Q. & A.

The Growing Rift Between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E.

沙特与阿联酋渐行渐远
What this shocking split might mean for the future of the Middle East.
这一令人震惊的分裂,对中东的未来意味着什么。
Mohammad bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan
Photograph by Abaca Press / Sipa / AP

In the years after he was named the deputy crown prince of Saudi Arabia, in 2015, Mohammed bin Salman—known informally as M.B.S.—has accumulated remarkable power in the country. (He became crown prince in 2017.) Saudi Arabia, under his de-facto leadership, embarked on a military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, temporarily kidnapped the Prime Minister of Lebanon, and blockaded Qatar. Many of these actions were part of a campaign to isolate Iran, whose Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, M.B.S. referred to in 2017 as “the new Hitler.” While conducting his aggressive foreign policy, M.B.S. had a close ally: Mohamed bin Zayed, the President of the United Arab Emirates. “M.B.Z. saw M.B.S. as a younger version of himself: smart, energetic, and eager to confront enemies,” Dexter Filkins reported for this magazine in 2018.

2015年,穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(Mohammed bin Salman,常被简称为M.B.S.)被任命为沙特阿拉伯副王储。此后数年,他在国内积累了惊人的权力(他于2017年成为王储)。在他的实际领导下,沙特对也门的胡塞武装发动了军事行动,一度绑架了黎巴嫩总理,并对卡塔尔实施了封锁。这些行动大多旨在孤立伊朗——2017年,M.B.S.曾将伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊(Ayatollah Ali Khamenei)称为“新希特勒”。在推行强硬外交政策期间,M.B.S.拥有一位亲密盟友:阿拉伯联合酋长国总统穆罕默德·本·扎耶德(Mohamed bin Zayed)。本刊记者德克斯特·菲尔金斯(Dexter Filkins)在2018年的报道中写道:“M.B.Z.将M.B.S.视为年轻版的自己:聪慧、充满活力,且渴望直面敌人。”

In the past few months, however, things have changed. The alliance that promised to reshape the Middle East has collapsed into acrimony, with Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. on different sides of violent conflicts in Yemen and in Sudan. The two countries are increasingly competing for economic opportunities in the region, while Saudi Arabia sees the U.A.E. as too willing to ally with Israel, and the U.A.E. seems resentful of Saudi Arabia’s power.

然而,过去几个月情况发生了变化。这个曾承诺重塑中东格局的联盟已陷入激烈争执,沙特阿拉伯与阿联酋在也门和苏丹的暴力冲突中分处对立阵营。两国在该地区的经济机遇争夺日益加剧,沙特认为阿联酋过于热衷与以色列结盟,而阿联酋似乎对沙特的强势心怀不满。

I recently spoke by phone with Kristian Ulrichsen, the author of “The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics and Policy-Making” and a fellow for the Middle East at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed what’s really behind the rift in this once strong alliance, what’s driving the U.A.E.’s catastrophic intervention in Sudan, and how the Trump Administration’s transactional approach to foreign policy may exacerbate the rivalry between the two countries.

我最近与克里斯蒂安·乌尔里克森(Kristian Ulrichsen)通了电话。他是《阿拉伯联合酋长国:权力、政治与政策制定》一书的作者,也是莱斯大学贝克公共政策研究所的中东研究员。在我们的对话中(为简洁清晰起见,内容经过编辑),我们探讨了:这个曾经牢固的联盟出现裂痕的真正原因是什么?是什么驱使阿联酋在苏丹进行灾难性的干预?以及特朗普政府交易式的外交政策方式可能会如何加剧两国间的对抗。

Why has a falling out occurred over the past several months?

过去几个月为何关系破裂?

The trigger was in early December when the U.A.E.-backed forces in Yemen, especially the separatist Southern Transitional Council, moved into two provinces of eastern Yemen and upended the fragile balance of power in Yemen. The Saudis saw this as highly provocative, as unhelpful to the anti-Houthi coalition in Yemen, and as a threat, because of the Yemeni-Saudi border, to Saudi security. And the U.A.E.’s initial advance was also on the same day Gulf leaders were meeting in Bahrain. So, in Riyadh, it was seen as a major provocation that a close ally, such as the U.A.E., would green-light an advance that was seen as so antithetical to Saudi interests.

