Q. & A.

The Lawlessness of Trump’s War in Iran

特朗普对伊朗开战的无法律依据
The ferocity of U.S. and Israeli attacks has raised questions about whether the two countries are even attempting to minimize civilian casualties.
美国和以色列攻击的猛烈程度,已令人质疑两国是否曾试图尽量减少平民伤亡。
A woman standing in the foreground with huge plumes of black smoke in the background.
Photograph by Arash Khamooshi / NYT / Redux

Since the United States and Israel launched their war against Iran, on February 28th, President Trump has offered a number of explanations for his decision—from wanting to overthrow the Iranian regime to trying to prevent the country from acquiring nuclear weapons. But the U.S.-Israel bombardment of Iran has led to civilian deaths estimated to be well over a thousand; a strike that hit a girls’ school in Minab killed more than a hundred and seventy-five people alone. (Trump has said that Iran struck the school, but initial evidence suggests that the U.S. was behind this attack.) In recent days, Israel has struck multiple Iranian oil facilities, which has led to an unknown number of civilian deaths and potentially dangerous clouds of smoke across Tehran. The ferocity of the war, along with recent efforts at the Pentagon, led by the Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, to undercut safeguards meant to limit civilian casualties, has raised questions about whether the United States and Israel are even attempting to minimize the war’s cost on Iranian civilians.

自美国与以色列于2月28日对伊朗开战以来,特朗普总统对其决策给出了多种解释——从意图推翻伊朗政权,到试图阻止该国获取核武器。但美以两国的轰炸已导致逾千名平民丧生;仅米纳布市一所女校遭袭事件就造成超过175人死亡。(特朗普声称是伊朗袭击了学校,但初步证据表明美国才是幕后主使。)近日,以色列多次袭击伊朗石油设施,导致不明数量的平民死亡,并在德黑兰上空形成可能危害健康的浓烟。战争的残酷程度,加之国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯近期在五角大楼主导削弱限制平民伤亡防护机制的行动,令人质疑美以两国是否曾尝试降低战争对伊朗平民造成的代价。

I recently spoke by phone with Oona Hathaway, a professor at Yale Law School and the director of its Center for Global Legal Challenges. She is also the president-elect of the American Society of International Law. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed what has most concerned her about the ways in which the U.S. and Israel are waging this war, how the Trump Administration has dismantled the architecture meant to protect civilians during war, and whether the international system is headed for a new kind of lawlessness.

我最近通过电话采访了耶鲁法学院教授、全球法律挑战中心主任乌娜·哈撒韦(Oona Hathaway),她也是美国国际法学会候任主席。在我们的对话中(为篇幅和清晰度经过编辑),我们讨论了美以两国作战方式中最令她担忧之处,特朗普政府如何拆解了旨在保护战时平民的法律架构,以及国际体系是否正走向一种新型的失序状态。

At this point, what do you think we can and can’t say about potential violations of international law in the war in Iran?

目前来看,关于伊朗战争中国际法潜在违反行为,我们能讨论和不能讨论的边界在哪里?

There are two bodies of law that are at issue. There’s the body of law that governs whether states can use force. And, here, there’s no doubt that the United States and Israel are in violation of international law, which provides that it’s only lawful to use military force against another state if it’s been authorized by the Security Council of the United Nations, or if a state is acting in its self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. And that has to be self-defense against an armed attack or an imminent attack. And I think the consensus is that there isn’t enough evidence to support the self-defense claim. And the fact that this has not been authorized by the Security Council means it is in violation of international law.

这里涉及两个法律体系。一个是关于国家能否使用武力的法律体系。在这方面,毫无疑问,美国和以色列违反了国际法。国际法规定,只有在获得联合国安理会授权,或根据《联合国宪章》第五十一条行使自卫权时,一国对另一国使用武力才是合法的。而自卫必须针对武装攻击或迫在眉睫的攻击。我认为普遍共识是,目前没有足够证据支持自卫主张。加之这次行动未经安理会授权,意味着它违反了国际法。

Then there’s a second body of law, which is the body of law that goes to how the war is conducted. That is: Who can be targeted, what can be targeted, what are the rules that govern the use of force once you’re engaged in an armed conflict?

