The Lede

The End of Limits on a President’s Wars

总统战争权限的终结
Past conflicts eroded Congress’s ability to decide when to go to war. Donald Trump’s attack on Iran destroyed it.
过往的冲突已侵蚀了国会决定何时开战的权力,而特朗普对伊朗的打击则彻底摧毁了这一权力。
A television screen shows a blurred Donald Trump at a podium wearing a hat that reads “USA.”
Photograph by Mark Peterson / Redux

On April 22, 1793, President George Washington issued a Proclamation of Neutrality in the war that had just been declared between France and Britain. The United States, Washington decreed, “should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent Powers.” Washington’s action raised a question: Where did the President get off declaring the country’s neutrality? After all, the Constitution, which had been written merely six years earlier, entrusted to Congress the power to declare war. Didn’t Washington’s actions infringe on that authority? The dispute generated an exchange over the proper scope of Presidential power, conducted in the pages of a Philadelphia newspaper, between Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. Hamilton, writing as Pacificus, reaffirmed his typically muscular reading of executive authority. A “correct and well informed mind will discern at once,” he asserted, that such discretion “of course must belong to the Executive.” After all, he continued, “The general doctrine then of our constitution is, that the Executive Power of the Nation is vested in the President; subject only to the exceptions and qu[a]lifications which are expressed in the instrument.”

1793年4月22日,乔治·华盛顿总统在法英两国刚刚宣战后发布了一份《中立宣言》。华盛顿宣布,美国“应以真诚与善意,采取并奉行对交战各国友好且不偏不倚之行为”。此举引发了一个问题:总统凭什么宣布国家中立?毕竟,六年前刚制定的宪法将宣战权授予国会。华盛顿的行为难道不是僭越了这项权力吗?这场争论引发了亚历山大·汉密尔顿与詹姆斯·麦迪逊在费城报纸上就总统权力的适当范围展开的论战。以“太平洋人”为笔名的汉密尔顿重申了他对行政权一贯的强势解读。他宣称,“正确且见闻广博者当能即刻洞悉”,此类裁量权“自当归属于行政机构”。他继而论述:“我国宪法之通则在于,国家行政权赋予总统;唯受宪法明文规定之例外与限制所约束。”

Madison pushed back, under the pen name Helvidius, after the Roman statesman who argued that the emperor should act only with the consent of the Senate. His concern extended beyond the precise question of the neutrality proclamation; Madison offered a more general admonition against bestowing war powers on a single, potentially flawed individual. “In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the executive department,” Madison, the primary author of the document, observed. Were that decision placed in the hands of the executive, he warned, “the trust and the temptation would be too great for any one man”—not, perhaps, “the prodigy of many centuries” but a more imperfect leader, “such as may be expected in the ordinary successions of magistracy.” The reason, Madison said, was clear: “War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement. . . . In war the public treasures are to be unlocked, and it is the executive hand which is to dispense them. In war the honors and emoluments of office are to be multiplied; and it is the executive patronage under which they are to be enjoyed. It is in war, finally, that laurels are to be gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to encircle. The strongest passions, and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; ambition, avarice, vanity, the honorable or venial love of fame, are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace.”

麦迪逊以笔名“赫尔维狄乌斯”(Helvidius)予以回击,该名取自古罗马政治家,此人曾主张皇帝须经元老院同意方可行动。他的忧虑超越了中立宣言的具体争议;麦迪逊提出了更普遍的警示,反对将战争权力授予某个可能存有缺陷的个体。这位宪法主要起草者指出:“宪法中最具智慧之处,莫过于将战与和的问题交予立法机关而非行政部门。”他警告,若将此决定权置于行政首长手中,“这份权力与诱惑对任何个人都过于巨大”——或许非“数百年一遇的奇才”所能抵御,而是那些“在常规官员更替中可能出现”的不完美领导者。麦迪逊阐明其理:“战争实乃行政权力膨胀的真正温床......战时国库将开启,而执掌分配大权的是行政之手;战时官职荣誉与俸禄将倍增,而享受这些需仰仗行政恩庇;最终,战时方能摘取桂冠,而承接荣光的将是行政首脑的额顶。人类胸中最炽烈的激情与最危险的弱点——野心、贪婪、虚荣、对名誉或高尚或卑劣的渴求——皆在共谋对抗对和平的渴望与责任。”

To read those words today, in light of President Donald Trump’s war against Iran, is to shudder. First, of course, at Madison’s prescience: like the other Founders, he grasped the frailty of human nature and the consequent imperative of checks and balances. Second, however, at the chasm between the Framers’ conceptions of Presidential war power and the unbounded nature of that authority today. Even Hamilton took it as a given that the decision about whether to go to war was wisely lodged in Congress, as the Constitution had provided. “If the Legislature have a right to make war on the one hand—it is on the other the duty of the Executive to preserve Peace till war is declared,” he wrote. Hamilton and Madison would have been aligned in horrified opposition had Washington, without congressional action, dispatched gunboats to sink British ships.

