Q. & A.

The Woman Behind Japan’s Rightward Shift

日本右倾化背后的女人
How Sanae Takaichi, the country’s first female Prime Minister, won big in last weekend’s election.
日本首位女首相高市早苗如何在上周末的选举中大获全胜。
Sanae Takaichi stands at a podium with flag behind her.
Source photograph by Franck Robichon / AFP / Getty

Last October, Sanae Takaichi became Japan’s Prime Minister after being elected as head of the Liberal Democratic Party, the conservative political party that has governed Japan for most of its postwar history. And on Sunday, after calling a snap election last month, she secured a supermajority in Japan’s lower house of parliament, giving her significant power to increase both military and domestic spending, push a harder line against China, and pursue a more restrictive immigration policy. Like Margaret Thatcher, whom she frequently invokes, Takaichi is her country’s first female Prime Minister, and she is operating in a largely male-dominated political system. She has already received strong support from President Trump, whom she will likely pressure to maintain a hawkish stance against China.

去年十月,高市早苗当选自民党总裁后成为日本首相。自民党是保守派政党,在战后大部分时间里统治着日本。今年三月,她宣布提前举行大选,并于周日带领自民党在众议院赢得绝对多数席位。这赋予她巨大权力,可以增加军事和国内支出,对中国采取更强硬立场,并推行更严格的移民政策。高市早苗经常以撒切尔夫人自比,和后者一样,她是本国首位女首相,在一个男性主导的政治体系中运作。她已经获得特朗普总统的强力支持,并很可能施压要求其维持对华鹰派立场。

I recently spoke by phone with Andrew Gordon, a professor of modern Japanese history at Harvard, about the significance of the election. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed what Takaichi’s landslide victory will mean for Japan’s relationship with China, the changes that have pushed Japanese politics rightward in recent decades, and how this election fits into the broader narrative of rising global populism.

近日,我通过电话与哈佛大学现代日本史教授安德鲁·戈登(Andrew Gordon)探讨了此次选举的意义。在我们的对话中(为篇幅与清晰度考虑已作编辑),我们讨论了高市早苗的压倒性胜利将对日中关系产生何种影响,探讨了近几十年来推动日本政治右倾化的变革,并分析了此次选举如何与全球民粹主义抬头的宏观叙事相呼应。

Does this election feel significant in the context of postwar Japanese politics?

这次选举是否在战后日本政治中具有特殊意义?

The scale of the L.D.P. victory is unprecedented since the Second World War. It marks the first time a party has secured a supermajority on its own. And it is especially impressive in the context of the last thirty years, when there’s been some degree of parity between the L.D.P. and the opposition. The 2005 election, where Junichiro Koizumi led the L.D.P. to a major victory, was also a large margin, but this was bigger.

自二战以来,自民党此次胜选的规模可谓前所未有。这是首次有政党独自赢得绝对多数席位。考虑到过去三十年间自民党与在野党之间始终保持着某种程度的均势,这一胜利尤其令人瞩目。2005年小泉纯一郎领导自民党取得大胜时,优势已然显著,但此次的胜利幅度更为惊人。

The other thing that’s notable is that there’s a stereotype, which I think has many kernels of truth to it, that Japanese politics is not heavily driven by personality. And a lot of the politicians who have been Prime Minister, and led the L.D.P. or other parties, haven’t done so with a lot of charisma. But Takaichi’s victory seemed to be largely driven by the surprising spike in the popularity of the Prime Minister. So that’s pretty unusual. The Koizumi election is the closest analogy I can think of, because of his persona. He had this rapid-fire way of speaking in short sentences, bluntly and clearly, that seemed to attract people, and he successfully made the election a referendum on him as much as on policy.

