The Lede

The Limits of Iran’s Proxy Empire

伊朗代理人帝国的局限
The country spent decades cultivating the Axis of Resistance, but, as the war continues, the Houthis and other allied forces have plenty of reason to stay out of it.
该国耗费数十年培植“抵抗轴心”,但随着战争持续,胡塞武装及其他盟友有充分理由置身事外。
Protesters holding up signs and guns with a giant Iranian flag spread out on the street.
Photograph by Osamah Abdulrahman / AP

On February 28th, just hours after the United States and Israel struck Iran, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, the supreme leader of Yemen’s Houthi movement, gave a speech denouncing the attacks as “a blatant, criminal, and barbaric act targeting the Muslim Iranian people.” He expressed “complete solidarity” with Iran and urged the entire Muslim world to apply pressure, of all forms, on the U.S. and Israel. The following day, at his behest, tens of thousands of people in Yemen took to the streets to protest the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. They carried portraits of the cleric and condemned America and Israel, using language that mirrored the Houthis’ motto: “God is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse on the Jews, victory to Islam.”

2月28日,就在美国和以色列袭击伊朗数小时后,也门胡塞武装最高领导人阿卜杜勒-马利克·胡塞发表讲话,谴责此次袭击是“针对伊朗穆斯林人民的公然、犯罪和野蛮行径”。他表示与伊朗“完全团结一致”,并敦促整个穆斯林世界以各种形式向美国和以色列施压。次日,在他的号召下,也门数万人走上街头,抗议伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉阿里·哈梅内伊遇害。他们高举这位宗教领袖的画像,用与胡塞武装口号如出一辙的言辞谴责美国和以色列:“真主至大,美国去死,以色列去死,诅咒犹太人,伊斯兰必胜。”

The Houthis, a Zaydi Shiite Islamist rebel group, which the U.S. has designated as a foreign terrorist organization, are among Iran’s most powerful and resilient allies. They are a key part of the so-called Axis of Resistance, an informal Iran-led military coalition in the Middle East. During his speech, al-Houthi suggested that the Houthis were ready to lend military support to Iran: “We are fully prepared for any necessary developments,” he said. And yet, as the war continues into its second week, the Houthis are essentially M.I.A.

胡塞武装是一个栽德派伊斯兰主义反叛组织,被美国列为外国恐怖组织,也是伊朗最强大、最坚韧的盟友之一。他们是所谓“抵抗轴心”的关键组成部分,这是一个由伊朗主导的中东非正式军事联盟。在演讲中,胡塞武装领导人暗示已准备好向伊朗提供军事支持:“我们已为任何必要的事态发展做好充分准备。”然而,随着战争进入第二周,胡塞武装却基本处于“缺席”状态。

Iran’s other proxies, meanwhile, have done little to bolster Tehran in the war. Hezbollah, the paramilitary group in Lebanon, got involved in the conflict, disregarding the state’s sovereignty and firing missiles and drones from Lebanese territory at an Israeli military site near Haifa. The projectiles fell short, but Israel carried out retaliatory strikes in Beirut and across Lebanon, killing at least six hundred people, including ninety-one children, injuring more than a thousand, and displacing some eight hundred thousand. In Iraq, pro-Iranian Shiite militias have attempted a series of small-scale drone and rocket attacks at Israel, and have targeted U.S. forces and personnel in Erbil and Baghdad, and in Jordan. But few of these have caused damage. “Their capabilities remain limited and not consequential at all,” Renad Mansour, a senior fellow and the project director of the Iraq Initiative at Chatham House, a London-based think tank, told me.

