The Weekend Essay

The True Story of ISIS’s Rise in Syria

“伊斯兰国”在叙利亚崛起的真相
The rebellion against Assad led to sudden freedom, but also to crime and inequality. The Islamic State took advantage.
反抗阿萨德的起义带来了突如其来的自由,却也滋生了犯罪与不平等。伊斯兰国趁虚而入。
ISIS logo on a wall of dilapidated building
Photograph by Alice Martins

In 2012, Manbij became one of the first Syrian cities to wrest itself from the tyranny of the dictator Bashar al-Assad. After the uprising began, with citizens calling for democracy outside the central mosque, the Syrian government attempted to crush it. But the regime, besieged by insurrections across the country, abandoned Manbij. At first, the city, which is near the Turkish border and has two hundred thousand residents, revelled in its liberation. Dozens of newspapers and magazines were launched, and for the first time in forty years people formed organizations without securing approval from the state. But, before a year was up, freedom had begun to feel like chaos. The new city government, controlled largely by business owners and other élites, seemed oblivious to the problems of the poor. The price of bread soared as bakery owners—no longer subject to price controls imposed by the regime—shamelessly profiteered. Rents doubled, then tripled, as more and more displaced Syrians crowded the city. And crime became so rampant that some citizens wondered if the revolution had been worth it. What good were “international human rights” when you were afraid to send your daughter to school because of kidnappings? What good was a republic that couldn’t provide law and order? Amid all this instability, a new group insinuated its way into Manbij: the Islamic State.

2012年,曼比季成为最早摆脱独裁者巴沙尔·阿萨德暴政的叙利亚城市之一。起义爆发后,民众在中央清真寺外呼吁民主,叙利亚政府试图镇压。但面对全国各地的叛乱,政权放弃了曼比季。起初,这座靠近土耳其边境、拥有二十万居民的城市沉浸在解放的喜悦中。数十家报刊杂志创刊,四十年来人们首次无需国家批准就能组建组织。然而不到一年,自由就开始变得像混乱。主要由企业主和其他精英控制的新市政府似乎对穷人的困境视而不见。面包价格飙升——面包店主不再受政权价格管制,无耻地牟取暴利。随着越来越多流离失所的叙利亚人涌入城市,租金先是翻倍,接着涨到三倍。犯罪猖獗到让一些市民怀疑革命是否值得。当你因为绑架案不敢送女儿上学时,“国际人权”有什么用?一个无法提供法律与秩序的共和国又有什么意义?在这种动荡中,一个新组织悄然渗入曼比季:伊斯兰国。

An opening for the Islamic State came one day in June, 2013, nearly a year after Manbij’s liberation, when the body of a young man was discovered by a shepherd outside town. Blood was streaked across the man’s pale face, and a section of his right temple was missing. The victim’s name was Musa Jasim. From the age of eleven, he’d accompanied his father, a plumber, on the job. They unclogged drains for the municipality—a tiring and thankless profession, but one that allowed them to build a nest egg, culminating in the purchase of a silver Saab. Musa started working as a taxi-driver. At eighteen, he married, and within a few years he had three young children and a fourth on the way.

伊斯兰国(Islamic State)的契机出现在2013年6月的一天,此时距离曼比季解放已近一年。一名牧羊人在城外发现了一具年轻男子的尸体,死者苍白的脸上布满血痕,右侧太阳穴缺了一块。受害者名叫穆萨·贾西姆(Musa Jasim)。从十一岁起,他就跟着当水管工的父亲干活。他们为市政部门疏通下水道——这份工作既辛苦又不讨好,但让他们攒下了一笔钱,最终买下了一辆银色萨博汽车。穆萨开始当出租车司机。十八岁那年他结了婚,几年内就有了三个年幼的孩子,第四个也即将出生。

One day, Musa was idling in his Saab at a roundabout when he accepted a few passengers and drove off. He did not return home. Ten days later, the authorities stopped a Saab, which had a new paint job, at a car wash. An inspection confirmed that the car was Musa’s. The driver was taken in for questioning, and he explained that he had recently bought the vehicle from a certain Manhal Hammoudi—supposedly, one of Musa’s friends. The authorities tracked down Hammoudi, who admitted that he and several others had asked Musa for a ride into the countryside, and that one of the passengers, Karoom, had pointed a pistol at Musa’s head. “Guys, quit screwing around,” Musa said. “This isn’t funny!” Karoom pulled the trigger. He and the others dumped the body in the bushes, repainted the Saab, and sold it for seven hundred and fifty dollars.

一天,穆萨开着萨博车在环岛闲逛时,载了几名乘客便驶离了。他再也没有回家。十天后,警方在一家洗车场拦下一辆新喷过漆的萨博车。检查证实这辆车正是穆萨的。司机被带走问话,他解释说最近从一位名叫曼哈尔·哈穆迪的人手中买了这辆车——据称此人是穆萨的朋友。警方追查到哈穆迪,他承认自己和其他几人曾要求穆萨载他们去乡下,其中一名乘客卡鲁姆用枪抵住了穆萨的脑袋。“伙计们,别闹了,”穆萨说,“这一点都不好笑!”卡鲁姆扣动了扳机。他们几人将尸体扔进灌木丛,重新喷漆了萨博车,以750美元的价格将其卖掉。

The murder appalled the city, and Musa’s family demanded justice. Karoom and the others were arrested, but a proper trial seemed unlikely. The new city government, supported by the Free Syrian Army, which had helped liberate the city, was underfunded and barely functional. Some authorities proposed executing the accused then and there, to show the public that the government was serious about countering crime. But for others this was a line they could not cross. Not only did it violate every precept of justice but what would the world think? What would Western capitals and human-rights organizations say if it emerged that the Free Syrian Army were executing unarmed civilians?

这起谋杀案震惊了全城,穆萨的家人要求伸张正义。卡鲁姆等人被捕,但一场正规审判似乎希望渺茫。在帮助解放这座城市的自由叙利亚军支持下成立的新市政府资金匮乏,几乎无法正常运作。部分官员提议当场处决被告,以向公众表明政府打击犯罪的决心。但对另一些人而言,这是不可逾越的底线——这不仅违背了所有司法准则,国际社会会如何看待?若自由叙利亚军处决手无寸铁的平民之事曝光,西方各国首都和人权组织将作何反应?

As the authorities dithered, people across the city grew restless. One activist decided to take matters into his own hands. Abdul Hadi Bisher was an energetic member of the Revolutionary Youth Movement, a pro-democracy organization that had organized protests against Assad. He’d been jailed after shouting “freedom” in the streets—and in detention he’d been sodomized and waterboarded. In the year since Manbij’s liberation, though, he’d grown disgusted with the city’s dysfunctional government, under which crime and inequality had become pervasive. He began to wonder if, in order to win justice for Musa, it was time to look for a more daring alternative.

