The Lede

The Israeli Employers Who Want to Bring Palestinian Workers Back

想把巴勒斯坦工人请回来的以色列雇主们
More than a hundred thousand Palestinians worked in Israel before October 7th. Most can no longer cross the border—and many are now destitute.
10月7日之前,有超过十万名巴勒斯坦人在以色列工作。如今,他们中的大多数人再也无法越过边境——很多人已陷入赤贫。
Cars drive through a wall
Photograph by Sergey Ponomarev / NYT / Redux

Early on the morning of October 7, 2023, Abu Naeem, a forty-two-year-old from Ramallah, in the West Bank, finished an overnight shift at a large produce-distribution center in Israel. He showered and went to sleep in a small private room that his employer had built for him. Then he woke to sirens and distant explosions. Somewhere above him, he could hear the cracks of interceptor missiles colliding with incoming rockets. Abu Naeem felt as if he were in a movie. He soon learned that Hamas and other militant groups had attacked Israel, killing about twelve hundred people.

2023年10月7日清晨,来自约旦河西岸拉姆安拉、四十二岁的阿布·纳伊姆(Abu Naeem)在以色列一家大型农产品配送中心刚上完夜班。他冲了个澡,在雇主为他搭建的一间小屋里睡下。随后,他被警报声和远处的爆炸声惊醒。他能听到头顶上方拦截导弹与来袭火箭弹相撞的爆裂声。阿布·纳伊姆觉得自己仿佛置身电影之中。他很快得知,哈马斯及其他武装组织袭击了以色列,造成约一千二百人死亡。

For the next six weeks, as the Israeli military bombarded and then invaded Gaza, Abu Naeem’s employer persuaded him to stay in Israel, afraid of what might happen if he crossed back to the West Bank. Israel soon barred nearly two hundred thousand Palestinian laborers from its workforce. “The economic Cabinet decided that Palestinian workers should not return to Israel,” Nir Barkat, Israel’s economy minister, declared in late 2023. Abu Naeem was able to avoid detection by Israeli authorities only because he spoke fluent Hebrew. He learned how to make himself small, invisible, and useful.

在接下来的六周里,以色列军方持续轰炸并随后入侵加沙,阿布·纳伊姆的雇主说服他留在以色列,担心他返回约旦河西岸后可能遭遇不测。以色列很快便禁止近二十万巴勒斯坦劳工进入其劳动力市场。“经济内阁决定,巴勒斯坦工人不应返回以色列,”以色列经济部长尼尔·巴尔卡特(Nir Barkat)在2023年底宣布。阿布·纳伊姆之所以能躲过以色列当局的盘查,仅仅因为他能说一口流利的希伯来语。他学会了如何让自己变得渺小、不起眼,同时又有用处。

Before October 7th, a fifth of the West Bank’s labor force was employed in Israel, earning more than double the prevailing wage at home. Palestinian workers were required to obtain permits, but a 2007 ruling by Israel’s High Court awarded them the same labor rights as Israelis. After October 7th, however, the number of Palestinian workers entering Israel each day fell from more than a hundred thousand to well under ten thousand. (Another thirty-four thousand maintain permits to work around Israeli settlements in the West Bank.) Unemployment in the West Bank surged to twenty-nine per cent. A World Bank report on the state of the Palestinian economy described what amounted to an economic collapse.

10月7日之前,约旦河西岸五分之一的劳动力受雇于以色列,挣得的工资是本地水平的两倍多。巴勒斯坦工人需要获得许可证,但以色列高等法院2007年的一项裁决赋予了他们与以色列人同等的劳工权利。然而,10月7日之后,每天进入以色列的巴勒斯坦工人数量从十多万骤降至不足一万。(另有约三万四千人持有在约旦河西岸以色列定居点工作的许可证。)约旦河西岸的失业率飙升至百分之二十九。世界银行一份关于巴勒斯坦经济状况的报告,描述了近乎经济崩溃的局面。

