Books

How to Measure the Good Life

如何衡量美好生活
In a new book, the conservative pundit Arthur C. Brooks offers tips to “young strivers” on maximizing their daily meaning quotient.
保守派评论家亚瑟·C·布鲁克斯(Arthur C. Brooks)在新书中为“年轻奋斗者”提供了提升每日意义指数的建议。
A person pouring out a wheelbarrow of books that create a face
Illustration by Pablo Amargo

The bromide has it that a liberal is a person who won’t take his own side in an argument. To this we might add a corollary: there is a certain kind of conservative pundit who has never really had a side to take. A creature of think tanks and business schools, galas and morning talk shows, he is assiduous about following the fashions of the right-wing establishment—at least, as long as they do not require him to relinquish his air of noncommittal politesse. In 2003, he opined on patriotism and national security, but never too rudely. In 2010, he railed against Obamacare, but never too peevishly. Now, in 2026, the peculiarities of the moment and the spiritual extremities of Trumpism oblige him to discourse on the point of life and the nature of the good—a task for which he is remarkably ill-equipped.

有句老话说,自由主义者是在争论中不愿为自己立场辩护的人。对此我们或许可以补充一条推论:有那么一类保守派评论员,其实从未真正拥有过自己的立场。这种穿梭于智库与商学院、晚宴与晨间脱口秀的生物,始终孜孜不倦地追随右翼建制派的潮流——至少,只要这些潮流不迫使他放弃那种模棱两可的彬彬有礼。2003年,他高谈爱国主义与国家安全,但从不失之粗鲁。2010年,他痛斥奥巴马医改,但总保持着得体的愠怒。如今到了2026年,时代的特殊性与特朗普主义的灵魂极端性,迫使他不得不探讨生命的意义与善的本质——这项任务对他而言,实在是力所不逮。

No specimen of this endangered breed is more irritating or more exemplary than Arthur C. Brooks, whose new book, “The Meaning of Your Life: Finding Purpose in an Age of Emptiness” (Portfolio), strains to match the febrile mood of contemporary conservatism. On the face of it, Brooks looks like just the man for the job. In the course of a chameleonic career, he has proved himself a master of reinvention. At nineteen, he left college to play the French horn, eventually finding a position with the Barcelona Symphony Orchestra, and it was not until his late twenties that he earned a bachelor’s degree. During his studies, he “fell in love” with free-market economics and decided to pursue a Ph.D. in public-policy analysis at the Rand Corporation. Later, he would frame his unconventional origin story as proof positive of the capitalist concept. “I’m a living example of the happiness vocation can bring in a flexible labor market,” he wrote in the Times, in 2013.

在濒危的保守派知识分子中,最令人恼火、也最具代表性的莫过于亚瑟·C·布鲁克斯(Arthur C. Brooks)。他的新书《生命的意义:在空虚时代寻找目标》(Portfolio出版社)竭力迎合当代保守主义的狂热情绪。表面看来,布鲁克斯似乎是完成这项使命的不二人选。在他变色龙般的职业生涯中,他不断重塑自我,堪称个中高手。十九岁那年,他离开大学去吹法国号,最终在巴塞罗那交响乐团谋得职位,直到近三十岁才获得学士学位。求学期间,他“爱上”了自由市场经济,并决定在兰德公司攻读公共政策分析博士学位。后来,他将自己非传统的出身故事包装成资本主义理念的活证。“在灵活的劳动力市场中,职业能带来幸福——我就是活生生的例子。”2013年,他在《纽约时报》上这样写道。

The flexible labor market has been good to him indeed. In 2009, after a stint in academia, he became president of the premier center-right think tank in the United States, the American Enterprise Institute. In this capacity, he demonstrated himself adept at flattering donors and chasing fleeting trends: initially, he championed a hard-line free-market agenda—but when Mitt Romney’s 2012 defeat kicked off the “reform conservatism” movement, he quickly fell in line. By 2015, Washington Post columnists were describing him as the “godfather of reform conservatism,” and in a best-selling book published that same year he promoted laissez-faire conservatism with a compassionate face (and basic welfare protections). “I simply don’t buy the argument that Trumpism is characteristic of Tea Party supporters or conservatives in general,” he wrote in early 2016. “I look at the Republican governors. . . . Many are pragmatic, serious, non-populists. I could plausibly argue that this is the future of the movement.”

