The Lede

The Scandal of the Sharenting Economy

晒娃经济背后的丑闻
As kidfluencers come of age, some may find the law an imperfect means of restitution for what was lost and broken in their childhoods.
随着童星网红逐渐长大成人,他们或许会发现,法律并非总能完美弥补童年时期被剥夺与损毁的一切。
A person looks out of a bedroom window through which a giant eye peers in.
Illustration by Bianca Bagnarelli

Family-centered content creation is an overstuffed toy chest of contradictions. Its meticulous mise en scène is that of candid, improvisational home life. Its ostensibly D.I.Y. output is financed by brand partnerships and affiliate marketing. It takes private and noninstrumental moments of childhood—potty-training mishaps, menarche, barfing—and makes them public and transactional; see, for example, the prominent mommy vlogger Aubree Jones, whose tween daughter’s first period was effectively sponsored by a feminine-hygiene brand. Jones’s seventh child, born last year, is named Disney. If “Infinite Jest” were a conjuration spell, it would manifest a momfluencer.

以家庭为中心的内容创作,是一个塞满矛盾的超载玩具箱。它精心布置的场景,却要伪装成随性自然的家庭生活;它看似自制的产出,实则由品牌合作与联盟营销资助。它将童年那些私密且非功利性的时刻——如厕训练的意外、初潮、呕吐——转化为公开且可交易的内容。以知名妈妈博主奥布里·琼斯(Aubree Jones)为例,她青春期女儿首次月经的视频,实质上是由一家女性卫生用品品牌赞助的。琼斯去年出生的第七个孩子,取名为“迪士尼”。倘若《无尽的玩笑》是一道召唤咒语,它召唤出的恐怕正是一位“妈妈网红”。

The most successful and lucrative family vlogs are indiscreet almost by definition—and yet the wrong kind of indiscretion can derail the whole gravy train. The vlogger Jordan Cheyenne, for one, wrecked her sharenting career by accidentally posting footage of herself coaching her son, who was distraught over the family’s sick puppy, to make a specific kind of sad face for YouTube. (“Act like you’re crying, really quick,” she prompted him. “I am crying,” he wailed in reply.)

最成功、最赚钱的家庭视频博客,几乎天生就缺乏分寸感——然而,分寸一旦失当,整台赚钱机器就可能脱轨。视频博主乔丹·切耶内(Jordan Cheyenne)便是一例:她无意间上传了一段自己指导儿子为YouTube视频摆出特定悲伤表情的片段,就此断送了“晒娃”事业。当时孩子正因家中幼犬生病而伤心欲绝,她却催促道:“快装出哭的样子。”孩子带着哭腔回答:“我明明在哭啊。”

Perhaps the strangest paradox of the sharenting economy, however, can be found simply in the staggering number of views, subscribers, and advertising dollars flowing toward content that is excruciatingly boring when it is not excruciatingly uncomfortable. In her new book, “Like, Follow, Subscribe: Influencer Kids and the Cost of a Childhood Online,” the journalist Fortesa Latifi acknowledges that even some of the most popular sharenting content, which can net its creators millions of dollars a year, is “objectively not that interesting” and “almost wildly mundane.” The young stars of these videos might be opening Amazon packages, sitting in a dentist’s chair, lip-synching to Morgan Wallen in an all-white kitchen beneath a giant box-pendant light fixture, or barfing. The mystery of why anyone would watch these displays is compounded by how little we know of the watchers themselves or of how their views are monetized, because social-media platforms are generally reticent to share demographic breakdowns of user data and ad revenues. Or, as America’s greatest advertising mind, Don Draper, once said, “Who knows why people do what they do?”