当局犹豫不决之际,全城民众日益焦躁。一位活动人士决定亲自采取行动。阿卜杜勒·哈迪·比舍尔是革命青年运动的积极分子,这个支持民主的组织曾发起反对阿萨德的抗议活动。他因在街头高呼“自由”被捕入狱,在羁押期间遭受鸡奸与水刑折磨。然而在曼比季解放后的这一年里,他对这座城市功能失调的政府日渐反感——犯罪横行与不平等现象在治理下愈演愈烈。他开始思索:要为穆萨讨回公道,是否该寻求更大胆的出路了。

Not long earlier, a hitherto unknown group called ISIS—the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—had set up an office in town, unfurling a black banner that proclaimed “There is no god but God, and Muhammad is His Prophet.” ISIS members milling outside the building were heavily armed, but it wasn’t obvious to residents what their plans were for Manbij. Some of the members were foreigners from Egypt and Iraq, but others hailed from the countryside outside the city.

不久前,一个此前不为人知的名为ISIS——伊拉克和叙利亚伊斯兰国——的组织在镇上设立了一个办事处,挂起一面黑色旗帜,上面写着“万物非主,唯有真主,穆罕默德是主的使者”。ISIS成员在楼外转悠,全副武装,但居民们并不清楚他们对曼比季有何打算。其中一些成员是来自埃及和伊拉克的外国人,但另一些则来自城外的乡村地区。

Abdul Hadi sought out an ISIS commander and explained the frustrations of Musa’s family. The commander listened patiently but replied that ISIS could not interfere with the judicial process in the city, because they were just one faction among many—that is, unless the people themselves demanded it. If the public lost faith in the judicial institutions of Manbij, then, and only then, could ISIS intervene.

阿卜杜勒·哈迪找到了一名ISIS指挥官,向他讲述了穆萨一家的困境。指挥官耐心听完后回应道,ISIS无法干涉该市的司法程序,因为他们只是众多派系中的一支——除非民众主动提出要求。倘若曼比季的司法机构失去了民众的信任,届时,也只有到那时,ISIS才能介入。

On June 13th, under a blazing sun, Abdul Hadi gathered with some two hundred residents for a rally, with Musa’s relatives in tow. “The people want the execution of criminals!” they chanted, while marching toward the old cultural center. From within, ISIS guards watched the throngs. The door did not open.

6月13日,烈日当空,阿卜杜勒·哈迪(Abdul Hadi)与约两百名居民聚集游行,穆萨的亲属也在其中。“人民要求处决罪犯!”他们高呼着口号,朝旧文化中心行进。伊斯兰国的守卫从建筑内部注视着人群。那扇门始终紧闭。

Abdul Hadi led the procession toward Main Street. Protesters held banners decrying criminality and calling for law and order. Men and women stepped onto their balconies, watching the crowd stream past—not an unusual sight there since liberation, except that now there were no tri-star revolutionary flags, no banners calling for freedom. Instead, the word that the protesters shouted was “justice.” They wanted to be able to sleep soundly at night, to be able to send their children to school, to make a living, to simply live. As the mass moved down Main Street, it grew. Soon there were six hundred people. The procession passed the headquarters of various Free Syrian Army factions, at whom the protesters hurled bitter insults for failing to protect the city. By late afternoon, the crowd had reached the central courthouse, where the five suspects had been detained, and demanded swift justice.

阿卜杜勒·哈迪(Abdul Hadi)带领着游行队伍走向主街。抗议者高举横幅,谴责犯罪行为,呼吁法律与秩序。男男女女走上阳台,看着人群如溪流般经过——自解放以来,这景象在当地并不罕见,只是如今不再有三星革命旗帜,也没有呼吁自由的标语。取而代之的,是抗议者高喊的那个词:“正义”。他们只求能夜夜安眠,能送孩子上学,能谋生,能活下去。当人群沿着主街行进时,队伍不断壮大,很快聚集了六百人。游行队伍经过各派自由叙利亚军的指挥部时,抗议者向这些未能保护城市的武装组织投去尖锐的辱骂。傍晚时分,人群抵达中央法院——五名嫌疑人正被关押于此——要求立即伸张正义。

Suddenly, three vehicles raced toward the crowd. Some ten ISIS members jumped out—perhaps the entire group then in Manbij—and stationed themselves around the courthouse. The ISIS commander with whom Abdul Hadi had spoken approached the building’s guards and demanded to enter. The policemen refused and ordered him back.

突然,三辆车疾驰冲向人群。大约十名“伊斯兰国”成员跳下车——这或许是当时曼比季的全部兵力——迅速包围了法院大楼。曾与阿卜杜勒·哈迪交谈过的那名“伊斯兰国”指挥官走向建筑守卫,要求进入。警察断然拒绝,勒令他立即后退。

The commander opened his vest to reveal a bomb strapped to his chest. “I’ll use it!” he shouted. “I have no fear!”

指挥官敞开外套,露出绑在胸前的炸弹。“我会引爆它!”他吼道,“我无所畏惧!”

The police backed away.

警察向后退去。

“The people of Manbij and the relatives of the deceased have asked for justice,” the commander declared. “The people have asked us to deal with this case, and we’re here to fulfill their wishes.” The stunned policemen opened the door. ISIS members gathered the suspects and stuffed them into their vehicles. As they drove off, a cheer went up from the crowd.

“曼比季的民众和死者家属要求伸张正义,”指挥官宣布。“人民要求我们处理此案,我们正是来满足他们的愿望。”惊愕的警察打开了门。伊斯兰国成员将嫌疑人集中起来塞进车辆。当车队驶离时,人群中爆发出欢呼声。

Later, Abdul Hadi met with several friends to discuss the astonishing episode. He hailed the commander’s follow-through—he had done exactly as he’d promised, waiting for residents to call for ISIS to intervene. These people aren’t afraid of anything, one of Abdul Hadi’s friends exclaimed. Perhaps they were exactly what the city needed.

后来,阿卜杜勒·哈迪(Abdul Hadi)与几位朋友见面,讨论这起令人震惊的事件。他称赞了那位指挥官的言出必行——他完全履行了承诺,等待居民主动请求ISIS介入。“这些人什么都不怕,”阿卜杜勒·哈迪的一位朋友感叹道。或许他们正是这座城市所需要的。

Locked in a room at ISIS headquarters, the five suspects desperately tried to work out a plan. It turned out that only three of them, including Manhal and Karoom, had been present at the murder scene. One of the other two was Manhal’s brother, Ayman. He was just sixteen, and he had known nothing about the crime. Manhal was pacing the room, near tears. Ayman, moved by his brother’s plight, offered to confess to the crime. Because he was underage, he expected lenience.

被关在伊斯兰国总部的一个房间里,五名嫌犯拼命想制定一个计划。原来,只有包括曼哈尔和卡鲁姆在内的三人当时在谋杀现场。另外两人中有一个是曼哈尔的弟弟艾曼。他才十六岁,对罪行一无所知。曼哈尔在房间里踱步,几乎要哭出来。艾曼被哥哥的困境打动,主动提出认罪。因为他未成年,他希望能得到宽大处理。

At the time, ISIS was an obscure organization. But it soon became known around the world as an armed group bent on establishing a caliphate governed by Sharia law. For most Westerners, the phrase “Sharia law” conjures images of sword-wielding fanatics with medieval sensibilities. Traditionally, though, less than ten per cent of Sharia—which means “religious law” in Arabic—relates to criminal injuries like murder, rape, or theft. The rest concerns prosaic matters of marital and family relations, commercial transactions, and ritual.