灵活的劳动力市场确实待他不薄。2009年,在学术界短暂停留后,他成为美国首屈一指的中间偏右智库——美国企业研究所(American Enterprise Institute)的所长。在这个职位上,他展现出取悦金主、追逐风潮的娴熟手腕:起初他力主强硬路线的自由市场议程,但当米特·罗姆尼2012年败选引发“改革保守主义”运动时,他迅速调整了方向。到2015年,《华盛顿邮报》专栏作家已将他描述为“改革保守主义教父”,同年他在畅销书中倡导戴着温情面具(并包含基本福利保障)的自由放任保守主义。“我完全不能认同特朗普主义代表茶党支持者或保守派普遍特征的说法,”他在2016年初写道,“看看共和党籍的州长们……多数都是务实、严肃、非民粹主义者。我完全有理由主张这才是这场运动的未来。”

Rarely has a political prognostication proved so wrong. In 2016, Brooks could not even conceive of the spasms and breaches of etiquette that Trumpism would produce on an almost daily basis. How was he to navigate the brave new world that MAGA would build over the next decade? Some of his more spirited peers on the professional right, such as David Frum and Jonah Goldberg, declared themselves Never Trumpers; less honorable figures, such as Tucker Carlson, reimagined themselves as disgruntled men of the people and started dressing in plaid. Brooks, for his part, equivocated. He made some tentatively anti-MAGA gestures during the 2016 Presidential campaign, opposing Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric and interventionist economic orientation, but he quickly lost what little remained of his nerve. He walked back his critiques, hosted Vice-President Mike Pence at A.E.I., and eventually beat a retreat from politics altogether, installing himself at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Harvard Business School, in 2019.

政治预言很少如此失准。2016年时,布鲁克斯根本无法想象特朗普主义几乎每日引发的痉挛与礼仪崩坏。他该如何应对“让美国再次伟大”运动在未来十年构建的美丽新世界?专业右翼阵营中某些更具风骨的同行——如大卫·弗拉姆和乔纳·戈德堡——宣布成为“永不支持特朗普者”;品格稍逊者如塔克·卡尔森,则将自己重塑为心怀不满的平民代言人,开始穿上格纹衬衫。至于布鲁克斯,他选择了模棱两可。2016年总统竞选期间,他曾试探性地做出反MAGA姿态,反对特朗普的反移民言论与干预主义经济导向,但残存的些许勇气很快消散殆尽。他撤回批评言论,在美国企业研究所接待副总统迈克·彭斯,最终于2019年彻底退出政治场域,将自己安顿在哈佛大学肯尼迪学院与哈佛商学院。

A bout of frantic rebranding ensued. In 2020, Brooks began writing a popular column about happiness for The Atlantic; by 2022, he was commanding hefty speaking fees and churning out best-sellers. The business of happiness, he discovered, was booming. And make no mistake: it was a business. Brooks had been experimenting with an entrepreneurial approach to self-cultivation since at least 2015, when he confessed in a Times op-ed that he treated his courtship with his wife “as if it were a start-up.” Soon, he was urging his audience to think of themselves in similar terms. “The whole idea is that you are your own enterprise,” he told them. “You are the CEO of You, Inc.”

随之而来的是一阵疯狂的重塑品牌行动。2020年,布鲁克斯开始为《大西洋月刊》撰写关于幸福的专栏,广受欢迎;到2022年,他已能收取高昂的演讲费,并接连推出畅销书。他发现,幸福这门生意正蓬勃发展。请务必明白:这确实是一门生意。至少从2015年起,布鲁克斯就开始尝试用创业思维来经营自我修养——当时他在《纽约时报》专栏文章中坦言,自己追求妻子时“就像经营一家初创企业”。很快,他开始敦促听众用类似的方式看待自己。“核心理念是:你就是你自己的企业,”他告诉他们,“你是'你有限公司'的首席执行官。”

Brooks’s shift toward happiness was canny, and strategically timed: well-being, once the province of philosophers, had been thoroughly usurped by podcasters, data scientists, and influencers by the time he got his hands on it. Hellenistic thinkers, such as the Stoics, had once proposed, in the words of the philosopher Martha Nussbaum, that “philosophy heals human diseases, diseases produced by false beliefs”—in other words, that by understanding and living in accordance with our nature we could achieve eudaemonia, which translates roughly to “flourishing.” Earlier thinkers, most famously Aristotle, had gone so far as to propose that eudaemonia was an inherently communal accomplishment, one that could only take root in the proper social and political context. But the social psychologists who catapulted to prominence in the early two-thousands were less interested in the richer concept of eudaemonia and more interested in a thinner, hollower, and vastly more individualistic enterprise of happiness, of simply feeling good. In 2006, two books by social psychologists—Daniel Gilbert’s “Stumbling on Happiness” and Jonathan Haidt’s “The Happiness Hypothesis”—set the latest wave of happiness studies in motion. But the written word was never the ideal medium for their particular message, and by 2026 innumerable podcasts had sprung up like mushrooms after a squall. There was “The Happiness Lab,” with Dr. Laurie Santos; there was “10% Happier,” with Dan Harris; and, inevitably, there was “Office Hours,” with Arthur Brooks.