导火索是十二月初,阿联酋支持的也门武装力量——特别是分离主义的南方过渡委员会——挺进也门东部两省,打破了也门脆弱的权力平衡。沙特方面认为此举极具挑衅性,既不利于也门的反胡塞联盟,又因也门与沙特接壤的边境而对沙特安全构成威胁。更关键的是,阿联酋的这次推进行动,恰逢海湾国家领导人正在巴林举行会议。因此在利雅得看来,作为亲密盟友的阿联酋竟批准了这场与沙特利益背道而驰的军事行动,无疑是重大挑衅。

The U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia were initially part of the same anti-Houthi alliance, as the Houthis were seen as a proxy for Iran, a regional rival for both countries. The war itself has been disastrous for Yemenis, but the thinking was that, broadly speaking, the two countries were aligned on that front.

阿联酋和沙特最初同属反胡塞联盟,因为胡塞武装被视为伊朗的代理人,而伊朗是这两个国家的地区竞争对手。这场战争本身对也门人民来说是灾难性的,但大体而言,两国在这条战线上曾被认为立场一致。

Well, they both went into Yemen together in March, 2015. It was M.B.S.’s first major foreign-policy move after becoming minister of defense in January of that year. Initially, there was coördination between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, especially between M.B.S. and M.B.Z., but gradually they began to diverge as Saudi forces became bogged down fighting the Houthis, while the U.A.E. was much more successful in pushing back the Houthis and reclaiming territory from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. So the U.A.E. felt like it had accomplished its mission.

2015年3月,两国共同出兵也门。这是穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(M.B.S.)在当年1月出任国防大臣后的首次重大外交政策行动。起初,利雅得与阿布扎比之间——尤其是M.B.S.与阿联酋实际掌权者穆罕默德·本·扎耶德(M.B.Z.)之间——保持着密切协调。但随着沙特军队深陷与胡塞武装的缠斗,而阿联酋在击退胡塞武装、从阿拉伯半岛基地组织手中收复失地方面成效显著,两国战略逐渐产生分歧。阿联酋由此认为自身已达成战略目标。

Meanwhile, the U.A.E. was coming under a lot of political pressure from the United States, and other parts of the world, about its tactics in the war. So in July, 2019, the U.A.E. announced that it was redeploying its forces, and it pulled back from the anti-Houthi battle lines in central Yemen, and switched to supporting militias and other groups on the ground, especially in southern Yemen, to insure access to a network of ports and maritime access on the Red Sea, on both sides of the Yemen-Africa coastline. Then, in 2022, a truce was reached between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, which has more or less held for the past four or five years. Since then, the conflict in Yemen has been almost frozen, which made the S.T.C.’s November advance so surprising. Nobody saw it coming. And the issue of why the U.A.E. or the S.T.C. would’ve wanted to reignite the advance is probably something that the Saudis are trying to get to the bottom of. There have been reports that the U.A.E. felt that, when M.B.S. was visiting the White House in mid-November, he should not have raised the issue of the Sudanese civil war with President Trump, in which the U.A.E. has been backing a non-state militia group, the Rapid Support Forces.

与此同时,阿联酋因其在战争中的策略而受到来自美国及世界其他地区的巨大政治压力。于是,2019年7月,阿联酋宣布重新部署其部队,从也门中部的反胡塞武装战线撤出,转而支持当地民兵和其他组织,尤其是在也门南部,以确保其能够进入红海沿岸、也门与非洲海岸线两侧的港口网络和海上通道。随后在2022年,胡塞武装与沙特领导的联盟达成停火协议,过去四五年间大体维持了这一局面。自那时起,也门冲突几乎陷入停滞,这使得南方过渡委员会在11月的推进行动显得尤为出人意料。无人预料到这一动向。至于阿联酋或南方过渡委员会为何希望重新点燃战火,这很可能是沙特方面正试图查明的问题。有报道称,阿联酋认为,当穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(M.B.S.)于11月中旬访问白宫时,本不应向特朗普总统提及苏丹内战问题——在这场内战中,阿联酋一直支持非国家民兵组织“快速支援部队”。

I want to turn to Sudan in a minute, but it does feel that, in Yemen and across the region, Saudi Arabia has acted incredibly aggressively over the past decade. Now something seems to have switched, and the U.A.E. seems more aggressive. What changed?