另一个值得注意的现象是,日本政治向来不以个人魅力为主导——这种刻板印象虽不尽然,却有其道理。许多曾担任首相、领导自民党或其他政党的政治人物,确实不以个人魅力见长。但高市早苗的胜选,很大程度上得益于首相支持率的意外飙升。这相当不寻常。我能想到最接近的先例是小泉纯一郎的选举,因其鲜明的个人风格:他说话如连珠炮般简短、直率、清晰,这种特质吸引了民众,并成功地将选举变成了对他个人及政策的双重公投。

But that is really unusual. I was in Japan from October through part of January. And the gap between Takaichi’s popularity and her party’s popularity seemed to be either as high or higher than it has ever been between a Prime Minister and their party. Usually, the popularity levels of the Prime Minister and the party are close. And sometimes the Prime Minister’s popularity is underwater compared to the party. So the big question was whether Takaichi could individually raise the profile and increase support for the L.D.P. And she succeeded.

但这确实很不寻常。去年十月到今年一月,我一直在日本。高市早苗的个人支持率与其所在政党的支持率之间的差距,似乎达到了历任首相与其政党之间前所未有的高度。通常,首相与政党的支持率是相近的。有时首相的支持率甚至低于政党。所以关键问题是,高市早苗能否凭一己之力提升自民党的形象、增加支持。她做到了。

Do you think it is helpful to view Takaichi’s success through the prism of right-wing nationalism’s rise across the world?

你是否认为,通过全球右翼民族主义兴起的棱镜来审视高市早苗的成功,会有所助益?

There is no question that it is absolutely part of the story. And the surprising success of the far-right Sanseito Party in last summer’s House of Councillors election, which determines the makeup of the upper house of parliament, seemed to come from their xenophobic, hard-line, anti-immigrant, anti-foreigner attitude, which is of a piece with what we see not only in this country, but in a growing number of countries. So it seemed pretty clear that the L.D.P. was going to try to move in that direction and to co-opt that support for the far right, which is a political strategy the L.D.P. has been very good at in the past. They will shift their own policies in the direction of the new sentiment among voters, and in both right and left directions. The best case for the other direction was in the nineteen-seventies and nineteen-eighties, when environmental protection was very popular on the political left and left-of-center, and the L.D.P. moved in that direction effectively and co-opted that. But they are moving right now, especially on immigration.

毫无疑问,这绝对是故事的一部分。去年夏天决定参议院组成的选举中,极右翼政党“参政党”(Sanseito)出人意料地获得成功,似乎正是源于他们排外、强硬、反移民、反外国人的态度——这种态度不仅在这个国家,而且在越来越多的国家都能看到。因此,自民党显然会试图朝这个方向靠拢,并争取极右翼的支持,这是自民党过去非常擅长的政治策略。他们会根据选民的新情绪调整自己的政策,无论是向右还是向左。另一个方向的最佳案例发生在1970年代和1980年代,当时环境保护在政治左翼和中左翼中非常受欢迎,自民党有效地朝这个方向靠拢并吸纳了这些主张。但现在他们正在向右转,尤其是在移民问题上。

The other major issue is the economy and inflation. And although it’s hard to trust that anyone has a good answer for reducing the inflation of the past three or so years, including the L.D.P., nobody else seemed to have a convincing case of what they were going to do. So voters seemed to say, “O.K., well, this new person, let’s give her a chance.”

另一个主要议题是经济和通胀。尽管很难相信任何人——包括自民党在内——对如何降低过去三年左右的通胀有好的解决方案,但其他政党似乎也没有提出令人信服的方案。因此选民们似乎在想:“好吧,既然这位新人出现了,不妨给她一个机会。”

Well, increased nationalism and hostility to immigrants, combined with concern about inflation, is obviously a widespread political reality. But, in this case, the Party that benefitted is the largest and most successful Party in postwar Japan, whereas in other countries, you have had older, more established parties struggle.

诚然,民族主义情绪高涨、对移民的敌意加剧,再加上对通胀的忧虑,显然已成为普遍的政治现实。但在此次选举中,受益的却是战后日本规模最大、最成功的政党,而在其他国家,那些历史更悠久、根基更稳固的政党反而举步维艰。

Right. Although, the other aspect of Takaichi’s rise that doesn’t exactly fit into the worldwide rightward drift is her hawkishness. As we see in the United States, much of that rightward drift has been isolationist.