布鲁克斯转向幸福话题的时机可谓精明且富有策略:在他涉足这一领域时,幸福这个曾经属于哲学家的领地,早已被播客主播、数据科学家和网红们彻底占据。正如哲学家玛莎·努斯鲍姆所言,古希腊的斯多葛学派等思想家曾提出“哲学能治愈人类因错误信念而产生的疾病”——换言之,通过理解并顺应我们的本性生活,我们就能实现“eudaemonia”(大致可译为“蓬勃生长”)。更早的思想家,最著名的如亚里士多德,甚至提出“eudaemonia”本质上是一种集体成就,只有在恰当的社会政治环境中才能生根发芽。但二十一世纪初声名鹊起的社会心理学家们,对“eudaemonia”这个更丰富的概念兴趣寥寥,反而更关注一种更单薄、更空洞、更具个人主义色彩的幸福事业——即单纯的愉悦感。2006年,社会心理学家丹尼尔·吉尔伯特的《撞上快乐》和乔纳森·海特的《幸福假设》两本书掀起了最新一波幸福研究热潮。但书面文字从来不是传递这种特定讯息的理想媒介,到2026年,无数播客如雨后春笋般涌现:劳里·桑托斯博士主持的《幸福实验室》、丹·哈里斯主持的《快乐10%》,当然还有阿瑟·布鲁克斯主持的《办公时间》。

These days, the C.E.O. of Brooks, Inc., appears to be thriving. He has acquired a jaunty wardrobe of loud suits and colorful pocket squares, and he exudes an avuncular charisma in videos he posts on YouTube. With the brisk, competent manner of a doctor prescribing medication, he assures his audience that his six-step morning “protocol” helps him manage “the negative side” of his “affect profile,” and expounds on “the science behind being good at leisure.” He has so thoroughly expunged his image of any unsavory political taint that he has co-authored a self-help book, “Build the Life You Want” (2023), with Oprah—and, as he never tires of informing his readers, paid a number of visits to the Dalai Lama. As of January, 2026, he had joined CBS News as a contributor and become a columnist at the anti-woke outlet The Free Press. His metamorphosis into social scientist-cum-sage appears to be complete.

如今,布鲁克斯公司的首席执行官似乎正春风得意。他购置了一身花哨西装与彩色口袋巾的潇洒行头,在YouTube发布的视频中散发着慈父般的魅力。他以医生开处方般利落干练的姿态,向观众保证自己六步晨间“仪式”有助于管理“情感特质中的消极面”,并阐释“擅长休闲背后的科学原理”。他已彻底抹去自身形象中任何令人不快的政治污点,甚至与奥普拉合著了自助书籍《构建你想要的生活》(2023年)——正如他乐此不疲地向读者强调的那样,他还多次拜访了达赖喇嘛。截至2026年1月,他已作为特约评论员加入哥伦比亚广播公司新闻部,同时成为反觉醒主义媒体《自由报》的专栏作家。这位社会科学家兼哲人的蜕变,似乎已然完成。

In “The Meaning of Your Life,” he no longer trumpets free markets, extolls entrepreneurs, or praises work as “a blessing,” as he did in earlier books. Now he claims that the ambitious professionals he calls “young strivers” lead superficial and unfulfilling lives. What they lack, in his view, is “the one thing that can never be simulated: meaning.”

在《生命的意义》一书中,他不再像早期著作那样高呼自由市场、颂扬企业家精神,或将工作誉为“天赐之福”。如今他宣称,那些被他称为“年轻奋斗者”的野心家们正过着肤浅而空虚的生活。在他看来,这些人所缺失的是“永远无法被模拟之物:意义”。
Three people standing in elevator.
“Seven and then door-close, door-close, door-close, door-close, door-close, door-close, door-close, door-close, and door-close.”
“七楼,然后关门、关门、关门、关门、关门、关门、关门、关门,还有关门。”
Cartoon by Paul Noth
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There are any number of prospective material explanations for the young strivers’ predicament, and Brooks makes brief note of several, among them the punishing housing market and the imminent collapse of the social safety net. But calcified habits die hard, and rather than seriously entertain any of these explanations, or even clarify why he rejects them, he turns instinctively to what he knows best—dubious social science.

对于年轻奋斗者们的困境,存在诸多可能的现实解释,布鲁克斯简要提及了其中几种,包括令人望而却步的房地产市场和社会安全网濒临崩溃的现状。但固化的思维习惯难以改变,他并未认真考量这些解释,甚至不愿阐明为何将其摒弃,而是本能地转向自己最熟悉的领域——那些值得商榷的社会科学理论。

To make sense of the strivers’ malaise, Brooks relies on the work of Jonathan “Happiness Hypothesis” Haidt, whose 2024 best-seller, “The Anxious Generation,” argued that digital natives have been addled by excessive screen time. What he adds to Haidt’s account is a dash of questionable neuroscience: in his telling, “hemispheric lateralization,” the phenomenon whereby cognitive functions are localized in different halves of the brain, “explains the acute crisis of meaning today.” A nebulous alloy of smartphones, social media, and a lust for optimization has thrust society into a “left-brained” orientation, forcing us to adopt a hyper-practical outlook. “The modern world of technology is literally changing the way people use their brains,” Brooks writes, “rendering them less and less capable of finding life’s coherence, purpose, and significance.”

