Q. & A.

The Gaza Peace Plan Has Gone Nowhere

加沙和平计划已无疾而终。
More than six months after the U.S.-negotiated ceasefire, Israel still controls more than half the territory in Gaza, and Hamas refuses to disarm.
在美国斡旋的停火协议达成六个多月后,以色列仍控制着加沙超过一半的领土,而哈马斯则拒绝解除武装。
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Photograph by Saher Alghorra / NYT / Redux

Seven months ago, Israel and Hamas reached an agreement for a ceasefire, largely ending the war in Gaza after two years of Israeli attacks and the deaths of more than seventy thousand Palestinians. The agreement, which was pushed on the Israeli government by the United States, involved a step-by-step process that would eventually lead to the disarmament of Hamas and the reconstruction of Gaza. These are still the things that the Trump Administration claims, via its Board of Peace, to want, but the situation remains unsettled, with Israel still striking the parts of Gaza that it does not control, killing more than seven hundred people since the ceasefire began. (Last weekend, three people were killed during an Israeli drone strike on a food-distribution center in Gaza.) Meanwhile, Hamas shows no signs that it plans to disarm.

七个月前,以色列与哈马斯达成停火协议,在历经两年以色列的军事打击、超过七万巴勒斯坦人丧生之后,加沙战争基本宣告结束。这份由美国施压以色列政府达成的协议,设定了分阶段推进的进程,最终目标是解除哈马斯武装并重建加沙。特朗普政府至今仍通过其“和平委员会”宣称要实现这些目标,但局势依然动荡不安——以色列持续轰炸其未控制的加沙地区,自停火以来已造成逾七百人死亡。(上周末,以色列无人机袭击加沙一处食品分发中心,导致三人丧生。)与此同时,哈马斯方面毫无解除武装的迹象。

I recently spoke by phone with Michael Milshtein, the head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at Tel Aviv University. Milshtein previously served as adviser to COGAT, which supervises civilian policy in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. He was also the head of the Department for Palestinian Affairs in the I.D.F.’s military-intelligence wing. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed the humanitarian situation in Gaza since the ceasefire, what a diminished Hamas is looking to accomplish, and whether the Israeli elections this fall could change the country’s policy in Gaza.

我近日与特拉维夫大学巴勒斯坦研究论坛负责人迈克尔·米尔施泰因(Michael Milshtein)进行了电话交谈。米尔施泰因曾担任以色列国防部驻巴勒斯坦领土政府活动协调处(COGAT)顾问,该机构负责监管约旦河西岸及加沙地带的民事政策。他还曾是以色列国防军军事情报局巴勒斯坦事务处处长。在本次经编辑整理以保持篇幅与清晰度的对话中,我们探讨了停火后加沙的人道主义局势、实力削弱的哈马斯(Hamas)试图实现的目标,以及今年秋季以色列大选是否会改变该国对加沙政策等问题。

How would you describe the situation on the ground in Gaza now, and what, if anything, has changed since the ceasefire began late last year?

你如何描述加沙地带当前的实地情况?自去年年底停火开始以来,有什么变化吗?

You know, nothing has changed. Since October, when the ceasefire started, we have been able to say one very clear thing, and this is that Hamas is the prominent player in Gaza. On the eve of the ceasefire, people spoke about how maybe there would be a kind of alternative government, or maybe Hamas would consider disarmament, or maybe even the Palestinian public would be more critical toward Hamas, and there would be protests against their rule. But right now Hamas has total control of the Palestinian side of Gaza. They control about forty per cent of the total territory of the Gaza Strip, which is the area that is not under Israeli control.

你知道吗,一切都没有改变。自十月停火开始以来,我们一直能明确地说出一件事:哈马斯是加沙的主导力量。停火前夕,人们还在谈论或许会出现某种替代政府,或者哈马斯可能会考虑解除武装,甚至巴勒斯坦民众会对哈马斯更加不满,并出现反对其统治的抗议活动。但如今,哈马斯完全控制了加沙的巴勒斯坦一侧。他们掌控了加沙地带约百分之四十的领土,也就是以色列未控制的区域。

And now we are stuck. There has been no progress on the second phase of the ceasefire, which was supposed to be about disarmament and governance and the reconstruction process. But there has been nothing.

