The Lede

The Distant Promise of Iran’s Would-Be King

伊朗流亡王储的遥远承诺
The U.S.-Israeli war on the Islamic Republic is Reza Pahlavi’s best chance to resume his family’s reign in nearly fifty years—will it pass him by?
美国与以色列对伊朗伊斯兰共和国的战争,是礼萨·巴列维(Reza Pahlavi)近五十年来重掌家族王权的最佳契机——他会错过吗?
Reza Pahlavi and Crown
Illustration by Ben Kothe; Source photographs from Getty Images

For about three weeks, Reza Pahlavi, the sixty-five-year-old son of the deposed Shah of Iran, appeared to be the most obvious figure to lead an overthrow of the Islamic Republic. The protests that broke out across the country at the end of December were triggered by the collapse of the rial and exorbitant inflation in food prices. But they soon came to target the whole theocracy and its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. On January 6th, Pahlavi sought to seize the moment, issuing a video message in which he called on Iranians to join together and chant slogans against the regime from their homes and in the streets. Two days later, Iran witnessed an unprecedented wave of protests, with demonstrations held in more than a hundred and fifty cities. In the capital, streams of people converged on overpasses and boulevards, calling not just for the end of the regime but for the return of Pahlavi himself, chanting “Long live the Shah.”

大约三周时间里,六十五岁的伊朗被废黜国王之子礼萨·巴列维(Reza Pahlavi)似乎是最有可能领导推翻伊斯兰共和国的人物。去年十二月底席卷全国的抗议活动,最初由里亚尔汇率暴跌与食品价格恶性通胀所引发,但很快将矛头指向整个神权体制及其最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊(Ayatollah Ali Khamenei)。1月6日,巴列维试图把握时机发布视频讲话,呼吁伊朗民众团结起来,在家中与街头齐声高呼反对现政权的口号。两天后,伊朗见证了前所未有的抗议浪潮,超过一百五十座城市爆发示威活动。在首都德黑兰,人潮汇聚于天桥与林荫大道,不仅要求终结现行体制,更呼喊着“国王万岁”,期盼巴列维重掌政权。

For years, Pahlavi had presented himself as a unifying figure, in keeping with a tradition of Iranian kingship as the glue that had held the fractious Persian Empire together. His strategists, ancien-régime figures who had surrounded him for nearly thirty years, believed that an inclusive approach would showcase his ability to lead and secure potential backers in the U.S. and in Europe. As recently as 2022, Pahlavi was trying to work within the often quarrelsome sphere of Iranian diaspora politics. During the Women, Life, Freedom movement that fall, prominent activists in Washington, D.C., were vying to take credit for sparking the nationwide protests. When a coalition of figures assembled at a Georgetown University forum, in February, 2023, the former Crown Prince sat humbly in a row of eight, alongside two actresses, a soccer player, and an Iranian Kurdish separatist.

多年来,巴列维一直以团结者的形象示人,这符合伊朗王权作为粘合剂将四分五裂的波斯帝国凝聚在一起的传统。他的战略顾问们——那些围绕在他身边近三十年的旧政权人物——相信,这种包容性的姿态能彰显他的领导才能,并争取到美国和欧洲潜在支持者。直到2022年,巴列维仍在试图在时常纷争不断的伊朗流亡政治圈中周旋。那年秋天“女性、生命、自由”运动期间,华盛顿特区的知名活动家们争相宣称是自己点燃了全国性抗议的火种。当2023年2月各方人物在乔治城大学论坛集结时,这位前王储谦逊地坐在八人席间,身旁是两位女演员、一名足球运动员,以及一位伊朗库尔德分离主义者。

Various strands of the opposition—ethnic minorities, leftists, and educated technocrats—appeared determined to block him, even at the price of leaving the regime in place. By then, Pahlavi was surrounded by a younger entourage of analysts and advisers, some of whom were brash figures once associated with the country’s reformist student movement. “I could imagine his advisers telling him, ‘You’re the King. You can’t surround yourself with people who don’t even acknowledge or respect your station,’ ” an Iranian analyst in Washington told me.