今天,在唐纳德·特朗普总统对伊朗发动战争的背景下,读到这些话令人不寒而栗。首先,当然是因为麦迪逊的先见之明:与其他开国元勋一样,他洞察了人性的脆弱,并由此认识到制衡的必要性。其次,则是因为制宪者们对总统战争权力的构想与当今这一权力的无限扩张之间存在着巨大鸿沟。即便是汉密尔顿也理所当然地认为,是否开战的决定权明智地赋予了国会,正如宪法所规定的那样。他写道:“如果立法机构有权发动战争,那么行政机构的职责就是在宣战之前维护和平。”如果华盛顿未经国会批准就派遣炮艇击沉英国船只,汉密尔顿和麦迪逊定会联合起来,惊恐地表示反对。

But here we are, in a world of congressional atrophy and seemingly unlimited Presidential war-making power. This lopsided situation is not solely of Trump’s making. Congress has not formally declared war since the Second World War, as the executive branch, under Presidents of both parties, has asserted ever-increasing authority to engage in the unilateral use of military force. Since that time, congressional acquiescence has generally taken the form of an authorization for the use of military force—when it has happened at all. To a certain extent, this is a logical and necessary outgrowth of technological innovations, and of the need for speed and flexibility in an age of nuclear weapons and global terrorism. The congressional power to declare war, like the rest of the Constitution, is not, to paraphrase Justice Robert Jackson, a suicide pact. Indeed, the Framers recognized these imperatives, along with the tension inherent between congressional authority and the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief. At the Constitutional Convention, they rewrote the draft language of the document, which originally assigned Congress the power to “make war.” According to Madison’s notes, “make” was changed to “declare,” “leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.”

然而,我们如今所处的世界,国会权力日渐萎缩,总统的战争权力却似乎无限扩张。这种失衡局面并非特朗普一人之过。自二战以来,国会再未正式宣战,而行政部门在两党总统的领导下,不断强化其单方面动用武力的权力。在此期间,国会即便有所行动,通常也只是以授权使用武力的形式表示默许。从某种程度上说,这是技术革新的必然产物,也是核武器与全球恐怖主义时代对速度与灵活性的必然要求。正如罗伯特·杰克逊大法官所言,国会的宣战权与宪法其他条款一样,绝非一纸自杀契约。事实上,制宪先贤们早已认识到这些必然性,以及国会权力与总统作为三军统帅的角色之间与生俱来的张力。在制宪会议上,他们修改了宪法草案的措辞——原草案赋予国会“发动战争”的权力。根据麦迪逊的笔记,“发动”被改为“宣示”,从而“将抵御突然袭击的权力保留给行政部门”。

Decade after decade, the modern Congress has allowed its authority to be eroded, with only tiny and largely ineffective peeps of protest. In 1989, after the Panamanian General Manuel Noriega refused to honor election results, President George H. W. Bush ordered thousands of troops to Panama to, among other things, capture Noriega to stand trial for drug trafficking in the United States. In 1999, President Bill Clinton instituted an air campaign, joined by NATO allies, to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo; the operation continued beyond the sixty-day deadline to obtain congressional approval for introducing U.S. troops into hostilities imposed by the 1973 War Powers Resolution. In 2011, President Barack Obama launched missile attacks against military sites in Libya; Obama called the action “a limited and well-defined mission in support of international efforts to protect civilians and prevent a humanitarian disaster.” During Trump’s first term, he conducted air strikes against a Syrian airfield in 2017, and again in 2018 on chemical-weapons facilities, the second time joined by the United Kingdom and France. In 2021, President Joe Biden, invoking his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief, ordered “defensive” air strikes against Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Syria.

数十年来,现代国会任由自身权力被侵蚀,只发出过微弱且基本无效的抗议之声。1989年,巴拿马将军曼努埃尔·诺列加拒绝承认选举结果后,总统乔治·H·W·布什下令派遣数千名士兵前往巴拿马,其中一项任务便是抓捕诺列加,以在美国就贩毒指控接受审判。1999年,总统比尔·克林顿发起空袭行动,北约盟国参与其中,旨在阻止科索沃的种族清洗;根据1973年《战争权力决议》,将美军投入敌对行动需在60天内获得国会批准,但此次行动超出了这一期限。2011年,总统巴拉克·奥巴马对利比亚的军事目标发动导弹袭击;奥巴马称此举是“一项有限且目标明确的行动,旨在支持国际社会保护平民、防止人道主义灾难的努力”。在特朗普的首个任期内,他于2017年对叙利亚一处空军基地发动空袭,并于2018年再次袭击化学武器设施,第二次行动有英国和法国参与。2021年,总统乔·拜登援引其作为总司令的宪法权力,下令对伊拉克和叙利亚境内受伊朗支持的民兵组织进行“防御性”空袭。

