Fault Lines

The Death of Shame Is Tearing Us Apart

羞耻之死正在撕裂我们
Increasingly, people are ignoring social norms in favor of a narrow self-interest. The results are disastrous.
越来越多的人无视社会规范,只顾狭隘的私利。后果是灾难性的。
Illustration of hands holding a trophy
Illustration by George Wylesol

This is the first in a series of columns about the decline of shame in the age of social media.

这是关于社交媒体时代羞耻感衰落系列专栏的第一篇。

This past February, during the dead months of the N.B.A. season, I went on a podcast to talk about the long-standing problem of tanking, which, for non-sports fans, is when a team purposely loses games to improve its odds of drafting the next franchise star. Domonique Foxworth, the podcast’s eponymous host, is a former N.F.L. cornerback who went on to serve as the president of the N.F.L. Players Association and then, after retirement, became the chief operating officer of the N.B.A.’s player union. On the show, he framed tanking in terms of shame. The problem with the N.B.A., he suggested, was that we, as a sports-watching society, no longer enforced any social penalties on the front offices that actively try to lose games by fielding subpar rosters or encouraging coaches to sit their best players during crunch time. People think about everything as a matter of return on investment; for middling or bad teams, there is clearly more value in losing than in winning. “We’ve gone into an optimization culture that removes the guardrails that shame used to provide,” Foxworth said.

今年二月,正值NBA赛季的沉闷期,我上了一档播客节目,聊了聊由来已久的“摆烂”问题——对于非体育迷来说,摆烂指的是一支球队故意输掉比赛,以提高抽中下一位建队核心新秀的概率。这档播客的同名主持人多莫尼克·福克斯沃斯(Domonique Foxworth)是前NFL角卫,后来担任过NFL球员工会主席,退役后又成为NBA球员工会的首席运营官。在节目中,他从羞耻的角度来谈摆烂。他提出,NBA的问题在于,我们作为一个观看体育赛事的社会,不再对那些积极试图输球的管理层施加任何社会惩罚——无论是派出实力不济的阵容,还是鼓励教练在关键时刻让最好的球员坐板凳。人们把一切都看作投资回报的问题;对于中游或弱队来说,输球的价值显然大于赢球。“我们已经进入了一种优化文化,这种文化拆掉了羞耻曾经提供的护栏,”福克斯沃斯说。

Foxworth’s lament has been stuck in my head ever since. Shame is one of the ways that groups of people mediate their norms without state intervention. This, of course, is not always a good thing. But any community without shame must have moral consensus, or else it risks splintering into the chaos of personal interpretation and individual will. How much of today’s societal collapse and atomization can be attributed to the blatant disregard for shame by what Foxworth called optimization culture? The answer might seem obvious, at first, and certainly this territory has been well trod since Donald Trump entered the political conversation, more than a decade ago. Still, I want to spend the next few weeks thinking a bit more about shame, specifically as a cultural backstop that prevents people from flagrantly violating norms.

福克斯沃斯的感叹从那时起就一直萦绕在我脑海中。羞耻是群体在没有国家干预的情况下调节规范的方式之一。当然,这并不总是好事。但任何一个没有羞耻感的社群,都必须拥有道德共识,否则就面临分裂为个人解读和个体意志的混乱的风险。当今社会的崩溃与原子化,有多少可以归因于福克斯沃斯所说的优化文化对羞耻的公然漠视?乍一看答案似乎显而易见,而且自唐纳德·特朗普十多年前进入政治话语以来,这片领域确实已经被反复耕耘过了。不过,我还是想在接下来的几周里,对羞耻多做一些思考,特别是把它视为一种防止人们公然违反规范的文化后盾。

First, a quick history of tanking. Teams have tanked for decades—the controversy has been a part of basketball discourse since at least 1984, when the Houston Rockets were accused of throwing their season to improve their shot at drafting the great center Hakeem Olajuwon. At the time, the last-place finishers in the N.B.A.’s Eastern and Western conferences would flip a coin to see who got the first pick. After the Rockets controversy, the N.B.A. introduced a lottery system. Every team that didn’t make the playoffs would be assigned an envelope; these envelopes were placed in a giant plastic bubble. During the first N.B.A. lottery, in 1985, the league’s commissioner, David Stern, reached into the plastic bubble and retrieved the envelope that happened to belong to the New York Knicks, who, of course, play in the biggest media market in the country, and who were thus able to draft Patrick Ewing, one of the most hyped college players of all time. Many still believe that the league froze the Knicks envelope so that Stern could identify it by touch.

