The Lede

The Humanism Driving the Anti-A.I. Movement

反人工智能运动背后的人文主义
At the Pro-Human Assembly in Washington, D.C., attendees talked less about jobs and policy, and more about their philosophy of life.
在华盛顿特区举行的“亲人类大会”上,与会者谈论的与其说是就业和政策,不如说是他们的人生哲学。
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Illustration by Ben Hickey

In the past year, data centers have emerged as a central issue in both American politics and the gyre of discourse swirling around American politics. On blogs and podcasts, the commentariat has marvelled at the emergence of an elusive bipartisan consensus. And well they should: the most recent polling shows that an astounding seventy-one per cent of the population opposes data-center construction in their areas.

过去一年里,数据中心已成为美国政治以及围绕美国政治打转的话语漩涡中的一个核心议题。在博客和播客上,评论界惊叹于一种难以捉摸的两党共识的出现。他们确实有理由惊叹:最新民调显示,高达百分之七十一的民众反对在自家附近建设数据中心,这一数字令人瞠目。

Equally astonishing, if not yet equally remarked upon, is the consensus about A.I. itself. Sixty-nine per cent of Americans are “concerned” about the technology’s role in society, according to a study that used data from NORC at the University of Chicago. A poll conducted by NBC last spring found that A.I. is less popular than such societal darlings as ICE, Donald Trump, and J. D. Vance.

同样令人惊讶——尽管尚未引起同等关注——的是关于人工智能本身的共识。根据一项使用芝加哥大学全国民意研究中心数据的研究,百分之六十九的美国人对该技术在社会中的角色感到“担忧”。全国广播公司去年春天进行的一项民调发现,人工智能的受欢迎程度低于移民与海关执法局、唐纳德·特朗普和J·D·万斯这类社会宠儿。

The vibes, less pollable but perhaps no less palpable, are noxious. Students boo speakers who extol A.I. in commencement addresses, and consumers deride celebrities and brands that embrace the technology. For months after the film studio A24 announced a “research partnership” with Google’s DeepMind, aggrieved commenters took to the company’s Instagram to lambaste “AI24” for its treachery. “We don’t have to accept this future,” an anonymous graffitist scribbled across a subway station ad for the dystopian Friend A.I. device, as documented in a photo in the Times.

这种氛围难以用民调捕捉,但或许同样真切可感,而且相当恶劣。学生们在毕业典礼上对赞美人工智能的演讲者发出嘘声,消费者嘲讽拥抱该技术的名人和品牌。电影公司A24宣布与谷歌DeepMind建立“研究伙伴关系”后数月间,愤怒的网友涌向该公司Instagram账号,痛斥“AI24”的背叛行径。“我们不必接受这个未来,”一位匿名涂鸦者在反乌托邦产品Friend人工智能设备的地铁站广告上潦草写道,《纽约时报》刊载的一张照片记录了这一场景。

Until 2022, when large language models exploded into the public consciousness, with the release of ChatGPT, the primary idiom of opposition to A.I. was that of techno-eschatology. Silicon Valley doomers feared A.I. for the very reason that they revered it: because they believed that it was powerful enough to contrive some futuristic means of annihilating humanity (perhaps, as in the classic and memorably silly thought experiment dreamed up by the philosopher Nick Bostrom, by converting us all into paper clips). But the data-center backlash has enlarged the established taxonomy of A.I. skeptics. In addition to the industry insiders who caution that A.I. might go rogue, there are the A.I. populists—defined by the tech journalist and The Atlantic contributor Jasmine Sun as adherents to “a worldview in which AI is viewed not only as a normal technology but as an elite political project to be resisted.” Sun stresses that these aggrieved everymen know little about the technology itself, arguing their ideas are “transmuting” the “anti-elite and nihilistic attitudes that have dominated US political culture in the last few years.”