反对派的不同阵营——少数民族、左翼人士和受过良好教育的技术官僚——似乎都决心阻止他,甚至不惜以维持现有政权为代价。当时,巴列维身边围绕着一群更年轻的分析师和顾问,其中一些人是曾与伊朗改革派学生运动有关的张扬人物。一位在华盛顿的伊朗分析师告诉我:“我能想象他的顾问会对他说,'您是国王。您不能让自己身边围绕着那些甚至不承认或不尊重您地位的人。'”

That April, two months after the Georgetown event, Pahlavi announced on X that he would no longer align himself with any single dissident group, a gesture that effectively positioned him as a leader of the opposition above all others. “When I was serving as his strategic counsellor, his philosophy was ‘Today, only unity,’ ” Mehrdad Youssefiani, who served as Pahlavi’s chief of staff for seventeen years, said. “Now his social-media presence projects the image ‘Today only me.’ To the critical audiences he needs to draw into his coalition, that’s an imperial posture that belies all his rhetoric of inclusive coalition.”

那年四月,也就是乔治城活动两个月后,巴列维在X平台上宣布,他将不再与任何单一异议团体结盟。这一姿态实际上将他置于所有反对派之上的领袖位置。“我担任他的战略顾问时,他的理念是'今日唯团结',”曾担任巴列维幕僚长十七年的迈赫达德·优素菲亚尼说,“如今他在社交媒体上展现的形象却是'今日唯我独尊'。对那些他需要争取的关键受众而言,这种帝王姿态与他包容性联盟的所有说辞都背道而驰。”

During the next two years, Pahlavi expanded his operation and deepened his ties with Israel. In 2023, he visited Jerusalem, where he posed for photos with Benjamin Netanyahu and Netanyahu’s wife, Sara, and visited Yad Vashem and the Wailing Wall. Pahlavi’s embrace of Israel risked alienating some of his potential supporters in Iran, but it also aligned him with a country committed to the destruction of the Islamic Republic which could also help him gain traction with policymakers in the U.S. By 2025, Gila Gamliel, the Israeli minister of science and technology, was saying to the press that she and Pahlavi had discussed a peace accord that would follow the fall of the Iranian regime “next year in Tehran.”

接下来的两年里,帕拉维(Pahlavi)扩大了行动规模,并深化了与以色列的联系。2023年,他访问耶路撒冷,与本雅明·内塔尼亚胡及其妻子萨拉合影,参观了亚德瓦谢姆大屠杀纪念馆和西墙。帕拉维对以色列的拥抱可能会疏远伊朗国内部分潜在支持者,但这同时也让他与一个致力于摧毁伊朗伊斯兰共和国的国家站在了同一阵线——此举或许能帮助他在美国政策制定者中获得更多支持。到2025年,以色列科技部长吉拉·甘贝雷(Gila Gamliel)已向媒体透露,她与帕拉维讨论了伊朗政权垮台后将在“明年于德黑兰”签署的和平协议。

In early January, state security forces used military-style weapons to kill thousands of protesters, exhibiting a level of violence that shocked even the regime’s most hardened opponents. The state was already on the verge of economic collapse, and Donald Trump, in close coördination with Israel, seemed intent on launching a military confrontation. Pahlavi’s team began putting out various plans to further erode the regime’s authority, calling on workers to strike and releasing a QR code through which defectors in the state security forces could sign on to his project, which Pahlavi claimed had elicited fifty thousand responses. At the same time, one of his advisers issued a blanket threat to Iranians inside the country who were “accomplices” to the regime: “You’re done for. Every last one of you.” If the U.S. had started conducting air strikes that week, delivering the support that Trump had promised the protesters, the demonstrations might have continued to grow.