These actions were typically abetted by legal opinions issued by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel; each opinion built on its predecessor to justify increasingly elastic interpretations of Presidential power. Jack Goldsmith, a Harvard law professor and a head of that office under President George W. Bush, has observed that the O.L.C. opinions on Presidential use of force “are famously promiscuously permissive.” The first part of O.L.C.’s analysis is whether the planned military activity furthers a “sufficiently important national interest.” Somehow, it always does. The second part is whether the “nature, scope and duration” of the expected use of force rises to the level of “ ‘war’ in a constitutional sense.” Somehow, it never does.

这些行动通常得到了司法部法律顾问办公室出具的法律意见书的支持;每份意见书都建立在前一份的基础上,为总统权力日益灵活的解读提供依据。哈佛大学法学教授、曾在乔治·W·布什总统任内担任该办公室主任的杰克·戈德史密斯指出,法律顾问办公室关于总统使用武力的意见书“以极其宽松的许可性而闻名”。该办公室分析的第一部分是计划中的军事行动是否服务于“足够重要的国家利益”。不知何故,答案总是肯定的。第二部分是预期使用武力的“性质、范围和持续时间”是否达到“宪法意义上的'战争'”水平。不知何故,答案总是否定的。

In considering whether military action amounts to a war, the O.L.C.’s lawyers examine factors such as whether there will be ground troops, the likely number of casualties, the scope of the mission (for instance, targeted strikes versus regime change), and the risk of escalation. As a report by the Congressional Research Service summarized, “The executive branch has never publicly concluded that a military operation crossed the threshold into an unconstitutional war, but it has opined that a variety of military operations do not reach this level. For example, O.L.C. concluded that deployments of 20,000 ground forces, a two-week air campaign including 2,300 combat missions, and an air campaign involving over 600 missiles and precision-guided munitions did not amount to wars in the constitutional sense.” Adding insult to congressional injury, “even when Congress enacted authorizations for use of military force—including in the Vietnam War, Persian Gulf War of 1991, post-September 11 conflict of Afghanistan, and the 2003 Iraq War—each Presidential Administration claimed that they possessed independent constitutional authority to engage in those conflicts even if Congress had not authorized them.” When Trump, in 2020, ordered the targeted killing of the Iranian general Qasem Soleimani while Soleimani was on a trip to Baghdad, the O.L.C. stretched the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force in Iraq to justify the killing of the Iranian leader. The O.L.C.’s interpretations are also, for the most part, unchallengeable. Since at least the war in Vietnam, courts have refused to referee disputes between the President and Congress over war powers.

在判断军事行动是否构成战争时,司法部法律顾问办公室的律师们会考量诸多因素:是否派遣地面部队、可能伤亡人数、任务范围(例如定点打击与政权更迭之别)以及局势升级风险。正如国会研究服务处报告所总结:“行政部门从未公开认定任何军事行动构成违宪战争,但曾多次表态称各类军事行动均未达到此标准。例如,司法部法律顾问办公室认定:部署两万地面部队、为期两周包含2300次作战任务的空袭行动、动用超600枚导弹及精确制导武器的空袭战役——这些皆未构成宪法意义上的战争。”更令国会难堪的是,“即便国会已通过军事武力授权法案(包括越战、1991年波斯湾战争、'9·11'后阿富汗冲突及2003年伊拉克战争),历届总统行政当局仍坚称其拥有独立宪法授权参与这些冲突,纵使未获国会批准。”2020年特朗普下令定点清除赴巴格达访问的伊朗将领卡西姆·苏莱曼尼时,司法部法律顾问办公室竟援引2002年《对伊拉克军事武力授权法案》为刺杀伊朗领导人的行动辩护。该办公室的法律解释大多具有不可挑战性——至少自越战以来,法院始终拒绝裁断总统与国会间的战争权力争议。

In other words, Trump took office for the second time with few significant constraints on his power to deploy the military. Then, typically, he blew through whatever limits remained. The first strike on Iran, in June, 2025, stretched the limits of his authority because of the risk it posed of setting off a regional conflict. The January, 2026, operation to seize the Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro, pressed the limits even further; the closest analogy is the George H. W. Bush Administration’s capture of Noriega, but, in that case, Panama’s Defense Forces had killed a U.S. marine, and its National Assembly had declared a state of war with the United States. The current war with Iran—as Trump himself has described it—represents an even greater leap into a realm of unchecked Presidential power. If there is any practical restraint on unilateral Presidential action, it is hard to discern. The Framers would have found this chilling.