与此同时,伊朗的其他代理人在这场战争中几乎未能给德黑兰提供实质性支持。黎巴嫩准军事组织真主党无视国家主权,从黎巴嫩领土向海法附近的以色列军事基地发射导弹和无人机,从而卷入冲突。这些投射物未能击中目标,但以色列对贝鲁特及黎巴嫩全境实施了报复性打击,造成至少六百人死亡(其中包括九十一名儿童),逾千人受伤,约八十万人流离失所。在伊拉克,亲伊朗的什叶派民兵组织试图对以色列发动一系列小规模无人机和火箭弹袭击,并针对埃尔比勒、巴格达及约旦境内的美军部队和人员发动攻击。但这些袭击大多未造成实质破坏。“他们的能力仍然有限,且完全不具决定性影响,”伦敦智库查塔姆研究所伊拉克倡议项目高级研究员兼主任雷纳德·曼苏尔(Renad Mansour)告诉我。

This was not what Iran envisioned when it began developing the Axis of Resistance, in the nineteen-eighties, pouring billions of dollars into cultivating a network that would help defend its borders, deter its enemies, and project influence across the region. The coalition started with Hezbollah, in 1982, which Iran helped establish in response to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. It eventually expanded to support Bashar al-Assad’s regime, in Syria; various Iraqi Shiite militias, such as the Popular Mobilization Forces; and Sunni militants, including Hamas. The Houthis, once a little-known insurgent group in northern Yemen, became a major military and political force after the Arab Spring, using nationwide unrest and government instability to seize large swaths of the country, including the capital, Sanaa. With the help of Iran, which provided training in addition to ballistic missiles and other advanced weaponry, the Houthis became adept at asymmetric warfare, using low-cost, high-impact methods like drones and rockets against more well-resourced militaries. With such tactics, they survived a years-long bombing campaign by a U.S.-backed, Saudi-led coalition seeking to reinstall Yemen’s elected government.

这并非伊朗在二十世纪八十年代开始发展“抵抗轴心”时所设想的局面。当时伊朗投入数十亿美元培育这个网络,旨在帮助保卫其边界、威慑敌人,并在整个地区投射影响力。该联盟始于1982年,伊朗为应对以色列入侵黎巴嫩而协助创建了真主党。随后逐渐扩展至支持叙利亚的巴沙尔·阿萨德政权、伊拉克各什叶派民兵组织(如人民动员部队),以及包括哈马斯在内的逊尼派武装力量。胡塞武装曾是也门北部一个鲜为人知的叛乱组织,在阿拉伯之春后利用全国性动荡和政府不稳的局势,夺取了包括首都萨那在内的大片领土,成为重要的军事政治力量。在伊朗提供弹道导弹等先进武器及训练支持下,胡塞武装精通非对称作战,能以无人机和火箭弹等低成本高效益手段对抗资源更充裕的军队。正是凭借这些战术,他们在美国支持的沙特联军长达数年的空袭中存活下来——该联军当时试图恢复也门民选政府。

All of Iran’s proxies share a deep ideological hatred of Israel and America. “The logic of the proxies for Iran, primarily, was this idea of forward defense, which meant that, instead of fighting in Iran, let’s do our fighting in other areas,” Mansour explained. But now that Iran is engaged in “a direct fight against the U.S. and Israel and its interests across the region,” he continued, these allied groups are “less necessary.”

伊朗的所有代理人组织都对以色列和美国怀有深刻的意识形态仇恨。“伊朗代理人组织的逻辑,主要是基于前沿防御的理念,这意味着与其在本土作战,不如在其他地区展开战斗,”曼苏尔解释道。但如今伊朗正“在整个地区与美国、以色列及其利益展开直接对抗”,他继续说道,这些盟友组织就“不那么必要了”。

Still, the Houthis could be especially valuable to Iran during the current conflict, as the group has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to withstand U.S. and Israeli strikes. This includes two American-led campaigns against Yemen—first under the Biden Administration, in 2024, then under the Trump Administration, last year, which pummelled Houthi positions and weapons arsenals for months. Not only did the group remain intact but their survival may have bolstered their image in Yemen and their grip on the country.