一月初,国家安全部队动用军用武器杀害了数千名抗议者,其暴力程度甚至令该政权最顽固的反对者都感到震惊。当时伊朗经济已濒临崩溃,而唐纳德·特朗普在与以色列的密切协调下,似乎决意要发动军事对抗。巴列维团队随即发布多项计划以进一步削弱政权权威,号召工人罢工,并发布二维码供国家安全部队中的变节者加入其阵营——据巴列维称,此举已获得五万人响应。与此同时,他的一位顾问向国内所有被视为政权“帮凶”的伊朗人发出无差别威胁:“你们完蛋了,一个都逃不掉。”倘若美国当周实施空袭,兑现特朗普对抗议者承诺的支援,示威浪潮或许会持续扩大。

Instead, the U.S. President slowly dispatched his armada to the Middle East, while his envoys, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, held negotiations with Iranian officials. The regime was given weeks to regroup. Iranians retreated from the streets. Pahlavi, stuck in limbo, became less affable, more combative. At the Munich Security Conference, which Pahlavi attended in mid-February, two hundred thousand people converged on the city for a pro-Pahlavi demonstration. “Millions of Iranians chanted my name and called for my return,” he said. The calls were effectively a mandate “to be the leader of this transition as they have asked for.”

相反,美国总统缓慢地向中东派遣舰队,同时他的特使贾里德·库什纳(Jared Kushner)和史蒂夫·维特科夫(Steve Witkoff)与伊朗官员进行谈判。伊朗政权获得了数周时间重整旗鼓。伊朗人从街头退却。巴列维则陷入进退维谷的境地,变得不再温和,更具对抗性。在巴列维于二月中旬出席的慕尼黑安全会议上,二十万人聚集在这座城市举行支持巴列维的示威活动。“数百万伊朗人高呼我的名字,要求我回归,”他说。这些呼声实际上构成了“应民众要求成为这场过渡的领导者”的授权。

When Israel launched its attack on Iran, on February 28th, it called the campaign Operation Roaring Lion, seemingly a nod to the Iranian monarchy. But a U.S. intelligence report, assembled prior to the events of early January, which was shown to Trump a week before the start of the war, concluded that Pahlavi lacked a sufficient network inside the country to lead an overthrow of the regime. “They never took him that seriously,” Vali Nasr, a professor at Johns Hopkins, said of the Administration. “There’s a difference between having an organization on the ground versus just having people who like you. If you’re going to help change a regime, you have to have a ground game.” Trump and his aides began referring to Pahlavi as the “loser prince.”

以色列于2月28日对伊朗发动袭击时,将此次行动命名为“咆哮雄狮行动”,似乎是在向伊朗君主制致意。但一份在1月初事件发生前汇编的美国情报报告显示,巴列维在国内缺乏足够的人脉网络来领导推翻政权。这份报告在战争开始前一周呈交给了特朗普。“他们从未真正重视过他,”约翰·霍普金斯大学教授瓦利·纳斯尔在谈及美国政府时表示,“拥有实地组织与仅仅拥有支持者存在本质区别。若要协助政权更迭,必须建立地面行动体系。”特朗普及其助手开始称巴列维为“败局王子”。

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, and his wife, Empress Farah, disagreed sharply on nearly every aspect of their son’s upbringing. The Shah, who wished to prepare Reza for his future role, believed that he should be tutored by tough military figures and immersed in Iranian society. The Empress preferred a more cloistered upbringing, with French nannies and hand-selected schoolmates. At one point, according to the published diaries of the Shah’s former court minister, Asadollah Alam, Reza was in the alarming thrall of Mademoiselle Joelle, his French governess, who filled his head with French history. “I heard the boy wanted to go hunting, but the French woman told him no—killing animals and birds is wrong,” Alam reported disapprovingly. Even small decisions, such as how the teen-age prince should commute to school—driving himself or chauffeured in a bulletproof Mercedes—held implications for the man Reza would become. “Better that he takes risks than that he ends up a shrinking violet like Ahmad Shah Qajar,” the Shah told his courtier, referring to the effete final monarch of the preceding dynasty.