如今我们陷入了僵局。停火协议的第二阶段——本应涉及解除武装、治理和重建进程——毫无进展,至今毫无动静。

And what I can say about Israel is that it is standing in front of a T-shaped junction, with two options. And while all options may be bad, we need to choose the least bad one. One of those options is the one that people in the government talk about every day, which is to renew the war, defeat Hamas, and maybe occupy all of Gaza. That’s what people like Bezalel Smotrich, the far-right finance minister, want. They want to resettle Gaza, and maybe to push the Palestinians out of Gaza. But this desire depends on Donald Trump, and I don’t see Donald Trump right now permitting such a dramatic move.

关于以色列,我只能说,它正站在一个丁字路口前,面前有两条路。虽然每条路都可能糟糕,但我们得选那条最不坏的。其中一条路,是政府里那些人天天挂在嘴边的——重启战事、击溃哈马斯,甚至可能占领整个加沙。这正是极右翼财政部长比撒列·斯莫特里赫(Bezalel Smotrich)那帮人想要的。他们想重新定居加沙,甚至可能把巴勒斯坦人赶出加沙。但这份野心得看唐纳德·特朗普的脸色,而眼下我看不出特朗普会允许如此激进的举动。

And the other option is actually to accept this idea of a more bureaucratic Palestinian government. It may not be ideal, and Hamas would still exist in this scenario, but it is better than the alternative of occupying Gaza.

而另一种选择,实际上是接受一个更为官僚化的巴勒斯坦政府这一构想。在这种情境下,哈马斯或许仍会存在,这并非理想状态,但总比占领加沙的替代方案要好。

Right, the second phase of the ceasefire envisioned not just the disarmament of Hamas but also the beginnings of a kind of more bureaucratic government that would empower different Palestinian factions to oversee governance in Gaza. And then, perhaps over time, Israel would allow more autonomy in the territory. Was that the idea?

没错,停火协议的第二阶段不仅设想了解除哈马斯的武装,还计划建立一个更具官僚色彩的政府,让不同的巴勒斯坦派别共同管理加沙。然后,随着时间的推移,以色列或许会允许该地区获得更多自治权。这是当初的构想吗?

Yes, the government of Israel even promoted this idea after the ceasefire was pushed on them—that Hamas would give up its weapons, there would be a kind of alternative government, which would not will be affiliated with Hamas, and that we would promote a kind of reconstruction with the support of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, and there would be the deradicalization of the Palestinians. It was utopian and, since Day One, a total illusion.

没错,以色列政府甚至在停火协议被迫接受后还鼓吹过这种想法——哈马斯会交出武器,成立一个与哈马斯无关的替代政府,我们将在阿联酋和沙特的支持下推动某种重建,并且巴勒斯坦人会去激进化。这简直是乌托邦,从一开始就完全是幻觉。

For one, if you asked Hamas about what they wanted, they were very clear that they were against disarmament, even after they said yes to Donald Trump’s plans. They said, O.K., we will accept this idea of the bureaucratic government. But they made clear that they would not abandon their weapons, and that this was important to who they were. So from Day One, it was obvious that there was a huge gap between the expectations of Israel, and maybe even the American Administration, and what Hamas wanted. So, you know, actually nothing is really surprising about the current situation and the fact that we are stuck right now in a very problematic place.

首先,如果你问哈马斯想要什么,他们非常明确地表示反对解除武装,即使在他们对唐纳德·特朗普的计划表示同意之后也是如此。他们说,好吧,我们会接受这个官僚政府的构想。但他们明确表示,不会放弃武器,这对他们的身份认同至关重要。所以从一开始,就显而易见,以色列——甚至可能还有美国政府——的期望与哈马斯的要求之间存在巨大鸿沟。因此,实际上,当前局势以及我们陷入如此棘手困境的事实,并不令人意外。

Not to be too cynical here—

别太愤世嫉俗了——

That’s O.K.

没关系。

But do both sides actually want this status quo?

但双方真的都希望维持现状吗?

Hamas, yes. But Israel, no. This settlement was forced on Netanyahu by Donald Trump. It’s obvious. If you could ask Netanyahu six months ago, before the ceasefire, if he wanted this, he would say, no, I want to continue the war. For him, it is an endless war. But his whole plan was really damaged by his idiotic attack against the leadership of Hamas in Qatar, because that caused Trump to pressure him to end the war.

哈马斯,是的。但以色列,不。这份协议是唐纳德·特朗普强加给内塔尼亚胡的。这显而易见。如果你在六个月前、停火之前问内塔尼亚胡是否想要这个结果,他会说不,我要继续打下去。对他来说,这是一场无休止的战争。但他那愚蠢的、针对哈马斯在卡塔尔领导层的袭击,彻底破坏了他的整个计划——因为那件事促使特朗普施压他结束战争。

What I meant was that, given Netanyahu’s inability to re-start the war without U.S. support, isn’t the status quo, with Israel controlling large swaths of Gaza, what he would prefer?