还有第二类法律,涉及战争如何进行。即:谁可以被列为攻击目标,什么可以被列为攻击目标,一旦卷入武装冲突,使用武力应遵循哪些规则?

There have been other wars fought with shaky legal reasoning or claims of self-defense that turned out to be ridiculous, but what’s notable is that, in this case, the United States has barely bothered to make any sort of case that there was an imminent threat from Iran.

历史上不乏以牵强的法律理由或自卫主张发动的战争,最终被证明荒谬可笑。但值得玩味的是,这一次美国甚至懒得费心论证伊朗构成了迫在眉睫的威胁。

I would agree with that. What’s striking here is that, while the argument is so extraordinarily bad that it’s almost not worth spending time on, it’s surprising to me that the rest of the world has been fairly silent in response.

我同意这一点。令人震惊的是,尽管这个论点糟糕到几乎不值得花时间讨论,但令我惊讶的是,世界其他地方的回应却相当沉默。

The United States and Israel are two countries that have waged a lot of aggressive wars. They are countries that have violated international law in the past and committed war crimes. There are war crimes that have been covered up by both governments. All of that being said, we really haven’t had a situation in the United States where the President quite clearly believes that America should be able to commit war crimes. Does this make you think, even if we should have always been skeptical of how the U.S. conducts war, that we should go into our analysis of this war with a different standard?

美国和以色列是两个发动过多次侵略战争的国家。它们都曾违反国际法、犯下战争罪行。两国政府都曾掩盖过某些战争罪行。尽管如此,我们确实从未在美国遇到过这种情况:总统如此明确地认为美国应当有权实施战争罪行。这是否会让你思考,即便我们始终应对美国的战争行为保持质疑,但在分析这场战争时是否该采用不同的标准?

What is so troubling here, among many things, is the almost celebration of the violation of the rules and the way in which there’s clearly a message coming from the top that the rules that are meant to protect civilians and protect the troops on both sides from unjustified use of military force are not worth paying attention to. And, in fact, as Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth put it, the “stupid rules of engagement” are rules that the United States has, while imperfectly observing, at other times worked hard to abide by. I worked in the Pentagon for a year and had a chance to work side by side with uniformed military lawyers, and they took these rules extremely seriously. And I think what’s really striking about this moment is we have a Secretary of Defense and a President who clearly don’t see the rules in that way.

这里最令人不安的一点,是几乎在庆祝对规则的破坏,以及高层显然在传递这样的信息:那些旨在保护平民、保护双方军队免受不必要军事力量伤害的规则,根本不值得关注。事实上,正如国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯所言,这些“愚蠢的交战规则”是美国制定的规则,尽管有时遵守得并不完美,但美国在其他时候也曾努力遵守。我在五角大楼工作过一年,有机会与身着制服的军队律师并肩工作,他们对待这些规则极其认真。我认为此刻真正令人震惊的是,我们拥有一位国防部长和一位总统,他们显然不这么看待这些规则。

So, in terms of what we’ve seen since the war started, what specifically worries you the most?

那么,就战争爆发以来的局势而言,您最担忧的具体是什么?

There are many things. We’ve seen many strikes now that on the face of it seem to suggest that there is not enough care being taken with the choice of targets. Everybody has been talking about the horrific strike on the girls’ school that led to the deaths of more than a hundred and seventy-five people. It was struck more than once, therefore killing some of the people who went to try to rescue those who were hurt in the first strike. I’m troubled by the fact that President Trump seems to be denying that the United States was responsible for that strike, despite the fact that the U.S. government has already released information that suggested that it was.