为了解释奋斗者的精神困境,布鲁克斯借鉴了乔纳森·海特(Jonathan Haidt)的研究——这位以《幸福假说》闻名的学者在2024年畅销书《焦虑的一代》中提出,数字原住民已被过度的屏幕时间侵蚀心智。布鲁克斯在海特论述的基础上,添上了一笔值得商榷的神经科学佐料:在他看来,“大脑半球偏侧化”——即认知功能分布于大脑不同半球的生理现象——“解释了当今时代这场尖锐的意义危机”。智能手机、社交媒体与对效率优化的狂热追求,这三者形成的模糊合金将社会推入“左脑主导”的轨道,迫使我们采取极度实用主义的视角。“科技主导的现代世界正在切实改变人们使用大脑的方式,”布鲁克斯写道,“使他们越来越难以寻得生命的连贯性、目标与意义。”

Even though researchers have found no evidence that contemporary populations use one hemisphere of the brain any more than the other, every part of this picture is presented with slick confidence. Appeals to “the science” abound. Brooks is apt to fall back on that old assurance “studies show,” even when studies conflict—or, worse, when the very studies he cites do not show what he says they do. In his book “The Conservative Heart,” from 2015, for instance, he avers that monogamy yields happiness, then adds, “This isn’t my moral opinion; it’s what empirical evidence tells us.” The “empirical evidence” in question is a study showing that subjects with a single sexual partner have an average of 0.077 additional “happiness points.” But it also found that people who have sex four or more times a week, possibly with any number of partners, have 0.12, a fact that Brooks conveniently neglects to mention.

尽管研究人员并未发现任何证据表明当代人更频繁地使用某一侧大脑,但布鲁克斯描绘的这幅图景的每个部分都带着油滑的自信。书中充斥着对“科学”的援引。布鲁克斯动辄搬出那句老套的保证“研究表明”,即便研究结论相互矛盾——更糟的是,他引用的研究本身并不支持他的说法。例如在2015年出版的《保守派之心》中,他断言一夫一妻制能带来幸福,随后补充道:“这不是我的道德观点,而是实证证据告诉我们的。”这里所谓的“实证证据”是一项研究,显示拥有单一性伴侣的受试者平均多出0.077个“幸福点”。但该研究同时发现,每周发生四次或以上性行为的人——无论有多少性伴侣——能获得0.12个幸福点,这个事实却被布鲁克斯巧妙地忽略了。

“The Meaning of Your Life” also contains its fair share of misrepresentations, as when Brooks muses that “the idea of opposites attracting might even be biological,” then cites a 1995 study that subsequent researchers have called into question. But no one reading the book will come away with the sense that studies are often contested, or that many of the findings of social psychology and economics remain unsettled, or that results can be interpreted in many ways. Like much popular social science, it makes no effort to prove or even to persuade. It simply asserts and instructs.

《生命的意义》一书同样不乏失实之处。例如布鲁克斯沉思道:“异性相吸的观念或许有其生物学基础”,随后引用了一项1995年的研究,而后续研究者对该研究提出了质疑。但读者不会从书中获得这样的认知:研究结论常存争议,社会心理学和经济学的诸多发现仍无定论,研究结果可能存在多种解读方式。如同许多流行社会科学著作那样,这本书既不试图论证,甚至无意说服。它只是断言与说教。

Its tone as it does so is distinctly infantilizing. Chapters are subdivided into digestible sections (“Get Bored the Right Way,” “Give More to Transcend Yourself”) and often end with homework, set aside in a little box, as in elementary-school textbooks. When Brooks is not offering “Questions for Reflection and Self-Assessment,” he is laying out “Three Big Things to Remember,” as if he were providing a study guide for the exam of a meaningful life. In his book “Love Your Enemies,” from 2019, he admiringly cites “The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People”—which he describes, perhaps with a sense of defensive self-awareness, as a “masterpiece” that is not “just cheesy self-help.” Brooks, for his part, rarely imposes on readers by asking them to count as high as seven, perhaps assuming that “three major lessons from the science of morality” and “five simple facts” make more manageable mathematical demands.

其行文语气明显带有居高临下的说教意味。章节被细分为易于消化的模块(如“正确方式体验无聊”、“超越自我多行善举”),结尾处常仿照小学课本设置独立框格布置“课后作业”。布鲁克斯若非在提供“反思与自我评估习题”,便是在罗列“三大要诀铭记于心”,仿佛在为人生意义这场考试编写复习指南。在他2019年出版的《爱你的敌人》一书中,他满怀敬意地引用了《高效能人士的七个习惯》——或许带着某种防御性的自我觉察,他称这部作品是“杰作”而非“庸俗的成功学”。至于布鲁克斯本人,则鲜少要求读者进行高达七项的计数练习,可能他认为“道德科学三大启示”与“五项简明事实”这类数字对读者而言更易掌握。

Still, Brooks’s turn away from politics and toward a more therapeutic project has not been wholly unhelpful. His practical advice fares better than both his theories and his pallid attempts at profundity. In his columns, he recommends such commonsense remedies as a good night’s sleep and regular exercise. “The Meaning of Your Life,” in particular, contains several promising suggestions. Who would deny that we would all do better to turn off our phones, interact with other human beings, and maybe even go outside for a walk every once in a while? Brooks struggles, however, when he strays from the cozy precincts of self-help and into the rugged realm of philosophy.