直到2022年,随着ChatGPT的发布,大语言模型引爆公众意识,在此之前,反对人工智能的主要话语模式是技术末世论。硅谷的末日论者恐惧人工智能,恰恰出于他们敬畏它的同一个原因:因为他们相信它强大到足以设计出某种未来主义的手段来毁灭人类(也许就像哲学家尼克·博斯特罗姆构想出的那个经典而令人难忘的荒诞思想实验——把我们全部变成回形针)。但数据中心的反弹扩大了人工智能怀疑论者的既有分类。除了警告人工智能可能失控的业内人士,还有人工智能民粹主义者——科技记者、《大西洋月刊》撰稿人贾思敏·孙将其定义为信奉“一种世界观,即人工智能不仅被视为一种普通技术,更被视为一个需要抵制的精英政治工程”的人。孙强调,这些愤愤不平的普通人对此项技术本身知之甚少,认为他们的观念正在“转化”过去几年主导美国政治文化的“反精英和虚无主义态度”。

Both the doomers and the populists were in evidence at the Pro-Human Assembly, a big-tent A.I.-critical gathering held in Washington, D.C., and organized by the Future of Life Institute, a nonprofit dedicated to insuring that technology serves humanity’s interests. The conference’s two headliners—Bernie Sanders representing the left, Steve Bannon the right—railed against the nefarious designs of the “oligarchs,” to the audible delight of the crowd; Alex Bores, a New York state assemblyman who narrowly lost a congressional primary on an A.I.-safety platform, gave a speech calling for heightened industry oversight. Panels featured labor organizers who warned that A.I. would undermine workers, and parents whose children confessed to chatbots that they had suicidal ideation before they killed themselves. Many of the panels centered on issues with A.I. that were somewhat orthogonal to the value of the technology itself. If A.I. were better regulated or better aligned, they seemed to suggest, it might become palatable.

末日论者和民粹主义者都出现在“亲人类大会”上。这是一场在华盛顿特区举行的大帐篷式人工智能批判集会,由生命未来研究所组织,该非营利机构致力于确保技术服务人类利益。会议两位主角——代表左翼的伯尼·桑德斯和代表右翼的史蒂夫·班农——痛斥“寡头们”的邪恶图谋,赢得听众的热烈反响;纽约州众议员亚历克斯·博雷斯曾以人工智能安全为政纲参加国会初选,以微弱差距落败,他发表演讲呼吁加强行业监管。专题讨论中,劳工组织者警告人工智能将削弱工人地位,有父母讲述自己的孩子在与聊天机器人倾诉自杀念头后结束了自己的生命。许多专题讨论聚焦于人工智能的问题,而这些议题与这项技术本身的价值多少有些偏离。它们似乎在暗示:如果人工智能得到更好的监管或更好的对齐,它或许可以变得可以接受。

Yet, when I asked attendees why they were there, few mentioned economic inequality or poor regulation, and none mentioned paper clips. For the most part, the going concerns were not about matters of policy as much as they were about matters of philosophy. The neuroscientist and writer Erik Hoel, who sported an impressive beard, told me that he hated that A.I. compromised human freedom. “I want a world where my kids are able to matter in the way that our generation was able to matter and make choices,” he said. Hoel, who had travelled to D.C. from Boston, became concerned about A.I. for the same reason that he decided to pursue a Ph.D. in neuroscience: because of his reverence for human consciousness. “I became very deeply scared that we would have language, but without consciousness,” he said, a possibility that he has described on his blog as “semantic apocalypse.”

然而,当我问与会者为什么来参加时,很少有人提到经济不平等或监管不力,没有人提到回形针。大体而言,人们关心的主要不是政策问题,而是哲学问题。神经科学家兼作家埃里克·霍尔蓄着一把令人印象深刻的胡子,他告诉我,他痛恨人工智能损害了人的自由。“我想要一个世界,在那里我的孩子能够以我们这一代人曾经能够的方式去产生影响、做出选择,”他说。霍尔从波士顿专程来到华盛顿,他关注人工智能的原因与他决定攻读神经科学博士的原因相同:出于对人类意识的敬畏。“我变得非常深切地恐惧,我们将会拥有语言,却没有意识,”他说。他在自己的博客上将这种可能性描述为“语义末日”。

Others voiced fears about A.I.’s effects on creativity, about the way it might etiolate the visual and artistic landscape. A lanky thirty-year-old novelist, filmmaker, and practicing clown who went by Red Lamb (he had been to clown school in France, he said) told me that he was “not a big policy-head” but that he dreaded the “slopification of the arts.” “No clanker has ever actually told a joke that I found amusing,” he said. “And I don’t think they ever will.” A twenty-two-year-old woman from the Young People’s Alliance, a youth-advocacy group, said that she felt she’d “lost brain cells” since she’d started using A.I. Like many of the people I spoke with at the Pro-Human Assembly, she seemed to be groping for a new lexicon—one that could capture her sense of a looming spiritual bankruptcy.