The decision to ban Palestinian workers was originally presented as an emergency measure, but as it continued, many business leaders and economists came to oppose it. According to the Times of Israel, a proposal to allow some Palestinian workers back into Israel, in late 2023, was supported by representatives from the Israeli military; from Israel’s security agency, the Shin Bet; and from COGAT, the agency responsible for implementing Israeli policies in Palestinian territories. Senior figures argued that job opportunities in Israel helped stabilize the West Bank, reducing tensions by providing income and a sense of economic mobility. But some Israeli politicians argued for a permanent shift. “Israel can and must advance alternatives that will provide a different solution to the economy,” Bezalel Smotrich, Israel’s finance minister, said. “We are leaving the old conception behind: stop employing Palestinian workers,” Barkat said, in 2024. More than two and a half years after October 7th, the ban is still in effect, and it no longer reads as temporary.

禁止巴勒斯坦工人入境的决策最初是作为紧急措施提出的,但随着它持续执行,许多商界领袖和经济学家开始反对。据《以色列时报》报道,2023年底一项允许部分巴勒斯坦工人返回以色列的提案,得到了来自以色列军方、以色列安全机构辛贝特(Shin Bet),以及负责在巴勒斯坦领土执行以色列政策的机构COGAT代表的支持。高层人士认为,以色列的工作机会有助于稳定约旦河西岸,通过提供收入和一种经济流动感来缓解紧张局势。但一些以色列政客主张永久性转变。“以色列能够也必须推进替代方案,为经济提供不同的解决方案,”以色列财政部长比撒列·斯莫特里赫(Bezalel Smotrich)说。“我们正在抛弃旧观念:停止雇用巴勒斯坦工人,”巴尔卡特在2024年表示。10月7日过去两年半多后,禁令依然有效,而且它读起来已不再像是临时性的了。

Abu Naeem returned to Ramallah in late November, 2023. He has never crossed back into Israel. More than two years later, I passed through Qalandia checkpoint, in northern Jerusalem, so that I could meet him on the other side. He came with Malek and Ihab, two other men who had worked in Israel. We sat at a table together; they set down phones and cigarette packs and lit one cigarette after another. Malek, a welder and ironworker from Al-Khalil (Hebron), held his head in his hands until someone suggested he go first.

阿布·纳伊姆于2023年11月底返回拉姆安拉。他再也没能回到以色列。两年多后,我穿过耶路撒冷北部的卡兰迪亚检查站,去另一边见他。和他一起来的还有马利克(Malek)和伊哈布(Ihab),另外两个曾在以色列工作过的人。我们围桌而坐;他们放下手机和烟盒,一根接一根地抽着烟。马利克,一位来自哈利勒(希伯伦)的焊工和铁工,双手抱头,直到有人提议让他先说。

Malek said that in Israel he worked on industrial frames and bridges weighing several tons. He earned enough to build a house for his family. Since the ban began, though, he had gone so deep into debt that he was denied access to a loan program established by the Palestinian Ministry of Labor. He described himself as living in hiding, afraid even to travel between Al-Khalil and Ramallah, for fear of being pursued by creditors. He depended on others to support his three daughters and a baby boy. He spoke longingly of izzat al-nafs—the dignity of not having to ask for help.

马利克说,他在以色列加工重达数吨的工业框架和桥梁。他挣的钱足够为家人盖一栋房子。然而,自禁令开始以来,他已债台高筑,甚至被巴勒斯坦劳工部设立的一项贷款计划拒之门外。他形容自己过着躲躲藏藏的生活,甚至不敢在哈利勒和拉姆安拉之间往来,生怕被债主追讨。他依靠别人来养活他的三个女儿和一个男婴。他充满渴望地谈起“伊扎特·纳夫斯”(izzat al-nafs)——那种不必求人的尊严。

Abu Naeem, a broad-shouldered man with expressive eyes, told us that he’d recently been unable to afford his ten-year-old son’s school fees of fifty shekels, or fourteen dollars. When he asked for a pencil and an eraser, he had to respond, “Tomorrow.” Two weeks later, he said, his son came home crying. The school had announced the names of families who had not paid. He had to borrow seven hundred shekels for the fees and school supplies.