不过,布鲁克斯从政治转向更具疗愈性的写作,也并非全无裨益。他的实用建议比他的理论探索和那些苍白乏味的深刻尝试要出色得多。在专栏文章中,他推荐诸如保证充足睡眠和定期锻炼这类常识性的疗愈方法。尤其是《你生命的意义》一文,其中包含了不少颇有前景的建议。谁能否认,如果我们都能放下手机、与他人互动,甚至偶尔出门散散步,生活会变得更好呢?然而,一旦布鲁克斯离开自我疗愈的舒适区,踏入哲学那崎岖的领域,就显得力不从心了。

If his subject has shifted, his methods have lagged. Nothing in his background has outfitted him with the intellectual equipment to grapple with our “age of emptiness,” and at times he comes close to recognizing the inadequacy of his register and frame of reference. “In their technical excellence,” he concedes, “strivers trivialize their humanness by reducing life’s magnificent inscrutability to a series of complicated but solvable problems.” How do these remarks square with Brooks’s fondness for compressing expansive human goods into orderly formulas? In “The Conservative Heart,” Brooks wrote of “the happiness portfolio,” which consists of “faith, family, community, and meaningful work.” Now the portfolio has been supplanted by a less prescriptive and more schematic “happiness equation,” according to which “Happiness = Enjoyment + Satisfaction + Meaning.” (“Meaning” is further subdivided into “Coherence + Purpose + Significance.”) It is perhaps unsurprising that Brooks measures his body-fat percentage with calipers and keeps a dutiful record of his own happiness on a spreadsheet, assigning various elements of his life a number and then a force multiplier reflecting their importance. (How do his children feel knowing they command a mere eight out of ten importance points, but his faith and his marriage both rate a nine?)

如果说他的主题已然转变,他的方法却依然滞后。他的背景中没有任何东西能为他提供应对我们这个“空虚时代”所需的智识装备,有时他几乎要承认自己惯用的表达方式和参照框架已不合时宜。“在技术卓越的表象下,”他承认,“奋斗者们将生命壮阔的不可知性简化为一系列复杂但可解的问题,从而贬低了自身的人性。”这番言论又如何与布鲁克斯热衷于将丰富的人类价值压缩成有序公式的倾向相协调?在《保守派之心》中,布鲁克斯曾提出由“信仰、家庭、社群和有意义的工作”构成的“幸福投资组合”。如今这个投资组合已被一个不那么规定性、更具图解性的“幸福方程式”取代:幸福=享受+满足+意义(“意义”又细分为“连贯性+目标+重要性”)。布鲁克斯用卡尺测量体脂率,在电子表格上虔诚记录自己的幸福指数,为生活的各个要素打分并赋予反映其重要性的权重系数——如此行径或许并不令人意外(不知他的孩子们得知自己仅获得十分之八的重要性分值,而他的信仰和婚姻都得到九分时作何感想)。

Readers may resent being abstracted into algebra, but they are nonetheless invited to sort themselves into one of four categories on the basis of a short quiz. They might be Hopeful Wanderers, unsure of the meaning of their lives but in active search of it, or Happy Homebodies, so sure of the meaning of their lives that they have little need to search for it. Alternatively, they might be Relentless Seekers, who have some notion of the meaning of their lives but remain in search of it anyway, or, worst of all, Lost in Place, the sort that is neither sure of the meaning of life nor in any rush to find it.

读者或许会反感被抽象成代数符号,但这里仍要请大家根据一份简短问卷,将自己归入以下四类之一:你可能是“满怀希望的漫游者”,虽不确定生命意义却积极追寻;或是“安于现状的居家者”,对生命意义如此笃定,以至于无需刻意探寻。你也可能是“永不停歇的探索者”,对生命意义已有某种认知却仍在追寻;又或者,最糟糕的情况是成为“原地迷失者”——既不确定生命意义,也不急于寻找。

It would be one thing if Brooks were reconciled to writing Enneagram tests, but “The Meaning of Your Life” is self-help that dreams it is philosophy. It makes a scattered show of its erudition in the form of drive-by efforts to project philosophical literacy. Only the aggressive carelessness that once enabled Brooks to write a column about how to “enhance your mood” with a playlist inspired by the unremitting pessimist Arthur Schopenhauer could have yielded his tortured misreadings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Søren Kierkegaard, and Karl Marx. Friedrich Nietzsche once declared, “The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—do you not know that only this discipline has created all enhancements of man so far?” This doesn’t stop Brooks from summarizing Nietzsche’s position as follows: “There is no essence to life, so the secret is to have fun and not worry too much about it.”