稍后我想谈谈苏丹的情况。但确实感觉过去十年间,沙特阿拉伯在也门乃至整个地区的行动都极具侵略性。如今形势似乎发生了转变,阿联酋反而显得更为强势。这种变化因何而起?

Between 2015 and about 2019, you had an alignment between the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia, between M.B.Z. and M.B.S. They were both much more interventionist and assertive, even aggressive, in their regional policies. This was after the Arab Spring. They felt that they had to be forceful in trying to push what they saw as countries that they saw supporting movements of change. Turkey and Qatar were examples. And the Saudis and Emiratis really wanted to limit radical change. And so they went into Yemen together in March, 2015. They intervened or they came together with the blockades of Qatar in 2017, orchestrating a blockade which lasted until January, 2021. And the Saudis intervened in Lebanon’s political affairs in November, 2017, holding the Lebanese Prime Minister hostage until he announced his resignation. So the Saudis were willing to intervene to project their interests across the region, and they were on the same page as the U.A.E. in many of these cases.

2015年至2019年前后,阿联酋与沙特阿拉伯之间、穆罕默德·本·扎耶德(M.B.Z.)与穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(M.B.S.)之间形成了政策同盟。在阿拉伯之春后的地区政策中,两国都展现出更强硬的干预主义姿态,甚至称得上激进。他们认为必须采取强硬手段,遏制那些在他们看来支持变革运动的国家——土耳其与卡塔尔便是例证。沙特与阿联酋实质上希望遏制激进变革。因此两国于2015年3月共同出兵也门;2017年又联手对卡塔尔实施封锁,这场持续至2021年1月的封锁行动由两国共同策划;同年11月,沙特更介入黎巴嫩政治事务,将黎巴嫩总理软禁至其宣布辞职。由此可见,沙特愿意通过干预手段在整个地区投射其利益,而在多数情况下,阿联酋都与沙特立场一致。

But what changed was the missile and drone attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure in September, 2019, which were assumed to be perpetrated by, but were never formally attributed to, Iran. And President Trump did nothing in response. He actually said, a couple of days after the attacks, “That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that wasn’t an attack on us.” And that sent shock waves through Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The Saudis began to pull back immediately. They began to realize that they were perhaps on their own much more than they had thought. And so, in the twenty-twenties, they began to de-escalate tensions with Iran, improve ties with Turkey to reduce sources of geopolitical risk, and focus on internal issues and economic growth.

但真正的转折点出现在2019年9月,当时沙特石油设施遭到导弹和无人机袭击。外界普遍认为袭击者是伊朗,但始终没有正式定论。而特朗普总统对此毫无反应。袭击发生几天后,他竟公开表示:“那是针对沙特的袭击,并非针对美国。”这番话在利雅得和阿布扎比引发震动。沙特方面立即开始收缩战线,他们逐渐意识到自己的处境可能比预想中更为孤立。于是进入2020年代后,沙特开始主动缓和与伊朗的紧张关系,改善与土耳其的往来以降低地缘政治风险,并将重心转向国内事务与经济发展。

Meanwhile, the U.A.E. was still much more willing to take risks, including by identifying and backing sub-state networks in countries without functioning state institutions that could better support security and governance on the ground. That’s where that divergence really grew throughout the twenty-twenties.

与此同时,阿联酋仍更愿意承担风险,包括在那些缺乏有效国家机构的国家识别并支持次国家网络,这些网络能更好地在当地提供安全与治理支持。这正是整个2020年代双方分歧真正扩大的领域。

And I assume you view Yemen as an example of this.