其他人表达了对人工智能影响创造力的担忧,担心它会使视觉和艺术景观变得苍白贫瘠。一位身材瘦长、三十岁的小说家、电影制作人兼执业小丑,自称红羔羊(他说自己曾在法国上过小丑学校),告诉我他“不是什么政策达人”,但他惧怕“艺术的垃圾化”。“没有一个铁疙瘩讲过我觉得好笑的段子,”他说,“而且我认为它们永远也讲不出来。”一位来自青年倡导组织“青年联盟”的二十二岁女性说,自从开始使用人工智能,她觉得自己“脑细胞都变少了”。和我在亲人类大会上交谈的许多人一样,她似乎在摸索一套新的词汇——一套能够捕捉她所感受到的那种迫在眉睫的精神破产的词汇。

Even people with political affiliations spoke in a more expansive and less wonky register. Joe Allen, until recently the “transhumanism editor” on Steve Bannon’s “War Room” podcast, told me in a resonant Southern accent that “the satanic mechanical beast” makes “the world uglier” and enables “cognitive offloading.” The Lutheran Reverend Rob Rose, assistant to the Bishop of Florida, used even more dramatic language: though he emphasized that A.I. had legitimate uses, he told me that students who use it to write papers may be depriving themselves of the chance to exercise their mental faculties and thereby “robbing” themselves “of intrinsic value as a creation of God.”

即便是带有政治立场的人,也以更开阔、更少技术官僚腔调的方式表达。乔·艾伦,直到最近还是史蒂夫·班农“作战室”播客的“超人类主义编辑”,用洪亮的南方口音告诉我,“撒旦的机械野兽”让“世界变得更丑陋”,并助长了“认知卸载”。路德宗牧师罗布·罗斯,佛罗里达主教的助理,使用了更为戏剧化的语言:尽管他强调人工智能有正当用途,但他告诉我,用人工智能写论文的学生可能剥夺了自己锻炼心智能力的机会,从而“剥夺”了自己“作为上帝造物的内在价值”。

During his speech, Bores announced a new initiative to push Democrats to regulate the A.I. industry, and a week later Sanders, along with fellow Pro-Human Assembly speaker, Texas Democratic congressman Greg Casar, introduced an act that would “ban artificial superintelligence.” But surprisingly few of the people I talked with mentioned Silicon Valley at all: Jennifer Frey, a Catholic philosopher at the University of Virginia who had spoken on a panel of religious figures, told me that it was important to her “to focus the conversation on those issues that religious leaders could speak most authoritatively about, such as what is distinctive and precious about human intelligence, and what threats A.I., A.G.I, and A.S.I. pose to the inner, spiritual lives of the human person.” She added, “We’ve heard so much about the threats to our external freedoms—job displacement, the consolidation of wealth and power—but to my mind our religious leaders need to pay attention to how A.I. might disrupt or weaken our spiritual capacities.”

博雷斯在演讲中宣布了一项新倡议,推动民主党人监管人工智能行业。一周后,桑德斯与亲人类大会的另一位演讲者、得克萨斯州民主党众议员格雷格·卡萨尔共同提出一项法案,将“禁止人工超级智能”。但令人惊讶的是,与我交谈的人中很少有人提到硅谷:弗吉尼亚大学天主教哲学家詹妮弗·弗雷曾在宗教人士专题讨论小组上发言,她告诉我,对她来说重要的是“把对话聚焦在宗教领袖最有权威发言的那些议题上,比如人类智能的独特性和珍贵性,以及人工智能、通用人工智能和超级人工智能对人类内在精神生活构成的威胁。”她补充道:“我们听到了太多关于外部自由威胁的讨论——工作岗位流失、财富和权力的集中——但在我看来,我们的宗教领袖需要关注人工智能可能如何扰乱或削弱我们的精神能力。”

In the lobby, I ran into a friend, Ari Schulman, an erstwhile computer scientist and A.I. engineer who defected to edit the tech-skeptical magazine The New Atlantis. When I asked him what he thought of policy solutions to the problems with A.I., he was pessimistic. “I think that this is the same mistake that the left made with social media,” he said, alluding to Biden-era efforts to break up tech monopolies. “They made it all about billionaires and antitrust, as if you could just get better, nicer people to be in charge of the tech companies and maybe make Facebook three products instead of just one product, and then it would be fine. But, no, this was just evil, bad technology. The problem was the technology.”