然而,分享式育儿经济最奇特的悖论或许在于:那些内容要么令人尴尬不适,要么乏味至极,却吸引着惊人的浏览量、订阅量和广告收入。记者福尔特萨·拉蒂菲(Fortesa Latifi)在新书《点赞、关注、订阅:网红儿童与线上童年的代价》中指出,即便是年收入可达数百万美元的热门育儿内容,也“客观上并不那么有趣”,甚至“近乎极度平庸”。这些小网红可能只是在拆亚马逊包裹、坐在牙医椅上、在悬挂巨型盒式吊灯的纯白厨房里对口型哼唱摩根·沃伦的歌,或是呕吐。更令人费解的是,我们几乎不了解这些观众的身份,也不清楚他们的观看如何转化为收益——社交媒体平台通常不愿公开用户数据的人口统计细分和广告收入细节。或者,正如美国广告界传奇人物唐·德雷珀所言:“谁能知道人们为何做他们做的事呢?”

We know a little, though. We know that pedophiles make up a disturbing proportion of the audience for family- and child-centered social-media content, and that the advent of generative A.I. has turned these images and videos into potential fodder for child sexual-abuse material. (Last month, a jury in New Mexico found that Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, failed to protect young users from sexual exploitation and ordered the company to pay three hundred and seventy-five million dollars in damages; Meta plans to appeal.) Bots are often in the mix, too, along with the hate-watchers who populate the “snark communities” devoted to family vloggers on Reddit. But, when Latifi conducted her own survey of hundreds of fans of sharenting content, she identified another, perhaps overlooked category of viewer: a child, teen, or young adult searching for an outlet from a lonely or volatile situation in their own home. The “presentation of perfect family life from vloggers,” Latifi explains, “was how they achieved that escape.”

我们对此并非一无所知。我们知道,恋童癖在家庭与儿童类社交媒体内容的受众中占据了令人不安的比例,而生成式人工智能的出现,更使这些图像和视频成为潜在的儿童性虐待材料来源。(上个月,新墨西哥州一个陪审团裁定,Facebook和Instagram的母公司Meta未能保护年轻用户免遭性剥削,责令该公司支付3.75亿美元赔偿金;Meta计划提起上诉。)此外,机器人账号也常混杂其中,还有那些充斥在Reddit上针对家庭视频博主“嘲讽社区”的恶意围观者。但当拉蒂菲(Latifi)亲自对数百名晒娃内容粉丝进行调研后,她发现了另一类或许被忽视的观众:那些在孤独或动荡的家庭环境中寻求出口的儿童、青少年或年轻人。“视频博主呈现的完美家庭生活,”拉蒂菲解释道,“正是他们实现这种逃避的方式。”

“Like, Follow, Subscribe” is decently reported, if clunkily written; it lacks the legal and philosophical acumen of Leah A. Plunkett’s “Sharenthood” or the sociological insights that Kathryn Jezer-Morton brings to her studies of momfluencers. The strongest and most original passages of Latifi’s book, however brief, are devoted to her survey participants, who say that clicking on kidfluencer content helped them feel like “part of a community,” even like “part of their family.” One of these fans, who described herself as a onetime “isolated homeschooler,” told Latifi, “It was my way of experiencing the world when I was stuck at home all day.”

《点赞、关注、订阅》一书报道详实,尽管文笔略显滞重;它既缺乏莉亚·A·普朗克特《分享式育儿》中的法律思辨与哲学洞见,也未具备凯瑟琳·杰泽-莫顿研究“妈妈网红”时展现的社会学眼光。然而拉蒂菲笔下最有力、最具独创性的段落——尽管篇幅不长——恰恰聚焦于她的受访群体。这些参与者坦言,点击观看儿童网红内容让他们感觉自己“成为了某个社群的一部分”,甚至像是“融入了那些家庭”。其中一位自称曾是“孤独的在家自学者”的粉丝告诉拉蒂菲:“当我整天困在家中时,这是我看世界的方式。”

Ironically, this isolated homeschooler was likely watching other homeschoolers. Traditional school systems are not a draw for mega-momfluencers such as Hannah Neeleman, of @BallerinaFarm (nine children, more than ten million Instagram followers); Jessica Ballinger, of @BallingerFamily (six children, more than three million YouTube subscribers); or Kristine Pack, of @FamilyFunPack (eight children, more than ten million YouTube subscribers), all of whom have homeschooled. Aubree Jones, in a 2023 post on her TikTok account (more than two million followers), offered three reasons that she homeschools, starting with “efficiency”—she boasted that her kids could complete their daily schoolwork in two hours or less, and suggested that an average day at a traditional school stretches to six or more hours to provide “day care” to working parents. Two was “flexibility”: Jones can choose what her children learn and, just as important, when they take vacations (which generate great content!). Third and last was “mass shootings.”

