The Lede

The Supreme Court’s Complicated Takedown of Trump’s Tariffs

最高法院对特朗普关税政策的复杂裁决
There are seven separate opinions—and even the Justices who agree with one another are in some ways at odds.
共有七份独立的意见书——即便是彼此认同的法官,在某些方面也存在分歧。
Donald Trump looking downward.
Photograph by Kevin Dietsch / Getty

On Friday, President Donald Trump asked reporters at the White House to consider how “ridiculous” it was that the Supreme Court had just struck down tariffs that he’d been imposing, unilaterally and gleefully, around the world since last year. As President, he had the right “to destroy foreign countries,” Trump said. “But not the right to charge a fee—how crazy is that?” He seemed to find it crazier still that two of the Justices he’d appointed—Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett—had joined John Roberts, the Chief Justice, and the Court’s three liberals in ruling against him. “I’m ashamed of certain members of the Court. Absolutely ashamed,” he said, and he thought their families should be embarrassed, too. The Justices who’d opposed him were “fools and lapdogs,” “very unpatriotic,” and probably under the sway of “foreign interests” and other “slimeballs.” He added that, by the time he was through, tariffs might be even higher than they are now.

上周五,美国总统唐纳德·特朗普在白宫要求记者们思考一下,最高法院刚刚推翻了他自去年以来在全球单方面、兴高采烈地征收的关税,这是多么“荒谬”。特朗普说,作为总统,他有权“摧毁外国”。“但没有权利收费——这有多疯狂?”他似乎觉得更疯狂的是,他任命的两名大法官——尼尔·戈萨奇和艾米·科尼·巴雷特——与首席大法官约翰·罗伯茨和法院的三名自由派一起做出了不利于他的裁决。“我为法院的某些成员感到羞耻。绝对羞耻,”他说,他认为他们的家人也应该感到尴尬。反对他的大法官是“傻瓜和走狗”,“非常不爱国”,可能受到“外国利益”和其他“卑鄙小人”的影响。他补充说,等他完事的时候,关税可能会比现在更高。

That threat was not empty. Before Friday was out, Trump had announced a new ten-per-cent worldwide tariff, with exceptions for certain countries and goods, this time under a different legal authority; by Saturday, he’d raised the rate to fifteen per cent. An odd aspect of this chapter in American economic history is that there are, in fact, statutes on the books that give Presidents the power to impose meaningful tariffs. But when Trump announced his “Liberation Day” tariffs last April, he instead invoked the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, a vaguely worded law that is dependent on a declaration of a national emergency. (He’d declared two emergencies, for good measure: drugs and migrants entering the United States from Canada, China, and Mexico; and a “large and persistent” trade deficit.) Some of those other, sounder tariff laws do have more time limits and require more of a process—an investigation, for example—which make them more difficult to deploy via Truth Social posts. There is additional uncertainty about the trade deals that Trump negotiated in recent months using the threat of roughly a gazillion dollars in tariffs as a stick. Trump’s tariff adventure is not over. But, going forward, he may have to pay more attention to the law.

这一威胁并非虚张声势。周五尚未结束,特朗普便宣布了新一轮全球范围10%的关税政策(部分国家与商品获得豁免),此次动用的法律依据与以往不同;到周六,关税税率已被上调至15%。这段美国经济史的特殊之处在于:现行法典中确实存在赋予总统实施实质性关税权力的法律条文。但去年四月特朗普宣布“解放日”关税时,援引的却是1977年《国际紧急经济权力法》——这部措辞含糊的法律需以宣布国家紧急状态为前提(为求稳妥,他当时宣布了两项紧急状态:毒品与移民从加拿大、中国和墨西哥进入美国;以及“规模庞大且持续存在”的贸易逆差)。其他更健全的关税法律确实设有更严格的时间限制与程序要求(例如需经调查),使其难以通过“真相社交”平台的一纸帖文实施。特朗普近月以数万亿美元关税为威胁筹码谈判达成的贸易协定,也存在着额外的不确定性。特朗普的关税冒险尚未终结。但展望未来,他或许需要更加审慎地对待法律框架。