伊朗国王穆罕默德·礼萨·巴列维与王后法拉赫在儿子教养问题上几乎处处针锋相对。国王希望为儿子礼萨继承大统作准备,主张让严厉的军事人物担任导师,并让他深入伊朗社会。王后则倾向于更封闭的养育方式,配备法国家庭教师,精心挑选同窗学伴。据已出版的国王前朝臣阿萨杜拉·阿拉姆日记记载,礼萨王子曾一度令人担忧地沉迷于法国家庭教师若埃勒小姐的影响——她整天给王子灌输法国历史。“我听说这孩子想去打猎,但那个法国女人不准他去,说什么杀害动物和鸟类是错误的。”阿拉姆在日记中不以为然地写道。即便是少年王子如何往返学校这样的小事——是自己开车还是乘坐防弹奔驰轿车由司机接送——也关乎礼萨未来会成为怎样的人。“宁可让他冒险,也不能让他变成卡扎尔王朝末代君主艾哈迈德·沙阿那样怯懦无能的人。”国王对朝臣如是说。

Reza was eighteen when the Islamic Revolution overthrew his family’s reign, in 1979. At the time, he was at fighter-pilot training in Lubbock, Texas, part of his preparations for becoming a modern king. The Pahlavis, in exile, were vilified, but the family still appeared duty-bound to project the image of Reza as the dynastic heir of Iranian monarchy. The Empress, based between Greenwich, Connecticut, and Paris, remained socially enmeshed in Europe’s royal circles, but Reza stayed in the United States, completing a degree at the University of Southern California, and then living a suburban existence in Potomac, Maryland. On a podcast in 2023, he admitted that, despite having always insisted that he was fighting to unseat the regime, he never envisioned returning to Iran permanently. “My children live here,” he said. “My friends live here. Everybody that I know is here. If I was to go back, what do I go back to?”

1979年伊斯兰革命推翻其家族统治时,礼萨(Reza)年仅十八岁。当时他正在得克萨斯州拉伯克接受战斗机飞行员训练,这是为成为现代君主所做的准备之一。流亡中的巴列维家族虽遭污名化,但家族似乎仍肩负着塑造礼萨作为伊朗君主制王朝继承人的形象之责。皇后常驻于康涅狄格州格林尼治与巴黎两地,社交圈仍深植于欧洲王室网络;而礼萨则留在美国,先在南加州大学完成学位,随后在马里兰州波托马克过着郊区生活。2023年他在播客中坦言,尽管始终坚称自己致力于推翻伊朗政权,却从未设想过永久回归故土。“我的孩子在这里生活,”他说,“我的朋友在这里,我认识的所有人都在这里。若我回去,究竟要回到何处?”

In the early eighties, when Pahlavi was in his twenties, Ardeshir Zahedi, the Shah’s last Ambassador to the U.S., brokered meetings between Pahlavi and American officials. “The Americans at the time were quite hopeful they could get some results with Reza, but they soon lost confidence in him,” Tino Zahedi, one of Ardeshir’s cousins, told me. “They didn’t believe he could reign.” In the following years, reports emerged of Pahlavi accepting funds and support from the C.I.A. and from various Arab monarchies to run his small-scale political operations. (Pahlavi has always denied this.) Ardeshir Zahedi eventually parted with him, saying in later years that accepting financial backing from foreigners and essentially asking them to drop bombs on their own country was un-Iranian.

八十年代初,巴列维二十多岁时,伊朗末代国王驻美大使阿尔德希尔·扎赫迪曾为他与美国官员牵线搭桥。“当时美国人对他寄予厚望,以为礼萨能成事,但很快就对他失去了信心,”阿尔德希尔的堂弟蒂诺·扎赫迪告诉我,“他们不相信他能担起大任。”随后几年,有报道称巴列维接受中情局和多个阿拉伯君主国的资金支持,用以维持小规模政治运作(巴列维始终否认此事)。阿尔德希尔·扎赫迪最终与他分道扬镳,晚年曾表示接受外国资金支持、实质上要求外国向自己祖国投掷炸弹的行为“有违伊朗人的风骨”。

For years, Pahlavi kept up appearances, insisting that he was the rightful Crown Prince of Iran, refusing to acknowledge the abolition of the Pahlavi monarchy, and releasing messages to the nation at the Persian New Year. But he was not a decisive political figure. To those who knew his father, he cut a strange figure, neither common nor majestic but a suburban man of Maryland who shopped at the mall and attended a weekly poker game in Bethesda. He seemed resigned to exile and uncertain about the prospect of changing Iranians’ minds from afar. “He’s a good person, but he’s indolent, and he knows it himself,” an Iranian insider in Washington who knew Pahlavi in the eighties said.