我想,在你看来,也门正是这一点的例证。

Yes. The Saudis feel that there has been a fragile but stable balance of power in Yemen since 2023, and that these moves by the U.A.E., or by the U.A.E.-backed S.T.C., are disruptive and unnecessary and threaten that balance of power.

是的。沙特方面认为,自2023年以来也门已形成脆弱但稳定的力量平衡,而阿联酋或阿联酋支持的南方过渡委员会(S.T.C.)采取的行动具有破坏性且毫无必要,正威胁着这种平衡。

You brought up M.B.S.’s visit to the White House in November, where he reportedly suggested sanctions against the U.A.E. Now we have a propaganda war on each side, with real anger from people in both governments, expressed on social media and elsewhere. I get that the two countries have different visions for the region, but does it seem like, given the speed with which this has spiralled out of control, there’s a deeper anger here?

你提到了穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(M.B.S.)去年十一月访问白宫的事,据说他当时建议对阿联酋实施制裁。如今双方已展开宣传战,两国政府内部都涌动着真实的愤怒情绪,并通过社交媒体等渠道表达出来。我理解两国对地区发展有着不同愿景,但鉴于局势失控的速度如此之快,这是否意味着背后存在着更深层的愤怒?

I think this animosity is part of each side trying to insure their narrative is the one that wins out, especially vis-à-vis the Trump Administration. Clearly, what M.B.S. may or may not have said during his visit to the White House in November, and whether or not it was taken as an attack by the U.A.E., rather than just a call for sanctions on the R.S.F., is a matter of fierce debate on both sides. It could be that perceptions have been driving the respective responses to a large extent, as each side seems to believe what it wants to hear. And yes, the depth of feeling is indicative of much deeper issues at play. In Yemen especially, these splits have been increasing for years as the two countries approached the conflict in different ways, but both sides decided to ignore the ramifications of their different approaches, and now they’ve become too big to ignore.

我认为这种敌意源于双方都试图确保自己的叙事能够胜出,尤其是在面对特朗普政府时。显然,穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(M.B.S.)去年11月访问白宫期间可能说过或没说过什么,以及阿联酋是否将其视为攻击而非仅仅是对快速支援部队(R.S.F.)的制裁呼吁,在双方间都引发了激烈争论。很大程度上,可能是各自的认知在驱动着双方的反应,因为每一方似乎都只相信自己愿意听到的内容。是的,这种强烈的情感表明背后存在着更深层的问题。尤其是在也门,多年来随着两国以不同方式介入冲突,这些分歧一直在加剧,但双方都选择忽视不同策略带来的后果,如今这些裂痕已大到无法再被忽视。

In terms of economics and investments, the Saudis are having difficulties in attracting foreign investment. They’ve been forced to scale back on some projects. And they’re trying to move into some of the economic sectors, like travel, tourism, and entertainment, that the U.A.E. has had a twenty- to twenty-five-year head start in. So there’s increasing economic competition between the countries as well, which is part of the backdrop to this rivalry, even though, at this point, it’s more economic and security-focussed, and isn’t yet a political rupture like the one during the blockade of Qatar in 2017.

在经济和投资领域,沙特在吸引外资方面遇到了困难,不得不缩减部分项目。他们正试图进军阿联酋已领先二十到二十五年的经济领域,如旅游、娱乐等。因此两国间的经济竞争也在加剧,这构成了当前竞争关系的背景之一——尽管目前竞争主要集中在经济和安全领域,尚未演变成2017年卡塔尔遭封锁时那样的政治决裂。

How do you think competing for the favor of the Trump Administration, which is uninterested in human rights and very interested in economic investments, changes the rivalry? There has been reporting about the U.A.E. buying huge stakes in a Trump family company.