当时,“伊斯兰国”还只是个名不见经传的组织。但很快,这个致力于建立伊斯兰教法统治的哈里发国的武装团体便举世皆知。对多数西方人而言,“伊斯兰教法”这个词总会让人联想到挥舞刀剑、秉持中世纪观念的狂热分子。然而传统上,阿拉伯语中意为“宗教律法”的伊斯兰教法,涉及谋杀、强奸或盗窃等刑事伤害的内容不足百分之十,其余都是婚姻家庭关系、商业交易和宗教仪式的日常事务。

In the early years of Islam, when states hardly existed as such in the Arab world, Sharia helped communities to manage their own affairs, based on a set of guidelines drawn from the Quran and on the sayings of the Prophet. The system emphasized community stability and accord. In the case of murder, for example, the victim’s next of kin had the power to decide remedial action: they could choose retaliation, or accept blood money, or grant a pardon. Judges often encouraged the payment of blood money, and, in the early centuries of Islamic rule, capital punishment was applied far less than one might expect. Other penalties, like stoning in the case of adultery, were severe but almost impossible to implement in practice: there had to be four male witnesses to the act of penetration.

在伊斯兰教早期,阿拉伯世界几乎不存在现代意义上的国家,伊斯兰教法(Sharia)帮助社群依据《古兰经》中的一系列准则和先知穆罕默德的言行管理自身事务。这一体系强调社群的稳定与和谐。以谋杀案为例,受害者的近亲有权决定补救措施:他们可以选择以命抵命,或接受血金(blood money),或予以宽恕。法官常常鼓励支付血金,在伊斯兰统治的最初几个世纪里,死刑的适用远比人们想象的要少。其他刑罚,如通奸案中的石刑,虽然严酷,但在实践中几乎不可能执行:必须有四名男性目击者见证性交行为。

Sharia law waned in influence as many Arab lands succumbed to foreign domination. In the post-colonial era, Arab dictators established secular laws, but these legal systems favored the ruling clique. By the nineteen-seventies, some Arab thinkers had begun looking with nostalgia to the halcyon days of early Islam, when everyone, from the caliph to the lowliest peasant, was—so they imagined—subject to the same law.

随着许多阿拉伯土地沦于外国统治,伊斯兰教法的影响力日渐式微。在后殖民时代,阿拉伯独裁者们建立了世俗法律体系,但这些法律制度往往偏袒统治集团。到了二十世纪七十年代,一些阿拉伯思想家开始怀念伊斯兰早期的黄金岁月——在他们想象中,那个时代从哈里发到最卑微的农民,人人都受同一部法律的约束。

In Syria, this remained a minority view. At the beginning of the revolution in Manbij, almost no one called for imposing Sharia. The collective dream was for a new, democratic structure that could replace Assad’s ossified legal regime. But, after eleven months of self-rule led to a surge in violent crime and yawning inequality, nostalgia for a purer form of justice began to crop up in the pages of the press and in public lectures.

在叙利亚,这仍属少数派观点。曼比季革命初期,几乎无人呼吁实施伊斯兰教法。人们共同的梦想是建立一个全新的民主架构,取代阿萨德僵化的法律体系。然而,当十一个月的自治导致暴力犯罪激增、不平等现象日益加剧后,对更纯粹正义形式的怀念开始见诸报端,并出现在公开演讲中。

One day, half a dozen foreigners from ISIS held a meeting with Abdul Hadi and other members of the Revolutionary Youth Movement. An ISIS commander told Abdul Hadi that his group harbored no interest in accruing political power in the city. Instead, members devoted every waking breath to restoring Sharia and, by doing so, heralding a new era of blind and impartial justice. Abdul Hadi came away fascinated.

一天,六名来自ISIS的外国人与阿卜杜勒·哈迪(Abdul Hadi)及革命青年运动的其他成员举行了一次会议。一位ISIS指挥官告诉阿卜杜勒·哈迪,他的组织对在这座城市积累政治权力毫无兴趣。相反,成员们将醒着的每一刻都奉献于恢复伊斯兰教法,并以此宣告一个盲目而公正的正义新时代的到来。阿卜杜勒·哈迪离开时,已被深深吸引。

The ISIS contingent then invited Musa’s father to visit their headquarters, where the suspects remained in their custody, and presented him with an option straight from Sharia: As next of kin, what redress did he want for the spilling of blood?

随后,伊斯兰国分队邀请穆萨的父亲前往其总部——嫌疑人仍被关押在那里——并向他提出了一项直接源自伊斯兰教法的选择:作为血亲,他想要为流血事件寻求何种补偿?

Musa’s father was a kindly old man, and he said that he was willing to pardon everyone in the car that day—or almost everyone. He was stuck deep in the recesses of shock and grief at the loss of the boy who’d labored by his side for so long, a boy who’d never harmed anyone and who had sat behind the wheel of that silver Saab from sunrise to sundown for the family. He could not, try as he might, forgive Karoom, who pulled the trigger. “Let the others go,” he said, weeping. “Let them go, but, for God’s sake, I don’t forgive Karoom.”

穆萨的父亲是一位慈祥的老人,他说愿意原谅那天车上的所有人——或者说几乎所有人。失去这个长久以来在他身边辛勤劳作的男孩,让他深陷震惊与悲痛的深渊。这个男孩从未伤害过任何人,每天从日出到日落都坐在那辆银色萨博车的方向盘后为这个家庭奔波。尽管他努力尝试,却始终无法原谅扣动扳机的卡鲁姆。“放了其他人吧,”他流着泪说,“放了他们,但看在上帝的份上,我绝不原谅卡鲁姆。”

The next morning, July 5th, gunmen appeared atop the Manbij Hotel, which overlooks the city’s central square. Flowing from the roof to the street was the massive tricolor flag that revolutionaries had hung on liberation day. Over the months, citizens had written on the fabric the names of men and women lost to strikes by the Assad regime. The flag had become a landmark, a giant adornment in the heart of downtown. The gunmen removed the revolutionary flag and replaced it with the black banner of ISIS. The new flag was four stories long.

次日清晨,也就是7月5日,枪手出现在俯瞰市中心广场的曼比季酒店楼顶。从屋顶垂挂至街面的巨幅三色旗,是革命者在解放日悬挂的旗帜。数月来,市民们在这面旗帜上写满了被阿萨德政权空袭夺去生命的男女姓名。这面旗帜已成为地标,是市中心一颗巨大的徽章。枪手们撤下革命旗帜,换上了伊斯兰国的黑色旗帜。新旗帜足有四层楼高。

Jihadi singing blared through the speakers. Masked ISIS members set up a stage. Across town, word flew from tongue to tongue that the group would announce its judgment against the murderers. A large crowd—including senators and other members of the city’s revolutionary government—gathered outside the hotel. At the entrance, busy setting up tables and pasting ISIS flags onto the wall, was Abdul Hadi. He’d never had much time for religion, but he was impressed by the group’s seriousness.

