Fault Lines

The Spectacle of War and the Struggle to Protest

战争的奇观与抗议的困境
On social media, images of destruction in Iran are giving way to commentary from talking heads, dulling the reality of war.
社交媒体上,伊朗的断壁残垣正被评论员们的喋喋不休所取代,战争的残酷现实正被消解。
A figure sits with on a pile of rubble with her face in her hands.
Photograph by Vahid Salemi / AP

A few days into the war in Iran, I found myself in a long text exchange with a friend, taking note of which public figures had come out strongly against the U.S. invasion, and which had not. The list included some politicians, but we were mostly focussed on the pundits of the short-form-video class: Tucker Carlson, the military commentator Shawn Ryan, and so on. For those following news about the war on social media, this affinity network—all these different figures with their own little tribes—has been quickly replacing images of the war with commentary on it. Instead of seeing yet another bombed-out building, we were seeing these faces and listening to incendiary thirty-second clips from their respective shows. My friend and I were just idly chatting, really, but as I thought about all this coverage I was struck by how social it felt. It was like talking about sports.

伊朗战争爆发几天后,我和一位朋友进行了一场漫长的短信交流,记录哪些公众人物强烈反对美国入侵,哪些没有。名单里包括一些政客,但我们主要关注的是短视频领域的评论员:塔克·卡尔森、军事评论员肖恩·瑞恩等等。对于那些在社交媒体上关注战争新闻的人来说,这种由不同人物及其小圈子组成的亲和网络,正迅速用战争评论取代战争画面。我们不再看到又一个被炸毁的建筑,而是看着这些面孔,听着他们各自节目中煽动性的三十秒片段。我和朋友其实只是漫不经心地闲聊,但当我思考所有这些报道时,突然意识到它们给人的感觉多么社交化。就像在谈论体育赛事。

In 1967, the theorist and filmmaker Guy Debord described a phenomenon that he called “the spectacle,” writing that it “is not a collection of images, but a social relation among people, mediated by the images.” What he meant was that life had become increasingly representational, captured through television and advertising. The ties that bound us together through work and through communal, lived experiences had been severed and replaced with a mere phantasm of connection. He was, in an aphoristic and admittedly melodramatic way, predicting the rise of social media.

1967年,理论家兼电影制作人居伊·德波(Guy Debord)描述了一种他称之为“景观”的现象,他写道:“景观不是图像的集合,而是通过图像中介形成的人与人之间的社会关系。”他的意思是,生活已日益被电视和广告所捕获,成为一种表象。那些通过工作和共同生活体验将我们联结在一起的纽带已被切断,取而代之的只是连接的幻影。用一句格言式的、甚至有些戏剧化的表述来说,他预言了社交媒体的崛起。

One of the abiding contradictions I’ve tried to think through during the past few years goes something like this: we see everything now—the slaughter of children, the assassinations of political figures, the killings of unarmed people by police officers—but all of that witnessing has produced little in the way of clarity or effective political resistance. War is no longer sanitized in the manner that it was during the first Gulf War, which, as I’ve written in the past, was presented to American viewers as a “clean military-technology show,” and yet the ubiquity, these days, of violent and deeply upsetting footage hasn’t made war feel any more real.

过去几年里,我一直在思考一个挥之不去的矛盾:如今我们目睹着一切——儿童的屠杀、政治人物的暗杀、警察对未持械者的枪击——但这些见证却几乎没有带来任何清晰的认知或有效的政治抵抗。战争不再像第一次海湾战争那样被净化处理(我曾撰文指出,那场战争对美国观众而言是场“洁净的军事科技秀”),然而当下无处不在的暴力与令人极度不安的影像,并未让战争显得更加真实。