然而,在当前冲突中,胡塞武装对伊朗可能具有特殊价值,因为该组织已多次展现出抵御美国和以色列打击的能力。这包括美国主导的两次针对也门的军事行动——先是2024年拜登政府时期,随后是去年特朗普政府时期,这两次行动对胡塞武装的阵地和武器库进行了长达数月的猛烈打击。该组织不仅完好无损地保存下来,其生存能力或许还提升了他们在也门的形象,并巩固了对该国的控制。

Were the Houthis to get involved now, they could open several new fronts in the war at once. The group could fire drones and missiles at commercial ships in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, as it has done before, shutting down a vital shipping lane that connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Significant amounts of the world’s crude oil, liquefied natural gas, manufactured goods, electronics, and food flow through this passage. Shutting it down—coupled with Iran’s choking off the Strait of Hormuz—could suffocate global trade, cause oil and energy prices to soar even higher, and prompt stock-market crashes all over the world, putting added pressure on the Trump Administration and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to end the war. Already, some shippers are avoiding the Red Sea route, anticipating Houthi attacks. (Last spring, as the U.S. struck Yemen, the Houthis claimed to have launched missiles and drones at the U.S.S. Harry S. Truman, an American aircraft carrier in the Red Sea.) The Houthis could also fire long-range missiles at Israel, and target Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf nations—including their oil, energy, and economic infrastructure—from the south, as Iran strikes these countries from the north, in a joint pincer movement.

如果胡塞武装现在介入,他们可以同时在多条新战线开辟战场。该组织可能像以前那样,向曼德海峡的商船发射无人机和导弹,从而切断这条经由苏伊士运河和红海连接地中海与印度洋的重要航道。全球大量原油、液化天然气、制成品、电子产品和食品都经由这条通道运输。一旦它被切断——再加上伊朗封锁霍尔木兹海峡——全球贸易将陷入窒息,石油和能源价格将进一步飙升,并可能引发全球股市崩盘,从而给特朗普政府和以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡施加更大压力,迫使其结束战争。一些航运公司已经预见到胡塞武装的袭击,开始避开红海航线。(去年春天,在美国袭击也门之际,胡塞武装声称向红海上的美国航空母舰“哈里·S·杜鲁门”号发射了导弹和无人机。)胡塞武装还可能向以色列发射远程导弹,并从南部瞄准沙特阿拉伯和其他波斯湾国家——包括它们的石油、能源和经济基础设施——而伊朗则从北部打击这些国家,形成联合钳形攻势。

It’s possible that the plan is for the Houthis to join the conflict later on, if there is a long-drawn-out war, and if the Gulf countries, which so far have been focussed on protecting themselves from Iranian strikes, go on the offensive. (On Saturday, Masoud Pezeshkian, the Iranian President, apologized to the Gulf states for its strikes, but the attacks have persisted.) Mohammed al-Basha, a Middle East politics-and-security expert, told me that the Houthis have been readying themselves for action. In recent weeks, he and other analysts have been told that the Houthis have deployed missile launchers, drone-operating units, and military brigades throughout northern Yemen—from the Red Sea coastlines to the border with Saudi Arabia. The group is also said to be digging tunnels, building bunkers, and erecting barriers and other defensive structures in case of an attack by the United States and Israel. Ahmed Nagi, a senior analyst for Yemen for the International Crisis Group, told me that Iran and its proxies believe in “gradual escalation,” understanding that it is perhaps not “wise to use your wild cards all at once.” The Houthis are Iran’s biggest wild card. And so the fact that the group has not yet entered the war can only be seen as “a calculated choice,” one that has been “fully coördinated with the Iranians,” Nagi said. “They believe that Iran, for now, can manage the situation and face all these challenges alone.” But, if the conflict widens even more, he added, “the Houthis will jump in. They need some time to assess the situation before joining the fight.”

有一种可能是,胡塞武装计划在战争旷日持久、且迄今专注于防范伊朗袭击的海湾国家转为进攻时,再介入冲突。(周六,伊朗总统马苏德·佩泽希奇扬就伊朗的袭击向海湾国家致歉,但袭击仍在持续。)中东政治与安全专家穆罕默德·巴沙告诉我,胡塞武装一直在为行动做准备。最近几周,他和其他分析人士获悉,胡塞武装已在也门北部——从红海沿岸到与沙特阿拉伯接壤的边境——部署了导弹发射器、无人机作战单位和军事旅。据称该组织还在挖掘隧道、建造掩体、设置路障和其他防御工事,以防备美国和以色列的袭击。国际危机组织也门问题高级分析师艾哈迈德·纳吉告诉我,伊朗及其代理人信奉“逐步升级”的策略,明白“一次性打出所有王牌或许并不明智”。胡塞武装是伊朗最大的王牌。因此,该组织尚未参战的事实只能被视为“经过算计的选择”,并且是“与伊朗方面充分协调后的决定”,纳吉说。“他们认为伊朗目前能够独自掌控局势并应对所有挑战。”但他补充道,如果冲突进一步扩大,“胡塞武装将会介入。他们需要一些时间来评估局势,然后再加入战斗。”