圣战歌曲从扬声器中轰鸣而出。蒙面的ISIS成员搭起舞台。消息在城中口耳相传,说这个组织即将宣布对凶手的判决。一大群人——包括参议员和该市革命政府的其他成员——聚集在酒店外。入口处,阿卜杜勒·哈迪正忙着摆桌子、往墙上贴ISIS旗帜。他过去从未在宗教上投入太多时间,但这个组织的严肃作风让他印象深刻。

A jeep drove up, and a man wearing a vest laced with explosives stepped out. Three men, hooded and shackled, were herded onto the stage. The singing ceased. The man wearing the explosives took the microphone. He introduced himself—in an Egyptian accent—as the “prince” of a nearby ISIS branch. “I swear by God, we did not come here with the aspiration of ruling over you,” he began. “We only want to implement God’s law on earth.” He spoke about the role of Sharia throughout history, its application in the glory days of the early Islamic empires, its disappearance with colonialism and the secular dictatorships. He announced that the time had come to revive God’s law.

一辆吉普车驶来,一名身穿绑满炸药的背心的男子走下车。三名头罩黑布、身戴镣铐的男子被押上舞台。歌声戛然而止。身绑炸药的男子接过麦克风,用带着埃及口音的阿拉伯语自我介绍——他是附近“伊斯兰国”分支的“王子”。“我向真主起誓,我们来到这里并非为了统治你们,”他开场说道,“我们只想在世间践行真主的律法。”他讲述了伊斯兰教法在历史上的作用,在早期伊斯兰帝国辉煌时代的应用,以及随着殖民主义和世俗独裁统治而消失的过程。他宣布,复兴真主律法的时刻已经到来。

Because ISIS feared God, the Egyptian went on, it wanted the people of Manbij to fear God, as well. God had prescribed in the Holy Quran the limits of human behavior, and those who feared His majesty should submit to His laws. No human community can survive, he continued, without justice. A community in which man is free to kill or rape is no community at all—it is the jungle. “Here, in Manbij, the people have suffered the rule of the jungle, and the God-fearing among you have beseeched us to apply God’s law,” he said. He then recounted the murder of Musa Jasim, his betrayal by people he believed to be his friends, the stolen car, the confessions. He added that the criminals had been a gang that had raped and killed others—they had kidnapped a ten-year-old girl, repeatedly raping her for a week and then killing her.

这位埃及人接着说,因为“伊斯兰国”敬畏真主,所以也希望曼比季的人民同样敬畏真主。真主在《古兰经》中规定了人类行为的界限,凡敬畏其威严者都应遵从其律法。他继续道,没有哪个人类社会能在缺乏正义的情况下存续。一个任由杀戮与强奸横行的地方根本不能称为社会——那是丛林法则。“在曼比季,人们曾饱受丛林法则之苦,你们当中敬畏真主的人恳请我们施行真主之法。”他说道。随后他详述了穆萨·贾西姆遇害案始末:嫌犯被自认的朋友出卖,被盗的汽车,以及最终招供的经过。他补充说,这些罪犯是个犯罪团伙,还犯下其他强奸杀人案——他们曾绑架一名十岁女童,连续强奸一周后将其杀害。

A gasp went through the crowd. No one had heard of these additional crimes.

人群中传来一阵倒吸冷气的声音。没人听说过这些额外的罪行。

The Egyptian declared, “It has fallen to our judges to implement God’s wishes, and because of these heinous crimes, these men”—he read three names, including those of Karoom and Ayman, the sixteen-year-old who had made the false confession to save his brother—“are hereby sentenced to death.”

这位埃及法官宣布:“执行神的旨意,已落在我们法官的肩上。鉴于这些滔天罪行,我宣布——”他宣读了三个名字,包括卡鲁姆和十六岁的艾曼(那个为救兄长而作伪供的少年)——“判处死刑。”

A cry rose from other ISIS members: “God is great!” The crowd was silent.

其他伊斯兰国成员中响起一声呼喊:“真主至大!”人群一片死寂。

Masked ISIS fighters chiselled three indentations into the hotel’s façade. The three prisoners were dragged to the wall and made to kneel, their backs to the crowd, their heads fitted into the indentations. A fighter in a balaclava read out a statement containing several verses of the Quran pertaining to the punishment of criminals, and pronounced that “these people were not wronged by anyone, but they wronged themselves by committing murder and theft.”

蒙面的ISIS武装分子在酒店外墙上凿出三个凹槽。三名囚犯被拖到墙边,被迫跪下,背对人群,头颅被塞进凹槽。一名戴着巴拉克拉瓦头套的武装分子宣读声明,其中引用了《古兰经》中关于惩罚罪犯的若干经文,并宣告“这些人并非受他人所害,而是因犯下谋杀与盗窃之罪而自食其果”。

The gunmen took aim. The prisoners remained still. No one in the crowd budged. Maybe they wanted to understand this new order, to fill their hearts with it. Maybe they had simply had enough. Maybe some stayed for the sheer pornography of it all. Shots were fired, the bodies jerked, and the cry rose again from the masked men: “God is great!”

枪手举枪瞄准。囚犯们一动不动。人群中无人挪步。或许他们想弄明白这新秩序,想把它装进心里。或许他们只是受够了。或许有人留下,只为见证这赤裸裸的暴力场面。枪声响起,躯体抽搐,蒙面人再次高喊:“真主至大!”

ISIS fighters loaded the bodies onto the back of a four-by-four and drove this grim exhibit slowly through the streets. The crowd did not disperse.

伊斯兰国武装分子将尸体装上一辆四驱皮卡,载着这阴森的展品缓缓驶过街道。人群并未散去。

Suddenly, someone shouted, “Airplane!”

突然,有人大喊:“飞机!”

There was a mad scramble—people running in every direction, some tumbling over others. But when they eventually looked up, they saw nothing but blue. The cry had been a ploy by ISIS to get everyone to leave.

人群陷入疯狂奔逃——人们四散奔跑,有人被绊倒在地。但当他们终于抬头张望时,眼前只有一片湛蓝。那声呼喊不过是“伊斯兰国”为驱散人群设下的诡计。

That evening, a relative of Ayman, the slain sixteen-year-old, went to the old cultural center and confronted the Egyptian ISIS leader. “How can you execute someone?” he demanded. “Who gave you the right?”

当晚,遇害的十六岁少年艾曼的一位亲属来到旧文化中心,当面质问埃及籍的“伊斯兰国”头目。“你们怎能处决一个人?”他质问道,“谁给了你们这种权力?”

“We are only implementing God’s law.”

“我们只是在执行上帝的律法。”

“But, according to Sharia, the next of kin has the choice, and he chose to pardon Ayman.” The relative reiterated that Ayman had confessed only to save his brother. The ISIS leader countered that Ayman was guilty of heinous crimes, including rape.

“但根据伊斯兰教法,近亲有权选择,而他选择了赦免艾曼。”这位亲属重申,艾曼认罪只是为了拯救他的兄弟。ISIS头目则反驳称,艾曼犯下了包括强奸在内的滔天罪行。

“Which girl is this that they raped? Show her to me.”

“被他们强奸的是哪个女孩?带她来见我。”

He did not receive an answer, and was asked to leave. In fact, there had been no rape, no criminal gang—the trumped-up charges were ISIS’s way of insuring popular support for the executions. The group even spread the fake news to various newspapers, which soon reported that all three of the deceased had been guilty of rape.