确实。不过,高市早苗崛起的另一面——她的鹰派立场——与全球右倾浪潮并不完全合拍。正如我们在美国所见,这股右倾浪潮很大程度上带有孤立主义色彩。

We’ll see about that, but go on.

走着瞧吧,不过你继续说。

Yes, it may not have turned out that way here in the U.S. But it is interesting how readily Takaichi has been willing to provoke China. Last year, in response to a question from a member of parliament, she stated that the Japanese government would act in defense of Taiwan in the case of a Chinese attack. Her answer is a departure in terms of how publicly it was stated. I think what she meant to say, which also would have been provocative, was that Japan would defend Taiwan because it has an alliance with the United States, who, of course, would be involved. Her answer amounted to saying we would stand with the United States, but that was left implicit. So it was a very provocative statement, even though nobody really knows what the United States will do these days, because Takaichi could have, if she wanted to, signalled to the Chinese government not to fool around with Taiwan through a back channel and easily avoided all of this fuss. But, because she said it publicly in the national legislature, it led the Chinese to respond with fury.

是的,美国的情况或许并非如此。但高市早苗如此轻易地挑起对华争端,这着实耐人寻味。去年,她在回应一名议员的质询时声称,若中国武力攻台,日本政府将采取防卫行动。这番公开表态本身已是对传统立场的突破。我认为她真正想表达的是——尽管同样具有挑衅意味——日本之所以会防卫台湾,是因为日美同盟的存在,而美国届时必然会介入。她的回答本质上是在暗示日本将与美国共同行动,只是未明说罢了。因此这番言论极具挑衅性,尽管如今谁也无法断言美国会采取何种行动。其实高市若真有意警告中国政府不要在台湾问题上轻举妄动,完全可以通过非公开渠道传达,轻易避免这场风波。但她偏偏选择在国会殿堂公开表态,自然激起了中方的震怒。

The Chinese government reacted by telling Chinese citizens not to travel to Japan, threatening economic retaliation, and pulling the plug on meetings that were long planned, putting a pretty deep freeze on China-Japan relations. So, to many people, including some people in the Japanese Foreign Ministry whom I talked to, Takaichi’s answer was a terrible mistake and the sign of an amateur.

中国政府的回应是告诫本国公民不要前往日本旅行,威胁采取经济反制措施,并取消了筹备已久的双边会谈,使中日关系陷入深度冻结。因此,包括我接触过的日本外务省官员在内的许多人都认为,高市早苗的回应是个严重的错误,暴露了其外交上的不成熟。

However, even though I’m not sure how calculated it was, her anti-China stance seems to have done well with the public. There’s a lot of fear of China in Japan, economically and militarily, and, even though people understand there’s interdependence between the two countries, Takaichi is seen as being willing to stand up to China, which inspires a kind of nationalism. So, her hawkishness does fit the nationalism narrative.

不过,尽管我不确定这是否经过精心算计,她的反华立场似乎颇得民心。日本在经济和军事上对中国怀有诸多恐惧,尽管人们明白两国之间存在相互依存关系,但高市早苗被视为敢于对抗中国,这激发了一种民族主义情绪。因此,她的鹰派作风确实符合民族主义叙事。

Japan struggled for a long time with deflation and, in fact, welcomed the surge in global inflation in the earlier part of this decade. Now, it seems like the Japanese electorate is tired of it. My understanding is that, despite Takaichi’s reputation as being on the right, at least in an American context, her economic policies include heavy government spending. I know some of it is on the military side, but how do you understand her economic policies from an ideological standpoint?

日本与通货紧缩斗争了很长时间,实际上,本世纪头几年全球通胀飙升时,日本是欢迎的。如今,日本选民似乎已经厌倦了通胀。据我了解,尽管高市早苗(Sanae Takaichi)在美国语境下被视为右翼,但她的经济政策包含大量政府支出。我知道其中一部分是军费开支,但从意识形态角度,你如何理解她的经济政策?