换言之,特朗普第二次上任时,他在动用军队方面的权力几乎不受重大制约。随后,他照例突破了所有尚存的限制。2025年6月对伊朗的首次打击,因其可能引发地区冲突的风险,已经触及他权力的边界。而2026年1月抓捕委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗的行动,则更进一步突破了限制;最接近的类比是老布什政府抓捕诺列加的行动,但在那个案例中,巴拿马国防军曾杀害一名美国海军陆战队员,且其国民议会已宣布与美国处于战争状态。当前与伊朗的战争——正如特朗普本人所描述的那样——代表着总统权力向不受制约的领域迈出了更大的一步。如果对总统单方面行动还存在任何实际制约,那也令人难以察觉。开国元勋们若见此情形,定会感到不寒而栗。

I spoke about the Iran war recently with Tess Bridgeman, who was a deputy legal adviser to the National Security Council during the Obama Administration; she is now a senior fellow and visiting scholar at N.Y.U. Law School’s Reiss Center on Law and Security and co-editor-in-chief of the website Just Security. Bridgeman told me that, prior to the Trump Administration, “this would have been one of the paradigmatic cases of, Of course you have to go to Congress.” Under previous Presidents, she said, “the separation of powers has been eroded. This is it being eviscerated.”

我最近与泰丝·布里奇曼讨论了伊朗战争问题。她曾在奥巴马政府时期担任国家安全委员会副法律顾问,现在是纽约大学法学院赖斯法律与安全中心的高级研究员和访问学者,同时也是网站“公正安全”的联合主编。布里奇曼告诉我,在特朗普政府之前,“这本来会是那种典型的、当然必须提交国会的案例”。她说,在之前的总统任期内,“权力分立已经被侵蚀了。而这次是被彻底掏空了。”

The War Powers Resolution of 1973 states that, within forty-eight hours of troops being introduced into hostilities, the President must inform Congress. The Trump Administration did so on Monday, asserting that the “strikes were undertaken to protect United States forces in the region, protect the United States homeland, advance vital United States national interests . . . and in collective self-defense of our regional allies, including Israel.” The law gives Congress the ability—in theory, anyway—to halt military action. In practice, this is doomed to failure in the current Congress; any resolution would have to survive an almost certain Presidential veto. Still, Congress taking a vote is important as a matter of symbolism and, not incidentally, politics. As Senator Tim Kaine, a Democrat who has been a stalwart defender of congressional prerogatives, put it, “Nobody gets to hide and give the President an easy pass or an end run around the Constitution. Everybody’s got to declare whether they’re for this war or against it.” In an effort to stop military action in Iran, Kaine, alongside the Republican senator Rand Paul, put forward a new war-powers resolution that has not been approved by Congress; it failed in the Senate on Wednesday, by a vote of 47–53; the House is expected to take up a similar measure on Thursday, with the same outcome expected.

1973年通过的《战争权力决议案》规定,总统在派遣军队进入敌对状态后的48小时内必须通知国会。特朗普政府周一履行了这一义务,声称“发动袭击是为了保护美国在该地区的军队,保护美国本土,推进美国至关重要的国家利益……并为我们包括以色列在内的地区盟友进行集体自卫。”理论上,该法律赋予国会阻止军事行动的能力。但在当前国会中,这注定会失败;任何决议都几乎肯定会被总统否决。尽管如此,国会进行投票在象征意义和政治考量上都很重要。正如民主党参议员蒂姆·凯恩所言:“没有人可以躲藏起来,给总统轻松放行或绕过宪法。每个人都必须表明自己是支持还是反对这场战争。”凯恩一直是国会特权的坚定捍卫者。为了阻止在伊朗的军事行动,凯恩与共和党参议员兰德·保罗共同提出了一项新的战争权力决议案,但未获国会批准;周三,该决议案在参议院以47票对53票未获通过;众议院预计将在周四审议一项类似措施,预计结果相同。

In the meantime, the war shows every sign of widening. On Tuesday, a U.S. submarine torpedoed an Iranian warship near Sri Lanka, more than two thousand miles from Iran; Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that it was the first such action since the Second World War. Hegseth vowed “death and destruction from the sky all day long” and said that the conflict had “only just begun.” If this is not “war in a constitutional sense,” nothing is. ♦

与此同时,战争扩大的迹象日益明显。周二,一艘美国潜艇在距伊朗两千多英里外的斯里兰卡附近击沉了一艘伊朗军舰;国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯称这是二战以来首次此类行动。赫格塞斯誓言“要让死亡与毁灭整日笼罩天空”,并称冲突“才刚刚开始”。若这尚不构成“宪法意义上的战争”,世间便再无战事可言。♦

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