我的意思是,既然内塔尼亚胡(Netanyahu)在没有美国支持的情况下无法重启战争,那么现状——以色列控制加沙大片区域——不正是他更想要的吗?

Yes, but both sides still hope they will get what they want. If you ask Hamas, they will tell you that they really hope that Donald Trump will push Israel to expand their withdrawal from the yellow line, where they are positioned, and to promote reconstruction. But that has not happened. And if you ask Netanyahu, he would say he wants that green light from Trump to renew the war, but so far that has not happened.

话虽如此,双方仍抱有希望,期待各自的目标能够实现。你若问哈马斯,他们会告诉你,他们真心希望唐纳德·特朗普能推动以色列从当前驻扎的黄线进一步撤军,并促进重建工作。但这一愿望尚未成真。你若问内塔尼亚胡,他会说,他希望特朗普能为他重启战事开绿灯,但迄今为止,这同样未能实现。

In a way, this is all very similar to what’s happening in Lebanon. The Americans are the only ones who can solve this, because if you depend on Israel and Hamas, or, in the Lebanese case, on Israel and Hezbollah, there is no way to bridge the gap. There have been all kinds of negotiations with the Lebanese government and Israel, but the only one who could really get a ceasefire right now is Donald Trump, by saying to Israel that this is what he demands.

从某种意义上说,这一切与黎巴嫩正在发生的事情非常相似。只有美国人才能解决这个问题,因为如果依赖以色列和哈马斯,或者在黎巴嫩的情况下依赖以色列和真主党,双方之间的鸿沟根本无法弥合。黎巴嫩政府和以色列之间进行过各种谈判,但眼下真正能促成停火的只有唐纳德·特朗普——他只需对以色列说,这是他提出的要求。

More broadly, how do you think Hamas views the current situation in Gaza?

更广泛地说,你认为哈马斯如何看待加沙当前的局势?

They, in fact, had been planning to use the establishment of a more bureaucratic government to allow themselves to behave similarly to Hezbollah in Lebanon, where the status of being a formal political party works as a kind of cosmetic cover for its paramilitary operations. Hamas, in this scenario, like Hezbollah, would be free to act on both a military and a political level.

事实上,他们一直计划通过建立一个更为官僚化的政府,让自己得以效仿黎巴嫩真主党(Hezbollah)的行事方式——在那里,正式政党的身份不过是为其准军事行动提供了一层粉饰性的掩护。按照这一设想,哈马斯(Hamas)将像真主党一样,得以在军事和政治两个层面自由行动。

One thing I think is important for people to understand is that Hamas will not give up on the principle of refusing to disarm. The principle of armed resistance is a deep part of their identity. It is my impression that Nickolay Mladenov, who is serving as the High Representative for Gaza at Trump’s Board of Peace, is very frustrated because he thought that they would be more flexible on this.

我认为有一点很重要,人们需要明白:哈马斯不会放弃拒绝解除武装的原则。武装抵抗的原则是他们身份认同中根深蒂固的一部分。据我观察,在特朗普的和平委员会担任加沙高级代表的尼古拉·姆拉德诺夫(Nickolay Mladenov)对此感到非常沮丧,因为他原以为哈马斯在这方面会更灵活一些。

But he is also frustrated with Israel, because they have also been inflexible on the political process to begin reconstruction, as well as on allowing humanitarian support into Gaza. So Israel is in the same place.

但他对以色列也感到沮丧,因为以色列在启动重建的政治进程以及允许人道主义援助进入加沙方面同样缺乏灵活性。因此,以色列也处于同样的僵局之中。

How do the two sides feel about the Board of Peace?

双方对和平委员会的看法如何?

Last week, I spoke with some Palestinians from Gaza about this issue. And they said, listen, we understand that Mladenov has had a lot of negotiations in Cairo about Phase Two, and about creating a more bureaucratic governing structure, but we don’t really feel the impact here. Nothing is concrete. But they also thought that he is a positive person who understands Palestinian concerns.