This unreality, in which we believe that we’re going through history together by staring at the same things on our handheld screens, seems to infect everything. Consider the No Kings protests that reappeared this past weekend across the country. The generic and essentially uncontroversial slogan of “No Kings” has rallied a population itching for real connection with other human beings, specific differences be damned. But the gulf between that urge and political change suggests that the separation Debord wrote about is far deeper than we might want to imagine. “The spectacle reunites the separate, but reunites it as separate,” he wrote. Modern forms of dissent, even when they entail real-world gatherings, rely on a feeling of connection through social media, which is why the urgency of such dissent often seems to dissipate even as the marching is taking place. We can still become collectively enraged at the sight of someone dying on our screens or at the flagrantly illegal actions of the Trump Administration, but once we find ourselves in the streets under a widely acceptable slogan, we discover that the years of being online have given us an image of political protest but little more than that. We feel a needed catharsis and connection but also the limits of what is possible in a separated and alienated population.

这种不真实感似乎感染了一切——我们相信,通过手持屏幕凝视相同的事物,我们正在共同经历历史。想想上周末在全国各地重新出现的“不要国王”抗议活动。“不要国王”这个笼统且本质上无争议的口号,动员了渴望与他人建立真实联系的人群,具体的分歧见鬼去吧。但这种冲动与政治变革之间的鸿沟表明,德波所写的分离远比我们愿意想象的更为深刻。“景观将分离的东西重新统一起来,但却是作为分离的东西重新统一的,”他写道。现代形式的异议,即使涉及现实世界的集会,也依赖于通过社交媒体建立的联系感,这就是为什么这种异议的紧迫性往往在游行进行时似乎就已消散。我们仍然会因屏幕上有人死去或特朗普政府公然违法的行为而集体愤怒,但一旦我们发现自己走上街头,高举一个广受认可的口号,就会发现多年的线上生活只给了我们政治抗议的表象,除此之外别无他物。我们感受到一种必要的宣泄和联结,但也感受到在一个分离和异化的人群中可能性的局限。

October 7th, and the decimation of Gaza, brought unshakeable images to screens around the world—of hang gliders, brutalized women in the backs of trucks, mangled children, flattened city blocks. The spectacle produced by the war in Iran has been, for distant viewers, comparatively familiar, almost generic. Similar images have appeared so many times that it’s become nearly impossible for many of us to know if we are looking at rubble in Gaza, southern Lebanon, Syria, Tel Aviv. The sameness of what we’re seeing has, in America, lowered the political stakes of war. Much of the public is still outraged about what’s happening, but I fear that two and a half years of images from Gaza may have built up a public immunity to the sight of smashed concrete and blown-up humans.

10月7日,加沙的毁灭性景象——滑翔翼、卡车后厢里遭受暴行的女性、肢体残缺的儿童、被夷为平地的街区——通过屏幕震撼着全球观众。相比之下,伊朗战争呈现给远方观者的景象却显得相对熟悉,近乎模式化。相似的画面反复出现,以至于我们许多人已难以分辨眼前究竟是加沙、黎巴嫩南部、叙利亚还是特拉维夫的废墟。在美国,这种视觉上的同质化降低了战争的政治风险。尽管公众仍对正在发生的一切感到愤怒,但我担心两年半来加沙的影像轰炸,或许已让人们对混凝土碎块与血肉横飞的画面产生了某种群体免疫。

What happens when the spectacle of war no longer captivates the public? What happens when we can’t even muster the illusions of shared separation?

当战争的奇观不再能俘获公众的视线,当连那点虚幻的集体疏离感都难以维系时,世界会变成怎样?

Strangely, as social media has moved from the text of status updates and tweets to short video, verbal commentary has actually grown more prominent and more viral. This is what led my friend and me to our idle accounting of new-media punditry. What’s shoved on our feeds is, increasingly, tight shots of people’s faces as they angrily decry one thing or another.

