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The No-Explanation War

无需解释的战争

The Trump Administration has decided that it need not make a case for military action. In the current media environment, that approach makes a disturbing kind of sense.

特朗普政府认定无需为军事行动提供理由。在当前的媒体环境下,这种策略竟显出一种令人不安的合理性。

By Jay Caspian Kang||5 min read
无需解释的战争

If you never have to explain yourself, you can’t really ever be wrong. In recent decades, few things have been as famously wrong as the political theatre surrounding the Iraq War: Colin Powell showing his satellite images in front of the U.N. Security Council and repeating the phrase “weapons of mass destruction,” Donald Rumsfeld’s word puzzles about known unknowns and the absence of evidence not being the evidence of absence, George W. Bush’s triumphant “Mission Accomplished” episode aboard the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln. These displays worked in the moment; support for the Iraq War was much higher among the public than some might remember now, and the media mostly filed in the back of the Administration’s dance line. They have since become synonymous not only with a loss of faith in the government’s duty to put American lives over profit but, perhaps more enduringly, with the end of the country’s trust in the media.

若你永远无需为自己辩解,便永远不会真正犯错。近几十年来,鲜有事物能像伊拉克战争的政治戏剧那样声名狼藉:科林·鲍威尔在联合国安理会展示卫星图像并反复强调“大规模杀伤性武器”;唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德用“已知的未知”这类文字游戏,以“没有证据不等于证据不存在”来诡辩;乔治·W·布什在“亚伯拉罕·林肯”号航母上宣告“任务完成”的凯旋时刻。这些表演在当时确实奏效——公众对伊战的支持度比如今人们记忆中的要高得多,而媒体大多亦步亦趋地跟随政府指挥棒起舞。如今这些场景不仅成为政府背弃“将国民生命置于利益之上”职责的象征,或许更深远的是,它们标志着这个国家对媒体信任的终结。

The Trump Administration, in contrast, has, in its own approach to war, simply skipped the explaining phase. This makes sense in a perverse way. You can consider the past half century of American military adventures as a continuum where the lessons of Vietnam—the first televised war, which delivered intimate footage of American draftees fighting in the jungle—instructed Desert Storm (a brief conflict, represented on TV largely by faraway shots of Patriot missiles), which, in turn, influenced the spectacle around Afghanistan and Iraq (wars of regime change, accompanied by images of liberation). It follows that, for our latest incursion into the Middle East, the Administration in charge would do away with the alleged moral imperatives and grand imagery of the previous wars and move straight to the bombs. The sight of a high-ranking official making his case in front of the U.N. Security Council now feels quaint and almost comical. Patriotism, apparently, is something you talk about during the Olympics and maybe during halftime at the Super Bowl but something you need not invoke when putting troops in the line of fire.

相比之下,特朗普政府在战争问题上直接跳过了解释阶段。从某种反常的角度看,这倒也说得通。你可以把过去半个世纪的美国军事冒险看作一个连续体:越战(第一场电视转播的战争,呈现了美国应征士兵在丛林中作战的亲密画面)的教训指导了沙漠风暴行动(一场短暂的冲突,电视上主要是爱国者导弹的远距离镜头),而沙漠风暴行动又影响了阿富汗和伊拉克战争(政权更迭战争,伴随着解放的画面)。因此,在我们最近一次入侵中东的行动中,负责的政府会摒弃之前战争所谓的道德要求和宏大画面,直接进入轰炸阶段。如今,看到高级官员在联合国安理会面前陈述理由,感觉既古怪又近乎滑稽。显然,爱国主义是你在奥运会期间、或许在超级碗中场休息时谈论的东西,但在让军队置身火线时,你无需援引它。

To date, the only explanations offered by the Administration have been confusing more than anything else. “We didn’t start this war,” the Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, said at a press conference on Monday, pointing out that President Trump, Marco Rubio, Jared Kushner, and the special envoy Steve Witkoff—evidently, the Iran negotiating team—had “bent over backwards for real diplomacy.” He also said that Iran had a “conventional gun to our head,” reiterating that America had no choice but to go on the offensive.