在大堂里,我偶遇了一位朋友阿里·舒尔曼,他曾是计算机科学家和人工智能工程师,后来转行主编科技怀疑论杂志《新亚特兰蒂斯》。当我问他对人工智能问题的政策解决方案有何看法时,他态度悲观。“我认为这和左派在社交媒体问题上犯的错误一样,”他说,暗指拜登时代拆分科技垄断企业的努力。“他们把一切都归结为亿万富翁和反垄断,好像只要让更好、更善良的人来掌管科技公司,也许把脸书拆成三个产品而不是一个,就万事大吉了。但不,这本来就是邪恶的、糟糕的技术。问题出在技术上。”

“The problem was the technology”: if there was a refrain that seemed to connect all the disparate grievances I heard at the assembly, this was it. The various pro-humans were not only alarmed by the differentials in wealth and power that A.I. has consolidated and reinforced, the noise pollution that data centers emit, and the dismaying prospect of human extinction (though these difficulties concerned them, too). They were also worried about what would happen in the best-case scenario, if the technology worked as planned.

“问题出在技术上”:如果说有什么主旋律能串联起我在大会上听到的各种不同怨言,那就是这句话。形形色色的亲人类人士不仅对人工智能所巩固和强化的财富与权力差距、数据中心排放的噪音污染、以及人类灭绝的可怕前景感到警觉(尽管这些难题同样令他们忧虑)。他们同样担忧的是,在最好的情况下——如果这项技术按计划正常运行——会发生什么。

According to Sun and other commentators who have embraced the term “A.I. populism,” A.I. is reviled primarily because it is a manifestation of a political system that serves the few at the expense of the many. After a recent reporting trip to the Midwest, where fights over data centers are roiling, Sun summed up her position succinctly: “AI populism is more about populism than about AI.” And there’s something to this theory: the backlash against L.L.M.s is continuous, at points, with more general populist backlash. But it is also continuous, perhaps even more so, with a long tradition of tech-skepticism. The anxieties that I heard voiced in D.C. echoed the anxieties I’d heard, over and over, in the course of recent conversations with other members of the emerging anti-A.I. coalition, a group that includes teachers, doctors, young people, labor organizers, artists, and religious communities.

根据孙和其他接受“人工智能民粹主义”这一术语的评论者的说法,人工智能之所以遭到憎恶,主要是因为它是一个以牺牲多数人利益来服务少数人的政治体制的体现。孙最近去中西部进行了一次报道之旅,那里的数据中心之争正闹得沸沸扬扬。之后她简洁地总结了自己的立场:“人工智能民粹主义更多的是关于民粹主义,而不是关于人工智能。”这个理论有一定道理:对大语言模型的反弹在某些节点上与更广泛的民粹主义反弹是连续的。但它同样——或许更加——与悠久的科技怀疑论传统一脉相承。我在华盛顿听到的焦虑,呼应了我在最近与新兴反人工智能联盟其他成员——包括教师、医生、年轻人、劳工组织者、艺术家和宗教团体——的对话中反复听到的焦虑。

When I spoke to a range of A.I. critics in the weeks before the Pro-Human Assembly, I learned that many of them had as much in common with—and, indeed, were, themselves—parents agitating to keep screens out of the classroom, and with the growing number of Americans eschewing smartphones, as they did with the resentful nihilists whom Sun describes.

在亲人类大会召开前几周,我与一系列人工智能批评者交谈时了解到,他们中许多人与那些推动屏幕远离课堂的家长、与越来越多弃用智能手机的美国人有着很多共同点——事实上,他们本身就是这些人——其共同之处不亚于他们与孙所描述的那些充满怨恨的虚无主义者之间的共同点。

“Let’s say there’s a world or time line I exist in where A.I. has been subject to regulation. It is ethical. It has no footprint environmentally,” the novelist Jeff VanderMeer, a prominent critic of A.I., told me over the phone. “With those guardrails in place, would I read an A.I. book? All I can say is no. And the reason is, in part, because I want to read something coming from a particular mind.” Using A.I., he said, “feels like a betrayal of the whole point of why you’re a writer.”