奇怪的是,随着社交媒体从状态更新和推文的文字形式转向短视频,口头评论实际上变得更加突出、更具病毒式传播力。这正是我和朋友开始闲来无事盘点新媒体评论员的原因。如今越来越多涌入我们信息流的,是人们愤怒谴责某事的脸部特写镜头。

On this well-lit but warped stage, the act of politics changes, although not always perceptibly. Recently, Joe Kent, the former head of the National Counterterrorism Center, who resigned earlier this month in opposition to the war, went on Tucker Carlson’s show. Antiwar liberals, who might not agree with much of anything that Kent has said in the past, might still happen upon clips of that interview on social media and find themselves hoping that Kent acquits himself well, so that he might provide a convincing counternarrative to his fellow-travellers on the right to oppose further military action. This, in turn, one might imagine, could help pressure lawmakers to turn on Trump.

在这个灯火通明却扭曲变形的舞台上,政治表演悄然改变——尽管这种变化并非总是显而易见。本月早些时候,因反对战争而辞职的前国家反恐中心主任乔·肯特(Joe Kent)现身塔克·卡尔森(Tucker Carlson)的节目。那些反战的自由派人士或许对肯特过往的言论鲜有认同,但当他们在社交媒体上偶然刷到访谈片段时,仍可能暗自期待他能有出色表现——毕竟,这位保守派同路人若能提出令人信服的反战论述,或许就能推动右翼阵营反对进一步的军事行动。人们不禁遐想:这样的连锁反应,或许终将形成压力,促使立法者们与特朗普决裂。

What’s striking about this train of thought, which is quite common among the terminally online—a population that is growing every day—is that it involves no actual agency on the part of the person tracking this Rube Goldberg political process. The viral talkers have become the measure and the expression of the public’s outrage, mediated through the algorithms of social media.

这种思维模式在那些“深度网民”中相当普遍——这个群体每天都在壮大——其引人注目之处在于,追踪这个鲁布·戈德堡式政治进程的个人,实际上并未发挥任何主观能动性。病毒式传播的言论者已成为公众愤怒的衡量标准和表达载体,而这一切都经由社交媒体算法的中介完成。

These are horrible conditions for meaningful dissent. Trump’s party controls all three branches of the government, but I suspect that another reason Trump and his Administration feel like they can do whatever they want without consulting popular opinion—or even really informing the public—is that they recognize, consciously or otherwise, that the American people, alienated and addicted to their phones, are currently incapable of organizing themselves toward significant political action. “The technology is based on isolation, and the technical process isolates in turn,” Debord wrote. “From the automobile to television, all the goods selected by the spectacular system are also its weapons for a constant reinforcement of the conditions of isolation of ‘lonely crowds.’ The spectacle constantly rediscovers its own assumptions more concretely.”

这是有意义的异议所面临的可怕处境。特朗普的政党掌控着政府三大分支,但我怀疑特朗普及其政府之所以觉得可以罔顾民意——甚至无需真正告知公众——就为所欲为,还有另一个原因:他们意识到,无论这种意识是否清晰,当下美国民众既疏离于公共生活,又沉溺于手机,已无力组织起具有实质意义的政治行动。“这项技术以孤立为基础,而技术过程又反过来强化孤立,”德波写道,“从汽车到电视,景观系统遴选的所有商品,同时也是其不断强化'孤独人群'孤立境况的武器。景观总在不断更具体地重新发现自身的前提。”

One could easily characterize the No Kings actions as simply more spectacle—drone shots of big crowds to feed the social-media machine. But I feel sure that most of the millions who marched this past weekend were not only looking for more capital within the viral economy; they were looking for other faces and voices that would remind them they’re not alone. This may be all that the protests can presently accomplish. But nothing is more important than remembering there’s life outside the spectacle. ♦

人们很容易将“无王”运动简单归结为又一场表演——用无人机拍摄大规模人群,为社交媒体机器输送素材。但我确信,上周参与游行的数百万人中,绝大多数不仅是为了在病毒式传播经济中获取更多关注资本;他们也在寻找其他面孔与声音,以确认自己并非孤身一人。这或许是目前抗议活动所能达成的全部。但没有什么比记住景观之外仍有生活更为重要。♦

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