That need to assess speaks to the enormous shifts that are currently under way in the Middle East, as Israel and the U.S. remake the region. It also unveils the struggle within Iran’s constellation of proxies to remain relevant, as their primary benefactor faces its greatest existential threat since its war with Iraq in the nineteen-eighties. Their calculus on whether to enter the war is shaped by several questions: Can they survive U.S. and Israeli retaliation, including attacks targeting their senior leaders? Do they possess enough missiles and drones, and the ability to build or acquire more advanced weapons, to sustain a prolonged war and defense? Will they be weakened domestically by entering the war? And is there something to gain—politically, economically, or diplomatically—by avoiding conflict?

这种评估的必要性,折射出中东地区正在发生的巨大转变——以色列和美国正在重塑这片土地。它也揭示了伊朗代理人网络内部为保持影响力而展开的挣扎,因为他们的主要庇护者正面临自上世纪八十年代两伊战争以来最严峻的生存威胁。他们是否参战的考量取决于几个关键问题:能否承受美国和以色列的报复,包括针对其高层领导人的定点清除?是否拥有足够的导弹和无人机储备,以及制造或获取更先进武器的能力,以支撑长期战争与防御?参战会否导致其国内力量被削弱?而避免冲突,是否能在政治、经济或外交层面获得某种收益?

Last June, during the Twelve-Day War—when Israel attacked Iran and the U.S. later joined in, striking Iranian nuclear facilities—the answers to these questions persuaded Iran’s proxies to remain largely on the sidelines. By then, significant cracks in the Axis of Resistance had emerged. In 2020, an American drone strike had assassinated General Qassem Suleimani, who oversaw support for Iran’s proxies and was widely viewed as the theocracy’s second most powerful leader, after Khamenei. After Hamas attacked Israel, on October 7, 2023, triggering a broad Israeli military campaign in Gaza, Israel killed Hamas leaders and decimated its military capabilities. In Lebanon and parts of Syria, Israel detonated thousands of pagers of Hezbollah officials and bombed the group’s headquarters in southern Beirut, killing its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. In Syria, Israeli strikes killed senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, crippling Iran’s coördination and control. Iran was either unable or unwilling to help Hamas or Hezbollah fend off Israeli attacks. Nor did it help quell a rebel offensive that ousted the Assad dictatorship, in December, 2024. Iran largely withdrew its forces from Syria, ending more than a decade of Iranian influence over the country.

去年六月,在“十二日战争”期间——当时以色列袭击了伊朗,美国随后加入,打击了伊朗的核设施——这些问题的答案说服了伊朗的代理人基本保持观望。彼时,“抵抗轴心”已出现严重裂痕。2020年,美国无人机袭击刺杀了卡西姆·苏莱曼尼将军,他负责监督对伊朗代理人的支持,被广泛视为神权政体中仅次于哈梅内伊的第二号实权人物。2023年10月7日哈马斯袭击以色列后,引发了以色列在加沙的大规模军事行动,以色列击毙了哈马斯领导人并重创其军事能力。在黎巴嫩和叙利亚部分地区,以色列引爆了数千台真主党官员的寻呼机,并轰炸了该组织在贝鲁特南部的总部,其领导人哈桑·纳斯鲁拉被炸身亡。在叙利亚,以色列的袭击导致伊斯兰革命卫队多名高级指挥官丧生,严重破坏了伊朗的协调与控制能力。伊朗要么无力、要么不愿帮助哈马斯或真主党抵御以色列的攻击。它也没有帮助平息2024年12月推翻阿萨德独裁统治的叛军攻势。伊朗基本从叙利亚撤军,结束了该国长达十余年的伊朗影响力。