如果布鲁克斯安于撰写九型人格测试也就罢了,但《生命的意义》这本打着哲学旗号的自助读物,不过是零散地炫耀其浮光掠影的哲学素养。唯有那种曾让他写出专栏文章、建议读者通过叔本华歌单“提升情绪”的鲁莽轻率,才能催生出他对爱默生、克尔凯郭尔和马克思如此牵强附会的误读。尼采曾断言:“苦难的磨砺,巨大的苦难——难道你们不知道,迄今为止人类所有的升华都源自这种磨砺吗?”但这并不妨碍布鲁克斯将尼采的立场概括为:“生命本无本质,所以秘诀在于享受乐趣,不必过于忧虑。”

But none of these ornamental flourishes can conceal his fundamental incuriosity. “Until recently,” Brooks writes hazily, of the meaning of life, “the definition probably wasn’t so important, because of the way people lived, just naturally going about life in ways that delivered meaning every day.” Which people? How recently? Readers of “The Meaning of Your Life” could be forgiven for thinking that despair was invented in 2007, the year the first iPhone was released. Brooks has no interest in the broader sweep of history and, indeed, no apparent knowledge of the philosophical accounts of encroaching meaninglessness which have been on offer for centuries—the 1785 letters in which the German philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi developed the idea of nihilism to describe the etiolation that accompanied the Enlightenment, for instance, or the fin-de-siècle sociologist Max Weber’s lament about how modernity shattered a formerly coherent world.

但这些华丽的修饰都无法掩盖他根本上的不思进取。布鲁克斯在谈及生命意义时含糊地写道:“直到最近,定义可能并不那么重要,因为人们的生活方式自然而然就能在日常中获取意义。”哪些人?多近才算最近?《你生命的意义》的读者若认为绝望情绪是2007年——第一代iPhone发布之年——才被发明的,倒也情有可原。布鲁克斯对更宏大的历史脉络毫无兴趣,事实上,他对几个世纪以来哲学界关于意义消逝的论述显然也一无所知——比如德国哲学家弗里德里希·海因里希·雅各比1785年的书信中发展出虚无主义概念,用以描述启蒙运动伴随的苍白化;或是世纪末社会学家马克斯·韦伯对现代性如何击碎昔日完整世界的哀叹。
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Nor is Brooks any more inquisitive about remedies for meaninglessness than he is about its origins. “The Meaning of Your Life” is the clearest possible demonstration of the extent to which the old think-tank mode, with its conspicuous show of reasonableness and its distaste for unseemly convulsions, is incongruous with the existential questions roiling contemporary conservatives (and not just conservatives) since Trump’s election in 2016. How should we live? What is the nature of the beautiful, the good, and the true? What Brooks proffers is not the philosophy these queries require but a kind of pharmacology—a pill designed to alleviate every last pang.

布鲁克斯对如何应对意义缺失的探讨,也和对意义缺失的起源一样缺乏探究。《生命的意义》一书最清晰地表明,自2016年特朗普当选以来,那种旧式智库模式——带着显而易见的理性姿态和对失态骚动的反感——与困扰当代保守派(且不止保守派)的存在主义问题有多么格格不入。我们该如何生活?美、善、真的本质是什么?布鲁克斯提供的并非这些问题所需的哲学思考,而是一种药理学方案——一颗旨在缓解所有阵痛的药丸。

It is striking that, in a book that is ostensibly about meaning, nothing approaching a positive picture of meaning ever emerges. Brooks ventures no substantive defense of the practices he recommends. Instead of exhorting readers to adopt any particular belief, he presses them to refrain from the rigors and responsibilities of commitment, urging them to “refuse to participate in ideologically polarized culture.” Moral and political causes seem like precisely the sorts of things that might afford a person a sense of meaning—but they provoke some measure of dishevelment, so Brooks renounces them in favor of more soothing stratagems. The logic he prefers is vulgarly instrumental. You should do things not because they are in fact valuable but because they generate meaning, which produces an enjoyable tingle. It is not because religious doctrine might be true that you ought to keep an open mind to what Brooks anemically calls “a metaphysical dimension to your life”; it is because “you will benefit.”