情况很多。我们目睹了多次空袭,表面看来似乎表明目标选择不够审慎。所有人都在谈论那场对女子学校的可怕袭击,导致超过一百七十五人丧生。该地点遭到多次轰炸,致使部分前往营救首次袭击伤者的人员遇难。令我困扰的是,特朗普总统似乎否认美国应对此次袭击负责,尽管美国政府已发布信息表明此事系美方所为。

And I’m troubled by the fact that this is the predictable result of a desire to dismantle some of the internal protections that have been put in place within the Department of Defense. There had been a multiyear effort to build up internal structures with lots of personnel who were devoted to this question of how to adequately protect civilians in times of armed conflict. There was a Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan that was developed by the Department of Defense. There was a whole office dedicated to this. That has all been dismantled and therefore it doesn’t come as a huge surprise that these mistakes happen, even though I believe that the school was not intentionally targeted. I have to believe that it was a mistake, but it’s a predictable mistake.

令我深感不安的是,这正是国防部内部某些保护机制被蓄意拆除后必然导致的后果。多年来,国防部曾投入大量人力构建内部架构,专门研究如何在武装冲突中充分保护平民。他们制定了《减轻与应对平民伤害行动计划》,并为此设立了专职办公室。如今这些机制已遭全面瓦解,因此即便我相信这所学校并非蓄意攻击目标,此类悲剧的发生也绝非意外——这虽是一场失误,却是可预见的失误。

I think that a lot of people draw a moral distinction between targeting civilians and civilians dying as collateral damage in the course of a war. And I agree that that can be a useful moral distinction. But, if you’re dealing with people who quite clearly do not care about civilian lives, and have tried to remove procedures that would protect civilians, it’s much harder for me to come up with any big moral distinction.

我认为,很多人会在蓄意针对平民与平民在战争过程中作为附带伤亡之间划出一条道德界线。我同意这可以是一条有用的道德分界线。但是,如果你面对的是那些显然毫不在乎平民生命、甚至试图废除保护平民程序的人,我就很难再从中找出什么重大的道德区别了。

Maybe it’s worth explaining this idea of collateral damage, or this question of whether you’re intentionally killing civilians versus unintentionally but knowingly killing civilians. So, under international law, intentionally targeting civilians is clearly unlawful and a war crime, but it is not unlawful to intentionally target a military objective when you know that there may be civilians or civilian objects that will be harmed, as long as the harm to the civilians and civilian objects is not anticipated to be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage that’s anticipated, and that’s sometimes called collateral damage.

或许值得解释一下“附带损害”这个概念,或者说,区分“蓄意杀害平民”与“非蓄意但明知会造成平民伤亡”这两种情况。根据国际法,蓄意以平民为攻击目标显然是非法的,属于战争罪。但当你明知可能伤及平民或民用设施时,以军事目标为攻击对象并不违法——只要预计对平民和民用设施造成的损害,与预期获得的具体直接军事优势相比,不被认为是过度的。这种情况有时就被称为“附带损害”。

And there is a really interesting moral question as to whether the two are really all that different, because, in one case, you’re intentionally killing civilians. In other cases, you are intentionally, in a sense, killing civilians—you know that they’re going to die, you’re taking a strike that you know is going to kill them—but you’re not aiming at them. But it’s cold comfort to the people who are killed in that strike. And there have been a lot of those cases where totally innocent civilians just happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. For them and their families, it doesn’t make a whole lot of difference that there was a military objective.

这里有一个非常有趣的道德问题:这两种情况是否真有那么大的不同?因为,在一种情况下,你是蓄意杀害平民。而在另一种情况下,从某种意义上说,你也是蓄意杀害平民——你明知他们会死,明知发起的袭击将夺走他们的生命——只是你没有以他们为目标。但对那些在袭击中丧生的人来说,这种区分不过是苍白的慰藉。已有太多这样的案例:完全无辜的平民只是不幸在错误的时间出现在错误的地点。对他们和他们的家人而言,是否存在军事目标并不能改变什么。

But I think the law does draw a distinction, and I think rightly so, because, if we’re intentionally targeting civilians, we’re giving up on the idea of actually trying to advance any of the war aims. The idea of this balancing, that’s built into the law, is that it’s impossible in times of war to completely insulate civilians from the damage that might be done. And so, if we’re targeting a high-enough-value military objective, occasionally it’s going to be necessary to kill civilians in order to do that. One of the things that comes in here, though, is, like, What is the proportionality calculus? And I think this may be what Hegseth is referring to when he says “stupid rules of engagement.”