阿布·纳伊姆肩膀宽阔,双眼富有表现力。他告诉我们,他最近连儿子五十谢克尔(约合十四美元)的学费都付不起。儿子向他要铅笔和橡皮时,他只能回答:“明天。”两周后,他说,儿子哭着回家。学校公布了未缴费家庭的名单。他不得不借了七百谢克尔来支付学费和学习用品。

Ihab, the other man who joined us, worked in Israel for almost eighteen years, he said, most recently as a supervisor for thirty workers at a supermarket in Or Yehuda, near Tel Aviv. At the time, he’d considered himself middle class, but now he lived with his mother. His marriage had collapsed. He refused to cross into Israel illegally, as many others did; he said that two of his relatives were killed trying to climb the border wall, and another was critically injured.

和我们一起的另一个人伊哈布说,他在以色列工作了将近十八年,最近的一份工作是在特拉维夫附近的奥尔耶胡达一家超市担任主管,管理三十名工人。那时,他自认为是中产阶级,但现在他和母亲住在一起。他的婚姻破裂了。他拒绝像许多人那样非法越境进入以色列;他说,他的两个亲戚在试图翻越边境墙时丧生,还有一个受了重伤。

Earlier this year, Palestinian workers who had lost jobs in Israel organized themselves on TikTok. They protested the closure of border crossings and appealed to the Palestinian Authority government in the West Bank. Ihab showed me a photograph of a meeting with the P.A.’s minister of labor. When the workers explained that they could not afford school fees, he said, the minister brought up the possibility of loan programs or school waivers. But loan programs would require clean bank records, Abu Naeem said, and unemployment has destroyed their credit. Even obtaining paperwork for the waiver, he added, would cost money that he did not have.

今年早些时候,在以色列失业的巴勒斯坦工人在TikTok上组织起来。他们抗议边境口岸关闭,并向约旦河西岸的巴勒斯坦权力机构政府发出呼吁。伊哈布给我看了一张与巴勒斯坦权力机构劳工部长会面的照片。他说,当工人们解释他们付不起学费时,部长提到了贷款计划或学费减免的可能性。但阿布·纳伊姆说,贷款计划需要干净的银行记录,而失业已经毁了他们的信用。他补充说,即使是获取减免所需的文件,也要花掉他没有的钱。

During our conversation, Ihab called his longtime employer in Israel, who was named Danny. Over speakerphone, Danny said that he missed Ihab and called him “a man who does the work of three people.” He told me that he had tried to “turn the world upside down to secure a permit,” but he had had no success. “I miss Or Yehuda,” Ihab said. Later, Abu Naeem called Hassan, a contractor from the Tulkarm area who once supervised more than a hundred workers in Israel. Hassan said that workers affected by the ban were in an abyss. He had seen families lose access to electricity and water, pull their children out of school, and go days without eating. “Not poverty,” Hassan said. “Something worse.”

在我们交谈时,伊哈布给他以色列的长期雇主丹尼(Danny)打了电话。通过免提,丹尼说他很想念伊哈布,称他是“一个人能干三个人的活”。他告诉我,他曾试图“把世界翻个底朝天去搞一张许可证”,但没能成功。“我想念奥尔耶胡达,”伊哈布说。后来,阿布·纳伊姆打给了哈桑(Hassan),一位来自图勒凯尔姆地区的承包商,他曾在以色列管理过一百多名工人。哈桑说,受禁令影响的工人正身处深渊。他见过一些家庭失去水电供应,让孩子辍学,一连几天吃不上饭。“不是贫穷,”哈桑说。“是更糟的东西。”

The framework that currently governs Palestinian workers in Israel dates to 1994, when Israeli and Palestinian officials agreed to the Paris Protocol of the Oslo Accords. The protocol established that the Israeli shekel would be the currency of the Palestinian economy, and that Israel would control borders, trade, tax transfers, and work permits. Walid Habbas, a researcher at the Palestinian Forum for Israeli Studies (MADAR), argued that Israeli policies made Palestinians dependent on Israel, and that work permits always functioned as a “mechanism of control.” Earnings from Israel made up nearly a quarter of the West Bank’s gross domestic product, generating income for households, local markets, and the government’s tax base.