“假设存在一个我身处其中的世界或时间线,在那里人工智能受到了监管。它是合乎伦理的。它没有环境足迹,”著名人工智能批评者、小说家杰夫·范德米尔在电话中告诉我。“在这些护栏到位的情况下,我会读一本人工智能写的书吗?我只能说不。原因之一是,我想读到来自一个特定心灵的东西。”使用人工智能,他说,“感觉像是对你身为作家这一根本意义的背叛。”

Perhaps it’s unsurprising that some of the richest critiques of A.I. have come from artists and religious leaders, both types whose professions oblige them to become comfortable with the sort of philosophical language that the political establishment tends to avoid. Many of the people I called were interested in what a flourishing human life looks like, and in how A.I. alters the texture of daily experience. Michael Grayston, a pastor with a congregation in Austin, whom I called after discovering his writing about A.I. and faith, told me that he is wary of the technology on theological grounds. When God created us, “He created us with a need for other people”—a need that chatbots can convince us they are fulfilling but which they can never truly fulfill. The Catholic commentator Marc Barnes, who has argued persuasively that speaking to a chatbot is a sin, made a similar point: A.I. chatbots are a “simulation of the human person” that appears to afford the sort of communion that humans are called upon by God to enact, when in fact it affords only a hollow facsimile.

也许不足为奇的是,对人工智能最深刻的一些批判来自艺术家和宗教领袖,这两类人的职业都要求他们习惯于使用政治建制派倾向于回避的那种哲学语言。我致电的许多人感兴趣的是:一个蓬勃发展的人生是什么样子,以及人工智能如何改变日常经验的质地。迈克尔·格雷斯顿是奥斯汀一位牧师,我在发现他关于人工智能与信仰的文章后给他打了电话。他告诉我,他基于神学理由对这项技术保持警惕。上帝创造我们时,“他创造我们时就赋予了我们对他人的需要”——聊天机器人可以说服我们相信它们在满足这种需要,但它们永远无法真正满足。天主教评论员马克·巴恩斯曾有力地论证与聊天机器人交谈是一种罪,他提出了类似的观点:人工智能聊天机器人是“对人的模拟”,表面上提供了上帝召唤人类去践行的那种共融,但实际上提供的只是一个空洞的仿制品。

This is not A.I. populism, as Sun describes it, so much as anti-A.I. humanism; its champions worry about what would be left if human pursuits became pointless. I was struck by how many A.I. skeptics converged on the same formulation: what is this activity for? When I called Lila Byock, a mother of two and the founder of Schools Beyond Screens, a coalition fighting the influence of big tech in schools, she said, “I think that we just need to ask ourselves, like, what is school for? What is education for? One of the really basic problems with using A.I. in education is that it is designed to make tasks easier and to reduce friction, and friction is how learning happens.”

这不是孙所描述的人工智能民粹主义,而更像是反人工智能的人文主义;其倡导者担忧的是,如果人类的各种追求变得毫无意义,还会剩下什么。令我印象深刻的是,如此多的人工智能怀疑论者不约而同地使用了同一个表述:这项活动是为了什么?当我致电莉拉·拜奥克——两个孩子的母亲、“屏幕之外的学校”创始人,该联盟致力于抵制大型科技公司对学校的影响——她说:“我认为我们只需要问问自己,学校是为了什么?教育是为了什么?在教育中使用人工智能的一个非常基本的问题是,它被设计用来让任务变得更容易、减少摩擦,而摩擦正是学习发生的方式。”

Jenny Trinitapoli, a sociologist at the University of Chicago and one of the architects of a policy restricting A.I. and devices in the Social Sciences Core classes there, echoed Byock almost exactly. She explained that she and her colleagues regarded the A.I. rules as an opportunity to “make a positive statement about, What are we doing in these small seminar courses? What are they for? And they’re not just for graduation, right? They’re for the habits of mind that our students are going to have for the rest of their lives.” Or, as Barnes, the Catholic commentator, put it: “What, really, do I want? What really makes me happy? What is a good, flourishing life?”

芝加哥大学社会学家珍妮·特里尼塔波利是该校社会科学核心课程限制人工智能和电子设备政策的制定者之一,她的说法与拜奥克几乎完全一致。她解释说,她和同事们将人工智能规则视为一个机会,可以“就我们在这些小型研讨课上做什么做出一个积极的声明。它们是为了什么?它们不只是为了毕业,对吧?它们是为了我们的学生将在余生中拥有的思维习惯。”或者,正如天主教评论员巴恩斯所说:“我真正想要的是什么?什么真正让我快乐?什么是好的、蓬勃发展的人生?”