首先,简单回顾一下摆烂的历史。球队摆烂已经有几十年了——这场争议至少从1984年起就是篮球话语的一部分,当时休斯顿火箭队被指控故意输掉整个赛季,以提高选中伟大中锋哈基姆·奥拉朱旺的概率。当时,NBA东西部排名垫底的球队会通过掷硬币来决定谁获得状元签。火箭争议之后,NBA引入了乐透抽签制度。每支未能进入季后赛的球队都会分到一个信封;这些信封被放进一个巨大的塑料球里。1985年第一次NBA乐透抽签时,联盟总裁大卫·斯特恩把手伸进塑料球,取出的信封恰好属于纽约尼克斯队——当然,尼克斯队所在的正是全美最大的媒体市场,他们因此得以选中帕特里克·尤因,这位有史以来最受炒作的大学生球员之一。许多人至今仍相信,联盟把尼克斯的信封冷冻过,好让斯特恩能靠触感辨认出来。

Since then, the panic about tanking has waxed and waned. If there was a high-water mark, it was between 2013 and 2015, when Sam Hinkie, a former finance and management-consulting professional, took over as the general manager of the Philadelphia 76ers and installed what came to be called the Process, a multiyear plan to lose as many games as possible. Hinkie’s idea was simple and, on its face, incontrovertibly expedient: if the point was to win a championship, the Sixers needed star players; the best way to get star players was through high draft picks; the best way to get high draft picks was to lose. As with the Rockets, three decades before, the problem wasn’t so much the losing as it was the shamelessness with which the franchise conducted itself. Tanking was understandable, even acceptable, but much of the public—albeit less of it than one might have thought—wanted the Sixers to at least pretend that they were trying. Hinkie, basically, said no. He would not pretend.

自那以后,关于摆烂的恐慌时起时落。如果说有一个最高水位线,那就是2013年到2015年之间,当时前金融和管理咨询从业者萨姆·辛基(Sam Hinkie)接任费城76人队总经理,推行了后来被称为“过程”(the Process)的多年计划,目标是尽可能多地输掉比赛。辛基的想法很简单,而且表面上无可辩驳地务实:如果目标是赢得总冠军,76人需要球星;获得球星的最佳途径是高顺位选秀权;获得高顺位选秀权的最佳途径就是输球。和三十年前的火箭队一样,问题与其说在于输球本身,不如说在于这支球队行事时的毫无羞耻。摆烂是可以理解的,甚至是可以接受的,但大部分公众——尽管人数比人们想象的要少——希望76人至少假装在努力。辛基基本上说了不。他不会假装。

Hinkie was forced out of his job in 2016. Tanking, of course, continued. Post-Hinkie, the league experimented with variations of the lottery, but none of them could deter teams from losing on purpose. And so, this past summer, the N.B.A. announced a full revamp of the system, with a new approach that penalizes the worst teams in the league. We will see how long this remediation lasts.