但我认为法律确实有所区分,这种区分是恰当的。因为如果我们蓄意以平民为目标,就等于放弃了真正推进任何战争目标的理念。法律中蕴含的这种平衡理念在于:战争时期不可能完全让平民免受可能造成的伤害。因此,当我们瞄准一个足够高价值的军事目标时,偶尔难免会造成平民伤亡。这里涉及的关键问题在于:如何计算比例原则?我认为赫格塞斯所说的“愚蠢的交战规则”,可能正是指这种计算方式。

But I do think there is a moral distinction. I think the law is right to draw a moral distinction.

但我确实认为这其中存在道德差异。我认为法律对此作出道德区分是正确的。

Right, but forget the law for a second. Many of the people carrying out this war, including the leaders, do not care about civilian casualties and, in fact, are trying to remove the architecture that is meant to protect civilians from dying—at that point, it’s very tough for me to draw a particularly big moral distinction.

好吧,暂且不谈法律。许多参与这场战争的人,包括领导者,并不在乎平民伤亡,实际上他们正试图拆除那些本应保护平民免于死亡的制度架构——到了这个地步,我很难从中划出一条特别清晰的道德分界线。

Yes, I think that’s right. And I actually think that this gets to something really important, which has been relatively unnoticed in the last year, which is the dismantling of this architecture that has been put in place. Nobody was really paying attention to it because it seems very bureaucratic and uninteresting and unimportant, but then, when war happens, this is the predictable result, right?

是的,我认为你说得对。实际上,我觉得这触及了一个非常重要却被相对忽视的问题——过去一年间,这套精心构建的体系正在被悄然拆解。由于它看起来过于官僚、乏味且无关紧要,几乎没有人真正关注过它。但当战争爆发时,眼前的结果便成了必然的结局,不是吗?

And the question then is: Can that be prosecuted as a war crime? And the short answer is probably not, even though I think that it is morally reprehensible. But I think, in cases where you’re making the same mistake over and over again, and predictably making the same mistake over and over again—that is a case where actually the law does require that you take feasible precautions to avoid and minimize incidental loss of civilian life.

那么问题来了:这种行为能否作为战争罪被起诉?简短的答案大概是“不能”,尽管我认为这在道德上是应受谴责的。但我想,当你反复犯同样的错误,并且可预见地一再重蹈覆辙时——这种情况下,法律确实要求你必须采取可行的预防措施,以避免和减少平民伤亡。

What else have you been paying attention to?

您最近还关注些什么呢?

Well, the strikes on the water-desalination plants on both sides. We don’t know exactly who’s responsible for these, but apparently there’s an Iranian desalination plant that was destroyed. And then there was also a desalination plant in Bahrain that the Iranians may have struck.

嗯,关于双方海水淡化设施遭袭的事件。我们尚无法确定具体责任方,但显然伊朗的一座海水淡化厂已被摧毁。此外,巴林的一座海水淡化厂可能也遭到了伊朗方面的袭击。

What could be the possible justification for something like that?

这种事怎么说得通呢?

I don’t think there is a lawful justification for it. It is not uncommon to want to target objects that are indispensable to survival, because striking them makes the lives of civilians really miserable, but it is clearly unlawful to do so. I haven’t seen any evidence that suggests that the desalination plant in Iran had any military use whatsoever, and, as a civilian object, it should be protected, but it’s also considered an object indispensable to survival, and in that respect is especially protected because it’s necessary to providing basic needs of human beings in a place where there’s already inadequate water.