That A.I. raises such fundamental questions—that it threatens our moral agency and faculties of self-definition—may go some ways toward explaining why young people, on the whole, are more skeptical of the technology than their elders: not only because they occupy a more vulnerable position in the job market but because they have not yet had the opportunity to become who they are, to paraphrase Nietzsche. Owen Yingling, a senior studying philosophy at the University of Chicago, told me that he and his peers fear that A.I. will prevent them from growing into full-fledged human beings. “I see people’s parents, my parents . . . they love all the things they can do with A.I., because these are people who are fifty, sixty years old, who have already lived lives, have already become the person that they are,” he said. “But for us, because we haven’t done anything or become anyone, it’s a sort of existential threat.”

人工智能引发如此根本性的问题——它威胁到我们的道德能动性和自我定义的能力——这或许在一定程度上解释了为什么年轻人总体上比长辈更怀疑这项技术:不仅因为他们在就业市场中处于更脆弱的位置,而且因为他们还没有机会成为自己,套用尼采的话说。芝加哥大学哲学专业大四学生欧文·英林告诉我,他和同龄人担心人工智能会阻止他们成长为完整的人。“我看到别人的父母,我的父母……他们喜欢用人工智能做各种事情,因为这些人已经五六十岁了,已经活过了一生,已经成为了他们自己,”他说。“但对我们来说,因为我们还没有做过任何事,还没有成为任何人,这是一种存在性威胁。”

Dario Amodei, the C.E.O. of Anthropic, characterized the threat somewhat differently. “I do agree that the public has a negative view of AI,” he wrote on X, last month. “I think it is fundamentally a crisis of trust. I think that ordinary people don’t trust companies, governments, or the tech industry.” It is easy to see why the C.E.O.s of A.I. companies might promote this theory. Mistrust is a familiar force in American public life. Both A.I. populism and A.I. doomerism are, in their own ways, politics as usual. They correspond to two well-established modes of discourse—the one of white papers and probability distributions, the other of spirited (and justified) calls for redistribution. But if people hate A.I. because it is at odds with their vision of the good life—because they see it as fundamentally anti-human—then the existing categories won’t suffice. A new vocabulary is required to describe what is shaping up to be an unprecedented political movement, one focussed on questions outside the bounds of traditional public discourse.

Anthropic首席执行官达里奥·阿莫代伊对这一威胁的描述有所不同。“我确实同意公众对人工智能持负面看法,”他上个月在X上写道。“我认为这从根本上是一场信任危机。我认为普通人不信任公司、政府或科技行业。”不难理解为什么人工智能公司的首席执行官们会推广这种理论。不信任是美国公共生活中一股熟悉的力量。人工智能民粹主义和人工智能末日论各自以其方式,都是常规政治。它们对应着两种根深蒂固的话语模式——一种是白皮书和概率分布式的,另一种是激昂的(且有充分理由的)再分配呼吁。但如果人们憎恨人工智能是因为它与他们对美好生活的愿景相冲突——因为他们认为它从根本上反人类——那么现有的范畴就不够了。需要一套新的词汇来描述这场正在成形的前所未有的政治运动,一场聚焦于传统公共话语边界之外问题的运动。

In one way or another, everyone I spoke with at the Pro-Human Assembly and on the phone was expressing something that American politics, in its more recognizable guises, cannot quite wrap its arms around—a vision of what they thought a human life was for. What, after all, will we do when A.I. frees us from doing our jobs and thinking our thoughts and, ultimately, leading our lives? Use more A.I. so that we can use our newfound free time to—use more A.I.? The result is a kind of Ponzi scheme that bottoms out in nothing. Staving off the A.I. apocalypse can only matter if there is something, anything, worth preserving. Who cares if we are alchemized into paper clips if we have become spiritual paper clips already? ♦

以这样或那样的方式,我在亲人类大会上以及电话中交谈的每个人,都在表达某种美国政治在其更常见的形态中无法真正拥抱的东西——一种关于人生究竟为了什么的愿景。归根结底,当人工智能把我们从工作中、从思考中、最终从生活中解放出来之后,我们该怎么办?用更多的人工智能,好让我们利用新获得的空闲时间去——用更多的人工智能?结果是一种最终归零的庞氏骗局。只有存在某种值得保存的东西——任何东西——阻止人工智能末日才有意义。如果我们已经变成了精神上的回形针,谁还在乎我们是否被炼金术般地变成真正的回形针呢? ♦

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