多年来,巴列维一直维持着体面,坚称自己是伊朗合法的王储,拒绝承认巴列维王朝已被废除,并在波斯新年向国民发表讲话。但他并非一个果决的政治人物。在那些认识他父亲的人看来,他显得颇为怪异——既不平凡,也不威严,更像是马里兰州郊区的普通人,会去商场购物,每周在贝塞斯达参加扑克牌局。他似乎已安于流亡,对远距离改变伊朗人想法这件事并不确定。“他是个好人,但很懒散,他自己也知道这一点,”一位八十年代就认识巴列维的华盛顿伊朗问题内部人士说。

In 2001, I interviewed Pahlavi for Time, and found him impressive. I was based in Tehran at the time, as an American-born foreign correspondent, and most of the Islamic Republic officials I met were slovenly, undereducated, and lecherous. Some were downright sinister; others piously refused to look women in the eye. Next to them, Pahlavi seemed dignified, well informed, and worldly. My abiding memories of the encounter were just how normal and decent he seemed, qualities that seemed precious inside Iran, where nothing was remotely decent or normal.

2001年,我曾为《时代》周刊采访过巴列维,他给我留下了深刻印象。当时我作为美籍驻外记者常驻德黑兰,遇到的伊斯兰共和国官员大多不修边幅、学识浅薄且好色成性。有些人甚至阴险可怖;另一些则虔诚到拒绝与女性对视。相形之下,巴列维显得庄重得体、见识广博、深谙世情。那次会面最令我难忘的,正是他那种寻常而体面的气质——在伊朗这片几乎与体面、寻常绝缘的土地上,这样的品质显得弥足珍贵。

The country, meanwhile, was experiencing a series of convulsions. Various reform and feminist movements were pushing the regime to soften its militant foreign policy, its oppressive dress codes, and its censorship of civil society. In 2009, when an election was stolen from a reformist candidate and handed to a hard-liner, millions of people marched peacefully in the streets. In response, the regime killed dozens, and arrested and tortured many more. A young generation born after the Revolution learned that modest, internal change would never come.

与此同时,这个国家正经历着一系列剧变。各类改革运动与女权运动不断推动政权软化其激进的外交政策、严苛的着装规范以及对公民社会的审查。2009年,当一场选举的结果从改革派候选人手中被窃取并交给强硬派时,数百万人走上街头和平抗议。作为回应,政权杀害了数十人,并逮捕、折磨了更多民众。革命后出生的年轻一代由此明白:温和的内部变革永远不会到来。

The following year, a London-based television network called Manoto began broadcasting directly to Iran in Persian. The network had secured access to the vast pre-revolutionary archive of Iranian state radio and television, allowing it to produce a sophisticated stream of content—documentaries, bio-pics, concerts—that elided the authoritarian grip of the Shah’s rule and highlighted the wealth and promise of pre-revolutionary Iran. It quickly became one of the most watched channels in the country. Seven years later, Iran International, a well-funded, pro-Pahlavi news network, emerged in London. Today, it covers Pahlavi’s every move with near-reverence. “Big money went into weaponizing the Iranian population through these networks,” Nasr said. “And Reza Pahlavi was the beneficiary. They created mass nostalgia for that era and positioned him as the person who could take Iranians back there.”

次年,一家总部位于伦敦、名为“马诺托”(Manoto)的电视网络开始用波斯语直接向伊朗播出。该网络获得了伊朗革命前国家广播电视的大量档案资料使用权,得以制作出一系列制作精良的节目——纪录片、传记片、音乐会——这些内容淡化了巴列维国王统治时期的专制控制,着重展现革命前伊朗的繁荣景象与美好前景。该频道迅速成为伊朗国内收视率最高的频道之一。七年后,资金雄厚、支持巴列维王朝的新闻网络“伊朗国际”(Iran International)在伦敦成立。如今,该媒体几乎以近乎虔诚的姿态报道着巴列维的每一举动。“大量资金通过这些媒体网络将伊朗民众武装起来,”纳斯尔说,“而礼萨·巴列维是受益者。他们营造出对那个时代的大规模怀旧情绪,并将他塑造成能够带领伊朗人重返那个时代的人物。”

One of the great challenges of the Islamic Republic was how to reconcile its Islamist project with Iran’s history. For nearly twenty-five centuries, the Persian Empire and the modern nation-state of Iran had been ruled through monarchy. The ancient idea of Iran was that of a distinct people bound together within a distinct empire, protected and led by shahs conferred with farr, a subtle concept that the Yale historian Abbas Amanat has described as “kingly charisma divinely bestowed upon a ruler of the right quality.” The king was “the shadow of God on earth,” but he could also lose his farr, if he failed to defend the kingdom or if he ruled as a tyrant.