In that sense, it wasn’t so much tariffs, per se, that the Court refused to endorse on Friday as it was legal laziness, recklessness, and a Trumpian sense that the White House is a kind of executive-power magic shop, in which the thinnest hint of permissiveness in an obscure statute can suddenly balloon into a limitless grant of permission for the President to do whatever he wants. At Trump’s press conference on Friday, a minute before he ruminated about the nation-wrecking damage he could still do—maybe with trade embargoes this time—he’d bragged about how “we don’t make the pennies anymore,” since his Treasury Department ended production of those coins last year. How could he, Trump, the slayer of pennies, possibly not have the power to impose tariffs?

从这个意义上讲,周五最高法院拒绝认可的与其说是关税本身,不如说是法律上的懈怠、鲁莽以及一种特朗普式的观念——认为白宫是某种行政权力的魔法商店,晦涩法规中最细微的许可暗示都可能突然膨胀为总统为所欲为的无限授权。在周五的特朗普记者会上,就在他沉思自己仍可能造成国家毁灭性损害(这次或许通过贸易禁运)的一分钟前,他还吹嘘“我们不再生产美分了”,因为他的财政部去年已停止生产这种硬币。他,特朗普,这位美分的终结者,怎么可能没有权力征收关税呢?

The case that the Court decided, Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump and Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, was the consolidation of two lawsuits, brought by small businesses and states, challenging Trump’s use of IEEPA. IEEPA is a powerful tool; its provisions include a long list of commerce-related actions, such as imposing export restrictions and quotas, that a President can take in the case of a national emergency. The problem for Trump is that “tariffs” is not on the list. Neither are related terms, like “duties” or “customs.” The entire world-market-upsetting tariff scheme—under which, Roberts wrote in the majority decision, Trump asserted that “the independent power to impose tariffs on imports from any country, of any product, at any rate, for any amount of time”—was built on nothing more than the awkward placement of the word “regulate” a couple of lines away from the word “importation.” And, as Roberts stated and a six-Justice majority found, “Those words cannot bear such weight.”

最高法院审理的“学习资源公司诉特朗普案”与“特朗普诉V.O.S.精选公司案”实为两起诉讼的合并审理,原告方包括小型企业和多个州政府,均对特朗普动用《国际紧急经济权力法》提出质疑。该法案赋予总统强大权限,其条款罗列了在国家紧急状态下可采取的各类贸易管制措施,包括实施出口限制和配额等。但特朗普面临的困境在于:这份清单并未包含“关税”二字,连相关的“税负”“海关”等术语也踪迹全无。罗伯茨大法官在多数意见书中指出,特朗普试图依据法案中“进口”一词数行开外某个孤立的“管制”表述,就主张自己拥有“对任何国家、任何产品、任意时长施加任意税率关税的独立权力”,这种撼动全球市场的关税体系完全建立在空中楼阁之上。正如罗伯茨所言,也是六位大法官组成的多数意见所认定的:“这些文字承载不起如此重负。”

Justice Elena Kagan, in a concurrence joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson, tallied up nine verbs in IEEPA (such as “investigate,” “block,” “direct”) and eleven objects related to foreign commerce (“acquisition,” “withdrawal,” “transfer”), meaning that there are “99 actions a President can take to address a foreign threat.” But, if the action in question, “regulate . . . importation,” really meant “impose tariffs,” it would be the “the odd man out,” in Kagan’s words, because “exactly none of the other 98 involves raising revenues.” IEEPA has been used, by various Presidents, more than seventy times, for example, to impose sanctions on Iran and Cuba; none has used it for tariffs.