在特朗普政府对人权漠不关心、却对经济投资兴致盎然的背景下,各国竞相争取其青睐的行为,将如何改变这场博弈?已有报道指出,阿联酋曾购入特朗普家族企业的大量股份。

I think Trump’s transactional approach to governing and policymaking has definitely created opportunities for the Gulf states, and both the Saudis and the Emiratis have made the most of those opportunities. In 2017, they felt that they had a once-in-a-generation chance to achieve their objectives vis-à-vis Qatar by enlisting Trump’s support. And after Trump was inaugurated in 2025, both countries reached out straight away with promises of investments, both in Trump-aligned companies and in bilateral investments. Both countries made separate pledges about investing in the U.S. economy. But they’ve done it separately. So they’re competing, I think, for the ear of the White House. Trump went to both Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi in May, last year. We’ve also seen the U.A.E. take the lead in A.I. over the past four or five years. In that sector, the Saudis are playing catch-up. So these things are all part of that competitive rivalry we see playing out, which now has much more of an edge to it than it did in the past.

我认为特朗普那种交易式的执政与决策方式,确实为海湾国家创造了机会,沙特和阿联酋都充分利用了这些机会。2017年,他们觉得借助特朗普的支持来对付卡塔尔,是千载难逢的良机。而2025年特朗普就职后,两国立即主动示好,承诺向亲特朗普的企业及双边投资项目注资。两国还分别就投资美国经济作出承诺。但他们是各自行动的。所以我认为,他们是在竞争白宫的青睐。去年五月,特朗普先后访问了沙特和阿布扎比。过去四五年间,我们也看到阿联酋在人工智能领域占据领先地位,沙特则处于追赶状态。这些现象都是两国竞争态势的组成部分,而如今的竞争火药味远比过去浓烈。

Let’s turn to the U.A.E. specifically. We don’t know how many hundreds of thousands of people have died in Sudan, but the U.A.E.-backed R.S.F. seems to be the most brutal actor among many in this conflict. Have you been surprised by the U.A.E.’s enduring support for the R.S.F., despite the bloodshed?

我们具体谈谈阿联酋。我们不知道苏丹已有多少数十万人丧生,但阿联酋支持的快速支援部队似乎是这场冲突中最残暴的角色之一。尽管血流成河,阿联酋对快速支援部队的持续支持是否令您感到意外?

I have been surprised by the fact that international criticism, even condemnation, of the R.S.F., and its pretty well-documented links to the U.A.E., including transfers of weapons under the guise of humanitarian support, hasn’t forced the U.A.E. to backtrack or to compromise its support. The U.A.E., in a way, has doubled down on the support for the R.S.F., and that, I think, has been a surprise. If you think back to Yemen in 2018, international criticism did ultimately lead to a change in approach. In Sudan, if anything has happened, it is that the atrocities committed by the R.S.F. have gotten worse. It may be that Abu Dhabi is now so entrenched and feels very defensive, even isolated in the region, that it has decided to double down on its support for the R.S.F., regardless of international criticism.

令我惊讶的是,国际社会对快速支援部队(R.S.F.)的批评乃至谴责——包括其与阿联酋(U.A.E.)之间证据确凿的联系,以及以人道主义援助为幌子的武器输送——并未迫使阿联酋退缩或调整其支持立场。某种程度上,阿联酋反而加强了对快速支援部队的支持,这在我看来确实出人意料。回想2018年的也门,国际批评最终确实导致了策略转变。而在苏丹,实际情况是快速支援部队犯下的暴行愈演愈烈。或许阿布扎比如今已深陷其中,感到自身处于守势甚至在该地区陷入孤立,因而决定不顾国际批评,加倍押注对快速支援部队的支持。

Do you view the U.A.E.’s increasingly aggressive actions in the Middle East and Africa as having some strong ideological component, or is this more about projecting regional power and securing practical ends, like port access and other business interests? Because, when we go back to the period after the Arab Spring when this approach started, there was a sense that the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia were embarking on an ideological project that was in part about opposition to Iran, but also to a certain strain of Islamist politics, as represented by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Erdoğan in Turkey, etc.