伊斯兰共和国面临的一大挑战,是如何将其伊斯兰主义事业与伊朗的历史相调和。近两千五百年来,波斯帝国与现代伊朗民族国家始终实行君主制。古老的伊朗理念认为,一个独特的民族凝聚在一个独特的帝国内,由享有“法尔”(farr)的沙阿庇护与领导——耶鲁大学历史学家阿巴斯·阿马纳特(Abbas Amanat)将这一精微概念描述为“神圣赋予合格统治者的王者魅力”。君主是“真主在大地上的影子”,但若他未能捍卫王国或施行暴政,也可能失去“法尔”。

From the start, the denigration of the Iranian monarchy was at the center of the Islamic Republic’s official ideology. Bulldozers and dynamite demolished the modernist mausoleum of Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty. Tile work and court paintings at historical sites were vandalized, the eyes of past royals gouged out. Villains in state-produced dramas bore the names of past kings. The Revolution’s language of Islamist class struggle fixated on Iran’s recent kings as stooges of Western imperialism. (“One strand of hair on the head of a slum dweller is more honorable than a thousand hairs on the head of a palace dweller,” the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, often said.) But, in time, Khomeini and the Revolution’s other leaders ascended to the same mansions in north Tehran that they had confiscated from the élite of the Shah’s era.

从一开始,对伊朗君主制的贬损就是伊斯兰共和国官方意识形态的核心。推土机和炸药摧毁了巴列维王朝创始人礼萨·沙阿的现代主义陵墓。历史遗址的瓷砖画和宫廷画遭到破坏,昔日王室成员的眼睛被凿去。国家制作的戏剧中,反派角色都顶着历代国王的名字。革命所用的伊斯兰主义阶级斗争话语,将伊朗近代的国王们死死钉在西方帝国主义傀儡的耻辱柱上。(“贫民窟居民头上的一根头发,也比宫殿居民头上的千根头发更尊贵。”伊斯兰共和国创始人阿亚图拉·鲁霍拉·霍梅尼常这样说。)但时移世易,霍梅尼与革命的其他领导人最终也住进了德黑兰北部的豪宅——那些他们从国王时代精英手中没收的宅邸。

Celebrating monarchy became an oblique language of protest. In the fall of 2016, thousands of people converged at Pasargadae, the ancient city containing the tomb of Cyrus the Great, near Shiraz. Cyrus, the founder of the Persian Empire, is remembered by Iranians for his enlightened and tolerant rule. The gatherers chanted pro-monarchy slogans, including wishes of happy birthday to Pahlavi, who was born around the same day in October that Cyrus is said to have conquered Babylon. The organizers were arrested and denounced by authorities as counter-revolutionaries. In the years since, security forces have turned people away from ancient Persian burial sites on commemorative days. Qajar-dynasty kitsch—kings with walrus mustaches and embellished turbans, women with unibrows in tunics—became ubiquitous as a motif in contemporary art, on the walls of cafés, on teapots. To this day, kingship suffuses Iranian literature and mythology.

对君主制的颂扬成了一种迂回的抗议语言。2016年秋天,数千人聚集在设拉子附近的帕萨尔加德古城,那里有居鲁士大帝的陵墓。这位波斯帝国的开国君主因其开明宽容的统治而被伊朗人铭记。集会者高呼支持君主制的口号,包括为巴列维国王庆生——他的生日与传说中居鲁士征服巴比伦的十月日期相近。组织者旋即被捕,被当局斥为反革命分子。此后数年,每逢纪念日,安全部队都会在古波斯陵墓遗址驱散人群。而卡扎尔王朝的俗艳意象——蓄海象胡须、戴华丽头巾的国王,身着束腰外袍、眉峰相连的女子——却悄然渗透进当代艺术,成为咖啡馆墙面与茶壶上的流行纹样。直至今日,王权叙事依然浸润着伊朗的文学与神话。