大法官埃琳娜·卡根在一份协同意见书中统计出《国际紧急经济权力法》包含九个动词(如“调查”“冻结”“指示”)和十一个涉及对外贸易的宾语(如“收购”“提取”“转移”),这意味着“总统可采取99种行动应对境外威胁”。这份意见书获得了大法官索尼娅·索托马约尔和凯坦吉·布朗·杰克逊的联署。但卡根指出,若争议条款中的“监管...进口”确实意味着“征收关税”,那这项权力将成为“异类”,因为“其余98项权力无一涉及增加财政收入”。该法案自颁布以来已被历任总统援引七十余次,例如对伊朗和古巴实施制裁,但从未被用于征收关税。

This question of revenue was highly significant to the Justices, because tariffs are a kind of tax, and, in our constitutional system, the power to tax is a central aspect of Congress’s power, not the President’s. (In 2012, the statute creating Obamacare survived a major constitutional challenge because the Court decided, in a landmark decision also written by Roberts, that the individual mandate to acquire health care was a form of tax.) The presumption is that, if Congress gave the President the ability to impose tariffs, as it sometimes does, it would make it reasonably clear that it was doing so. But IEEPA does not look like any kind of a tax law. In the oral arguments for the case, D. John Sauer, Trump’s Solicitor General, tried to get around the problem by contending that Trump’s tariffs shouldn’t really be thought of as taxes at all—a position that was met with near-mockery from even some of the conservative Justices.

关税收入问题对最高法院大法官们而言至关重要,因为关税本质上是一种税收,而在美国的宪法体系中,征税权是国会而非总统的核心权力。(2012年,确立奥巴马医改的法案之所以能经受住重大宪法挑战,正是因为罗伯茨主笔的里程碑式判决认定个人强制参保条款属于税收形式。)按照法理推定,若国会授权总统征收关税(此类授权偶有发生),理应以明确方式作出规定。但《国际紧急经济权力法》完全不具有税法特征。在此案的口头辩论中,特朗普政府的副司法部长约翰·绍尔试图通过主张“特朗普关税根本不应被视为税收”来规避这一矛盾,却连部分保守派大法官都对此报以近乎嘲讽的态度。

And Trump’s new tariffs have raised a great deal of revenue—almost two hundred billion dollars’ worth, according to an estimate by economists at the Penn-Wharton Budget Model for Reuters. But Roberts’s opinion says nothing about whether or how that money might be refunded. “While the Supreme Court’s decision was pending, hundreds of importers filed suit at the Court of International Trade, seeking refunds of the tariffs paid,” Mark Wu, a professor of international trade law at Harvard Law School, told me. “Those cases were stayed, but with the decision handed down, those cases can now proceed.” Trump, on Friday, wondered why the Court hadn’t put in a sentence telling him whether to “keep the money or don’t keep the money.” He added, “I guess it has to get litigated for the next two years.” A moment later, Trump upped that estimate to five years.

特朗普的新关税政策带来了巨额收入——根据宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院预算模型为路透社所做的估算,其价值接近两千亿美元。但罗伯茨大法官的意见书并未提及这笔钱是否以及如何退还。“在最高法院裁决悬而未决期间,数百家进口商向国际贸易法院提起诉讼,要求退还已支付的关税,”哈佛法学院国际贸易法教授马克·吴告诉我,“这些案件曾被搁置,但随着裁决的公布,现在可以继续推进了。”周五,特朗普质疑最高法院为何不在判决书中明确指示他“保留这笔钱还是不保留”。他补充道:“我猜这事还得再打两年官司。”片刻之后,特朗普又将这一预估延长至五年。

The lack of guidance on refunds may be an indication that Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump was not a simple case for the Justices, despite the lopsided outcome. There are seven separate opinions, adding up to a hundred and seventy pages. The principal dissent, by Brett Kavanaugh—whom Trump, on Friday, thanked for “his genius”—is more than sixty pages. Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas joined Kavanaugh; Thomas also wrote a dissent in support of broad tariff powers for Presidents. And even the Justices who agree with one another are in some ways at odds. Roberts only mustered a majority for part of his opinion; midway through, the three liberals peeled off, meaning that, although there is a 6–3 majority on striking down the tariffs, there is no full consensus on the reasoning or its implications. Specifically, the liberals declined to join the section in which Roberts wrote that Trump’s tariffs are unlawful because they do not meet the demands of something called the “major questions doctrine.”