目前管理在以色列的巴勒斯坦工人的框架,可以追溯到1994年,当时以色列和巴勒斯坦官员同意了《奥斯陆协定》中的《巴黎议定书》。该议定书规定,以色列谢克尔将成为巴勒斯坦经济的货币,以色列将控制边境、贸易、税收转移和工作许可证。巴勒斯坦以色列研究论坛(MADAR)的研究员瓦利德·哈巴斯(Walid Habbas)认为,以色列的政策使巴勒斯坦人依赖以色列,而工作许可证始终充当着一种“控制机制”。来自以色列的收入曾占约旦河西岸国内生产总值的近四分之一,为家庭、地方市场和政府的税基创造了收入。

Raead, a contractor from Tarqumiyah, erected high-rise buildings in Israel for twelve years. “We built Tel Aviv,” he told me proudly. His house has polished stone floors and a central courtyard; photographs of his father, the owner of a major construction company, were displayed in every room. Families like his used to lend support to relatives and neighbors; they paid when others couldn’t. Now, he told me, he was two hundred thousand dollars in debt. Palestinians are liquidating their possessions, he said—cars, furniture, jewelry, even land meant to be passed down to children. “When people are desperate, they sell,” he told me.

来自塔尔库米亚的承包商拉伊德(Raead),曾在以色列承建高层建筑长达十二年。“我们建造了特拉维夫,”他自豪地告诉我。他的房子铺着光滑的石地板,有一个中央庭院;每个房间都陈列着他父亲——一家大型建筑公司老板的照片。像他这样的家庭过去常常接济亲戚和邻居;别人付不起的时候,他们来付。现在,他告诉我,他欠了二十万美元的债。他说,巴勒斯坦人正在变卖他们的财产——汽车、家具、珠宝,甚至是本打算传给子女的土地。“人一绝望,就会卖东西,”他告诉我。

Some Palestinians have decided that they can no longer wait for new opportunities. Ashraf, who studied media at Hebron University and then found construction work in Israel, ran out of money after about eight months of unemployment. He kept hearing about men who were entering Israel without permits, for cash work in construction or agriculture. He began to weigh the possibility of getting hurt while sneaking across the border against the certainty of going hungry at home. He showed me a video of a man who was shot near the border wall, his lower leg soaked in blood. But another video showed Palestinians successfully using ropes to climb over the wall and disappear into Israel.

一些巴勒斯坦人认定,他们不能再等待新的机会了。阿什拉夫(Ashraf)在希伯伦大学学习媒体,后来在以色列找到建筑工作。失业大约八个月后,他没钱了。他不断听说有人没有许可证就进入以色列,在建筑或农业领域打现金工。他开始权衡:是冒着偷越边境时受伤的风险,还是面对在家挨饿的必然结局。他给我看了一段视频,一个男人在边境墙附近中枪,小腿浸透了血。但另一段视频显示,巴勒斯坦人成功地用绳索翻过墙,消失在以色列境内。

Ashraf runs a popular TikTok account that focusses on the lives of workers. In one video, he greets viewers from the fiftieth floor of a construction site in Tel Aviv. “Good morning to all the workers,” he says. In our conversation, he criticized the Israeli work ban as a form of collective punishment. He is particularly troubled by the Hebrew term Shabach, a portmanteau for “illegal resident” that has connotations of criminality. “I’m not coming to hurt anyone,” he told me. “I’m coming to work.”