辛基于2016年被赶下台。摆烂当然还在继续。辛基之后,联盟尝试了各种乐透抽签的变体,但都无法阻止球队故意输球。于是,今年夏天,NBA宣布对制度进行全面改革,采用一种惩罚联盟最差球队的新方案。我们且看这种补救措施能维持多久。

If losing on purpose is a sin, the N.B.A. systematically escalated its efforts to scrub it from the game. The league did this because its leadership became more sensitive to fan and media outrage. In prior decades, sports were primarily covered locally, meaning that a particularly bad team in Cleveland which was obviously trying to lose would not necessarily catch the attention of a columnist at, say, the New York Post or the Los Angeles Times—and, in any case, those writers wouldn’t waste their column inches on the Cavaliers. During the 1996–97 season, for example, the Boston Celtics went 15–67 and effectively admitted to tanking for the right to draft Tim Duncan. (The effort was not successful.) This was a bit of a scandal at the time, but it didn’t lead the national sports news. Even now, not every mediocre team tries to lose every single game and maximize their draft odds—last year, the Sacramento Kings, who had one of the worst opening-day rosters in the league, tried to win games for much longer than reason would seem to dictate. But the media environment has changed. When all news is national and every outraged fan can post their thoughts on social media, a suspicious lineup in Utah in April can feed a daylong news cycle.

如果说故意输球是一种罪,那么NBA系统性地加大了将其从比赛中清除的力度。联盟之所以这样做,是因为其领导层对球迷和媒体的愤怒变得更加敏感。在过去的几十年里,体育报道主要是地方性的,这意味着克利夫兰一支明显在故意输球的烂队,不一定会引起《纽约邮报》或《洛杉矶时报》专栏作家的注意——而且无论如何,那些作者也不会把版面浪费在骑士队身上。例如,在1996-97赛季,波士顿凯尔特人队战绩为15胜67负,实际上承认了摆烂以争取选中蒂姆·邓肯的权利。(这次努力没有成功。)这在当时算是一桩小丑闻,但并没有成为全国体育新闻的头条。即使在今天,也不是每支平庸的球队都会试图输掉每一场比赛、最大化自己的选秀概率——去年,萨克拉门托国王队拥有联盟最差的开季阵容之一,但他们努力赢球的时间远远超出了理性所指示的限度。但媒体环境已经变了。当所有新闻都是全国性的,每个愤怒的球迷都可以在社交媒体上发帖时,犹他州四月的一份可疑阵容就能喂饱一整天的新闻周期。

Under this interpretation of events, front offices aren’t necessarily more shameless than they were in the past; rather, shame itself is dictated by changes in the media and in technology. A competing theory might hold that, in the pre-Olajuwon era, a coin flip sufficed because the degrees of shame and basic decency were sufficient to prevent teams from doing what the Rockets did. Once the Rockets broke the shame seal and stole away with Olajuwon, the league needed to take drastic measures, because everyone would now feel emboldened to make a mockery of the game. This view suggests that the sense of shame was collectively weakened by a series of self-interested actors who shattered the social firmament and opened up the gates to chaos. The league’s anti-tanking rules are, then, responses to moral decline. Some amalgam of fan input, ticket sales, ratings, and media outrage determines what’s right and wrong, and this collective taste shifts more slowly than the behavior of front-office opportunists.

按照这种对事件的解读,管理层未必比过去更无耻;相反,羞耻感本身是由媒体和技术的变化所决定的。另一种竞争性理论可能认为,在奥拉朱旺时代之前,掷硬币就足够了,因为羞耻感和基本体面的程度足以阻止球队做出火箭队那样的事。一旦火箭队打破了羞耻的封印,带着奥拉朱旺溜之大吉,联盟就需要采取极端措施,因为现在每个人都会感到有恃无恐,敢于把比赛变成一场闹剧。这种观点认为,羞耻感被一系列自利的行为者集体削弱了,他们打碎了社会的地基,打开了通往混乱的大门。联盟的反摆烂规则,因此是对道德滑坡的回应。球迷意见、门票销售、收视率和媒体愤怒的某种混合体决定了什么是对、什么是错,而这种集体品味的变化速度,比管理层机会主义者的行为要慢得多。

The McLuhanite in me wants to stick to the first interpretation, in which the apparent shift in shame is a matter of morality getting funnelled through a new medium. This kind of technological effect, detailed by Neil Postman in his book “Amusing Ourselves to Death,” provided the underlying premise of this column when it launched, and I still believe in its broad explanatory power. If it feels like all discourse has become unhinged and flooded with hate, full of provocations that once would have been shamed out of public life, this is probably because social media allows us the cover of anonymity and physical distance. Most people communicate digitally now, so most interactions are less mediated by shame. In person, you are much less likely to insult someone’s wife, for instance, because you would have to calculate the very real possibility that you would get punched in the face.

