Books

Can Psychoanalysis Help You Get the Life You Want?

精神分析能帮你过上想要的生活吗?
In a new book, Adam Phillips wages a playful war on the strictures of traditional talk therapy.
在一本新书中,亚当·菲利普斯对传统谈话疗法的条条框框发起了一场俏皮的战争。
Spirits coming out of a person during therapy.
Illustration by Kevin Lucbert

In “Monogamy,” a collection of a hundred and twenty-one aphorisms on coupling and uncoupling, the psychoanalyst and prolific writer Adam Phillips suggests that the faithful and the promiscuous aren’t so different. Both are “idealists,” he writes, “deranged by hope, in awe of reassurance, impressed by their pleasures.” The book criticizes monogamy as “a way of getting the versions of ourselves down to a minimum,” but it doesn’t exactly defend infidelity. Phillips’s real target may be monotony, the offspring of rote rule-following. “We take monogamy for granted,” he writes, and “treat it as the norm,” sleepwalking into a future without considering whether it actually satisfies us. Ironically, Phillips’s strongest defense of sexual exclusivity is that a steadfast union might offer the same turnabouts and dramas, the same incandescences and crashing disappointments, that you’d normally pursue via cheating. “Perhaps we value monogamy because it lets us have it both ways,” he writes—novelty and continuity, enchantment and disillusion, the lives we live and those we merely visit in our dreams.

在《一夫一妻制》这部收录了121则关于结合与分离的警句集中,精神分析师兼多产作家亚当·菲利普斯(Adam Phillips)提出,忠贞者与纵情者其实并无太大差异。他写道,两者都是“理想主义者”,“被希望搅乱了心神,对慰藉心怀敬畏,又为自己的欢愉所震撼。”这本书将一夫一妻制批评为“将自我版本削减至最低限度的一种方式”,但并未真正为不忠辩护。菲利普斯真正抨击的或许是单调乏味——这种墨守成规的产物。“我们视一夫一妻制为理所当然,”他写道,“将其奉为圭臬”,在梦游般步入未来时,从未思考过它是否真能令我们满足。颇具讽刺意味的是,菲利普斯为性排他性所作的最有力辩护竟是:一段坚定的关系或许能提供与出轨通常所追求的相同的转折与戏剧、炽热与幻灭。“或许我们珍视一夫一妻制,正是因为它让我们得以两全其美,”他写道——新鲜感与延续性,迷恋与醒悟,我们真实经历的人生与仅在梦中造访的彼岸。

What do we want from the lives that we secretly imagine for ourselves? “A difficult mixture of the all too familiar and the experimental, the mostly reassuring and the partly disinhibited,” Phillips contends in “The Life You Want” (Farrar, Straus & Giroux), his latest book. When we were children, he continues, our parents recognized some parts of us and not others (athleticism but not musicality, for instance, or cheerfulness but not guile); now we go around both upholding and rebelling against those received regimes. We alternately display and downplay our encouraged aspects, hide and flaunt our uncountenanced ones. “Haunted by the versions of ourselves” that remain unembodied, Phillips writes, we wish to be who we are and also who we aren’t, splitting the difference even in fantasy.

我们对自己暗自想象的人生,究竟有何期待?菲利普斯在他的新书《你想要的生活》中提出:“那是一种难以言说的混合物,既包含太过熟悉的部分,又掺杂着实验性的元素;既大体令人安心,又带着些许放纵。”他继续写道,当我们还是孩子时,父母只认可我们的某些特质(比如运动天赋而非音乐才能,或者开朗性格而非机敏狡黠);如今我们既遵循着这些被赋予的框架,又不断反抗它们。我们时而展现那些被鼓励的特质,时而又刻意淡化;时而隐藏那些不被认可的部分,时而又大肆炫耀。菲利普斯写道,我们“被那些未能实现的自我版本所困扰”,既渴望成为现在的自己,又向往成为另一个自己——即便在幻想中,我们也在寻找折中的可能。