关于退款事宜缺乏指导意见,可能表明尽管结果一边倒,但“学习资源公司诉特朗普案”对最高法院大法官们而言并非一桩简单案件。本案共产生七份独立意见书,总计达一百七十页。由布雷特·卡瓦诺执笔的主要异议意见书超过六十页——这位被特朗普在周五称赞“天赋异禀”的大法官,获得了塞缪尔·阿利托和克拉伦斯·托马斯的联署;托马斯还另撰异议书,主张总统应享有广泛的关税权力。即便是立场相近的大法官们,也在某些方面存在分歧。首席大法官罗伯茨仅为其部分意见争取到多数支持;撰写中途,三位自由派大法官选择脱离多数意见。这意味着,虽然以6比3的票数推翻了关税政策,但关于判决理由及其影响的论述未能达成完整共识。具体而言,自由派大法官拒绝加入罗伯茨论述“特朗普关税因不符合'重大问题原则'要求而违法”的章节。

In the most general terms, the major-questions doctrine holds that government actions with great political or economic significance must be based on a clear legislative authority—rather than on oblique or confusing statutory language—and that the bigger the action is, the clearer that authority should be. Practically speaking, though, conservative Justices have cited this doctrine to disallow actions such as the Environmental Protection Agency’s attempt to push power plants to transition away from coal, in 2022 (saying that the E.P.A. had stretched the language of the Clean Air Act too far), and, in 2023, Joe Biden’s cancellation of student-loan debt (finding that he’d improperly relied on the COVID-19 national-emergency declaration to do so). Disagreements about the doctrine—and whether it is even useful—have thus become entwined with the question of what powers Congress can properly delegate to a President. Many liberals view “major questions” as little more than a fancy way for conservatives to say that they don’t like administrative agencies. (Kagan has suggested as much.) One possible response is that the Trump experience is, if nothing else, a reminder that it’s not necessarily a bad idea to place such limits on how creatively the executive branch can read a law; it was under the banner of major questions that Roberts, Barrett, and Gorsuch broke away from Trump in this case. So it’s complicated. Gorsuch’s concurrence is a forty-six-page catalogue of what he seems to regard as his colleagues’ shortcomings with relation to the major-questions doctrine. Kavanaugh, meanwhile, writes that, although he’s generally a big fan of the doctrine, he does not believe that it applies in “the foreign affairs context.” So power-plant transitions are bad, but tariffs—and any number of other things Trump might want to get up to overseas—are good.

广义而言,“重大问题原则”主张具有重大政治或经济意义的政府行动必须基于明确的立法授权——而非模棱两可或令人困惑的法定条文——且行动越重大,授权应越明确。但在实践中,保守派大法官援引该原则否决了多项行政行动:例如2022年环保署推动发电厂淘汰燃煤的计划(认为其过度延伸了《清洁空气法案》的条文),以及2023年拜登取消学生贷款债务的举措(认定其不当援引新冠疫情国家紧急状态声明作为依据)。关于该原则的争议——乃至其是否具有实际价值——已与“国会可向总统授予何种权力”这一根本问题交织在一起。许多自由派人士认为,“重大问题”不过是保守派表达厌恶行政机构的华丽辞藻(卡根大法官曾暗示此观点)。一种可能的反驳是:特朗普执政经历至少提醒我们,对行政部门解读法律的“创意”加以限制未必是坏事——正是在“重大问题原则”旗帜下,罗伯茨、巴雷特和戈萨奇大法官在本案中与特朗普分道扬镳。这确实复杂。戈萨奇的协同意见书长达四十六页,详尽列举了他眼中同僚们在适用该原则时的缺陷。而卡瓦诺大法官则写道:尽管他总体推崇该原则,但认为其不适用于“外交事务领域”。于是,发电厂转型不可为,但关税政策——以及特朗普可能在海外采取的任何行动——皆可为。

Kagan, in her concurrence, argues that nothing like “the so-called major-questions doctrine” is required in this case—the “ordinary tools” of interpretation, such as just reading the text in context, are all that a person needs to realize that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs—which is why she and the other liberals did not sign on to the section of Roberts’s opinion concerning the doctrine. As a result, with only Barrett and Gorsuch joining Roberts on those pages, they are not part of the Court’s majority finding. In a way, that’s a pity, because that particular section contains some of his most pointed criticism of Trump’s “dizzying” use of tariffs and his claims of “unchecked,” “unbounded,” and “sweeping” powers, as well as skepticism about “emergencies.” Such language, coming from the Chief Justice and joined by two conservatives, is encouraging, especially as the Court prepares to hear additional landmark cases this term, including on Trump’s claim that he can unilaterally redefine birthright citizenship.