他没有得到答复,反而被要求离开。事实上,根本不存在强奸案,也没有犯罪团伙——这些捏造的指控是伊斯兰国(ISIS)确保民众支持处决的手段。该组织甚至将假新闻散布给多家报社,很快就有报道称三名死者都犯有强奸罪。

Abdul Hadi had helped set up the stage; he’d even arranged for the sewing of the black flag. But he had not expected executions in a city square—he’d been certain that there would be a timely public trial, followed by imprisonment. He told his friends that he felt as if someone had plunged a knife into his stomach. He could not sleep for days. He found one of the executioners, a Tunisian, and asked how he could sleep at night. The Tunisian replied, “It was the first time I’ve killed, and let me tell you, in my entire life I have not slept with such peace as I slept last night.” Abdul Hadi found himself without words. He swore to his comrades in the Revolutionary Youth Movement that he’d never go by the ISIS headquarters again. But they could not hide their disgust. “What did you expect?” a friend demanded. “Do you know who you are dealing with?” One by one, they quit the Revolutionary Youth Movement and avoided Abdul Hadi. He was now on his own.

阿卜杜勒·哈迪曾帮忙搭建行刑台,甚至张罗缝制了那面黑色旗帜。但他从未料想会在城市广场公开处决——他原以为会有一场及时的公开审判,随后是监禁。他告诉朋友们,自己感觉像被人捅了一刀。他连续数日无法入眠。他找到其中一名来自突尼斯的行刑者,质问对方夜晚如何安睡。突尼斯人答道:“这是我第一次杀人,但说实话,我这辈子从没像昨晚睡得那么安稳。”阿卜杜勒·哈迪顿时语塞。他向革命青年运动的同志们发誓,再也不会踏足伊斯兰国总部附近。但同伴们掩饰不住鄙夷。“你当初指望什么?”一位朋友质问道,“你清楚自己在和什么人打交道吗?”他们陆续退出革命青年运动,纷纷疏远阿卜杜勒·哈迪。他成了孤身一人。

The next day, a freshly painted message was written on the wall of the old cultural center: “The Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria invites citizens to register any concerns about life in the city with us.”

次日,旧文化中心的墙上新刷了一行标语:“伊拉克和大叙利亚伊斯兰国诚邀市民登记关于城市生活的任何诉求。”

With the loss of his friends, Abdul Hadi began turning up at ISIS headquarters, spending hours sipping tea and watching battle videos. He wasn’t sure what to make of the wild-haired men at the cultural center, or if he could even trust them, but with them, at least, he did not feel alone. He had often mocked rival brigades for adopting Muslim names; now he quit drinking and studied the Quran. His former friends joked that he had begun dressing like someone from Afghanistan.

朋友们相继离去后,阿卜杜勒·哈迪开始频繁出现在ISIS总部,一坐就是几个小时,边喝茶边观看战斗视频。文化中心里那些头发蓬乱的男人们让他捉摸不透,他甚至不确定能否信任这些人,但至少和他们在一起时,他不觉得孤单。他曾经常嘲笑敌对旅团采用穆斯林名字的做法;如今他自己戒了酒,开始研读《古兰经》。昔日的朋友们开玩笑说,他的穿着打扮越来越像阿富汗人了。

The executions had shaken many Manbij residents, but others—disturbed by the crime and disorder—were grateful that someone was finally willing to take a stand.

处决事件令曼比季的许多居民深感不安,但也有人——因犯罪与混乱而忧心忡忡——终于有人愿意挺身而出,他们对此心怀感激。

ISIS, emboldened, began to make forays into the city’s political life. It launched the Fertile Crescent, an assembly that held Quran-memorization competitions for children, conducted lectures on Islamic history, and distributed alms to the poor. ISIS also founded a charity, which held lectures on Sharia, Arabic, math, physics, and chemistry, to “raise awareness of science.” At the start of Ramadan, ISIS members handed out dates and figs to families displaced by the war, and contributed to citywide collection efforts to provide poor families with a free iftar meal, to break the day’s fast. These activities, in the context of rising prices and insecurity, won the newcomers growing respect. A newspaper called al-Ra’y al-Horr (“Free Opinion”) ran an interview with a preacher who declared that ISIS fighters have a “zeal for religion and God’s law . . . but they can’t rise up on their own.”

伊斯兰国(ISIS)气焰日盛,开始向这座城市的政治生活渗透。它发起了“新月沃土”计划,为儿童举办《古兰经》背诵比赛,开设伊斯兰历史讲座,并向穷人施舍救济。伊斯兰国还成立了一个慈善机构,开设伊斯兰教法、阿拉伯语、数学、物理和化学课程,旨在“提升科学意识”。斋月伊始,伊斯兰国成员向因战争流离失所的家庭分发椰枣和无花果,并参与全市范围的募捐活动,为贫困家庭提供免费开斋饭。在物价飞涨、安全堪忧的背景下,这些举动为这些新来者赢得了越来越多的尊重。一份名为《自由观点》的报纸刊登了对一位传教士的采访,他宣称伊斯兰国战士“对宗教和真主的律法充满热忱……但他们无法独自崛起”。

The Fertile Crescent Assembly resolved to “clean up” the city by scrubbing the walls of slogans praising democracy. Supporters of the revolutionary government, which had been chosen in a citywide election, watched ISIS’s campaign with alarm. They vetted the imams of the city’s forty-two mosques, to insure that they were still preaching the local Sufi brand of Islam, which was not hostile to democracy.

“新月沃土”议会决定“清理”这座城市,清除墙上歌颂民主的标语。革命政府的支持者们忧心忡忡地注视着伊斯兰国的行动。该政府是通过全市选举产生的。他们审查了城内四十二座清真寺的伊玛目,以确保这些宗教领袖仍在宣扬当地苏菲派伊斯兰教义——这种教义并不敌视民主。

The city council, meanwhile, cracked down on drug peddlers and shut down Manbij’s sole bar: they could not afford to let ISIS paint the government as dissolute. City officials also proposed banning black flags at demonstrations. They lost the vote—not because the majority favored such flags but because some politicians worried that the law would trample free-speech rights. In the end, the proposal backfired, as residents who harbored little interest in black flags began hoisting them as an assertion of their freedom of speech. Islamist groups in Manbij began organizing rallies with a sea of black fabric waving in the wind.

与此同时,市议会严厉打击毒贩,并关闭了曼比季唯一的酒吧——他们不能让ISIS将政府描绘成道德败坏的形象。市政官员还提议禁止示威活动中出现黑色旗帜。这项提案未能通过表决——并非因为多数人支持这类旗帜,而是部分政客担心该法律会践踏言论自由权利。最终,这项提案产生了反效果:原本对黑旗毫无兴趣的居民开始高举旗帜,以此宣示他们的言论自由。曼比季的伊斯兰主义团体开始组织集会,让成片的黑色旗帜在风中飘扬。

ISIS decided to up the ante.

ISIS决定加码。

The Great Mosque in downtown Manbij offered free lessons on Quranic interpretation, and the instructor, Sheikh Abu Saeed al-Dibo, was one of the city’s most respected scholars. He’d published books of poetry, a history of Manbij, and a treatise on Orientalism.