Admen and bad romance novelists would like us to think that wanting is straightforward—indivisible, intuitive, and perhaps best remedied by credit card. For Phillips, however, wanting isn’t so simple; it has byways and switchbacks, weight and depth. What if we want something forbidden? What if the objects of our longing are socially acceptable but undermine who we’d like to be? What if we try to attain our aims and fail? What if we succeed and are disappointed, or the intensity of our delectation causes us to lose ourselves? And then, Phillips warns, there is the scandalous origin of our wanting: “our helplessness, our abjection . . . and our dependence.” We cannot satisfy ourselves; we must make demands on others; worse, others make demands on us. Interacting with one’s peers “is never exactly what one was hoping for,” Phillips observes wryly in “Missing Out,” a book from 2012 “in praise of the unlived life.” Socializing involves no fewer than “three consecutive frustrations: the frustration of need, the frustration of the fantasized satisfaction not working, and the frustration of satisfaction in the real world being at odds with the wished-for, fantasized satisfaction.” And that, he adds, is when everything goes well.

广告商和蹩脚的言情小说家总想让我们相信,欲望是直截了当的——它不可分割、凭直觉而生,或许刷个信用卡就能解决。但在菲利普斯看来,欲望远非如此简单;它有着迂回曲折的路径,承载着重量与深度。如果我们渴望的是禁忌之物呢?如果我们渴求的对象虽被社会接纳,却会侵蚀我们理想中的自我呢?如果我们努力追求目标却失败了怎么办?如果我们成功了却感到失望,或是狂喜的强度让我们迷失了自我呢?接着,菲利普斯警示我们注意欲望那令人难堪的起源:“我们的无助、我们的卑贱……以及我们的依赖。”我们无法自我满足;我们必须向他人提出要求;更糟的是,他人也对我们有所要求。在2012年出版的《赞美未竟人生》一书中,菲利普斯犀利地指出,与同辈交往“从来不会完全符合我们的期望”。社交活动至少涉及“三重连续的挫败:需求受挫,幻想中的满足未能实现的挫败,以及现实世界中的满足与期望中、幻想中的满足相冲突的挫败”。而这,他补充道,还是一切顺利的情况。

Yet “it is only in states of frustration that we can begin to imagine—to elaborate, to envision—our desire,” Phillips writes. He’s articulating the traditional Freudian account of fantasy guiding us toward our best-case scenario: the “ordinary unhappiness” of reality, or what Phillips calls “the possibility of a more realistic satisfaction.” But one also feels his work pulling in a less orthodox direction, toward the pleasure of longing itself. For Freud, wishful thinking was an abandonment of reality. For Phillips, it’s an information source, one we jettison too quickly in our quest to be cured. “The Life You Want” finds Phillips chafing at his field’s prescriptiveness and dismayed by our inclination to submit to other people’s preëmptive conclusions about what we want. “Old-fashioned psychoanalysis always had a known destination,” he observes. There’s a risk that the patient gets up from the couch having discovered not her druthers but what Melanie Klein or Jacques Lacan or Sigmund Freud thought her druthers should be. “Describing the life we want,” Phillips cautions, “can sometimes be the most compliant—i.e., defensive—thing we ever do.”

然而,“唯有在受挫的状态下,我们才能开始想象——精心构思、展望——我们的欲望,”菲利普斯写道。他阐述的是传统弗洛伊德学派对幻想的解释:幻想引导我们走向最佳情境:现实的“寻常不幸”,或菲利普斯所称的“更现实的满足的可能性”。但人们也能感受到他的作品正朝着不那么正统的方向发展,转向渴望本身的乐趣。对弗洛伊德而言,一厢情愿是对现实的放弃。对菲利普斯来说,它是一种信息来源,我们在寻求治愈的过程中太快地抛弃了它。《你想要的生活》一书展现了菲利普斯对其领域规定性的不满,以及对我们倾向于顺从他人对我们欲望的预设结论的沮丧。“老派的精神分析总是有一个已知的目的地,”他指出。风险在于,病人从躺椅上起身时,发现的不是她自己的偏好,而是梅兰妮·克莱因、雅克·拉康或西格蒙德·弗洛伊德认为她应有的偏好。“描述我们想要的生活,”菲利普斯警告说,“有时可能是我们做过的最顺从——即防御性——的事情。”

Phillips is a figure for our therapy-soaked era, even if, for him, therapy feeds into and enables life, whereas we often seem to view life as feeding into and enabling therapy. He’s spent decades translating specialized concepts for general audiences—demystifying transference and projection, peeking under the hood of everyday occupations such as tickling and being bored, drawing on classic works of literature to illustrate the relevance of his field to ordinary experience. A shaman of the psychoanalytic Slate pitch, he often adopts an impish persona, issuing counterintuitive pronouncements about the benefits of quitting, pessimism, or shame. He once told The Paris Review that his adolescent study of English literature prepared him “to ironize the ambitions of grand theory.” Elsewhere, he has remarked with an unmistakable air of indulgence on how much of human endeavor—from art and prayer to political activity—is explicable as a form of attention-seeking.