The Twelve-Day War showcased the U.S. and Israel’s military supremacy, but what was most unsettling to Iran’s proxies was the way in which Israel’s intelligence apparatus had infiltrated Iran, killing top security officials and nuclear scientists who were housed at high-security military complexes. Hezbollah, severely weakened and struggling to rebuild itself, didn’t join the conflict, nor did Iraq’s Shiite militias. The Houthis fired a few missiles at Israel early on and then turned silent; they had just emerged from their own conflict with the U.S., and Israel was in the midst of bombing Yemen and targeting senior Houthi commanders and officials. At the time, several regional experts told me that top security and political figures inside the Iraqi Shiite militias and the Houthis were limiting their use of technology, using burner phones and spending minimal time online to prevent Israel from tracking them.

这场为期十二天的战争展示了美国和以色列的军事优势,但最令伊朗代理人不安的是以色列情报机构渗透伊朗的方式——他们潜入高安全级别的军事基地,刺杀了多名身处其中的伊朗高级安全官员与核科学家。真主党因实力严重受损且忙于重建而未参战,伊拉克什叶派民兵组织同样按兵不动。胡塞武装仅在战争初期向以色列发射数枚导弹便陷入沉寂:他们刚结束与美国的冲突,而以色列此时正持续轰炸也门,锁定胡塞武装高级指挥官与官员实施打击。当时数位区域问题专家告诉我,伊拉克什叶派民兵与胡塞武装内部的高层安全及政治人物都在限制电子设备使用,通过一次性手机通讯并最大限度减少上网时间,以防被以色列追踪。

This time around, Hezbollah got involved because “they feel that Iran is facing an existential war, and what happens to Iran is going to happen to them, so in a way they are intertwined in Hezbollah’s future,” Randa Slim, a program lead for the Middle East at the Stimson Center, told me. “Ideologically, they are bound to intervene once asked, and religiously they have a duty to intervene once the Supreme Leader is killed.” Khamenei was both Hezbollah’s political ally and its paramount spiritual guide; the group followed his religious rulings and used his authority to legitimize violent acts. And yet Hezbollah’s choice to plunge the country into war has fractured the group, which is now facing backlash from its own supporters, and from the Lebanese government. In Iraq, too, Iran’s allied militias are fragmented. Smaller ones have joined the war for ideological reasons and to avenge Khamenei’s death. But the Badr Organization, one of the largest Shiite militias and Iran’s oldest proxy in Iraq, has yet to get involved. Its leaders are part of the Iraqi government, and have access to lucrative oil contracts that are worth millions of dollars more now that oil prices have spiked, Mansour, the senior fellow at Chatham House, told me. “All these groups, including the Houthis, they’re all in survival mode,” he went on, “and they’re all just, from their perspectives, pragmatically trying to understand what the best decisions would be.”

“这一次,真主党之所以介入,是因为'他们感到伊朗正面临一场关乎存亡的战争,伊朗的遭遇也将成为他们的命运,因此在某种意义上,真主党的未来已与伊朗紧密交织,'”斯廷森中心中东项目负责人兰达·斯利姆告诉我。“从意识形态上说,一旦接到召唤,他们就有义务干预;从宗教层面看,当最高领袖遇害时,他们更有责任出手。”哈梅内伊既是真主党的政治盟友,也是其至高无上的精神导师;该组织遵循他的宗教裁决,并借其权威为暴力行动赋予正当性。然而,真主党将国家拖入战争的决定已使其内部产生裂痕,如今不仅面临支持者的反弹,也遭到黎巴嫩政府的反对。在伊拉克,伊朗的盟友民兵组织同样处于分裂状态。规模较小的团体出于意识形态原因加入战争,并为哈梅内伊之死复仇。但巴德尔组织——伊拉克最大的什叶派民兵之一,也是伊朗在伊拉克历史最悠久的代理人——至今尚未参战。查塔姆研究所高级研究员曼苏尔告诉我,该组织的领导人已进入伊拉克政府,并获得了利润丰厚的石油合同;随着油价飙升,这些合同的价值如今增加了数百万美元。“所有这些组织,包括胡塞武装,都处于生存模式,”他接着说,“从各自的角度出发,他们都在务实地试图判断什么才是最佳决策。”