The Shah’s regime, in repressing its political opponents, had overlooked the dissident clergy and Islamists, believing that secular leftists formed its most dangerous threat; similarly, the theocracy had fixated on everyone—liberal intellectuals, reformists, labor leaders, feminist activists—except ordinary Iranians gravitating toward Reza Pahlavi. In January, when the regime realized that Pahlavi was able to mobilize Iranians inside the country, it resorted to a bloodbath. Teen-agers born thirty years after the end of his father’s reign were shot and killed for chanting his name. An estimated seven thousand people were killed (with more than eleven thousand deaths under investigation), upward of twenty-five thousand were injured, and more than fifty thousand were arrested. Security forces entered hospitals and shot injured protesters at close range. The darkest moment in Iran’s recent history brought Pahlavi into direct confrontation with the regime that had long ignored him.

巴列维王朝在镇压政治反对派时,忽视了持不同政见的教士和伊斯兰主义者,认为世俗左翼分子才是其最危险的威胁;同样,神权政体也紧盯所有人——自由派知识分子、改革主义者、劳工领袖、女权活动家——唯独忽略了那些逐渐倒向礼萨·巴列维的普通伊朗民众。今年一月,当政权意识到巴列维有能力动员国内民众时,便诉诸血腥镇压。那些在他父亲统治结束三十年后才出生的青少年,只因呼喊他的名字便遭枪杀。据估计,约七千人丧生(另有一万一千多起死亡事件正在调查中),超过两万五千人受伤,五万余人被捕。安全部队甚至闯入医院,近距离射杀受伤的抗议者。伊朗近代史上最黑暗的时刻,将巴列维推向了与这个长期忽视他的政权的直接对抗。

The U.S.-Israeli war on Iran is now the ultimate test for Pahlavi’s standing. He has called the attack “a humanitarian rescue mission,” even as the daytime sky of Tehran has been blackened out by smoke from bombings on oil facilities. A strike on the first day of the war killed at least a hundred and seventy-five people, most of them children, at a girls’ school in Minab; Pahlavi has so far not commented on the event. One of his top aides, Saeed Ghasseminejad, has identified in interviews and on social media critical oil and gas infrastructure that could be destroyed in the war. Many of those sites have since been hit. On March 10th, Iran’s police chief said, “From now on, if someone acts at the enemy’s behest, we will no longer consider them as a protester or anything of the sort but as the enemy.” His officers, he warned, “have their fingers on the trigger.” Four days later, Pahlavi called on the “Valiant Heroes of the Immortal Guard”—cells of armed loyalists inside the country—to attack the regime’s apparatus of repression, declaring that “help has arrived.”

美以对伊朗的战争如今成为检验巴列维声望的终极试金石。他将这场袭击称为“人道主义救援行动”,尽管德黑兰白昼的天空已被轰炸石油设施产生的浓烟染成墨色。战争首日,米纳布市一所女子学校遭袭,至少一百七十五人丧生,其中多为儿童;巴列维迄今未对此事置评。其高级顾问赛义德·加塞米内贾德通过采访和社交媒体,指认了战争中可能被摧毁的关键油气基础设施,其中多处目标此后确实遭到打击。3月10日,伊朗警察总长宣称:“从今往后,若有人按敌人旨意行事,我们将不再视其为抗议者或任何此类身份,而是直接认定为敌人。”他警告道,麾下警员“手指已扣在扳机上”。四天后,巴列维号召国内武装忠诚者组成的“不朽卫队英勇战士们”袭击政权镇压机器,宣告“援军已至”。

Netanyahu and Israel’s Defense Minister, Israel Katz, have said that the bombardment of not just Iranian military sites but also security and law-enforcement targets will “create the conditions” for the Iranian people to complete the job of overthrowing the regime. But the past three weeks have made clear that air strikes alone are not likely to achieve that goal. “From Israel’s point of view, as long as Iran is weak, it doesn’t matter if it becomes a failed state or a disintegrated state,” Raz Zimmt, the director of the Iran program at the Institute for National Security Studies, in Tel Aviv, told me. Netanyahu, commenting on the absence of an organized Iranian resistance, has all but expressed such indifference. “You can lead someone to water,” he said on March 12th. “You cannot make him drink.”