上周,我与几位来自加沙的巴勒斯坦人谈及此事。他们说,我们知道姆拉德诺夫在开罗就第二阶段谈判以及建立更官僚化的治理结构进行了大量磋商,但我们在当地并未切实感受到任何影响——一切都悬而未决。不过他们也认为,他是一位理解巴勒斯坦人关切的建设性人物。

On the Israeli side, no one will attack the Board of Peace, but my impression is that, within the government, there is no one who is really trying to support or encourage its efforts. Everyone is waiting to see what Donald Trump will do.

在以色列方面,没有人会攻击和平委员会,但我的印象是,政府内部并没有人真正试图支持或鼓励其努力。所有人都在观望唐纳德·特朗普会采取什么行动。

It seems unlikely that Trump is going to want Israel to re-start the war, but it also seems unlikely that Trump is going to invest a huge amount of capital in trying to push this forward to the next phase, which would be similarly difficult.

特朗普似乎不太可能希望以色列重启战事,但同样也不太可能投入大量精力推动谈判进入下一阶段——而这一阶段同样困难重重。

Yeah, and we are also in a situation where I am not sure if Donald Trump is paying any attention to what is happening in Gaza. He is focussed on Iran and China and even Cuba. I’m not sure if he is aware of anything that is happening in Gaza, or, really, if he is aware that nothing is happening in Gaza.

是啊,而且我们现在还面临这样一种局面:我不确定唐纳德·特朗普是否在关注加沙正在发生的事。他的注意力集中在伊朗、中国,甚至古巴。我不确定他是否知道加沙发生了什么,或者,说真的,他是否意识到加沙其实什么都没发生。

Immediately after the ceasefire, Israel controlled fifty-three per cent of the territory in Gaza. What is that number now?

停火协议刚生效时,以色列控制了加沙百分之五十三的领土。现在这个数字是多少?

There is a narrative here in Israel that the way to punish the Palestinians, or to pressure Hamas, is by taking more and more territory. So we started the ceasefire in a place where Israel controlled something between fifty-two and fifty-three per cent of the territory, and now it’s around sixty per cent.

在以色列,有一种说法认为,惩罚巴勒斯坦人或向哈马斯施压的方式,就是不断夺取更多领土。因此,停火开始时,以色列控制的领土大约在百分之五十二到五十三之间,而现在已接近百分之六十。

But this brings up another question that is being asked by many Israelis, and not only regarding Gaza, but also regarding Lebanon. And that is, What is the purpose of staying on the yellow line? What are you going to do? Are you going to occupy and annex the territory to create new settlements over there? Or are you just going to stay over there, as Israel did in Lebanon between 1982 and 2000? And my impression is that there is no strategy. Or that the only strategy is attacking and force.

但这又引出了许多以色列人正在追问的另一个问题,不仅涉及加沙,也涉及黎巴嫩。那就是:停留在黄线上有什么意义?你们打算做什么?是要占领并吞并那片土地,在那里建立新的定居点吗?还是像以色列在1982年至2000年间在黎巴嫩所做的那样,只是驻扎在那里?我的印象是,根本没有战略。或者说,唯一的战略就是攻击和武力。

Aren’t security concerns the stated reason that they’ve established the yellow line in Gaza?

难道安全顾虑不是他们在加沙设立黄线的公开理由吗?

Yes, and it’s the same stated reason as in Lebanon. But Israel’s over-all strategy should not just be military strategy. And that’s why we are stuck. And of course, we are also stuck in Lebanon.

是的,这与以色列在黎巴嫩给出的理由如出一辙。但以色列的整体战略不应仅仅是军事战略。正因如此,我们才陷入了僵局。当然,我们在黎巴嫩也同样陷入了困境。

So right now, no one is speaking about a political solution in Gaza. You have taken around sixty per cent of the territory. You can attack whenever you want. We even saw this last week when Israel struck and killed the leader of Hamas’s military wing. So yes, one very important achievement is that Hamas cannot really strengthen itself militarily, because Israel controls the Philadelphi Corridor, which prevents Hamas from smuggling weapons into Gaza. But that’s not enough. What is the long-term plan? Do you want to occupy Gaza? Do you refuse to bring the Palestinian Authority into Gaza? For a while, it seemed like they wanted to set up a local regime based on clans. This was nonsense, but it was a very popular illusion a year or two ago. But now we are stuck in these wars with no clear purpose.