The Houthis, at least at the moment, have more to gain from staying out of the war. As the Axis of Resistance has weakened, they’ve grown in stature. When the war in Gaza erupted, the Houthis fired ballistic missiles and drones at Israel, in solidarity with the Palestinians, and imposed their chokehold on Red Sea shipping lanes. Last May, in a ceasefire deal following nearly two months of U.S. aerial assaults, the Houthis agreed to stop targeting American ships—but not Israeli ones. President Trump claimed victory, whereas the Houthis declared it was the U.S. that had backed down, strengthening their resistance credentials.

至少就目前而言,胡塞武装置身战争之外反而能获得更多好处。随着“抵抗轴心”的削弱,他们的地位反而有所提升。加沙战争爆发时,胡塞武装为声援巴勒斯坦人,向以色列发射弹道导弹和无人机,并对红海航道实施封锁。去年五月,在美国近两个月的空袭后达成的停火协议中,胡塞武装同意停止袭击美国船只——但以色列船只除外。特朗普总统宣称取得胜利,而胡塞武装则宣称是美国做出了让步,这反而增强了他们作为抵抗力量的公信力。

Despite their bravado, the Houthis have suffered significant losses during their conflict with Israel. In late August, Israel struck Sanaa, killing senior Houthi figures, including the group’s Prime Minister and several other ministers. In October, the group announced that its military chief of staff, Muhammad Abd al-Karim al-Ghamari, a popular figure in the country, had also been killed in the strikes. Large crowds turned out for his state funeral, and he still appears on billboards in the Yemeni capital, a constant reminder of how much the Houthis have lost. Their recent buildup of defenses is likely less about getting ready to support Iran and more about preventing Israel and the U.S. from killing their supreme leader. After Khamenei and Nasrallah, “Abdul Malik al-Houthi is the long-lasting leader that is still standing from that generation,” Basha said.

尽管胡塞武装态度强硬,但在与以色列的冲突中已遭受重大损失。8月下旬,以色列袭击了萨那,造成胡塞武装多名高层人物死亡,包括该组织的总理和数名部长。10月,该组织宣布其军事总参谋长穆罕默德·阿卜杜勒·卡里姆·加马里也在袭击中丧生。这位在国内广受拥戴的人物,其国葬仪式吸引了大量民众参加,他的形象至今仍出现在也门首都的广告牌上,不断提醒着人们胡塞武装蒙受的损失。他们近期加强防御部署,与其说是准备支援伊朗,不如说是为了防止以色列和美国刺杀其最高领导人。“继哈梅内伊和纳斯鲁拉之后,'阿卜杜勒·马利克·胡塞是那一代领导人中依然屹立不倒的常青树',”巴沙指出。

The Houthis are also facing significant domestic challenges. Yemen’s economy is in tatters, and the country is facing a dire humanitarian crisis. There are cash shortages, and the salaries for civil servants haven’t been paid out, even for many Houthi fighters. During this holy fasting month of Ramadan, many Yemenis can hardly afford basic items, sparking widespread anger at the Houthi authorities, who are also under pressure from U.S. and European sanctions. Politically, too, there are concerns. Saudi Arabia is seeking to unify anti-Houthi forces in southern Yemen following the recent military withdrawal of the United Arab Emirates and the implosion of a key but divisive militia it backed. The Houthis are also seeking billions of dollars from Saudi Arabia to pay salaries and other government expenses as part of a stalled political agreement. They could threaten to attack in order to extract concessions from the kingdom, but targeting Saudi Arabia on behalf of Iran could prove unwise. The Houthis are concerned about the day after, Nagi, of the International Crisis Group, said. Even if they don’t join the war, they could become targets of the U.S. and Israel later, or face harsher sanctions should Iran become significantly weakened or were the regime to collapse. “They have tough options, and each option is worse than the other,” Nagi said.