阿什拉夫经营着一个颇受欢迎的TikTok账号,关注工人的生活。在一段视频中,他在特拉维夫一个建筑工地的五十层楼上向观众打招呼。“所有工人早上好,”他说。在我们的交谈中,他批评以色列的工作禁令是一种集体惩罚。他尤其对希伯来语词“沙巴赫”(Shabach)感到困扰,这是一个意为“非法居留者”的混成词,带有犯罪的含义。“我不是来伤害任何人的,”他告诉我。“我是来工作的。”

I started my reporting in late 2025, shortly after Israel and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire in Gaza. By then, more than seventy thousand Palestinians had been killed, and where I live, in the Netherlands, the war in Gaza was widely discussed as a genocide. The workers I met in the West Bank, in contrast, did not seem eager to talk about the political situation. They seldom brought up the subject of Gaza, expressed little interest in political factions, and focussed on practical concerns: work, income, survival. They expressed anger at Israel for the work ban and frustration with the Palestinian Authority for failing to mitigate it. Some blamed Hamas for destroying years of hard-won economic security.

我于2025年底开始做这篇报道,就在以色列和哈马斯同意在加沙停火后不久。那时,已有超过七万巴勒斯坦人丧生,而在我居住的荷兰,加沙战争被广泛讨论为一场种族灭绝。相比之下,我在约旦河西岸遇到的工人们似乎并不急于谈论政治局势。他们很少主动提起加沙的话题,对政治派别没什么兴趣,而是专注于实际关切:工作、收入、生存。他们对以色列的工作禁令表示愤怒,对巴勒斯坦权力机构未能缓解困境感到沮丧。一些人指责哈马斯毁掉了多年辛苦挣来的经济保障。

Then there are the workers who used to cross into Israel from Gaza. After October 7th, thousands were rounded up, bused to Ramallah, and dispersed across West Bank cities. In Ariha (Jericho), a low-lying, sun-struck town on the edge of the desert, four hundred and eighty Gazans have spent two years of limbo in a military base operated by the Palestinian Authority Security Forces. On my way there, I passed villas with pools, encampments where displaced persons lived, and government compounds. I paid a visit to Ariha’s governor, Hussein Hamayel, who said that the Palestinian Authority lacked the resources to help those affected by the work ban. He said that the West Bank was under a “financial siege.” Israel has withheld tax revenues that it collects on the P.A.’s behalf, a major source of the P.A.’s budget, and the government struggles to pay its own employees.

还有那些过去常从加沙进入以色列的工人。10月7日之后,数千人被围捕,用大巴送到拉姆安拉,然后分散到约旦河西岸的各个城市。在阿里哈(杰里科),一个位于沙漠边缘、地势低洼、烈日炙烤的小镇,四百八十名加沙人在巴勒斯坦权力机构安全部队运营的一处军事基地里,度过了两年漂泊不定的生活。在去那里的路上,我经过了带泳池的别墅、流离失所者居住的营地,以及政府建筑群。我拜访了阿里哈的省长侯赛因·哈马耶勒(Hussein Hamayel),他说巴勒斯坦权力机构缺乏资源来帮助那些受工作禁令影响的人。他说,约旦河西岸正遭受“财政围困”。以色列扣留了它代为巴勒斯坦权力机构征收的税款,这是巴勒斯坦权力机构预算的主要来源,导致政府连支付自己雇员的工资都困难。

On the military base, I was accompanied by a Palestinian officer. He insisted on listening as I interviewed a sixty-year-old worker from Gaza. The worker, whom I’ll call Salim, moved slowly, his slippers brushing the floor as he walked in; he talked without inflection, as though his story belonged to someone else. On October 7th, he said, he was in the Sderot area, where Hamas carried out relentless attacks. He pointed to places where he said he was shot that day: his leg, his hand, near his eye. He was treated briefly in the south of Israel and then the Israeli military—the I.D.F.—took him to Ofer prison. Salim told me that, during a seventy-day incarceration, he slept on stones in an open yard, wondering what would happen to him. He said he was never charged with a crime but had no contact with his family or a lawyer. Because he suffered from chronic health issues, he was eventually released to the Palestinian Authority. (An Israeli military spokesperson told The New Yorker, “The I.D.F. operates in accordance with Israeli and international law.")