曼比季市中心的大清真寺提供免费的《古兰经》解读课程,授课者谢赫·阿布·赛义德·迪博(Sheikh Abu Saeed al-Dibo)是当地最受尊敬的学者之一。他出版过诗集、曼比季地方史专著,还有一部关于东方主义的论述。

On July 9, 2013, he was delivering a lesson when an argument broke out between him and a young Tunisian in the class, who was a member of ISIS. At issue was Sheikh Dibo’s description of the prayer that locals tend to say when visiting a grave; to the ISIS member, such prayers were sacrilege. The heart of the matter lay in when, or to whom, one might pray. Sheikh Dibo was schooled in Sufism, one of the dominant strains of Islam in northern Syria. Sufism held at its center the strange, fantastical, miraculous figure of the saint, to whom one might pray for miracles.

2013年7月9日,他正在授课时,与班上一位年轻的突尼斯人发生了争执——此人是“伊斯兰国”成员。争论的焦点是迪博谢赫对当地人扫墓时惯常诵念的祷文的描述;在这位“伊斯兰国”成员看来,此类祈祷实属亵渎。问题的核心在于:人们何时可以祈祷,或向谁祈祷。迪博谢赫受教于苏菲主义,这是叙利亚北部伊斯兰教的主要流派之一。苏菲主义的核心是神秘、奇幻、能行神迹的圣徒形象——人们可以向圣徒祈求奇迹。

To ISIS, which owes its theological roots to the austere Islam of Saudi Arabia, worshipping at the tombs of saints was rank superstition. In fact, praying to saints or ancestors elevated them above the status of mere mortals, effectively denying the singular might of God. Sheikh Dibo’s instructions on how to pray at the grave, as innocuous as they may have sounded to most Manbij residents, struck the Tunisian ISIS member as a disavowal of monotheism itself.

伊斯兰国(ISIS)的神学根源可追溯至沙特阿拉伯的严苛伊斯兰教派,在他们看来,在圣徒墓前祈祷是十足的迷信。事实上,向圣徒或祖先祈祷是将他们提升至凡人之上,这实质上否定了真主的独一性。对大多数曼比季居民而言,谢赫·迪博关于如何在墓前祈祷的指导或许听起来无伤大雅,但在这位突尼斯籍伊斯兰国成员耳中,这无异于对一种论的背弃。

As the argument grew heated, Sheikh Dibo could not believe the young foreigner’s insolence. The sheikh had studied religious law at Damascus University and earned a master’s degree in Lebanon; the Tunisian had not completed a day’s worth of religious study in his life, relying instead on YouTube videos and stray sermons. “I have as many qualifications as you have years in age,” Sheikh Dibo declared. To the Tunisian, though, that was precisely the problem: Islam was saddled with such men, who acted as gatekeepers to true knowledge. Saints, imams, and sheikhs stood between the individual and God. By rejecting such figures, ISIS was attempting something akin to the Protestant Reformation for Islam, in which the religion would be open to anyone who chose to believe, direct and unmediated. To Sheikh Dibo, this sounded like madness. “If you want to learn about your religion, I’ll teach you!” he thundered.

争论愈演愈烈,谢赫·迪博(Sheikh Dibo)简直不敢相信这个年轻外国人的无礼。谢赫在大马士革大学学习过宗教法,还在黎巴嫩获得了硕士学位;而那个突尼斯人这辈子没正经学过一天宗教知识,全凭YouTube视频和零散的布道。“我的资历比你活的年头还多,”谢赫·迪博宣称。但在突尼斯人看来,这恰恰是问题所在:伊斯兰教被这样的人所累,他们把守着通往真知的大门。圣人、伊玛目和谢赫们横亘在个人与真主之间。通过拒绝这些人物,ISIS试图在伊斯兰世界发起一场类似新教改革的运动,让宗教向任何选择信仰的人直接敞开,无需中介。对谢赫·迪博而言,这简直是疯话。“如果你想了解你的宗教,我来教你!”他怒吼道。

That evening, ISIS summoned Sheikh Dibo to its headquarters. They debated doctrinal issues, and finally ISIS made a plea for pluralism: in a free city, the people should have the right to hear different views on the question of saints. Let different ideas compete in Manbij; let the people decide. To which the Sheikh responded, “I’ll give you the pulpit over my dead body.”

当晚,伊斯兰国将谢赫·迪博召至总部。双方就教义问题展开辩论,最终伊斯兰国竟提出多元主义诉求:在自由的城市里,民众应当有权听取关于圣徒问题的不同观点。让不同思想在曼比季自由竞争,让人民自行抉择。对此,谢赫回应道:“除非我死,否则休想登上我的讲坛。”

While Sheikh Dibo sparred with ISIS, a rumor spread through the city that he’d been detained. Hundreds of people collected across the street from the old cultural center. Under the glow of streetlamps, they chanted, “Out, out, out! The Islamic State get out!” A man shouted into a camera, “ISIS is just like the Syrian regime!” A protester later exclaimed, “We’ve been praying here since our grandfathers’ and great-grandfathers’ time. Now these foreigners are going to tell us how to worship God?”

就在谢赫·迪博与ISIS周旋之际,城中流传起他被捕的谣言。数百人聚集在老文化中心对面的街道上。街灯昏黄的光晕下,人们高呼:“滚出去,滚出去!伊斯兰国滚出去!”一名男子对着摄像机怒吼:“ISIS和叙利亚政权根本是一丘之貉!”后来有位抗议者愤然道:“从祖父曾祖父那辈起,我们就在这儿做礼拜了。现在这些外来者倒要教我们如何敬拜真主?”

When the news reached ISIS headquarters, the commanders there allowed Sheikh Dibo to leave. This was the first time demonstrators had called for the group’s expulsion. ISIS members realized they might have gone too far.

消息传到ISIS总部后,那里的指挥官允许迪博长老离开。这是示威者首次要求该组织撤离。ISIS成员意识到,他们可能做得太过火了。

The following evening, ISIS and its Fertile Crescent Assembly organized a lecture in front of the old cultural center. An ISIS member announced that the organization would be holding a religious-trivia contest that night, followed by a talk on the current state of Manbij. Among the prizes on offer were figs, gilded Qurans, and perfumes. ISIS had also organized activities for children, including hide-and-seek. A comedian delivered riffs about Assad, about how he’d been sired by donkeys, and the audience was in stitches.

第二天晚上,伊斯兰国(ISIS)及其“新月沃土议会”在老文化中心前组织了一场讲座。一名伊斯兰国成员宣布,当晚将举行宗教知识竞赛,随后是关于曼比季现状的讨论。奖品包括无花果、镀金古兰经和香水。伊斯兰国还为孩子们组织了捉迷藏等活动。一位喜剧演员即兴表演了关于阿萨德的段子,说他是由驴子所生,引得观众捧腹大笑。

An ISIS member took to the dais and argued that Manbij should be ruled by religious law—not by drunkards and thieves—and that people should not be seduced by democracy, which promises the world but cannot even put food in bellies. A bag of bread now cost a hundred liras—seven times what it had cost when Manbij was “liberated.” Olive oil and other staples were similarly out of reach.