我认为此举缺乏法律依据。以生存必需设施为打击目标的做法并不罕见,因为这会让平民生活陷入极度困苦,但此类行为显然是非法的。我尚未看到任何证据表明伊朗的海水淡化厂具有军事用途。作为民用设施,它理应受到保护;更何况它还是生存必需设施,在这样一个本就缺水的地区,这类保障人类基本需求的设施更应受到特别保护。

There have been reports of attacks on medical facilities, which are deeply worrisome, if true. There have been attacks on parts of the oil infrastructure, which is reportedly causing terrible health conditions in Tehran and potentially making life dangerous for people who are living there. It’s important also to mention that Iran’s attacks are also clearly in violation of international humanitarian law. They’ve just been striking out pretty much everything, and many of these strikes have been on things like apartment buildings.

有报道称医疗设施遭到袭击,若属实则令人深感忧虑。石油基础设施部分也遭到攻击,据报道这导致德黑兰健康状况严重恶化,可能使当地居民生活陷入危险。同样重要的是,伊朗方面的袭击显然也违反了国际人道法。他们几乎是在无差别攻击,许多袭击目标都是公寓楼这类民用建筑。

This is against other Gulf states.What about striking things like oil infrastructure? Because, obviously, you could imagine that oil infrastructure could be used by both civilians and the military. I suppose that the most important thing would be to be aware of those medium-term consequences, like people in Tehran being able to breathe, along with whatever initial explosion there is from bombing oil infrastructure.

这与其他海湾国家的情况不同。那么针对石油基础设施这类重要目标呢?显然,石油设施既可能被平民使用,也可能被军方利用。我认为最关键的是要意识到那些中期后果——比如德黑兰的居民或许能呼吸到更清洁的空气,当然还有轰炸石油设施可能引发的直接爆炸冲击。

Yeah. So it is not uncommon to go after oil infrastructure. The United States has done it in its counter-terrorism campaign. Oil infrastructure is often referred to as a dual-use object, and while that’s not a formal legal term, it’s often a term used to refer to objects that have both civilian and military uses. And it’s not uncommon to target these dual-use objects, but it can be quite damaging to civilians and civilian life. It doesn’t appear, at least from initial reports, that this was used solely for military purposes, but that these are sort of general oil resources that are available to the civilian and to the military population. And this can have impacts on the environment, which we’re hearing about, such as acid rain, and the various health effects that people are suffering immediately in the area, but also it has what are sometimes referred to as reverberating effects. That is, it’s not just the harm that’s done by the strike itself, the civilians who are working at the plant and might be killed, but the aftereffects as well. It’s all the things that follow from it that can be extremely damaging to civilian life.

是的。因此,针对石油基础设施发动袭击并不罕见。美国在其反恐行动中就曾采取过此类手段。石油基础设施常被称为“双重用途目标”,虽然这不是正式的法律术语,但常用来指代兼具民用与军用功能的设施。攻击这类双重用途目标虽属常见,却可能对平民及民生造成相当严重的损害。至少从初步报告来看,这些设施似乎并非专供军事用途,而是军民共用的普通石油资源。此类袭击会对环境产生影响——我们已听闻酸雨等报道,当地民众正直接承受各种健康危害,同时还会产生所谓的“涟漪效应”。这不仅是袭击本身造成的伤害(比如在工厂工作的平民可能丧生),还包括后续影响。所有随之而来的连锁反应,都可能对平民生活造成极大破坏。

And there’s an ongoing debate among international lawyers as to whether reverberating effects should be part of the calculus when you’re assessing whether a strike is an excessive strike, and therefore one that should be avoided. The International Committee of the Red Cross says, yes, these reverberating effects should be taken into account. I think they’re right about that, because that’s a way of actually assessing the harm that’s in fact being done to civilians. It’s not just that initial strike but now the fact that you’ve got these horrific fires, that people can’t breathe and the environment is being poisoned, and that people are not going to have access to oil for all the things that they’re going to need for civilian life. Those things ought to be taken into account, but that’s contested, and neither the U.S. nor Israel has accepted that view. And so they don’t take into account those reverberating effects. And so they are more willing to take strikes that have these long-tail effects.