在军事基地,一名巴勒斯坦军官陪同着我。我采访一位来自加沙的六十岁工人时,他坚持要在场旁听。这位工人,我称他为萨利姆(Salim),行动缓慢,趿拉着拖鞋走进来时,鞋底擦着地面;他说话语调平直,仿佛他的故事属于别人。他说,10月7日那天,他在斯德洛特地区,哈马斯在那里发动了无情的攻击。他指着他所说的那天中枪的部位:腿、手、眼睛附近。他在以色列南部接受了简短治疗,然后以色列军方——以色列国防军(I.D.F.)——把他带到了奥弗监狱。萨利姆告诉我,在七十天的监禁中,他睡在露天院子的石头上,不知道会发生什么。他说他从未被指控任何罪行,但无法联系家人或律师。由于患有慢性病,他最终被移交给巴勒斯坦权力机构释放。(以色列军方发言人告诉《纽约客》:“以色列国防军的行动符合以色列法律和国际法。”)

Only when Salim talked about his family did his posture change slightly; energy returned to his voice. Periodically, he said, he received about seven hundred shekels from the Palestinian Authority. He sent half to his family by phone. He has ten children and about fifty grandchildren. When I asked if he knew all their names, he said, “Not all of them.” He laughed briefly, then fell silent for a moment. “We wish to go see them before we die.”

只有当萨利姆谈起他的家人时,他的姿态才微微改变;声音里恢复了活力。他说,他定期从巴勒斯坦权力机构收到大约七百谢克尔。他把一半通过电话转给家人。他有十个孩子和大约五十个孙辈。当我问他是否知道他们所有人的名字时,他说:“不是全部。”他短暂地笑了笑,然后沉默了片刻。“我们希望在死之前去看看他们。”

In 2025, the Fattal Hotel Group, which describes itself as Israel’s largest hospitality organization, dismissed more than a hundred Palestinian workers. They were not accused of misconduct, and they had continued working throughout the war. Many of them turned to MAAN, a workers’-rights organization based in Israel, for help. After MAAN began to investigate, the management of the hotel chain produced a letter from Israel’s Ministry of Tourism. The ministry was informing hotels of a forthcoming policy: Palestinian workers were to lose their work permits and be replaced by laborers from abroad.

2025年,自称是以色列最大酒店集团的法塔尔酒店集团(Fattal Hotel Group),解雇了一百多名巴勒斯坦工人。他们没有被指控行为不当,而且在整个战争期间一直在工作。他们中的许多人向MAAN——一家设在以色列的工人权利组织——寻求帮助。MAAN开始调查后,该连锁酒店的管理层出示了一封来自以色列旅游部的信函。旅游部通知各酒店一项即将出台的政策:巴勒斯坦工人将失去工作许可证,由来自国外的劳工取代。

Assaf Adiv, MAAN’s executive director, recently visited a café in al-Eizariya, a city in the West Bank, east of Jerusalem, to meet some of the dismissed Palestinian workers, who wore pressed shirts and leather shoes. One of them showed a video from a farewell party; his colleagues at the Leonardo Club Dead Sea, an all-inclusive waterfront hotel, warmly thanked him for his work. Adiv had bad news for the hotel workers: the letter from the Ministry of Tourism seemed to provide a legal justification for their dismissals. He offered to seek compensation from their employers. What the workers really wanted, though, was to get their jobs back.