I think that her economic policies are within a realm of normalcy, unlike perhaps the United States today. She’s not looking to fight inflation by raising tariffs or something like that. But what’s strange is that the government got part of what it wanted, when deflation ended and prices started going up, but what it really wanted was for wages and incomes to be going up as well. And the thought was that, with the Bank of Japan keeping interest rates negative, you can give people more money through greater pay increases. But inflation ended up outpacing those increases.

我认为她的经济政策尚属正常范畴,不像如今的美国那样剑走偏锋。她并不打算通过提高关税之类的手段来对抗通胀。但奇怪的是,当通缩结束、物价开始上涨时,政府确实部分实现了目标,可他们真正期待的是工资和收入也能同步增长。日本央行的设想是:通过维持负利率政策,企业可以给员工加薪来增加民众收入。但最终通胀率却跑赢了薪资涨幅。

The puzzle to me is that, as far as I can tell, what Takaichi is promising to do isn’t necessarily going to keep prices down. She’s talking about what she calls an aggressive financial policy, which actually means the return of low or negative interest rates and easy money, so it’s the opposite of fighting inflation. And then big increases in military spending. It’s hard to see what is anti-inflationary in what she proposes.

令我困惑的是,据我所知,高市早苗承诺要做的未必能抑制物价。她谈论的是所谓的“积极金融政策”,实际上意味着恢复低利率或负利率以及宽松货币政策——这与抗击通胀背道而驰。再加上大幅增加军费开支,实在看不出她的提议中有任何抗通胀的成分。

I was talking to a friend who has travelled to Japan regularly, and he told me that he was quite worried about things like the intimidation of immigrants and the erosion of press freedom, which has included the government threatening to cancel broadcast licenses of TV stations that are critical of the L.D.P. I said that my perception was that Japan’s institutions were perhaps stronger than they are in the United States, and could resist such things. He responded that he thought those institutions had rarely been tested in the past, because they depended on the idea that the L.D.P. historically divided up its control of institutions between different factions, so you don’t have the same centralized control that you would have in a more authoritarian setup. But he was concerned that could be coming to an end because of Takaichi’s popularity and centralized control of the L.D.P.

我和一位经常去日本的朋友聊天,他告诉我,他相当担忧日本的一些现象,比如对移民的恐吓、新闻自由的侵蚀——政府甚至威胁要吊销那些批评自民党的电视台的广播执照。我说,在我看来日本的制度或许比美国更稳固,应该能抵御这类威胁。他回应说,他认为这些制度在过去很少经受考验,因为自民党历来将不同机构的控制权分散在各个派系之间,所以不会像威权体制那样形成高度集中的控制。但他担心,随着高市早苗声望日隆且集中掌控自民党,这种制衡可能即将终结。

Your friend is right about how the L.D.P. historically functioned. The question is whether Takaichi’s victory will give her such a lock over the Party and its actions that they’ll go along with policies that will be controversial with the public. Your friend could be right. There’s a possibility that Takaichi is going to move very aggressively. I think she will on some military-spending plans.

你朋友对自民党(L.D.P.)历史运作方式的判断是正确的。问题在于高市早苗(Takaichi)的胜利是否会使她对党内决策形成绝对掌控,以至于自民党将推行那些可能引发公众争议的政策。你朋友的观点或许没错——高市确实可能采取相当激进的行动。我认为她在某些军费开支计划上就会这样做。

But will she go after opponents in a Trumpish way? I don’t think so. And I also don’t think her anti-immigrant moves will be the same as Trump’s. First of all, there are very few undocumented immigrants in Japan, so even the most aggressive policy toward foreigners isn’t so much going to be rounding people up and sending them home as shutting the doors to more people coming, and perhaps making life more difficult for foreigners who are in Japan in terms of access to social services and things like that. But you’re not going to see the type of scenes that we see in the U.S.