菲利普斯是我们这个浸淫于治疗时代的代表人物——尽管对他而言,治疗滋养并赋能生活,而我们却常常将生活视为滋养并赋能治疗的途径。数十年来,他致力于为普通读者阐释专业概念:揭开移情与投射的神秘面纱,窥探挠痒与无聊这类日常行为的内在机制,援引经典文学作品来阐明其研究领域与寻常经验的关联。作为精神分析领域的萨满式布道者,他常以顽童般的人格姿态,发表关于放弃、悲观或羞耻之益处的反直觉宣言。他曾告诉《巴黎评论》,少年时期研习英国文学的经历让他学会“对宏大理论的野心进行反讽”。在另一些场合,他更以毫不掩饰的纵容口吻指出,人类从艺术、祈祷到政治活动等种种努力,大多可被理解为寻求关注的形式。

In his published writing, which extends to more than twenty books, Phillips shows a love of mischief and tomfoolery. His wordplay is sporadically self-delighted; his pose of guileless receptivity caused Joan Acocella to compare him, in this magazine, to a child wondering what would happen if he pushed a pencil up his nose. He believes that we are incorrigibly self-defeating, that we constantly obstruct our own knowledge because we fear being in a position to sate our wayward desires. Hence, perhaps, the contrarianism, a commitment to reversing whatever expectation the reader might be imagined to hold, in an attempt to disarm and deprogram, possibly even cure her.

菲利普斯已出版的作品多达二十余部,字里行间透露出对恶作剧与戏谑的偏爱。他的文字游戏时而流露出自得其乐的况味;那种不设防的接纳姿态,曾让琼·阿科切拉在本刊将他比作好奇铅笔捅进鼻孔会怎样的孩童。他深信人类具有难以救药的自我挫败倾向——我们总在阻挠自身认知,唯恐获得满足恣意欲望的能力。这种逆向思维或许正源于此:他执意颠覆读者可能怀有的任何预期,试图解除她的心理武装、破除思维定式,甚至疗愈她的心灵。

Phillips is a Freudian, but a selective and partial one, preferring to emphasize his predecessor’s sensitive, more literary aspects. The Austrian doctor was interested “in sentences, in the fact that language is evocative as well as informative,” Phillips told an interviewer, after he was tapped to edit a volume of the Penguin Modern Classics edition of Freud. In “Becoming Freud,” a slender, circumlocutory biography, Phillips conjures a “champion” for patients, “someone who, like a good parent, or a good art critic, could appreciate what they were up to.”

菲利普斯是弗洛伊德学派的信徒,但有所取舍,更偏爱这位前辈那些细腻、更具文学性的面向。在被选中编辑企鹅现代经典版弗洛伊德文集后,他曾对采访者说,这位奥地利医生“对句子感兴趣,关注语言既能传递信息又能唤起情感的特质”。在《成为弗洛伊德》这本简洁而迂回的传记中,菲利普斯塑造了一位患者的“捍卫者”,“这个人如同优秀的父母或艺术评论家,能够理解他们正在经历的一切”。

He can be flippant about psychoanalysis, in one essay describing the analyst’s interpretation of the analysand as a “sophisticated form of interruption” undertaken to make the analyst feel “important.” In “Irreverence,” an essay from the new book, he depicts the titular concept as a way of testing authority (whether your target can withstand such shot-taking) and also a love test (whether your target will want to remain on reasonably good terms with you). If “the irreverent are wholly dependent on those they mock,” he writes, irreverence is also, potentially, “a sign of growing up.”