以色列总理内塔尼亚胡和国防部长卡茨表示,对伊朗军事目标以及安全与执法目标的轰炸将“创造条件”,让伊朗人民完成推翻政权的任务。但过去三周的情况表明,仅靠空袭不太可能实现这一目标。“从以色列的角度来看,只要伊朗虚弱,无论它变成失败国家还是解体国家都无关紧要,”特拉维夫国家安全研究所伊朗项目主任拉兹·齐姆特告诉我。内塔尼亚胡在评论伊朗缺乏有组织的抵抗时,几乎表达了这种漠不关心的态度。“你可以牵马到水边,”他在3月12日说,“但不能强迫它喝水。”

Trump, when asked whether Pahlavi was an option to become the next leader of Iran, said, “I guess he is. Some people like him.” But, the President went on, “it would seem to me that somebody from within might . . . maybe would be more appropriate.” Pahlavi, in turn, has seemed to tailor his public comments for Trump’s benefit. During a recent appearance on Fox News, he warned that Iranians “are not going to settle for anything that is a remnant of this system,” and that anything less than a full transition to democracy dictated by Iranians would lead to further chaos and instability. At the same time, he has thanked the U.S. President for his “humanitarian intervention.” “Iranian society is fracturing,” Nasr told me. “The fights are not over whether you support or oppose the Islamic Republic but whether your hatred for the regime is stronger than the love of your country.” Pahlavi, he said, “has basically fallen right through that fissure.”

当被问及巴列维(Pahlavi)是否可能成为伊朗下一任领导人时,特朗普表示:“我想是的。有些人喜欢他。”但总统接着说:“在我看来,来自内部的人……或许会更合适。”而巴列维似乎也在调整自己的公开言论以迎合特朗普。最近在福克斯新闻的节目中,他警告说伊朗人“不会接受任何这个体制的残余”,任何不完全由伊朗人主导的向民主过渡都将导致进一步的混乱和不稳定。与此同时,他感谢美国总统的“人道主义干预”。纳斯尔(Nasr)告诉我:“伊朗社会正在分裂。争论的焦点不是你支持还是反对伊斯兰共和国,而是你对政权的仇恨是否强于对国家的热爱。”他说,巴列维“基本上已经掉进了这条裂缝”。

Pahlavi remains the most prominent figure among the various dissidents jockeying for a leadership role in a post-Islamic Republic Iran. But, despite his seemingly good intentions, the pounding of Iran’s cities, the bombing of its palaces and cultural heritage sites, the food and gas shortages, the toxic smoke-filled skies, the dead schoolchildren, and the buzz of low-flying drones overhead all risk transforming his image from the leader of a unified future to the agent of his country’s ruin. In the ancient kingship tradition, endangering the empire would cause a king to lose his farr. No monarch in two and a half millennia of Persian history has invited a foreign power to attack the land of Iran, and nowhere in the long literary tradition of royal counsel—known as andarznameh, or “mirror for princes”—has an exception been made for the cause of ending domestic tyranny. This is the current predicament of Pahlavi, whose royal charisma has never been more on the line. ♦

在众多觊觎后伊斯兰共和国伊朗领导权的异议人士中,巴列维依然是最显赫的人物。然而,尽管他看似怀有善意,但伊朗城市遭受的猛烈轰炸、宫殿与文化遗产遗址被毁、粮食与燃气短缺、毒烟弥漫的天空、死去的学童、头顶低空盘旋的无人机嗡鸣——这一切都可能将他的形象从团结未来的领袖,转变为国家覆灭的推手。在古老的王权传统中,危及帝国将导致君王失去“灵光”。波斯两千五百年历史上,从未有君主引外敌攻伐伊朗疆土;在源远流长的“君王鉴”文学传统中,也从未为终结国内暴政之由破例。这正是巴列维当下的困境——他的王者魅力,正面临前所未有的危机。♦

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