MAAN的执行董事阿萨夫·阿迪夫(Assaf Adiv)最近去了约旦河西岸、耶路撒冷以东的城市阿扎里亚的一家咖啡馆,会见了一些被解雇的巴勒斯坦工人,他们穿着熨烫平整的衬衫和皮鞋。其中一人展示了一段告别派对的视频;他在死海莱昂纳多俱乐部酒店——一家全包式海滨酒店——的同事们,热情地感谢了他的工作。阿迪夫给这些酒店工人带来了坏消息:旅游部的信函似乎为解雇他们提供了法律依据。他提出帮他们向雇主要求赔偿。然而,工人们真正想要的,是拿回他们的工作。

Adiv told me that, nowadays, wherever he goes in Israel, he sees newly arrived workers from Asia. They have limited rights, he added, and depend on staffing agencies for their housing and their work. He also said that he has been hearing about Palestinian workers being shot, sometimes fatally, while attempting to cross into Israel. “It’s a catastrophe,” he said. Those who make it to Israel increasingly hide in construction sites, warehouses, and vehicles, moving at night and avoiding checkpoints; they remain vulnerable to anyone who decides to report them. “The longer this continues, the more desperate people become,” he said.

阿迪夫告诉我,如今,他在以色列无论走到哪里,都能看到新来的亚洲工人。他补充说,他们的权利有限,住房和工作都依赖劳务中介公司。他还说,他一直听说有巴勒斯坦工人在试图越境进入以色列时遭到枪击,有时是致命的。“这是一场灾难,”他说。那些成功进入以色列的人,越来越多地藏在建筑工地、仓库和车辆里,夜间行动,避开检查站;他们仍然容易受到任何决定举报他们的人的伤害。“这种情况持续得越久,人们就会变得越绝望,”他说。

On the Israeli side, employers described a different kind of collapse. I met Ran Cohen, a fifty-three-year-old contractor from an Israeli settlement near Jerusalem, at a large bank that was being renovated near Tel Aviv. I could barely hear him over the sound of walls being torn down. For more than two decades, he told me, he had run a renovation company that depended on dozens of Palestinian workers from a single extended family in Yatta, south of Hebron. Fathers taught sons. The crew moved from project to project together. They built his house. He attended their weddings. “Like family,” Cohen said, without irony. “Sure, they probably want us out of this land—and we would also like to have the place to ourselves. So what?” Politics remained outside the construction site. Trust grew anyway.

在以色列一侧,雇主们描述了另一种崩溃。我在特拉维夫附近一家正在翻修的大银行里,见到了五十三岁的承包商兰·科恩(Ran Cohen),他来自耶路撒冷附近的一个以色列定居点。在墙壁被拆除的噪音中,我几乎听不见他说话。他告诉我,二十多年来,他经营着一家翻修公司,依赖的是来自希伯伦南部亚塔镇一个大家族的好几十名巴勒斯坦工人。父亲教儿子。这群工人一起从一个项目转到另一个项目。他们为他建了房子。他参加过他们的婚礼。“就像家人一样,”科恩毫无讽刺意味地说。“当然,他们可能想让我们离开这片土地——我们也想自己拥有这个地方。那又怎样?”政治被留在了建筑工地之外。信任还是生长了出来。

Cohen’s workers were denied entry to Israel on October 8, 2023, and have not been able to return. He described the ban as a “death sentence” for businesses like his. Without his crew, he was forced to refund clients; he spent months at home, depressed. He did not want to hire Palestinians without permits because Israeli authorities were carrying out inspections; Israeli employers caught hiring unauthorized workers can face heavy fines, arrests, and temporary closures. “This is not a political position,” he said. “It is math.” He’d paid skilled Palestinian workers six hundred to eight hundred shekels a day; foreign workers from third-party staffing agencies cost fifteen hundred. In Cohen’s telling, the work is slower, the quality is lower, and there aren’t enough workers available; the primary beneficiaries are the agencies. Ironically, the result is that homes scarred by war—including the ongoing conflict with Iran and its proxy Hezbollah—are going unrepaired. To stay afloat, Cohen took out mortgages worth millions of shekels, and he began working temporary jobs as a construction-site manager.