引人注目的是,在一本表面上探讨意义的书中,从未浮现出任何接近积极意义图景的内容。布鲁克斯对他所倡导的实践并未提出实质性的辩护。他没有敦促读者接受任何特定信念,反而要求他们回避承诺所需的严谨与责任,怂恿他们“拒绝参与意识形态两极分化的文化”。道德与政治事业恰恰是可能赋予人意义感的事物——但它们总会引发某种程度的纷乱,因此布鲁克斯摒弃了这些,转而推崇更令人安心的策略。他所偏爱的逻辑是粗鄙的工具主义:你做事不应因其本身有价值,而因为它们能产生意义,带来愉悦的刺激感。你之所以应对布鲁克斯苍白地称之为“生命中形而上学维度”的事物保持开放心态,并非因为宗教教义可能是真实的,而是因为“你将从中受益”。

“You will benefit” (preferably in a chemically measurable way) is this book’s single promise and its overriding concern. Religion is good—because “recalling spiritual experiences lowers activity in the medial thalamus and caudate nucleus (brain regions controlling sensory and emotional processing).” Beauty is good—because psychological research outlines “well-being strategies using music or art.” Suffering is good—because “a belief that happiness requires an absence of suffering undermines happiness itself.” Romantic love (and, in some cases, marriage) is good—because it yields an influx of “the neurotransmitters norepinephrine and dopamine” and activates “the ventral tegmental area, nucleus accumbens, caudate nucleus, insula, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,” all of which sound alarmingly contagious.

“你将受益”——最好能以化学方式测量——是这本书唯一的承诺,也是其压倒一切的关切。宗教有益——因为“回忆灵性体验会降低内侧丘脑和尾状核(控制感觉与情绪处理的大脑区域)的活跃度”。美有益——因为心理学研究勾勒出“运用音乐或艺术的幸福策略”。苦难有益——因为“认为幸福需要免除苦难的信念反而会损害幸福本身”。浪漫爱情(有时包括婚姻)有益——因为它能带来“去甲肾上腺素和多巴胺神经递质”的涌入,并激活“腹侧被盖区、伏隔核、尾状核、脑岛、背侧前扣带皮层和背外侧前额叶皮层”——这些名词听起来都带着令人不安的传染性。

Philosophy, too, is pummelled into profitability. It is worthwhile because a foray into the “big questions . . . stimulates numinousness,” as if thinking were a hormone. What “Socrates meant when he said, ‘the unexamined life is not worth living,’ ” Brooks explains, is that “a life that is not deeply questioned is bereft of meaning.” But surely it is relevant that Socrates and Plato asked “big questions” not because they sought to increase their daily meaning quotient but because they cared about the answers. Might it be that pursuing love and religion primarily because they induce “pleasant feelings of warmth in the chest,” as one Brooks-approved psychologist puts it, prevents us from attaining them at all? If my husband told me he married me to get his ventral tegmental area thrumming, I would file for a divorce immediately.

哲学同样被捶打成了有利可图的东西。它之所以有价值,是因为对“大问题”的探索“能激发神圣感”,仿佛思考是一种荷尔蒙。布鲁克斯解释说,“苏格拉底说'未经审视的人生不值得过',意思就是'未经深刻追问的人生是缺乏意义的'。”但苏格拉底和柏拉图追问“大问题”并非为了提升日常意义指数,而是因为他们关心答案——这个事实显然值得注意。如果像一位布鲁克斯推崇的心理学家所言,我们追求爱情与宗教主要是为了诱发“胸口愉悦的暖意”,这是否反而会让我们永远无法真正触及它们?倘若我丈夫告诉我,他娶我只是为了让腹侧被盖区产生悸动,我会立刻申请离婚。

Brooks’s discomfort with those pesky “big questions” is hardly surprising. After all, he came of age during a brief period when the liberal order seemed durable and secure. The watchword was “neutrality,” a doctrine according to which the state must remain ecumenical about differing conceptions of the good life. Policies were justified not with reference to morality or metaphysics but with citations of white papers. Even those who advocated for conservative positions were compelled to make their case in language amenable to the liberal sensibility. But Trump’s election proved that a sizable contingent of the population had no problem imposing their values on others—and even hoped that the government might do so for them. As the reactionary pundit Sohrab Ahmari wrote in a 2019 essay that has become one of the founding documents of the so-called post-liberal movement, the aim of the state is to produce “a public square re-ordered to the common good and ultimately the Highest Good.”

布鲁克斯对这类恼人的“大问题”感到不适,这并不令人意外。毕竟,他成长于自由主义秩序看似稳固持久的短暂年代。那个时代的口号是“中立性”——根据这一信条,国家必须对各种良善生活的构想保持超然态度。政策论证不诉诸道德或形而上学,而是援引白皮书。即便是持保守立场者,也不得不使用符合自由主义敏感性的语言来阐述观点。但特朗普的当选证明,相当一部分民众毫不介意将自身价值观强加于人——甚至期待政府代行此事。正如反动派评论家索拉布·阿马里在2019年那篇已成为所谓“后自由主义运动”奠基文献的文章中所写:国家的目标在于构建“以共同福祉、乃至至高之善为归依的公共秩序”。

The think-tank set was not prepared to tackle the common good, much less the Highest. Brooks has never even had the temerity to endorse what he is nominally endorsing: he eschews all convictions, save those about what makes people feel better according to “The Science” and its henchmen, “The Studies.” How convenient, then, that the things that make us feel better are all conservative staples! Brooks, Inc., may have changed its advertising, but it has not quite abandoned its old politics. Brooks is still wont to assume that social crises are a function of our personal habits, not economic or political injustice, and his methodological tics are the same as ever. Free enterprise was a moral imperative in 2013 for the same reason that falling in love is advisable in 2026: because the “empirical evidence” shows that it tends to make us happier.