所以现在,没人谈论加沙的政治解决方案。你们已经控制了大约六成的领土,随时可以发动攻击。上周我们就看到了这一点——以色列发动袭击,击毙了哈马斯军事分支的领导人。没错,一个非常重要的成就是,哈马斯确实无法在军事上真正壮大自己,因为以色列控制了费城走廊(Philadelphi Corridor),阻止哈马斯向加沙走私武器。但这还不够。长期计划是什么?你们想占领加沙吗?你们拒绝让巴勒斯坦权力机构进入加沙吗?有一段时间,他们似乎想建立一个以部族为基础的地方政权。这简直是胡闹,但一两年前,这却是一个很流行的幻想。可现在,我们陷入了这些目标不明的战争之中。

What is your sense of the humanitarian situation in Gaza since the ceasefire? How much has changed, and how much has not?

自停火以来,你对加沙的人道主义局势有何感受?哪些方面发生了变化,哪些方面依然如故?

The sense that I got from speaking to people in Gaza last week was that people are not hungry in the same way. But regarding the basic existential conditions in Gaza, things are very bad. I am speaking of housing, health, education. The education system was basically ruined during the war. So we are speaking about a place with no civil space, with no civil society. Many people are hoping there would have been reconstruction by now. But there is nothing. Nothing is being implemented.

上周与加沙民众交谈时,我感受到的并非同一种饥饿。但就加沙的基本生存条件而言,情况极为严峻。我指的是住房、医疗和教育。教育体系在战争期间基本被摧毁。因此,我们谈论的是一个没有公民空间、没有公民社会的地方。许多人曾希望现在能开始重建,但什么都没有。没有任何措施得到落实。

Israel is going to have elections later this year. Is there any possible configuration of the next Israeli government that would allow things to change in Gaza?

以色列将在今年晚些时候举行选举。下一届以色列政府是否有可能通过某种组合方式,让加沙的局势发生改变?

I hope that any assessment I make is not influenced by wishful thinking. Currently, Netanyahu cannot do anything differently because of the far-right partners in his coalition, who have threatened to collapse the government. But a new, more centrist government might be ready to discuss this idea of establishing a more bureaucratic government in Gaza, which could have some involvement of the Palestinian Authority.

我希望自己的任何判断都不受一厢情愿的影响。目前,内塔尼亚胡因联合政府中的极右翼盟友而束手束脚,这些盟友威胁要推翻政府。但一个更倾向中间派的新政府或许愿意讨论这一设想:在加沙建立一个更具官僚色彩的政府,并让巴勒斯坦权力机构在一定程度上参与其中。

However, I think there will be things that even a different government will not be able to accept, like Hamas being allowed to reconstruct its military capacities and becoming again as powerful as they were on the eve of October 7th. For example, they would not allow Hamas to have control over the Philadelphi Corridor. So, if Israeli forces pull back, there would have to be another solution to preventing Hamas from retaking it. Maybe American forces could be deployed over there.

不过,我认为即便换了一个政府,有些事情也无法接受,比如允许哈马斯重建其军事能力,并恢复到10月7日前夕那样的实力。举例来说,他们不会允许哈马斯控制费城走廊。因此,如果以色列军队撤出,就必须有其他方案来阻止哈马斯重新夺回该地区。或许可以考虑部署美军在那里。

But all of that assumes that there will not be internal political chaos during the election as a result of the decisions that this government has made over the past few years. We have not spoken about what has been happening in the West Bank, where the current government has been allowing settlers to become even more aggressive. And if we have a new government that tries to restrict the settlers, it will be like a volcano erupting in Israeli politics.

但这一切都建立在一个前提之上:即选举期间不会因本届政府过去几年的决策而引发内部政治动荡。我们尚未谈及约旦河西岸正在发生的事——现任政府一直在纵容定居者愈发激进。倘若新政府试图限制这些定居者,那将如同以色列政坛火山喷发。

You are painting a picture that makes it seem like the status quo may extend for a long time.

你在描绘一幅画面,仿佛现状可能会持续很长一段时间。

Any change will be very difficult. But it would have to start from a situation where we do not speak any more about the reëstablishment of the settlements in Gaza, which far-right ministers in the Netanyahu government do all the time. And it would have to start with a situation where the Israeli government does not boycott the Palestinian Authority’s presence in Gaza, as Netanyahu has been doing. Netanyahu is not able to even discuss new changes. Maybe a new government could. ♦

任何改变都将举步维艰。但变革的前提,是我们不再谈论重建加沙定居点——内塔尼亚胡政府中的极右翼部长们却总在鼓吹此事。变革的起点,还必须是以色列政府不再像内塔尼亚胡那样抵制巴勒斯坦权力机构在加沙的存在。内塔尼亚胡甚至无法讨论新的变革方案。或许新一届政府能做到。♦

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