卡根在其协同意见书中主张,本案无需援引所谓“重大问题原则”——只需运用“常规解释工具”,例如结合上下文解读文本,便足以使人认识到《国际紧急经济权力法》并未授权征收关税。正因如此,她与其他自由派大法官均未签署罗伯茨判决书中涉及该原则的章节。最终仅有巴雷特和戈萨奇在该部分支持罗伯茨,导致这些论述未能成为最高法院多数意见的组成部分。这多少令人遗憾,因为该章节包含了首席大法官对特朗普“令人目眩”的关税政策及其所谓“不受制约”“无边无际”“包罗万象”权力主张最尖锐的批评,同时表达了对“紧急状态”声明的质疑。在最高法院即将审理特朗普声称可单方面重新定义出生公民权等重大案件的此刻,由首席大法官执笔且获得两位保守派大法官附议的这番论述,无疑具有振奋人心的意义。

And yet, to read Kavanaugh’s dissent is to get an unsettling reminder of Trump’s ability to rally judges, politicians, and many voters behind him. As Kavanaugh sees it, Trump absolutely has the power to impose tariffs under IEEPA, but the Justice’s explanation for why that might be so is oddly cloudy. In a confounding footnote, he tries to establish a precedent for IEEPA tariffs by saying that Richard Nixon had used a different predecessor statute, the Trading with the Enemy Act, as a basis for global tariffs—but then adds that Nixon hadn’t initially told people that he was relying on the law, because he thought that its name might make certain countries feel bad by “suggesting that allies were enemies.” Is hiding the legal rationale for a major Presidential action supposed to be a good thing? Nixon is remembered for his phantom “secret plan” to end the Vietnam War, his illegal secret bombing of Cambodia, and the secret break-in that led to his impeachment; does Kavanaugh think that Trump should take Nixon’s supposed secret jurisprudence as some kind of model?

然而,阅读卡瓦诺的异议意见,会令人不安地想起特朗普有能力团结法官、政客和许多选民支持他。在卡瓦诺看来,特朗普绝对有权根据《国际紧急经济权力法》征收关税,但他对此的解释却奇怪地含糊不清。在一个令人困惑的脚注中,他试图通过理查德·尼克松曾使用另一项前身法律《与敌贸易法》作为全球关税的依据来为《国际紧急经济权力法》关税确立先例——但随后又补充说,尼克松最初并未告诉人们他依赖该法律,因为他认为该法律的名称可能会让某些国家感到不快,因为它“暗示盟友是敌人”。隐藏总统重大行动的法律依据难道是件好事吗?尼克松因其结束越南战争的虚幻“秘密计划”、对柬埔寨的非法秘密轰炸以及导致他被弹劾的秘密闯入事件而被人们记住;卡瓦诺是否认为特朗普应该以尼克松所谓的秘密法理学为某种榜样?

At the most basic level, Kavanaugh regards it as “nonsensical” that the President, who has the power to do so much under IEEPA, should not also be able to set tariffs as he pleases. But that’s not how this law, or the rule of law, works. It is the sort of thinking that gets Trump to call a Justice a genius. Perhaps, for Kavanaugh, that’s good enough. ♦

在最基本的层面上,卡瓦诺认为,总统根据《国际紧急经济权力法》拥有如此广泛的权力,却不能随心所欲地设定关税,这简直是“荒谬的”。然而,这既不符合该法律的规定,也不符合法治的原则。正是这种思维方式,让特朗普称一位大法官为天才。或许,对卡瓦诺来说,这就足够了。♦

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