智库界尚未准备好探讨公共利益,更遑论至高之善。布鲁克斯甚至从未真正践行他名义上推崇的理念:他回避一切信念,唯独信奉那些据“科学”及其帮凶“研究”所言能让人感觉更好的信条。多么便利啊——那些让我们感觉更好的事物,竟全是保守主义的陈年货色!布鲁克斯有限公司或许更新了广告词,却未曾真正抛弃旧日政见。他依然惯于将社会危机归咎于个人习惯,而非经济或政治不公;其方法论癖好也一如既往。2013年他将自由企业奉为道德律令,正如2026年建议人们坠入爱河的理由如出一辙:只因“实证证据”表明这往往能让我们更幸福。

What’s changed in the intervening years is certainly not the ubiquity of this style of argument. (Even the other Brooks in political media, David, helps himself to this mode of justification on occasion, encouraging Americans to wed because “married people are 30 points happier than the unmarried.”) What’s changed is the cultural environment in which these wan pleas ring out. The post-liberals are calling for the Highest Good, and even capitalizing it Germanically—and there goes the think-tank brigade, clinging to the forms that predominated during the liberal consensus, making a point of their neutrality and apologetically suggesting that the numbers forced them to come out in favor of Christianity. Their solution to Trumpism is to tackle the new problems, but always in the old tone.

这些年真正改变的,绝非此类论调的泛滥之势。(就连政治媒体圈里另一位布鲁克斯——大卫·布鲁克斯——偶尔也会挪用这种辩护模式,他劝美国人结婚的理由是“已婚人士的幸福指数比未婚者高出30个百分点”。)真正改变的,是这些苍白呼吁回响其中的文化环境。后自由主义者们正在呼唤“至高之善”,甚至效仿德语习惯将其首字母大写——而智库军团却依然固守自由主义共识盛行时期的思维范式,刻意标榜中立立场,怯生生地暗示是数据迫使他们站到了基督教这边。面对特朗普主义,他们的解决方案是用旧时代的语调来应对新时代的问题。

Arthur Brooks, in particular, has made a career of elevating his noncommittal waffling into a warped kind of virtue. In “Love Your Enemies,” from 2019, a book that he completed as he was on the cusp of his supposed pivot away from politics, he dismisses moral argument as futile. “You aren’t going to change [anyone’s] mind through the force of argument any more than I will make my wife start liking cilantro by trying to force enough of it into her mouth,” he writes. Then he tells readers to “make your moral discussions with most people like the cilantro at our family dinner,” that is, treat ethical disagreements as trivial. As it happens, he has chosen the textbook example of what ethics are not like. Morality is not simply a matter of taste, of chocolate or vanilla. It transcends personal preference—and getting it right matters.

阿瑟·布鲁克斯尤其擅长将模棱两可的骑墙态度扭曲成某种美德,并以此谋生。在2019年出版的《爱你的敌人》一书中——当时他正宣称要淡出政治圈——他将道德辩论贬为徒劳之举。“你不可能通过论辩的力量改变任何人的想法,就像我不可能把足够多的香菜塞进妻子嘴里,就让她爱上香菜。”他写道。随后他建议读者“让与多数人的道德讨论变得像我家餐桌上的香菜”,也就是把道德分歧视作无足轻重的小事。可偏偏他举的这个例子,恰恰是伦理问题的反面教材。道德绝非巧克力或香草冰淇淋般仅关乎个人口味,它超越个人偏好——而明辨是非至关重要。

“I am not going to try to convert you to my religion,” Brooks writes in “The Meaning of Your Life,” before regaling us with neuroscientific findings about the health of religious brains. I almost wish he had. Reading Brooks, in all his fatal mildness, I could start to see how the ominous Highest Good might come to seem so appealing. A fanatical belief in something—and the irrepressible urge to proselytize that goes with it—is far more invigorating than the all-encompassing blandness of the therapeutic imperative. The post-liberals stand for cruelty and inanity, but Brooks can’t admit to standing for much of anything at all. ♦

“我不会试图让你皈依我的宗教,”布鲁克斯在《你生命的意义》中写道,随后便向我们展示了一系列关于宗教信徒大脑健康状态的神经科学研究成果。我几乎希望他真能尝试说服我。阅读布鲁克斯那充满宿命般温和的文字时,我开始理解那个不祥的“至善”概念为何会显得如此诱人。对某种事物的狂热信仰——以及随之而来难以抑制的传教冲动——远比包罗万象却平淡乏味的治疗性指令更令人振奋。后自由主义者们至少代表着残酷与荒谬,而布鲁克斯甚至不愿承认自己真正主张什么。♦

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