我身上的麦克卢汉主义者倾向让我倾向于第一种解读,即羞耻感的表面变化是道德被导入一种新媒介的问题。这种技术效应,尼尔·波兹曼在他的《娱乐至死》一书中做了详细阐述,也是本专栏创立时的基本前提,我至今仍相信它具有广泛的解释力。如果说所有话语都变得失控、充斥着仇恨,充满了过去会被羞耻感驱逐出公共生活的挑衅,那很可能是因为社交媒体给了我们匿名和物理距离的掩护。现在大多数人通过数字方式交流,所以大多数互动较少受到羞耻的调节。面对面时,你不太可能侮辱别人的妻子,因为你必须考虑到一个非常现实的可能性:你会被一拳打在脸上。

Sometimes, though, these genealogies of behavior can seem beside the point, serving only to dull one’s analysis of the situation. Twenty-four-hour news cycles, social media, and smartphones may have altered our sensitivity to shame, but they don’t explain everything. Social media has certainly helped spread what Foxworth called optimization culture, but the hiring of M.B.A.s and quants into management positions across markets didn’t happen because Elon Musk changed the Twitter algorithm. The kind of thinking that they embody has always been part of American capitalism—still, it’s everywhere now, and it’s worse.

不过,有时候,这类行为的谱系学似乎无关紧要,只会钝化一个人对局势的分析。二十四小时新闻周期、社交媒体和智能手机可能改变了我们对羞耻的敏感度,但它们不能解释一切。社交媒体无疑帮助传播了福克斯沃斯所说的优化文化,但MBA和量化分析师被聘入各行业管理岗位,并不是因为埃隆·马斯克改了推特的算法。他们所体现的那种思维一直是美国资本主义的一部分——只不过现在无处不在,而且更糟了。

In tech, finance, and, to a lesser degree, politics, those preaching a piecemeal gospel rooted in maximum optimization believe that they have obviated society’s need for shame. There is a conflict between those who still believe in social barriers and those who believe that all actions should be based on a proper calculation of the return on investment. That conflict constitutes both the present and the future of America’s culture war. The optimizers have all the money; the empaths only really have one another—and the assurance, however fleeting, that there are more of us than there are of them.

在科技、金融以及程度较轻的政治领域,那些宣扬以最大化优化为根基的零敲碎打福音的人,相信他们已经使社会对羞耻的需求变得多余。一边是仍然相信社会屏障的人,另一边是相信一切行动都应基于对投资回报的恰当计算的人,两者之间存在冲突。这种冲突构成了美国文化战争的现在和未来。优化者拥有所有的钱;共情者真正拥有的只有彼此——以及一种确信,无论多么短暂:我们的人数比他们多。

Efficient and sometimes monstrous thinking existed in the past, of course, but it generally made some effort to hide. Today, everything from our kids’ sports leagues to our parents’ nursing homes are profit-optimized right in front of our faces. Shame can no longer curtail a private-equity firm from buying up children’s sports facilities and shaving away every soft edge that made them feel like community property. Like the N.B.A., our world at large will need intervention and direct regulation to counter the gospel of flagrant optimization. ♦

高效而有时近乎可怕的思想在过去当然也存在,但它通常会做出某种努力来隐藏自己。今天,从我们孩子的体育联赛到我们父母的养老院,一切都在我们眼前被利润优化。羞耻已经无法阻止一家私募股权公司收购儿童体育设施,然后削掉每一个让它们感觉像社区财产的柔软边缘。和NBA一样,我们身处的更大世界将需要干预和直接监管,来对抗公然优化的福音。♦

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