他有时对精神分析学态度轻慢,曾在一篇文章中将分析师对分析对象的诠释描述为一种“复杂的打断形式”,目的是让分析师感觉自己“很重要”。在新书收录的《不敬》一文中,他将标题概念描绘为检验权威的方式(测试对方能否承受这样的冒犯),同时也是一种爱的考验(测试对方是否仍愿与你保持尚可的关系)。他写道,如果说“不敬者完全依赖他们嘲弄的对象”,那么不敬也可能“标志着一个人的成长”。

By that standard, the most recent work, animated by the question of what therapy should be and how it might help you get the life you want, is pretty mature. With nose-thumbing insouciance, Phillips recruits the pragmatic philosopher Richard Rorty—or an imagined version of him—to vocalize his discontent with the strictures of his discipline. Rorty used the phrase “God terms” for ideas, such as human nature or objective reality, that alienate us from our agency by appealing to a higher truth. Phillips, a Londoner, takes him as a stand-in for American optimism about the power of positive thinking. “The Life You Want” sets out to shape Freud into a more amenable ancestor, someone better suited to Phillips’s purposes. It’s what Rorty would call a creative “redescription” of the goals of psychoanalysis, redescription being the quintessential pragmatic activity, a flexible trying out of different stories or perspectives until you find one that works for you. As Phillips freely admits, this redescription—and perhaps redescription in general—might be naïvely wishful, not a bending of reality but a flight from it.

按照这个标准,菲利普斯的最新作品显得相当成熟,其核心关切是心理治疗应当是什么、又如何能帮你获得想要的生活。他以一种轻蔑的、满不在乎的姿态,请来实用主义哲学家理查德·罗蒂——或者说一个想象中的罗蒂——来替自己表达对学科桎梏的不满。罗蒂曾用“上帝术语”指代诸如人性或客观现实这类概念,它们诉诸更高真理,却使我们与自身能动性疏离。身为伦敦人的菲利普斯,将罗蒂视为美国式乐观主义——那种相信积极思考力量的乐观主义——的代言人。《你想要的生活》一书试图将弗洛伊德重塑为更易被接纳的思想先驱,一个更符合菲利普斯意图的形象。这正是罗蒂所说的对精神分析目标的创造性“重述”,而重述是实用主义活动的精髓:灵活尝试不同叙事或视角,直到找到适合你的那一种。正如菲利普斯坦然承认的,这种重述——或许所有重述皆然——可能只是一厢情愿的天真幻想,并非扭转现实,而是逃避现实。

Freud’s biggest contribution to psychoanalytic thought might be his portrait of a persecutory, enigmatic, and disturbing unconscious. For Rorty, the Freudian id is another God term, a bad-faith bid to “delegate and outsource our purposes and our imagination and our intelligence to something beyond ourselves,” as Phillips puts it. Rorty, he writes, prefers to envision the unconscious as a team of partners or interlocutors, all of them “really useful, helpful and informed.” The prospect delights Phillips, but he’s skeptical: Does pragmatism’s redescription merely baffle our efforts to understand and transform our darker impulses? It’s when we refuse to face what we really want, he worries, that we grow pliant and manipulable, vulnerable to the lure of instant gratification and denied the chance to make something tonic out of our frustration.

弗洛伊德对精神分析思想的最大贡献,或许在于他描绘了一个充满迫害欲、神秘莫测且令人不安的无意识世界。在罗蒂看来,弗洛伊德所谓的本我不过是又一个“上帝式概念”,用菲利普斯的话说,这是一种自欺欺人的企图,旨在“将我们的目标、想象力与智慧都委派并外包给某种超越我们自身的存在”。菲利普斯写道,罗蒂更倾向于将无意识想象成一组合作伙伴或对话者,他们全都“切实有用、乐于助人且见多识广”。这个设想令菲利普斯欣喜,但他仍心存疑虑:实用主义的重新描述是否反而会阻碍我们理解并转化内心幽暗冲动的努力?他担心,当我们拒绝直面内心真实渴望时,就会变得顺从易控,既难以抗拒即时满足的诱惑,又错失了将挫折转化为成长动力的可能。