您是否认为阿联酋在中东和非洲日益强势的行动具有强烈的意识形态色彩?抑或这更多是为了投射区域影响力、确保实际利益——比如港口准入和其他商业利益?若追溯至阿拉伯之春后这种策略开始形成的时期,当时确实存在一种认知:阿联酋与沙特阿拉伯正在启动一项意识形态工程,其中既包含对抗伊朗的成分,也针对特定流派的伊斯兰主义政治力量,例如埃及的穆斯林兄弟会、土耳其的埃尔多安政权等。

I think there’s a bit of both. For example, the U.A.E. has intervened heavily in Libya in the past decade, in part because the Qataris were supporting what the U.A.E. views as Islamist groups in western Libya. In response, the U.A.E. intervened in eastern Libya, backing an authoritarian strongman. And, starting with that decision, you now find links between Libya and Chad and Sudan that show the networks the U.A.E. has built up in the wider regional arena.

我认为两方面因素都有。以阿联酋为例,过去十年它深度介入利比亚局势,部分原因是卡塔尔支持阿联酋眼中的利比亚西部伊斯兰主义团体。作为回应,阿联酋介入利比亚东部,支持一位威权强人。正是从那个决定开始,你会发现利比亚与乍得、苏丹之间产生了联系,这展现出阿联酋在更广阔区域舞台上构建的关系网络。

The U.A.E. is one of the heaviest international investors in Africa. A lot of it is economic. There are heavy investments in renewable energy and infrastructure, for example, across the continent. But there is also that component of trying to push back against, as they see it, Islamist influence, by backing authoritarian strongmen who try to limit the spread of Islamist movements and groups. So there is a combination of both. And of course, in the U.A.E., Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed al-Nahyan is both the national-security adviser and the head of many of the country’s biggest investment groups. So you can very clearly see a link between security and investment in Emirati policy.

阿联酋是非洲最大的国际投资者之一。其中很多是经济投资。例如,阿联酋在整个非洲大陆对可再生能源和基础设施进行了大量投资。但还有一部分投资是为了抵制他们眼中的伊斯兰主义影响,具体方式是支持那些试图限制伊斯兰主义运动和团体传播的威权强人。所以这两者是结合在一起的。当然,在阿联酋,谢赫·塔赫农·本·扎耶德·阿勒纳哈扬既是国家安全顾问,又是该国许多最大投资集团的负责人。因此,你可以非常清楚地看到阿联酋政策中安全与投资之间的联系。

The Saudis were less rigid. They were more pragmatic in some ways. For example, in Yemen, the Saudis were willing to work with Islamists in southern Yemen, specifically, a group that is sort of the Yemeni offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, whereas the U.A.E. was adamantly opposed to working with them. Again, it goes back to risk calculations. M.B.Z. has a zero-tolerance approach to any form of political dissent. And, in that context, he believes that Islamist movements are the most likely form of political dissent. If you give them an opening, they will take more and more. And so he has a zero-tolerance approach, meant to deny them even an opening.

沙特方面则不那么死板。在某些方面,他们更为务实。例如,在也门,沙特愿意与南部的伊斯兰主义者合作,具体来说是与一个类似穆斯林兄弟会也门分支的团体合作,而阿联酋则坚决反对与他们合作。这又回到了风险计算的逻辑。穆罕默德·本·扎耶德对任何形式的政治异见采取零容忍态度。在他看来,伊斯兰主义运动是最可能出现的政治异见形式。一旦给予他们可乘之机,他们就会得寸进尺。因此,他采取零容忍策略,旨在连一丝机会都不给他们。

What do you make of the Saudis accusing the U.A.E. of becoming too close to Israel? Because, for a long time, it seemed that M.B.S. was the one hoping to get closer to Israel, and who wanted a normalization deal between the Saudis and the Israelis.