但她会像特朗普那样打击对手吗?我认为不会。我也不认为她的反移民举措会与特朗普如出一辙。首先,日本几乎没有无证移民,因此即便采取最强硬的外国人政策,重点也不会是大规模遣返,而是收紧入境门槛,并可能让已在日本的外国人在社会福利等方面面临更多困难。但美国那种场景,你在日本是看不到的。

What were some of the differences among L.D.P. factions?

自民党内部各派系间存在哪些差异?

One issue has always been about Japan’s history, and whether you see Japan as a country that has something to apologize for in its conduct during the Second World War. The L.D.P. has shifted toward a policy of denial that Japan has any need to keep apologizing, but not entirely. There remains a portion of the L.D.P. that resists that idea. But Takaichi has considered the Second World War a war of survival and of self-defense, which is a view that’s held on the Japanese right wing. So that’s one place where I think a divide in civil society and some divide in the Party was a check on the hawkish wing. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was going to make a statement on the seventieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War in 2015, and there was a lot of fear that he was going to disavow any contrition or apology or self-reflection. And in the end, he didn’t do that. You can quibble, and I do quibble with some of the things Abe said, but he responded to a combination of foreign and domestic pressure and did something that I think fell short of what he would have liked to say in his heart. Will Takaichi feel constrained in that regard? I think she might, because international relations matter, and the last thing she needs now is a huge fight with South Korea.

一个核心问题始终关乎日本的历史,以及如何看待日本在二战期间的行为是否仍有需要道歉之处。自民党已转向否认日本需要持续道歉的立场,但并非铁板一块。党内仍有部分力量抵制这种观点。而高市早苗将二战视为一场生存与自卫之战——这正是日本右翼所持的观点。因此我认为,民间社会的分歧以及党内的部分分歧,对鹰派势力形成了某种制衡。2015年安倍晋三首相原计划在二战结束七十周年发表声明时,外界曾担忧他将彻底抛弃忏悔、道歉或反省。最终他并未如此。尽管人们(包括我本人)仍可对安倍声明的某些措辞吹毛求疵,但他终究在国内外压力共同作用下,做出了某种妥协——这恐怕远非其内心真正想表达的内容。高市早苗会在这方面感受到约束吗?我认为可能会,毕竟国际关系至关重要,而眼下她最不需要的就是与韩国爆发激烈冲突。

I think Trump has given a boost to Japan’s relations with South Korea, and probably made her less likely to pick a fight on the history issue with South Korea.

我认为特朗普实际上促进了日韩关系,可能还降低了日本在历史问题上与韩国发生冲突的可能性。

How so?

怎么说?

Because Japan and South Korea both have to deal with this unpredictable President who may or may not defend them. So it’s in their interest to be buddies.

日本和韩国都得应付这位难以预测的总统——他可能出手相护,也可能袖手旁观。因此,两国结为盟友符合自身利益。

Despite the fact that South Korea is obviously, for very understandable reasons, suspicious about Japanese nationalism.

尽管韩国对日本民族主义抱有显而易见的、且完全可以理解的疑虑。

Yes, it is, but I think they have a lot of economic interdependence and, in terms of security and military issues, there’s a lot of ties that bind the two countries together, especially when the U.S. is seen as an unreliable partner.

确实如此,但我认为两国在经济上存在高度相互依存关系。在安全与军事议题上,两国间更存在着诸多纽带——尤其当美国被视为不可靠的合作伙伴时,这些联结显得尤为关键。

I hear what you are saying about the ways Takaichi may be constrained. But my understanding is that when she was communications minister of the L.D.P. about a decade ago, press freedom in Japan declined. And I know that there are incidents in her past, like posing for a photograph with a neo-Nazi politician and blurbing a book that was euphemistic about Hitler. Do you think these authoritarian leanings are a core part of who she is?

我理解你关于高市早苗可能受到制约的说法。但据我所知,大约十年前她担任自民党通信部长期间,日本的新闻自由确实有所下降。我也知道她过去的一些事件,比如曾与新纳粹政客合影,还为一部对希特勒持委婉态度的书籍撰写推荐语。你认为这些威权主义倾向是她本质的核心部分吗?