Freud theorized that our lives are a project of tempering and downgrading desire, an ongoing compromise between fantasy and reality. By contrast, Phillips writes that the Rortian seeks “the most inclusive conversation possible” with our unconscious selves, one that “will further and proliferate our purposes and increase our sense of autonomy.” Strikingly, we should try to “proliferate” our purposes, not just advance them. If the father of talk therapy aimed to mitigate our wanting’s intensity, Rorty sought to intervene in its monomania. Phillips lays this out in “Too Bad, or On Seeing the Worst,” a chapter about an essay, by the Romanian author Emil Cioran, speculating that our elemental self, our “daimon,” might never have wanted to have been born in the first place. A Freudian might ask, lugubriously, how we might endure such pain. Phillips seizes the opportunity to wonder what we might gain from expressing a permanently unattainable desire. (“Having been born,” he writes, “is the one problem we can never solve.”) Perhaps, he offers, a loosening is possible—some breathing room, some permission to look around at what else might appeal. Via Rorty, he invites us to consider that we can desire many things and to live in a way that tests this hypothesis, releasing ourselves from the stranglehold of our single-minded obsessions.

弗洛伊德的理论认为,我们的人生是一场驯服与降格欲望的工程,是幻想与现实之间持续不断的妥协。相比之下,菲利普斯写道,罗蒂式疗法的追寻者试图与我们的无意识自我展开“尽可能包容的对话”,这种对话“将推进并增殖我们的目标,增强我们的自主感”。值得注意的是,我们应当努力“增殖”而非仅仅推进目标。如果说谈话疗法之父旨在缓和欲望的强度,罗蒂则试图干预其偏执性。菲利普斯在《太糟了,或论目睹最坏之事》一章中阐述了这一观点——该章节围绕罗马尼亚作家埃米尔·齐奥朗的随笔展开,文中推测我们本质的自我、我们的“守护神”,或许最初就从未渴望降生。弗洛伊德学派或许会忧郁地追问:我们该如何承受这般痛苦?菲利普斯则抓住契机思索:表达一种永远无法企及的欲望能让我们获得什么。(“已然降生,”他写道,“是我们永远无法解决的唯一难题。”)他提出,或许某种松脱是可能的——些许喘息的空间,些许环顾四周寻觅其他吸引之物的许可。通过罗蒂的思想,他邀请我们思考:我们可以渴望许多事物,并以检验这一假设的方式生活,从而将自己从偏执的桎梏中解放出来。

“We have ourselves put the authorities deep down inside us,” Phillips writes in “The Life You Want.” In “Against Self-Criticism,” a 2015 essay for the London Review of Books, he picks a fight with the Freudian superego, whose ceaseless opprobrium, he claims, objectifies the rest of the psyche, reducing it to a single blameworthy victim. In fact, he writes, there is more to our inner ensemble than convict and executioner, or prisoner and despot. Each of us contains a “repressed repertoire” of “fragmentary alternative selves,” Phillips proposes. “Where judgment is, there conversation should be. Where there is dogma there is an uncompleted experiment.” Instead of letting your superego browbeat the other dramatis personae into submission, Phillips intimates, you should emulate a podcast host, moderating a respectful discussion among your mental parts.

“我们已将权威内化于心,”菲利普斯在《你想要的生活》中写道。在2015年为《伦敦书评》撰写的《反对自我批评》一文中,他向弗洛伊德式的超我发起挑战——他认为这种超我无休止的苛责将心理的其他部分客体化,将其贬为单一的应受谴责的受害者。他写道,事实上我们的内心世界远比罪人与刽子手、囚徒与暴君更为丰富。菲利普斯提出,每个人都拥有“碎片化替代自我”构成的“被压抑的剧目”。“凡有审判之处,应有对话存在。凡有教条之处,必有未竟的实验。”他暗示,与其让超我威逼内心其他角色屈服,不如效仿播客主持人,在心理各组成部分间主持一场相互尊重的讨论。

His ideal of the psyche, in which all self-fragments get a hearing, can be extrapolated onto a society whose members are free to debate one another as they decide their paths forward. In his book “Equals,” he writes that “being listened to can enable one to bear—and even to enjoy—listening to oneself and others; which democracy itself depends on.” Psychoanalysis is misnamed as a “talking cure,” he submits. Really, it is a “listening cure.” Unsurprisingly, one of the political forms he’s most interested in is the relationship between analyst and analysand.