在国际法学者中,关于评估袭击是否构成过度打击时是否应将连锁效应纳入考量,目前仍存在持续辩论。国际红十字委员会主张,这些连锁效应应当被纳入评估范围。我认为他们的观点是正确的,因为这是实际评估平民所受伤害的方式——不仅要考虑最初的袭击,还要考量后续引发的恐怖火灾、民众呼吸困难、环境遭受毒害,以及人们将无法获得维持民用生活所需石油等事实。这些因素理应被纳入考量,但该观点仍存争议,美国和以色列均未接受这一立场。因此他们不会考虑这些连锁效应,也就更倾向于采取那些会产生长尾效应的打击行动。

I am curious how you are thinking through these issues broadly right now, because to some degree these questions seem a little bit almost beside the point, because we essentially have this unstable guy carrying out a war for some unknown reason that no one can figure out, and it almost feels like this whole set of rules that we have from the middle of the twentieth century is absurd to talk about.

我很好奇你目前是如何从宏观角度思考这些问题的,某种程度上,这些问题似乎有些偏离重点——我们面对的本质上是一个难以捉摸的不稳定者,他正以无人能理解的理由发动战争,这让人感觉讨论二十世纪中叶形成的整套国际规则体系几乎显得荒谬。

I agree that the original sin is the war itself, and that, without the launching of this unlawful war, we wouldn’t be talking about any of the rest of it. On the other hand, I do think the rules that govern the conduct of war are extraordinarily important because they are what protect civilians in the context of these kinds of armed conflicts. Obviously, the first, best solution is to not have the war in the first place, and I’m the first to argue that these wars should never happen, and that we shouldn’t be waging illegal and misguided wars in the first place, but it’s also the case that these rules really do matter.

我同意原罪是战争本身,若非这场非法战争的发动,我们根本不会讨论后续的一切。但另一方面,我认为规范战争行为的规则至关重要,因为它们正是在这类武装冲突中保护平民的屏障。显然,最优解是从源头上避免战争——我始终主张这些战争本不该发生,我们本就不该发动非法且误入歧途的战争——但同样不可否认的是,这些规则确实举足轻重。

I recognize that Trump and Hegseth don’t care about these rules. Having worked at the Department of Defense, I very much doubt that that is a view that is widely shared within the Pentagon. I think that people who are in the armed services believe that these rules really do matter. And they understand they matter because they protect not just civilians but American forces as well. And these are rules that govern what happens if any member of the armed forces is captured, that govern what can happen to them. It protects their own sense of humanity.

我深知特朗普和赫格塞斯并不在乎这些规则。曾在国防部工作的经历让我确信,五角大楼内部绝非普遍认同这种观点。我相信军人们真心认为这些规则至关重要。他们明白这些规则不仅保护平民,也保护着美国军队自身——它们规范着军人被俘后的处置方式,决定着他们将面临何种境遇。这些规则守护着军人对人性尊严的坚守。

I believe that there is a culture war happening within the Pentagon, because I doubt that the people who have been there and the people who have been serving share that view and that disregard for the rules. Certainly, there are some, but the vast majority believe that we should be fighting by these rules. Over time, that culture will erode and it’ll get worse and worse. And maybe the erosion has already been taking place, but I don’t know that you can destroy a culture in a year. That said, you can destroy structures in a year.

我认为五角大楼内部正在发生一场文化战争,因为我怀疑那些曾在其中服役的人会认同这种观点,会如此漠视规则。当然,有些人会,但绝大多数人相信我们应该遵守这些规则作战。随着时间的推移,这种文化会逐渐侵蚀,情况会越来越糟。或许侵蚀早已开始,但我不认为一年的时间就能摧毁一种文化。话虽如此,一年的时间足以摧毁制度架构。

And a country, it turns out.

而一个国家,也终究如此。

It sometimes feels that way, that’s for sure. ♦

有时确实会有这种感觉,这是肯定的。♦

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