迄今为止,政府给出的唯一解释,与其说是澄清,不如说是让人更加困惑。战争部长皮特·赫格塞斯周一在新闻发布会上说:“我们没有发动这场战争。”他指出,特朗普总统、马可·卢比奥、贾里德·库什纳以及特使史蒂夫·维特科夫——显然,这是伊朗谈判团队——“为了真正的外交已经竭尽全力”。他还说,伊朗“用常规武器指着我们的头”,重申美国别无选择,只能采取攻势。

But he also struck a tone of nihilistic defiance. “No stupid rules of engagement, no nation-building quagmire, no democracy-building exercise, no politically correct wars,” Hegseth said. “We fight to win, and we don’t waste time or lives.” In other words, all the old patriotic and moral justifications for our forever wars no longer applied. We just do it because we want to “win,” even if we can’t really tell you what we’re winning. On Wednesday, Hegseth fired up the cliché factory again, saying, “Death and destruction from the sky all day long. We’re playing for keeps.” If you don’t like that, well, then, Hegseth and the Trump Administration are telling you that they don’t care.

但他同时流露出一种虚无主义的挑衅姿态。“没有愚蠢的交战规则,没有国家建设的泥潭,没有民主建设的演习,没有政治正确的战争,”赫格塞斯说,“我们为胜利而战,我们不浪费时间和生命。”换句话说,所有那些为我们的永久战争辩护的爱国主义和道德理由都不再适用。我们这样做只是因为我们想“赢”,即使我们无法真正告诉你我们在赢什么。周三,赫格塞斯再次启动陈词滥调工厂,说道:“全天候从天而降的死亡与毁灭。我们是玩真的。”如果你不喜欢这样,那么,赫格塞斯和特朗普政府就是在告诉你,他们不在乎。

Last year, when writing about how the public would remember the war in Gaza, I asked what happens “when every image becomes a site of contestation; when the rare sights we all see together, whether joyous or devastating, quickly fray into thousands, even millions, of threads, each with their own grip on reality”? In the two years that I’ve been writing this column, I’ve asked some variation of this question on several occasions, because I still don’t really know whether the internet as we now experience it—constantly, on our phones—has made it impossible for any narrative to stick with the public, and whether this, in turn, makes it impossible to tell any story that might inspire abiding dissent.

去年,在撰写关于公众将如何铭记加沙战争的文章时,我曾追问:当每一幅画面都沦为争议的战场;当我们共同目睹的罕见景象——无论是欢庆还是灾难——迅速碎裂成千丝万缕的叙事线索,每条线索都紧握着各自认定的现实,会发生什么?撰写本专栏两年来,我曾多次以不同形式提出这个问题,因为我至今仍不确定:我们如今通过手机持续接触的互联网,是否已使任何叙事都无法在公众心中扎根?而这是否又意味着,我们再也无法讲述那些可能激发持久异议的故事?

Like so many brooding young men of my generation, I was quite taken, when I was in high school, by the novels of Milan Kundera. At the time, my interest was divided between trying to understand totalitarianism and horniness, but one passage in particular from “The Book of Laughter and Forgetting” stuck with me and seems relevant today: “The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.” These days, we forget because there’s too much to try to remember, and because we can’t tell what’s worth holding on to and what’s online trash. On Tuesday night, the U.S. Southern Command announced that it had launched joint operations with Ecuador against “Designated Terrorist Organizations.” Meanwhile, the list of elected officials who have made conflicting or meaningless statements about Iran keeps growing, and now includes Chuck Schumer, who said, “No one wants an endless war but we certainly don’t want a nuclear Iran,” a statement so noncommittal, gnarled, and koan-y that it sounds like it was written by history’s most frustrating Buddhist monk. (On Wednesday, Schumer, making the case for a war-powers resolution, said, “Americans overwhelmingly oppose war with Iran. And Senate Republicans have a duty to stand up for Americans by forcing Donald Trump to reverse course.”) We are aware that stuff is happening that we should care about, but the fog of bullshit surrounding this stuff is so thick that we can barely make out its shape or heft. Less than six weeks have passed since Alex Pretti was shot dead by C.B.P. agents in Minneapolis, and yet that, too, already feels like yesterday’s problem.