他理想中的心灵状态,是让所有自我的碎片都能被听见。这种理念可以推演至社会层面——当社会成员共同决定前进方向时,他们应当能自由地相互辩论。在《平等者》一书中,他写道:“被倾听能让人承受——甚至享受——倾听自己和他人;而民主本身正有赖于此。”他认为精神分析被误称为“谈话疗法”,实质上应是“倾听疗法”。无怪乎他最感兴趣的政治形态之一,正是分析师与受分析者之间的关系。

Self-criticism, Phillips writes in his L.R.B. essay, is “our most unpleasant—our most sadomasochistic—way of loving ourselves,” an attempt to win over the authorities when we fear we can’t otherwise live up to their expectations. In his telling, the patient often wants to comply with the heroic, omniscient analyst in order to avoid thinking for herself; the analyst must guard against this dynamic and against his own desire to dominate the patient. For Phillips, analysis is meant to help us “with our idealizations, with our craving for authority, our wish to idolize and be controlled.” The threat is that the analyst instead comes to resemble the superego, a “boring and vicious soliloquist with an audience of one.”

菲利普斯在《伦敦书评》的文章中写道,自我批评是“我们最令人不快——也最受虐狂式的——自爱方式”,当我们担心自己无法达到权威的期许时,便会试图以此赢得他们的认可。在他看来,患者常常为了逃避独立思考而顺从那位英雄般全知的分析师;分析师则必须警惕这种互动模式,同时克制自己支配患者的欲望。对菲利普斯而言,精神分析的意义在于帮助我们“处理理想化倾向,处理对权威的渴求,处理偶像崇拜与受控的欲望”。危险在于分析师可能沦为超我的化身,成为“面对唯一听众进行乏味恶毒独白的角色”。

In “The Life You Want,” Phillips’s anti-authoritarian tendencies motivate him to rescue the idea of resistance, which in psychoanalysis refers to the conscious and unconscious strategies that patients use to impede the therapeutic process. “Resistance,” the volume’s culminating essay, notes that the analysand may have healthy reasons for evading her desires—she may be hoping to preserve a cherished value, for example—and that resistance can prolong and thus enrich the work of the cure.

在《你想要的生活》一书中,菲利普斯反权威的倾向促使他重新审视“阻抗”这一概念——在精神分析领域,阻抗指患者有意识或无意识地阻碍治疗进程的策略。这部文集的压轴之作《阻抗》指出,接受分析者回避自身欲望可能出于健康的理由——比如她可能希望坚守某种珍视的价值观——而阻抗能够延长治疗过程,从而让疗愈工作获得更丰富的内涵。

This last argument enacts a familiar rhetorical move. Phillips often takes something apparently undesirable, such as guilt, and reframes it as a prelude or a precondition, a way station in a necessary developmental process. (Recall how he creatively redescribed frustration as the midwife to “realistic satisfaction.”) But his defense of resistance ultimately settles into a different shape and leaves him opposing the priorities of traditional psychotherapy. Phillips does not, finally, claim that recalcitrance on the couch crystallizes a patient’s understanding, thereby reducing her suffering. Resistance may not reduce her suffering at all. Rather, it demonstrates that she will proceed on her own terms and in her own time. Resistance “is integral to our singularity,” Phillips writes; the opposite of “defeatedness,” it’s a step toward “following one’s inclination and curiosity and refusing to be intimidated.” Here, departing from Freud, he casts freedom as more curative than the truth.

这最后的论点,是一种我们熟悉的修辞手法。菲利普斯常常将某些看似不受欢迎的东西——比如内疚——重新定义为一种前奏或先决条件,一个必要发展过程中的中转站。(回想一下他是如何创造性地将挫败感重新描述为“现实满足感”的助产士。)但他对阻抗的辩护最终呈现出不同的形态,使他与传统心理治疗的优先目标形成对立。菲利普斯最终并未主张:患者在躺椅上的顽固不化会使其理解变得清晰,从而减轻痛苦。阻抗可能根本不会减轻她的痛苦,反而表明她将按照自己的方式和节奏前行。菲利普斯写道,阻抗“是我们独特性的组成部分”;它是“挫败感”的反面,是迈向“追随自己的倾向与好奇心、拒绝被恐吓”的一步。在此,他背离弗洛伊德,将自由视为比真相更具疗愈力量的存在。