For a young politician to rise in the Party, you need a patron. Many politicians are children of members of the legislature, and they’ve got family ties and somebody to nurture and protect them. But she didn’t. She comes from a family with no political background or connection. In that sense, she raised herself up. So she had to attach herself to somebody, and she decided that Prime Minister Abe was the person to attach herself to earlier in her career. And he nurtured and brought her along and allowed her profile to rise. And so, maybe there is an opportunistic aspect to her early political decisions.

在党内,年轻政客想要出头,就得有靠山。许多政客都是议员的子女,他们有家族关系,有人提携保护。但她没有。她出身于一个毫无政治背景或人脉的家庭。从这个意义上说,她是靠自己闯出来的。所以她必须依附于某个人,而在职业生涯早期,她认定安倍晋三首相就是她要依附的对象。安倍提携她、栽培她,让她逐渐崭露头角。因此,她早期的政治抉择或许带有机会主义的色彩。

But at the moment, these positions don’t strike me as a pose. Her nationalism, her view on the Second World War, her concerns about immigrants—all of this strikes me as pretty deeply felt, and it’s become, I think, a core part of her identity and also of her base. So does that mean she’s going to go full bore in imposing things that are going to be really controversial, both at home and with Japan’s neighbors, especially China and Korea? Not necessarily. Abe, too, suppressed his core ideological convictions. Not completely, but to some extent, because he was also a pragmatist.

但眼下,这些立场在我看来并非故作姿态。她的民族主义、对二战的看法、对移民的担忧——所有这些都让我觉得是她相当深切的真实感受,而且我认为,这已成为她身份认同的核心部分,也是她基本盘的核心部分。那么,这是否意味着她会全力推行那些在国内和日本邻国——尤其是中国和韩国——都将极具争议的政策呢?未必。安倍也曾压抑自己的核心意识形态信念。不是完全压抑,但在一定程度上确实如此,因为他也是个务实主义者。

Do you see the hawkishness of some members of the L.D.P. toward China as a continued expression of the Second World War-era nationalism, or do you see it as something newer, spurred by China’s position as a rising power?

您认为自民党部分成员对中国的鹰派态度,是二战时期民族主义的延续表现,还是因中国作为崛起大国的新态势所激发的产物?

I absolutely see it as newer. I don’t think the ideas that motivated Japan’s invasion of China and the atrocities committed in the Second World War are the primary factors. It has to do with the sense that China is a rising military power that might threaten Taiwan, is allies with North Korea, and is acting aggressively. The anti-Chinese feeling in Japan today is, I think, almost entirely related to China’s international activities, economically and militarily.

我绝对认为这是一种新的情绪。我不认为当年日本侵华和二战暴行的思想动机是主要因素。这与一种认知有关:中国作为崛起的军事强国,可能威胁台湾,与朝鲜结盟,并采取强硬姿态。在我看来,当今日本的反华情绪几乎完全与中国在国际上的经济军事活动相关。

Takaichi is also the first female Japanese Prime Minister. How important was that to her campaign, and how important does it seem to you that Japan has elected a woman?

高市早苗也是日本首位女首相。这对她的竞选有多重要?日本选出一位女性领导人,在你看来又有多重要?

That is not how she defines herself. The fact that she’s the first Japanese Prime Minister, who happens to be a woman, is not something she’s putting front and center, and her own views are basically anti-feminist. But it’s been interesting to see a divide among Japanese women, with some saying, “It’s great that a woman has gotten to this level because this will be an inspiration to other women.” And others who say, “No, you’ve got to look at what somebody says and does and not who their identity is.” And so has inspired a kind of anti-identitarian feminist push from some people.