与我这一代许多忧郁的年轻人一样,高中时我深受米兰·昆德拉小说的吸引。那时,我的兴趣徘徊于理解极权主义与青春躁动之间,但《笑忘录》中的一段话尤其令我难忘,至今仍觉贴切:“人与权力的斗争,就是记忆与遗忘的斗争。”如今,我们遗忘是因为需要记住的太多,更因为难以分辨何者值得珍藏、何者只是网络垃圾。周二晚间,美国南方司令部宣布与厄瓜多尔联合开展针对“指定恐怖组织”的军事行动。与此同时,对伊朗问题发表矛盾或空洞言论的当选官员名单持续加长,最新加入者是查克·舒默——“无人想要无休止的战争,但我们当然也不愿看到拥有核武器的伊朗”,这番表态如此模棱两可、晦涩曲折、充满禅机,简直像出自史上最令人抓狂的僧侣之手。(周三舒默为战争权力决议案辩护时称:“绝大多数美国人反对与伊朗开战。参议院共和党人有责任捍卫美国人民,迫使特朗普改弦易辙。”)我们明知正在发生值得关注的事件,但环绕其周的迷雾如此浓重,几乎无法辨明事件的轮廓与分量。亚历克斯·普雷蒂在明尼阿波利斯被边境巡逻队射杀尚不足六周,却已恍如隔日旧闻。

This doesn’t mean that we can’t remember anything. Whatever resistance does form against our new war in the Middle East won’t come out of deep knowledge of the conflict or even disagreements over its justifications—when none are offered, how can we argue against them?—but, rather, out of the collective memory of Afghanistan and Iraq. The Trump Administration is making a bet that this remembering will be obscured by all the news and trash we take in every day. And, as long as American boots do not hit the ground in Iran—which would take the war from our phones into the family living rooms of the servicepeople who are deployed—Trump might well get away with it.

这并不意味着我们无法记住任何事。无论对中东新战争形成何种抵制,都不会源于对冲突的深刻认知,甚至不会源于对其正当性的质疑——当政府根本不作任何解释时,我们又如何反驳?——而是源于对阿富汗和伊拉克战争的集体记忆。特朗普政府正在赌这种记忆会被我们每天接收的海量新闻与信息垃圾所遮蔽。只要美军不踏上伊朗领土——那将使战争从手机屏幕走进被部署军人的家庭客厅——特朗普就很可能得逞。

If we do forget the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq, it won’t be on account of a revisionist history about those wars, one that has swayed us with jingoistic propaganda about a caring military or some paean about spreading democracy. Instead, Trump will have won by simply refusing to tell a story at all, outside of Hegseth’s absurd football-coach talk. Hegseth, in a way, is right: nobody believes in those stories anymore, so why would he bother spinning them? Just say, essentially, nothing, and hope that, eventually, we’ll all go back to our phones. ♦

如果我们真的遗忘了阿富汗和伊拉克的教训,那并非因为那些战争被修正主义历史所改写,也不是因为那些关于军队关怀或传播民主的颂歌般的沙文主义宣传曾左右过我们。相反,特朗普的胜利将仅仅源于他拒绝讲述任何故事——除了赫格塞斯荒谬的橄榄球教练式说辞。从某种意义上说,赫格塞斯是对的:如今已无人相信那些陈词滥调,他又何必费心编织谎言?索性保持沉默,寄望于我们最终都会重新埋头于手机之中。♦

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