一名“伊斯兰国”成员登上讲台,坚称曼比季应当由宗教法统治——而非醉汉与窃贼——并告诫民众不要被民主制度蛊惑,这种制度许诺整个世界,却连填饱肚子都做不到。如今一袋面包售价一百里拉,是曼比季“解放”时价格的七倍。橄榄油等生活必需品同样令人难以企及。

ISIS, he explained, had fought many battles outside the city, and was building a new empire—an Islamic caliphate where nobody would go hungry or live in fear. “Peace and prosperity will only come with Sharia!” he shouted. The crowd applauded.

他解释道,伊斯兰国已在城外打过许多仗,正在建立一个新帝国——一个伊斯兰哈里发国,在那里没有人会挨饿或生活在恐惧中。“只有实行伊斯兰教法,才能带来和平与繁荣!”他喊道。人群报以掌声。

That September, ISIS seized the city’s grain mills, on the ground that the ruling élite was changing so much that everyday people were starving. But the group still didn’t control the city. All autumn, ISIS continued its propaganda offensive, holding seminars detailing life under religious law. They culled examples from the history of early Islam, when the differences between rich and poor were, they said, minimal, when leaders were bound by a moral code that superseded their earthly whims. They told stories of the leaders of the first Muslim communities—caliphs—who kept greedy merchants at heel, enforcing price controls. They extolled zakat, the ancient practice of giving alms to the poor, one of the five pillars of Islam. They disseminated videos and pamphlets promoting the glories of living in a caliphate—universal public housing, free health care, cities so secure you could leave your doors open at night. No more kidnappings, no more checkpoints. No more families torn apart, with sons in far-flung lands, sweating under the hot sun in construction sites, returning home only once a year. The picture was of an Islamic welfare state, where cities were ruled not by the wealthy or the well connected but by the just.

那年九月,伊斯兰国占领了该市的磨坊,理由是统治精英更迭频繁,导致平民百姓忍饥挨饿。但该组织仍未控制这座城市。整个秋天,伊斯兰国持续发动宣传攻势,举办研讨会详细介绍宗教法下的生活。他们从早期伊斯兰历史中筛选案例,声称那时的贫富差距极小,领导者受道德准则约束,超越世俗欲望。他们讲述首批穆斯林社群领袖——哈里发——的故事,这些领袖遏制贪婪商人,实施价格管制。他们颂扬天课(zakat)——这项古老的施舍穷人的实践是伊斯兰五功之一。他们散播视频和小册子,宣扬哈里发国生活的荣光:全民公共住房、免费医疗、夜不闭户的安全城市。不再有绑架,不再有检查站。不再有家庭骨肉分离——儿子们不必远赴他乡,在烈日下的建筑工地挥汗如雨,每年只能回家一次。他们描绘的是一个伊斯兰福利国家的图景:城市由公正者统治,而非权贵。

ISIS members opened educational centers in Manbij to teach basic science and history. They dispatched volunteers to visit the ill and the wounded in hospitals, distributing dates and milk. They gave Qurans and perfume to patients. They took up collections at mosques for displaced people. Wherever they went, they swore that, under an Islamic state, the government would provide such services. Manbij had known fear and division for too long; under their rule, it would know brotherhood and sisterhood. The greatness of the city would be measured by the fates of the least among them.

伊斯兰国成员在曼比季开设了教育中心,教授基础科学和历史。他们派遣志愿者前往医院探望病患和伤员,分发椰枣和牛奶。他们向病人赠送《古兰经》和香水。他们在清真寺为流离失所者募捐。所到之处,他们都誓言在伊斯兰国治下,政府将提供此类服务。曼比季经历了太久的恐惧与分裂;在他们的统治下,这座城市将迎来兄弟情谊。这座城市的伟大,将以其中最卑微者的命运来衡量。

The revolutionaries who ran Manbij could not understand the allure of such a message. They hadn’t risked their lives for free health care and price controls—they had braved bullets and prison for values greater and more noble than material goods. In a statement, the elected senators of Manbij reminded the city: “We declare that this revolution is a revolution of dignity and not a revolution of the hungry! Because if we were hungry, we would have accepted the Assad regime, under which bread cost fifteen Syrian liras!”

曼比季的革命者们无法理解这种诉求的吸引力。他们并非为了免费医疗和价格管制而冒生命危险——他们直面子弹与牢狱,是为了比物质利益更崇高、更珍贵的价值。曼比季民选参议员在一份声明中提醒全城:“我们宣告,这场革命是尊严的革命,而非饥饿者的革命!倘若我们只为果腹,大可以接受阿萨德政权统治,那时面包不过十五叙利亚里拉!”

After a year of crisis upon crisis, these words felt tone-deaf to most residents. Those who spoke loudest about “dignity” were those who did not have to worry about their next meal. They did not have to send their sons off to foreign lands to beg for work.

历经一年的重重危机,这番言论在多数居民听来显得不合时宜。那些将“尊严”喊得最响的人,恰恰是无需为下一餐饭发愁的人。他们不必将儿子送往异国他乡乞求工作机会。

One morning, two masked men approached Sheikh Dibo and fired. He died instantly. ISIS then began warning the city’s independent newspapers and threatening its elected politicians. The pro-democracy revolutionaries attempted to rally the masses to march against ISIS, as they had over the summer. But now, after months of spiralling prices, few people were willing to stand with the elected city government.

一天清晨,两名蒙面男子走近谢赫·迪博(Sheikh Dibo)并开枪。他当场死亡。随后,ISIS开始警告该市的独立报纸,并威胁民选政客。支持民主的革命者试图像夏天那样,再次动员群众游行反对ISIS。但如今,在物价连续数月飞涨之后,几乎没有人愿意站出来支持民选市政府。

In December, Manbij witnessed a freak blizzard, one of the harshest in memory. ISIS members immediately seized the advantage. They plowed roads and markets, and volunteered as traffic police. They distributed free bread in the central square and in the camps for displaced people. They demanded price controls and denounced rapacious landlords. ISIS was now the most popular entity in the city, armed or civilian.

去年12月,曼比季遭遇了一场罕见的暴风雪,是当地记忆中最为严酷的雪灾之一。伊斯兰国成员立即抓住了这个机会。他们清扫道路和市场,自愿充当交通警察。他们在中央广场和流离失所者营地分发免费面包。他们要求控制物价,并谴责贪婪的房东。伊斯兰国如今成了这座城市最受欢迎的实体,无论是武装组织还是平民机构。

Eight months of painstaking political work—building coalitions, establishing civic front organizations, circulating propaganda, well-timed theatre—had won ISIS a decisive following. Revolutionaries had braved bullets and prison to overthrow the dictatorship and build a fledgling democracy. In the beginning, they had the allegiance of the masses, who marched through the alleyways and plazas chanting in praise of freedom. But now people spoke only of the prices at the grocer, the cost of rent. The city had exhausted itself, and people hoped not for liberation but deliverance.

