发了关于美军在该地区效能与角色的棘手问题。正如卡内基国际和平基金会高级研究员斯蒂芬·韦特海姆所言:“美军在整个中东地区的存在意义何在?若说有意义,本应是防止霍尔木兹海峡关闭这类事件。然而美军的行动恰恰导致了它本应防范的问题。”

For Israel, which had to vacate its Sinai conquest in 1956, there are parallels, too. Tactical achievements don’t make up for a lack of strategic gains, and, for all the demonstrated prowess of Israel’s military and intelligence services in Iran, the regime endures, and seems even more firmly in the grip of ideological hard-liners. Nimrod Novik, a distinguished fellow at the Israel Policy Forum and a former adviser to the late Prime Minister Shimon Peres (who, in his younger days, played a key role in planning the 1956 offensive), sees Trump possibly leaving behind a muddle in Iran, where future rounds of conflict are still likely. “In 1956, the British and French proved politically unreliable, certainly once the U.S. banged its fist on the table,” Novik told me. “Israel’s brilliant military achievements produced no lasting stable security environment.” After all, a bit more than a decade later, hostilities would explode anew in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, during which Nasser shut the canal again. “I wonder whether we are in for an equally—even more significant—disappointing ending in Iran, where joining forces with a transformative ambition ends up but another round with more to come,” Novik said.

对以色列而言,1956年被迫放弃西奈半岛的征服成果,如今也有相似之处。战术上的胜利无法弥补战略层面的缺失,尽管以色列的军事和情报机构在伊朗展现了强大实力,但伊朗政权依然稳固,甚至似乎被意识形态强硬派更牢固地掌控。以色列政策论坛杰出研究员、已故总理西蒙·佩雷斯的前顾问尼姆罗德·诺维克(佩雷斯年轻时曾在策划1956年攻势中发挥关键作用)认为,特朗普可能给伊朗留下一个烂摊子,未来冲突很可能再度爆发。“1956年,英法两国被证明在政治上不可靠,尤其在美国拍案而起之后,”诺维克告诉我,“以色列辉煌的军事成就并未带来持久稳定的安全环境。”毕竟仅仅十余年后,1967年阿以战争中战火重燃,纳赛尔再次关闭了运河。“我怀疑我们在伊朗是否将迎来同样——甚至更为重大的——令人失望的结局,这场以变革为目标的联合行动,最终不过是又一轮冲突的开端。”

Should Trump decide that he wants to continue the war, one key difference between then and now is that there is no outside power willing or able to stop him, the way Eisenhower did with Britain and France. Eisenhower had little patience with Britain’s late-imperial delusions, and exerted tremendous economic pressure to rein them in, blocking assistance from the International Monetary Fund and threatening to dump U.S. holdings of British bonds, which triggered a collapse in the British pound. The Soviets, meanwhile, warned Britain and France that it would consider striking them with long-range weapons if their campaign continued. The U.N., too, played a central role in ending the Suez crisis and in managing the aftermath; today, the institution is becoming a geopolitical sideshow, and the U.S. President seems more keen to carry out his agenda in defiance of the U.N. than out of duty to it.

倘若特朗普决意延续这场战争,今昔之间的一个关键区别在于,如今已没有任何外部势力愿意或能够像当年艾森豪威尔对英法两国所做的那样阻止他。艾森豪威尔对英国迟暮帝国的幻想毫无耐心,他施加了巨大的经济压力来约束他们,不仅阻挠国际货币基金组织提供援助,还威胁抛售美国持有的英国债券,从而引发英镑暴跌。与此同时,苏联警告英法两国,若其军事行动继续,将考虑用远程武器打击他们。联合国在结束苏伊士运河危机和处理善后事宜中也发挥了核心作用;而如今,该机构正沦为地缘政治的配角,美国总统似乎更热衷于无视联合国推行自己的议程,而非履行对其的义务。

Russia and China, for their part, have gained simply by staying out of the conflict: the former is making more money from oil sales, while the latter keeps accruing more soft power as America’s credibility erodes. “The Iran war won’t keep the United States from remaining the most powerful country in the world,” Wertheim said. “But it could prove to be a turning point by laying bare the poor quality of American governance and the overstretched condition of America’s military, which is now tasked with providing deterrence and defense in four regions with a one-war force.”

俄罗斯和中国则通过置身冲突之外而获益:前者从石油销售中赚取了更多利润,后者则在美国信誉不断削弱之际持续积累软实力。“伊朗战争不会阻止美国继续保持世界最强大国家的地位,”韦特海姆表示,“但它可能成为一个转折点,暴露出美国治理能力的低下以及美军捉襟见肘的现状——这支仅具备单线作战能力的军队,如今却要承担四大区域的威慑与防御任务。”

Countries that came to rely on American security guarantees—guarantees that expanded as the U.S. consolidated its singular-superpower status in the West in the aftermath of the Suez crisis—are reckoning with new realities. “This war is a violation of international law—there is little doubt about that,” German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier said in a speech to German diplomats last week. “It is also a politically fatal error.” Vivian Balakrishnan, the foreign minister of Singapore, described the geopolitical shift underway, in a recent interview: “The underwriter of this world order has now become a revisionist power, and some people would even say a disruptor,” he said. “But the larger point is that the erosion of norms, processes, and institutions that underpinned a remarkable period of peace and prosperity; that foundation has gone.” ♦

那些曾依赖美国安全承诺的国家——这些承诺在美国于苏伊士运河危机后巩固其在西方世界唯一超级大国地位的过程中不断扩张——如今正面对新的现实。“这场战争是对国际法的公然违背——这一点毋庸置疑,”德国总统弗兰克-瓦尔特·施泰因迈尔上周对德国外交官发表演讲时表示,“同时也是政治上的致命错误。”新加坡外交部长维文·巴拉克里希南在近期访谈中这样描述正在发生的地缘政治转变:“当前世界秩序的担保人如今已成为修正主义力量,甚至有人称之为破坏者。但更关键的是,支撑了这段非凡和平繁荣时期的规范、程序与制度正在遭受侵蚀——那个根基已经不复存在。” ♦

2 free previews left — register to get 30 translations a month