颇具讽刺意味的是,这位与世隔绝的在家上学者,很可能正在观看其他在家上学者的内容。对于像@BallerinaFarm的汉娜·尼勒曼(九个孩子,Instagram粉丝超千万)、@BallingerFamily的杰西卡·巴林格(六个孩子,YouTube订阅者超三百万)或@FamilyFunPack的克里斯汀·帕克(八个孩子,YouTube订阅者超千万)这样的超级“妈妈网红”来说,传统学校体系毫无吸引力——她们都选择让孩子在家上学。奥布里·琼斯在2023年的一条TikTok视频(粉丝超两百万)中,列举了她选择在家上学的三个理由。首先是“高效”——她夸耀自己的孩子每天完成学业只需两小时甚至更短,并暗示传统学校之所以将日常教学拉长到六小时以上,实则是为在职父母提供“日托服务”。其次是“灵活”:琼斯可以自主决定孩子学什么,同样重要的是,还能决定何时度假(这可是绝佳的内容素材!)。最后第三条理由是“大规模枪击事件”。

A fourth reason, obvious but unspoken, is that homeschooled kids have more time and availability to make stuff for the family vlog. In this respect, power sharenters may homeschool for the same reason that schools in farming communities used to close down during spring planting and fall harvests: so that the kids could stay home and work.

第四个原因显而易见却无人明说:在家上学的孩子有更多时间和精力为家庭视频博客制作内容。从这个角度看,权力型晒娃家长选择让孩子在家上学,与过去农业社区学校在春播秋收时节停课是同样的逻辑——让孩子留在家中干活。

The social-media ascent of the religious-conservative “trad wife,” and of the von Trapp-size brood skipping blondly behind her, is inextricable from the material conditions necessary for a typical family-vlogging operation, in which a stay-at-home mother is the main producer-director and, ideally, adds fresh infants to her cast of characters on a roughly biennial schedule. (Several of Latifi’s sources in the family-vlogging industry believe, incredibly or not, that some sharenters “are explicitly choosing to have more children for brand deals.”) In its specific appeal to evangelical Christian and Mormon communities, including the semi-apostates of what’s often referred to as MomTok, mommy vlogging has striking parallels with multilevel marketing: both industries offer money-making opportunities that are supposedly compatible with traditional homemaking, and both demand constant leveraging of personal relationships in order to achieve and sustain success.

宗教保守派“传统主妇”在社交媒体上的崛起,以及她们身后那些特拉普家族式规模的金发孩童队列,与家庭视频博客运营所需的物质条件密不可分。在这种典型模式中,居家母亲身兼制片人与导演,最好还能以大约两年为周期,为她的演员阵容增添新生的婴儿。(家庭视频博客行业的几位消息人士向拉蒂菲透露——无论多么难以置信——有些分享型家长“显然是为了品牌合作而选择生育更多孩子”。)在针对福音派基督徒和摩门教社群(包括常被称为“妈妈抖音圈”的半游离群体)的特定吸引力方面,育儿视频博客与多层次营销有着惊人的相似性:这两个行业都提供了据称能与传统家庭生活兼容的赚钱机会,并且都需要持续利用人际关系来获取并维持成功。

What makes sharenting far more ominous, of course, is that its practitioners must chase the mood swings of the social-media algorithm if they want to extract maximum value from family life. Positive pregnancy tests and squishy newborns usually deliver strong returns. So does footage of a child in physical or emotional pain. As a lower-tier mommy vlogger tells Latifi, “The videos that got the most eyes on them are the ones that had the bloody noses, or the broken arms, or the emergency room visit, or whatever.” One of the pinned posts on the Instagram page of Jamie Otis Hehner (a million followers) is a video of her toddler son suffering a febrile seizure as one of his siblings sobs in the background.