对于沙特指责阿联酋与以色列走得太近,你怎么看?毕竟长期以来,似乎一直是穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(MBS)在寻求与以色列拉近距离,并希望促成沙特与以色列的关系正常化协议。

Yeah, part of the Saudi propaganda campaign has been to play up the depths of ties between the U.A.E. and Israel, and to describe the U.A.E. and Israel as being the disruptors of regional politics today. And this is even though, as you say, before October 7th, the Saudis were in dialogue with the United States over the contours of a deal with Israel. M.B.S. said it himself in a Fox News interview in late September, 2023, about three weeks before October 7th, saying that they were getting close to what would be the biggest deal since the end of the Cold War. So there was definitely a feeling that a deal was doable. Whereas now, with everything that has happened in Gaza, the price for Saudi Arabia has risen. I think they still would like to eventually normalize, but they’re going to ask for a higher price to sell it domestically.

是的,沙特宣传策略的一部分,就是渲染阿联酋与以色列关系的深度,并将阿联酋和以色列描述为当今地区政治的颠覆者。然而,正如你所说,在10月7日之前,沙特其实正与美国就与以色列达成协议的框架进行对话。穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(M.B.S.)本人在2023年9月下旬——也就是10月7日的大约三周前——接受福克斯新闻采访时亲口说过,他们正在接近达成一项可能是冷战结束以来最重要的协议。所以当时确实有一种感觉,认为协议是可以达成的。而现在,随着加沙发生的一切,沙特要付出的代价已经升高。我认为他们最终仍希望实现关系正常化,但为了在国内能交代过去,他们会索要更高的价码。

Is Saudi Arabia more wary of domestic political pressure than the U.A.E. is?

沙特阿拉伯比阿联酋更警惕国内政治压力吗?

Saudi Arabia is much larger. There are more than twenty million Saudi citizens. It’s the home of the two holiest sites in Islam. There’s a religious element to Saudi policymaking as the guarantor of Mecca and Medina. So the Saudis are always more careful about how their policies are seen, both domestically and across the Arab and Muslim worlds. So they might lack the ability of the U.A.E., which has a much smaller population, to act decisively and fast, even though M.B.S. did a lot of decisive and fast actions at the beginning of his time as crown prince. But, again, there’s more of a caution in Saudi policymaking, especially when it comes to something as sensitive as diplomatic relations with Israel, which many Saudi citizens still, in opinion polls, do not seem too enthusiastic about.

沙特阿拉伯的体量要大得多。它有两千多万公民,拥有伊斯兰教两大圣地。作为麦加和麦地那的守护者,宗教因素影响着沙特的政策制定。因此,沙特在制定政策时总是更为审慎,既要顾及国内反应,也要考虑在整个阿拉伯和穆斯林世界的观感。尽管王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(Mohammed bin Salman)执政初期推行过许多雷厉风行的举措,但相比人口少得多的阿联酋,沙特可能确实缺乏那种果断迅速的行动力。归根结底,沙特的政策制定更为谨慎,尤其是在与以色列建交这类敏感议题上——民调显示,许多沙特民众对此似乎仍不太热衷。

You said that M.B.S. started becoming less aggressive in 2019, after Iran’s attack on Saudi oil fields. Do you think that the worldwide condemnation of Jamal Khashoggi’s murder, in 2018, had anything to do with it, too?

你提到,在伊朗袭击沙特油田后,穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(M.B.S.)自2019年起逐渐收敛锋芒。那么,2018年贾迈勒·卡舒吉(Jamal Khashoggi)遇害案引发的全球谴责,是否也对此产生了影响?

It did. It certainly brought initial plans for his so-called Vision 2030 to a halt. If you remember, M.B.S. spent several weeks in the United States in 2018, meeting former Presidents, being celebrated in Silicon Valley, and meeting all the tech titans. That all came to a shuddering halt after Khashoggi’s death. M.B.S. really became persona non grata in Western circles, up until, ironically, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Vladimir Putin’s isolation in 2022 led to the rehabilitation of M.B.S., as Western leaders realized that they had to deal with him whether they liked it or not.