八个月苦心经营的政治工作——建立联盟、设立民间阵线组织、散播宣传、把握时机的戏剧化行动——为ISIS赢得了决定性的追随者。革命者们曾冒着枪林弹雨和牢狱之灾推翻独裁统治,建立起稚嫩的民主政体。起初,他们拥有民众的忠诚,人们穿行于街巷广场,高歌自由赞歌。但如今人们只谈论杂货铺的物价、房租的涨跌。这座城市已精疲力竭,人们不再期盼解放,只渴望救赎。

Syria is hardly the only example of this phenomenon. Persistent economic inequality has long sounded democracy’s death knell. In the latter years of the Roman Republic, landowners amassed unprecedented riches while plebeians floundered, spawning resentment that infected many corners of society. In the context of this soaring inequality—that is, of ordinary people’s loss of power—there appeared, for the first time, populist politicians like Julius Caesar, who promised reforms while accruing dangerous degrees of power themselves. Other élites fiercely resisted the populist surge but refused to make meaningful concessions to address the citizenry’s core grievances. Ultimately, civil war led to the fall of the Republic and the rise of dictatorship.

叙利亚远非这一现象的唯一例证。长期存在的经济不平等,早已敲响了民主的丧钟。在罗马共和国后期,土地所有者积累了前所未有的财富,而平民阶层却在困境中挣扎,由此滋生的怨恨情绪渗透到社会的各个角落。正是在这种不平等急剧加剧——即普通民众权力丧失——的背景下,首次出现了尤利乌斯·凯撒这样的民粹主义政客,他们一面承诺改革,一面为自己攫取危险程度的权力。其他精英阶层激烈抵制民粹主义的浪潮,却拒绝作出有意义的让步来解决公民的核心诉求。最终,内战导致了共和国的覆灭与独裁统治的崛起。

In 1848, a popular uprising in France overthrew the monarchy, demanding universal manhood suffrage and wealth redistribution. The revolution established government-owned workshops that employed the poor, but were bitterly opposed by the wealthy. A conservative government shut them down, prompting bloody riots. Eventually, the masses voted for Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, a nephew of the famed emperor, in a landslide. He styled himself as all things to all people—a paragon of order to the right, a champion of the poor to the left. As soon as he was elected, he cracked down on the freedoms of press and assembly, and later dissolved parliament. Before long, he declared himself emperor.

1848年,一场民众起义在法国推翻了君主制,要求实现普选权和财富再分配。革命建立了政府所有的工坊来雇用穷人,却遭到富人的激烈反对。保守派政府关闭了这些工坊,引发了血腥暴动。最终,民众以压倒性优势投票支持路易·拿破仑·波拿巴——那位著名皇帝的侄子。他把自己塑造成所有人的救星——对右翼而言是秩序的典范,对左翼而言是穷人的捍卫者。刚一当选,他就开始打压新闻与集会自由,随后解散了议会。不久之后,他便自立为帝。

Aspiring tyrants inevitably promise security and food on the table. The masses, demeaned and starved, see in tyranny a tantalizing elixir of equality and self-respect, which will liberate them from élite domination and deliver them from want and anxieties.

野心勃勃的暴君总以保障安全与温饱为诱饵。那些饱受屈辱与饥馑的民众,往往在专制统治中窥见平等与尊严的诱人幻影——仿佛这剂魔药能助他们挣脱精英阶层的桎梏,从此远离匮乏与忧惧。

On January 24, 2014, ISIS took over Manbij. That morning, Abdul Hadi climbed onto the roof of a grain silo. He ran his eyes over the vista below—the concrete blocks and warrens smelling of exhaust. He would inhabit a new city, one different than he’d ever known—the streets without squalor, the streets busy with purpose, peopled by men and women joined in common struggle. It would be a city of workshops and warehouses, simple mosques and well-kept cemeteries, but there would be no gates or lines, no rich or poor. This would be his city of justice.

2014年1月24日,“伊斯兰国”占领了曼比季。那天清晨,阿卜杜勒·哈迪(Abdul Hadi)爬上一座谷仓的屋顶。他俯瞰着下方的景象——混凝土建筑群与弥漫着尾气味的街巷迷宫。他将要栖居的是一座崭新的城市,与他所知的任何地方都不同——街道上没有肮脏污秽,街道因明确的目标而繁忙,男男女女因共同的奋斗而联结。这将是个遍布工坊与仓库、简朴清真寺与整洁墓园的城市,但不会有门禁与界限,没有贫富之分。这将是他理想中的正义之城。

The Islamic State’s tyranny drew on the cultural resources of the Middle East—Islam—while Assad’s tyranny drew upon a different but also uniquely Middle Eastern heritage, Arab nationalism. Yet the tyrannical impulse of authoritarian populists is the same across the world. In one context, the authoritarian is railing against non-Muslims; in another it is immigrants. No matter the trope, the forms of mobilization are identical: those who feel powerless and hopeless, who are embittered by the rapacious greed of élites controlling their democracy, will begin to question the idea of democracy. If tyranny is where democracies go to die, inequality is the cause of death.

伊斯兰国的暴政汲取了中东的文化资源——伊斯兰教,而阿萨德的暴政则源于另一种同样独特的中东遗产——阿拉伯民族主义。然而,威权民粹主义者的专制冲动在全球如出一辙。在某些情境下,威权者猛烈抨击非穆斯林;在另一些情境下,他们攻击移民。无论口号如何变化,动员形式完全相同:那些感到无力与绝望、因掌控民主的精英阶层贪婪掠夺而愤懑的人们,终将开始质疑民主理念本身。如果说暴政是民主的坟墓,不平等便是其死因。

The caliphate ruled Manbij for two brutal years—years of summary executions and punitive amputations. Once people realized that the Islamic State’s promises were false—that the only security they were granted was one of desolation—it was too late. One by one, residents who’d been enthralled by ISIS’s message tried to escape the city. Sometimes they succeeded, but often they were hunted down. By the time Abdul Hadi realized how wrong he’d been, there was nowhere to turn. An American-backed coalition obliterated the group and destroyed large parts of Manbij. Abdul Hadi spent his days hiding in hovels in distant parts of Syria, turning his mind obsessively over the old days of revolution, over fleeting encounters and terrible choices. He has never been able to return home. ♦

哈里发国对曼比季的统治持续了残酷的两年——那是草率处决与惩罚性截肢横行的两年。当人们终于意识到伊斯兰国的承诺不过是谎言——他们获得的唯一安全保障竟是满目疮痍——却为时已晚。那些曾被ISIS宣言蛊惑的居民,开始一个接一个试图逃离这座城市。偶有成功者,但更多人遭到追捕猎杀。等到阿卜杜勒·哈迪(Abdul Hadi)幡然醒悟自己错得多么离谱时,早已无处可逃。美国支持的联军剿灭了该组织,也将曼比季大半城区夷为废墟。阿卜杜勒·哈迪终日躲藏在叙利亚偏远角落的破屋里,思绪执拗地翻搅着革命岁月里的旧日时光,那些转瞬即逝的相遇与万劫不复的抉择。他再也未能重返故乡。♦

This is drawn from “Days of Love and Rage: A Story of Ordinary People Forging a Revolution.”

本文节选自《爱与愤怒的日子:普通人如何锻造革命的故事》。

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