当然,“晒娃”之所以更令人不安,是因为实践者若想从家庭生活中榨取最大价值,就必须追逐社交媒体算法的情绪波动。阳性验孕棒和软糯新生儿通常能带来高流量,孩子身体或情感受创的影像同样如此。正如一位中层妈妈博主告诉拉蒂菲的:“观看量最高的视频总是那些流鼻血、手臂骨折、急诊室就诊之类的。”杰米·奥蒂斯·海纳(百万粉丝)Instagram置顶帖中,有一段她蹒跚学步的儿子高热惊厥的视频,背景里还能听见另一个孩子的啜泣。

The abundant risks and perverse incentives of the sharenting industry have, in recent years, inspired some well-meaning legislation. In 2023, Illinois became the first state to pass a law explicitly intended to safeguard the earnings of kidfluencers, requiring that a percentage of profits from monetized content be placed in a trust until the child reaches the age of eighteen. Since then, several more states—including the nation’s two busiest sharenting hubs, Utah and California—have either passed new laws or amended existing ones to similar ends, extending the same protections to the child stars of social media that have long been in place for their counterparts in film and television.

近年来,分享式育儿产业中泛滥的风险与扭曲的激励,催生了一些善意的立法。2023年,伊利诺伊州成为美国首个通过明确保护“儿童网红”收入法案的州,要求将商业化内容收益的一定比例存入信托账户,直至孩子年满十八岁。此后,包括犹他州和加利福尼亚州这两个全美最活跃的分享式育儿中心在内的多个州,也相继通过新法案或修订现有法律,将影视童星长期享有的保护措施,延伸至社交媒体上的儿童明星。

But the texts of these new laws—which are heavily predicated on a kidfluencer’s willingness to sue his or her own parents—are at turns vague, confounding, and possibly toothless. Utah’s law, which came into effect last year, specifies that family vloggers “shall use the formula E = (A/T) * (Q/S) * (M/2) or the formula E = 245 (A/T) * (1/X) * (M/2) to determine the qualifying minor’s earnings”; this alphabet soup of variables requires tallying “all paid minutes featuring any qualifying minor.” As is the case in other states, Utah not only puts parents in charge of this complex bookkeeping but also appoints them as their children’s trustees—and all in the name of protecting children’s earnings from greedy parents. The fox is still guarding the henhouse, but at least now the hens can sue.

然而这些新法案的文本——其效力很大程度上取决于儿童网红是否愿意起诉自己的父母——时而语焉不详,时而令人困惑,甚至可能形同虚设。去年生效的犹他州法律规定,家庭视频博主“应使用公式E = (A/T) * (Q/S) * (M/2)或公式E = 245 (A/T) * (1/X) * (M/2)来确定适格未成年人的收入”;这锅字母汤般的变量要求统计“所有出现适格未成年人的付费分钟数”。与其他州的情况类似,犹他州不仅让父母负责这项复杂的记账工作,还指定他们担任子女的受托人——这一切都以保护儿童收入免受贪婪父母侵害的名义进行。狐狸仍在看守鸡舍,但至少现在小鸡可以提起诉讼了。

Some legislatures are attempting to find additional legal remedies for former kidfluencers who believe that they were harmed by oversharing parents. Utah and Minnesota have recently codified formal processes that allow minors to request the deletion of content in which they appear, but these seem open to any number of challenges on First Amendment grounds. Arkansas’s Child Content Creation Protection Act, which will take effect in July, makes it “unlawful to financially benefit” from airing “any visual depiction of a minor with the intent to sexually gratify or elicit a sexual response in the viewer or any other person.” This provision, which is aimed at parents who share images of their underage daughters in bikinis and leotards for a monetized audience of perverts, describes an objectively abhorrent phenomenon, but in inevitably subjective terms.