确实如此。卡舒吉事件无疑让穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(M.B.S.)所谓的“2030愿景”初期计划陷入停滞。回想2018年,他曾在美国逗留数周,会晤多位前总统,在硅谷受到追捧,与所有科技巨头会面。而卡舒吉遇害后,这一切都戛然而止。颇具讽刺意味的是,直到2022年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰前,M.B.S.在西方世界几乎成了不受欢迎的人物。2022年普京陷入孤立,反而促成了M.B.S.的“复出”——西方领导人意识到,无论喜不喜欢,他们都不得不与这位沙特王储打交道。

Because of oil prices, you mean?

你指的是油价的原因吗?

Yes, because at the time, oil prices were rising, and the West wanted Saudi support in managing oil prices and output levels. Biden, of course, went to Saudi Arabia after this and fist-bumped M.B.S., after previously having said he had to be held accountable.

是的,因为当时油价正在上涨,西方希望沙特在管理油价和产量水平方面提供支持。拜登此前曾表示必须追究穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(Mohammed bin Salman)的责任,但之后还是去了沙特,并与他碰拳致意。

A lot of the early articles about M.B.S. and M.B.Z. focussed on a kind of mentorship that M.B.Z. supposedly provided. I’m curious if you think that kind of narrative was oversimplified, and if you think their falling out has anything to do with their personal dynamic.

早期关于穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(M.B.S.)与穆罕默德·本·扎耶德(M.B.Z.)的报道,大多聚焦于后者对前者所谓“导师式引领”。我很好奇,您是否认为这类叙事过于简化?而两人关系破裂,是否与他们之间的私人互动模式有关?

I’m not sure if there was ever a mentor-mentee relationship, but M.B.Z. is twenty-four years older than M.B.S., and I think M.B.Z. certainly saw in M.B.S. a version of himself, somebody who was willing to take risks (even if he’s less willing now), somebody who was willing to break eggs to make an omelette, and somebody who could see the bigger picture of economic reform. The U.A.E., like most of the other Gulf states, was concerned that with the advanced age of leadership in Saudi Arabia, and with multiple economic and social challenges building up, the Saudis needed a decisive transformation. They needed someone to really grasp the policymaking process. And in M.B.S. they found that person. Initially, M.B.Z. spent a lot of time in Western capitals talking him up. People in the West didn’t know who he was, and they weren’t sure whether to take him seriously. And M.B.Z. played a reassuring role in saying, “He’s the real deal.” So, at the beginning, he was important in establishing M.B.S.’s credibility.

我不确定他们之间是否存在过导师与门徒的关系,但穆罕默德·本·扎耶德(M.B.Z.)比穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(M.B.S.)年长二十四岁。我认为穆罕默德·本·扎耶德无疑在穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼身上看到了自己的影子——一个敢于冒险(即便如今冒险意愿有所减退)、不惜打破常规以成大事、且能洞见经济改革全局的人。与大多数海湾国家一样,阿联酋曾担忧沙特领导层高龄化,加之多重经济社会挑战不断累积,沙特亟需一场果断的变革。他们需要有人真正掌控政策制定的进程,而穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼正是他们找到的那个人。最初,穆罕默德·本·扎耶德花费大量时间在西方各国首都为他奔走宣传。西方政要当时并不熟悉穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼,也犹豫是否该认真对待他。穆罕默德·本·扎耶德此时扮演了稳定人心的角色,不断向外界强调:“他是真正能成事的人。”因此在初期,他为建立穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼的国际信誉发挥了重要作用。

I think the challenge was always that these are two headstrong characters. M.B.Z. is older, but M.B.S. is now the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, the regional leader in many ways. So I think there was always going to be a clash of character over who had the upper hand in the relationship. And we’re seeing that play out now, where neither one wants to be the one that backs down. ♦

我认为挑战始终在于,这两位都是性格强势的人物。穆罕默德·本·扎耶德(M.B.Z.)年长,但穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(M.B.S.)如今已是沙特王储,在许多方面堪称地区领袖。因此,双方在关系中谁占上风的问题上,性格冲突恐怕在所难免。而我们现在正目睹这种冲突的展开——谁也不愿成为先让步的那一方。♦

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