What do we need psychoanalysis for, then? For Phillips, the answer comes back to the intricate turnings and archeological layers of desire. Rorty believes “that we are good at knowing what we want,” Phillips writes, a contention that erases our ambivalence and underestimates our “need for safety.” Moreover, he claims, the Rortian vision of desire is informed by a shallow and too innocent view of the unconscious. Insensible to our Stygian instincts, pragmatism is always threatening to shade into permissiveness, a “kind of capricious, impulsive egotism.” It’s true that, without Rorty, Freud can appear “omniscient and impoverishing.” But without Freud, Phillips suggests, Rorty can’t surface the sunken richness of our wanting, its destructiveness, its haunting strangeness. Pragmatism fails to listen to desire. As a result, an essential texture of life escapes its grasp.

那么,我们还需要精神分析做什么呢?对菲利普斯而言,答案在于欲望那错综复杂的转向与考古地层般的结构。他写道,罗蒂相信“我们擅长了解自己想要什么”,这种主张抹除了我们内心的矛盾,也低估了我们“对安全的需求”。此外,菲利普斯指出,罗蒂式的欲望观建立在对潜意识过于天真浅薄的认知之上。由于对人性深处的幽暗本能缺乏感知,实用主义总可能滑向纵容放任,沦为“一种任性冲动的自我中心主义”。诚然,若没有罗蒂的参照,弗洛伊德的理论可能显得“全知全能却贫瘠乏味”;但菲利普斯暗示,若没有弗洛伊德,罗蒂便无法揭示我们欲望深处被淹没的丰饶、其破坏性及其萦绕不去的异质性。实用主义未能倾听欲望的低语,因而错失了生命本质的肌理。

Like monogamy and infidelity, or our lived and unlived lives, psychoanalysis and pragmatism need each other. The plenitude, variety, and pluralism that are the highest values of liberal democracy require the force and insight of the psychoanalytic tradition, and vice versa. It’s unclear, though, that any of these pairs can be fully reconciled. The best case, Phillips implies, might be a conversation—not the idealized sort that results in unanimity or even acceptance, but a realistic one that grants the participants their full difficulty and irrationality and acknowledges that alignment might remain out of reach.

正如一夫一妻制与婚外情、我们经历与未曾经历的人生,精神分析与实用主义亦彼此依存。自由民主制度所珍视的丰饶、多元与包容,需要精神分析传统的力量与洞见,反之亦然。然而,这些对立面能否真正调和尚未可知。菲利普斯暗示,最理想的状态或许是展开一场对话——不是那种追求共识甚至相互认可的完美对话,而是直面参与者全然存在的困境与非理性,并承认协调一致或许终究无法企及的务实对谈。

Still, the fantasy of a more perfect union persists. In one chapter of “The Life You Want,” Phillips describes the Freudian dream work. During the day, he explains, “we unconsciously pick things out that will be used in the making of our night’s dream.” This idea, that our unconscious gathers material during the day to dream with at night, suggests that what Rorty wants for us—to proliferate our purposes, to look around at what else we might want—is, in Phillips’s reading of Freud, already ours. By subjecting our inner worlds to such devoted scrutiny, the author of “The Interpretation of Dreams” emphasizes, in Phillips’s words, “the sheer scale of our interests,” the possible lives we formulate even when we don’t realize we’re doing so. “The Life You Want” is itself a sort of dream work, which synthesizes opposing elements into a poetic, if wishful, whole. ♦

然而,对更完美结合的幻想依然存在。在《你想要的生活》的某一章中,菲利普斯描述了弗洛伊德所说的梦的工作。他解释道,白天“我们无意识地挑选出一些东西,用来构筑夜晚的梦境”。这种关于无意识在白天收集素材以供夜间造梦的观点暗示着,罗蒂所期望的——让我们拓展目标,环顾四周寻找其他可能想要的东西——在菲利普斯对弗洛伊德的解读中,其实早已为我们所有。《梦的解析》的作者通过对我们内心世界进行如此专注的审视,用菲利普斯的话说,强调了“我们兴趣的庞大规模”,那些我们甚至在未意识到时就已经在构想的生活可能。《你想要的生活》本身就像一种梦的工作,它将相互对立的元素融合成一个充满诗意——即便有些一厢情愿——的整体。♦

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