这并非她定义自己的方式。作为首位日本女首相这一事实,并非她刻意凸显的核心标签,而她本人的观点本质上是反女权主义的。但有趣的是,日本女性群体内部出现了分歧:有人主张“女性能够达到这样的高度是件好事,这将激励更多女性”;也有人认为“不,我们必须关注一个人的言行而非身份标签”。这反而激发了一部分人发起反身份政治的女权主义运动。

She styles herself on Margaret Thatcher, and it’s clear that to rise in the L.D.P., there is no way you could rise as a feminist. She had to win the support of the old male guard, and Abe and the older politicians like him were dead set against doing things that feminists want. For instance, one very controversial current issue is whether women can keep their original names, the names they’re born with, after getting married.

她以玛格丽特·撒切尔为榜样,显然,要在自民党内晋升,绝无可能以女权主义者身份实现。她必须赢得党内男性元老的支持,而安倍晋三及其同辈的老派政客们,对女权主义者所追求的改革坚决抵制。例如,当前极具争议的一项议题是:女性婚后能否保留自己出生时的姓氏。

At the moment, the answer is no. And Takaichi agrees with that. A married couple can only have one family name legally. The husband can take the wife’s name or the wife can take the husband’s name, but only one family name. Women can do it informally. In the academic world, a number of female scholars, even after they marry, continue to use their maiden name professionally. But legally speaking, for a passport, for any government activities, that’s not their name.

目前,答案是否定的。高市早苗也认同这一点。法律上,一对夫妇只能有一个姓氏。丈夫可以随妻姓,妻子也可以随夫姓,但只能保留一个姓氏。女性可以在非正式场合使用婚前姓氏。在学术界,不少女性学者即便婚后仍会在专业领域沿用娘家姓氏。但从法律角度而言,无论是护照还是任何政府事务中,那都不是她们的合法姓名。

To go back to the importance of this election, from everything you’ve said, it seems like there are ways in which Takaichi represents something new, but you don’t see her rise as some sort of fundamental break with the politics of postwar Japan.

回到这次选举的重要性,从您刚才的论述来看,高市早苗似乎确实代表了一些新动向,但您并不认为她的崛起意味着日本战后政治发生了某种根本性的断裂。

Yeah. I think that in the context of Japanese politics, this is a very unusual result and a rightward tilt, but the L.D.P. has tilted right in the past. So it’s not a profound rupture with the existing mode of Japanese politics. It’s just a strong shift in a direction that, in many ways, things were already moving toward.

是的。我认为在日本政治的语境下,这是个非常不寻常的结果,也是一次右倾转向,但自民党过去也曾右倾过。所以这并非与日本现有政治模式的深刻决裂,而是一次朝着既定方向的强势转向——在许多方面,这个趋势其实早已显现。

It is also important to note that the L.D.P. remains a minority party in the upper house. This will be somewhat of a check on the Party. I say somewhat because the House of Councillors is a weaker body than the lower house, and it is possible for the government to pass a budget that the lower house supports, even if the upper house does not approve it. But revising the constitution, specifically Article 9, which much of the L.D.P. dislikes, and which essentially outlaws Japan from waging war, requires a two-thirds vote in each body. Then a majority of voters must approve it in a referendum. So although the L.D.P. win will certainly bring the idea of revision into play, I see no chance for it to actually happen until the L.D.P. secures a comparable majority in the Councillors. The next election of that body is not until 2028, and only half the members stand for reëlection each time.

还需注意的是,自民党在参议院仍属少数党。这将在一定程度上制衡该党。之所以说“一定程度”,是因为参议院权力弱于众议院,即便参议院不予批准,政府仍有可能通过众议院支持的预算案。但修宪——特别是自民党多数成员反感的第九条(该条款实质上禁止日本发动战争)——需要两院各获得三分之二赞成票,随后还需在全民公投中获得多数选民支持。因此,尽管自民党此次胜选必将推动修宪议题进入议程,但在该党于参议院取得相应多数席位前,修宪实际通过的可能性微乎其微。参议院下次选举要等到2028年,且每次仅改选半数议席。

So there are reasons for caution and doubt about how aggressively she could transform things. ♦

因此,对于她能在多大程度上大刀阔斧地推动变革,我们确有理由保持审慎与怀疑。♦

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