一些州的立法机构正试图为那些认为自己因父母过度分享而受到伤害的前“儿童网红”寻找额外的法律救济途径。犹他州和明尼苏达州最近已通过立法程序,确立了允许未成年人要求删除其出镜内容的正式流程,但这些规定似乎可能面临基于《第一修正案》的各种挑战。阿肯色州的《儿童内容创作保护法案》将于七月生效,该法案规定“以性满足或引发观众或他人性反应为目的播放未成年人影像并从中牟利”属于违法行为。这项条款针对的是那些为牟利而向变态受众分享未成年女儿身着比基尼或紧身衣照片的父母,它描述了一种客观上令人憎恶的现象,却使用了必然带有主观色彩的表述方式。

As more and more kidfluencers come of age, and as they confront all that may have been lost or broken in their childhoods, they are likely to find that the law is an imperfect instrument for restitution. Multiple U.S. Supreme Court decisions, dating to the nineteen-twenties, have strongly favored parents’ rights to determine the best interests of their children, as the attorney Shreya Agarwala explained in a superb 2025 article in the Columbia Human Rights Law Review. Privacy law may apply to, say, a stranger who broadcasts a toddler’s febrile seizure to a potential audience of millions, but the same child generally cannot claim a legal right to privacy from his mother or father. Similarly, a minor may feel that her reputation has been permanently warped by embarrassing childhood footage of her tantrums or bathroom accidents, but, Agarwala writes, defamation law is a bulwark against falsehoods, not against the disclosure of true events that your parents immortalized for clicks. Agarwala briefly mulls whether public-health campaigns on the dangers of sharenting might be more effective than legal action—and the answer may well have been yes in a pre-COVID, pre-R.F.K., Jr., era of institutional trust.

随着越来越多“网红儿童”长大成人,当他们直面童年时期可能被剥夺或损毁的一切时,很可能会发现法律并非完美的救济工具。正如律师施雷娅·阿加瓦拉(Shreya Agarwala)在《哥伦比亚人权法律评论》2025年刊发的杰出文章中所阐释的,自二十世纪二十年代以来,美国最高法院的多项判决都强烈倾向于父母有权决定子女的最大利益。隐私法或许能约束陌生人——比如将幼儿高热惊厥的视频传播给数百万潜在观众的行为——但通常而言,儿童无法主张法律赋予的隐私权来对抗自己的父母。同样,未成年人或许会觉得自己因童年发脾气的尴尬影像或如厕训练事故的片段而遭受永久性的名誉损害,但阿加瓦拉指出,诽谤法防范的是虚假陈述,而非父母为博取流量而记录的真实事件。阿加瓦拉简要探讨了关于“晒娃”危害的公共卫生宣传是否可能比法律诉讼更有效——若是在新冠疫情前、小罗伯特·F·肯尼迪(R.F.K., Jr.)现象出现前那个公众尚信任体制的时代,答案很可能是肯定的。

Maybe it’s not too fantastical to hope for a surprise shift in the Zeitgeist, one that compels members of the family-vlogging élite to start withdrawing their kids from view. Maybe quiet parenting, like quiet quitting and quiet luxury before it, could catch on as a meme among key influencers. Maybe concealing one’s children from social media could become a status symbol, and putting them on public display could acquire a useful stigma—not that I’d want to wish disgrace on mommy vloggers. I’d rather not know anything about them at all. “It’s a dark place to be,” a former sharenter tells Latifi, “watching other women do things.” ♦

或许,期待时代精神出现令人惊喜的转变并非痴人说梦——这种转变将迫使家庭视频博客界的精英们开始将孩子撤出公众视野。正如之前的“安静辞职”与“安静奢华”风潮,“安静育儿”或许也能在关键意见领袖间形成病毒式传播。将子女隔绝于社交媒体之外可能成为一种身份象征,而将他们公开展示或许会招致某种有益的污名——当然,我并非希望给育儿博主们蒙上耻辱。我宁愿对她们一无所知。“看着其他女性做这些事,实在是种阴暗的体验,”一位曾分享育儿内容的母亲对拉蒂菲坦言。♦

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