胡塞武装在国内也面临重大挑战。也门经济支离破碎,人道主义危机严峻。现金短缺,公务员的工资发不出来,许多胡塞武装人员也领不到薪水。在这个神圣的斋月里,许多也门人连基本生活用品都买不起,引发了对胡塞当局的普遍愤怒,而胡塞当局还承受着美国和欧洲制裁的压力。政治方面也存在隐忧。在阿联酋最近撤军及其支持的一支关键但分裂的民兵组织瓦解后,沙特正寻求统一也门南部的反胡塞力量。作为一项停滞的政治协议的一部分,胡塞武装还向沙特索要数十亿美元,用于支付工资和其他政府开支。他们可能会以发动袭击相威胁,以迫使沙特让步,但代表伊朗袭击沙特可能并不明智。国际危机组织的纳吉表示,胡塞武装担心的是“后事”。即使他们不参战,日后也可能成为美国和以色列的目标,或者如果伊朗被严重削弱或政权垮台,他们可能面临更严厉的制裁。“他们的选择很艰难,而且一个比一个更糟,”纳吉说。

Unlike Hezbollah and the Iraqi militias, the Houthis are not politically beholden to Iran. And, unlike many Shiites around the world, they didn’t view Khamenei as their supreme religious authority; that role is filled by Abdul Malik al-Houthi and his ancestors. (The Houthis believe in Zaydism, a branch of Shia Islam that emerged in the eighth century, whose followers are almost exclusively found in Yemen.) Iran may have positioned the Houthis as a regional player that can exert pressure on Iran’s neighbors, but the Houthis have always put their own interests first. “It’s a mutually beneficial relationship, but it’s transactional in its nature,” Slim told me.

与真主党和伊拉克民兵组织不同,胡塞武装在政治上并不依附于伊朗。与世界上许多什叶派信徒不同,他们也不将哈梅内伊视为最高宗教权威——这一角色由阿卜杜勒-马利克·胡塞及其家族世代承袭。(胡塞武装信奉栽德派,这是公元八世纪从什叶派伊斯兰教中分化出的一个分支,其信徒几乎全部集中在也门。)伊朗或许将胡塞武装定位为能在其邻国施加压力的地区力量,但胡塞武装始终将自身利益置于首位。“这是种互利关系,但本质上属于交易性质,”斯利姆告诉我。

During the past few years, the Houthis have become less reliant on Iran for weapons, smuggling in drone components from Chinese companies and small arms from the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, without Iran’s help, the Houthis would not be the force they are today. And so the rhetorical support for Iran remains fierce and loud—on the streets, on television, and on social media. On March 5th, in another televised speech, Abdul Malik al-Houthi said, “Our fingers are on the trigger, ready to respond at any moment should developments warrant it.” But if the Houthis do respond, it won’t just be to help Iran—it’ll be to help themselves. “I don’t know the extent to which Iran could make the Houthis do something they don’t ultimately want to anymore,” Mansour said. “Iran is not the same Iran from more than a decade ago, and the Houthis aren’t the same Houthis from back then. The power balance has shifted.” ♦

过去几年间,胡塞武装对伊朗武器的依赖有所降低,他们从中国公司走私无人机部件,从非洲之角走私小型武器。然而,若无伊朗的援助,胡塞武装不可能成为今日这般势力。因此,在街头、电视和社交媒体上,对伊朗的口头支持依然激烈而响亮。3月5日,阿卜杜勒-马利克·胡塞在又一次电视讲话中宣称:“我们的手指已扣在扳机上,随时准备在局势需要时作出回应。”但若胡塞武装真的采取行动,那将不仅是为了援助伊朗——更是为了他们自身的利益。“我不确定伊朗还能在多大程度上迫使胡塞武装去做他们最终不愿做的事,”曼苏尔表示,“如今的伊朗已非十多年前的伊朗,胡塞武装也今非昔比。力量的天平已经倾斜。” ♦

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