科恩的工人们在2023年10月8日被拒绝进入以色列,此后一直无法返回。他将这项禁令描述为对他这样企业的“死刑判决”。没有了他的团队,他被迫向客户退款;他待在家里好几个月,意志消沉。他不想雇用没有许可证的巴勒斯坦人,因为以色列当局正在进行突击检查;被发现雇用无证工人的以色列雇主可能面临高额罚款、逮捕和临时停业。“这不是政治立场,”他说。“这是算术。”他过去付给熟练的巴勒斯坦工人每天六百到八百谢克尔;而来自第三方劳务中介的外国工人要价一千五百谢克尔。按照科恩的说法,活干得更慢,质量更低,而且可用的工人数量也不够;主要受益者是那些中介公司。具有讽刺意味的是,结果是那些因战争——包括与伊朗及其代理人真主党之间持续的冲突——而伤痕累累的房屋得不到修缮。为了维持下去,科恩申请了价值数百万谢克尔的抵押贷款,并开始做建筑工地经理的临时工作。

The official justification for the ban remains security. “The policy governing the entry of Palestinian workers . . . is determined in accordance with security assessments and subject to the directives of the political echelons,” COGAT said in a statement. But Esteban Klor, an economist at Hebrew University, reviewed seventeen years of data about attacks inside Israel and found that only three were carried out by Palestinian permit holders. The security argument, he concluded, doesn’t hold; he sees the ban as a political choice. Still, even if the ban were lifted tomorrow, many Israelis might not want Palestinian workers in their homes, according to Eran Sib, the chairman of the Renovation Contractors Association.

禁令的官方理由仍然是安全。“管理巴勒斯坦工人入境的政策……是根据安全评估确定的,并服从政治高层的指示,”COGAT在一份声明中说。但希伯来大学的经济学家埃斯特班·克洛尔(Esteban Klor)审查了十七年来关于以色列境内袭击事件的数据,发现只有三起是由持有许可证的巴勒斯坦人实施的。他得出结论,安全论点站不住脚;他认为禁令是一种政治选择。尽管如此,根据翻修承包商协会主席埃兰·西布(Eran Sib)的说法,即使禁令明天就解除,许多以色列人可能也不希望巴勒斯坦工人出现在他们家中。

When I met Cohen, he was preparing to make his second trip to Colombo, Sri Lanka, to recruit workers who could fill jobs in Israel. Cohen is also a member of the Renovation Contractors Association. During his first trip, he had watched hundreds of candidates lay tiles and finish drywall. Only a few had had the necessary training.

我见到科恩时,他正准备第二次前往斯里兰卡科伦坡,去招募能填补以色列工作岗位的工人。科恩也是翻修承包商协会的成员。在他第一次行程中,他观看了数百名候选人铺瓷砖和做石膏板墙。只有少数人具备必要的技能。

Before we parted, Cohen showed me some WhatsApp messages from Uda, a Palestinian worker from Yatta who had spent nearly twenty years on his crews. The two men still exchanged voice notes, jokes, and holiday greetings. Cohen also showed me a receipt from a money transfer. He’d sent a thousand shekels to a stranger who’d promised an Israeli work permit for Uda. Cohen knew it was probably a scam, but he’d paid up because he didn’t know what else to do. “I sent it so Uda would see I was still trying,” he told me. ♦

分别前,科恩给我看了一些来自乌达(Uda)的WhatsApp消息,乌达是来自亚塔的一名巴勒斯坦工人,在他的团队里干了将近二十年。这两个男人仍然互发语音留言、笑话和节日问候。科恩还给我看了一张汇款收据。他给一个陌生人汇了一千谢克尔,那人承诺能为乌达搞到一张以色列工作许可证。科恩知道这很可能是个骗局,但他还是付了钱,因为他不知道还能做什么。“我把钱汇过去,是为了让乌达看到我还在努力,”他告诉我。♦

Reporting for this story was supported by the Dutch Fund for In-Depth Journalism (Fonds B.J.P.).

本报道的采写得到了荷兰深度新闻基金(Fonds B.J.P.)的支持。

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