The New Yorker Interview

The Case for A.I. Optimism

为人工智能乐观主义辩护
The tech reporter Kevin Roose discusses the rise of Anthropic, the fall of Jensen Huang, and why not to freak out—too much—about the new age enveloping us all.
科技记者凯文·鲁斯谈论Anthropic的崛起、黄仁勋的失势,以及为什么不必——过于——恐慌于正在笼罩我们所有人的新时代。
The Case for A.I. Optimism

In Washington, it is essential to read, or at least display, the collected works of Robert Caro. (The spines of “The Power Broker” and the multivolume biography in progress of Lyndon Johnson are compulsory in every Zoom background on cable news.) In Silicon Valley, the required reading list surely includes Richard Rhodes’s “The Making of the Atomic Bomb,” a magisterial history of the discovery of nuclear fission and its epochal resolution with the Manhattan Project and the start of the nuclear age. Not a few of the tech barons and innovators of our time see themselves as neo-Oppenheimers. When A.I. reaches maturity, it may get its Caro or Rhodes. In the meantime, Kevin Roose’s lucid journalistic account “The AGI Chronicles: The Inside Story of the Race to Create an Artificial Superintelligence” does the trick.

在华盛顿,阅读或至少陈列罗伯特·卡洛的全集是必不可少的。(《权力掮客》和那部仍在写作中的林登·约翰逊多卷本传记的书脊,是有线新闻里每一个Zoom背景中的必备道具。)在硅谷,必读书单上肯定有理查德·罗兹的《原子弹的制造》,这是一部关于核裂变发现及其划时代结局——曼哈顿计划和核时代开端——的权威史著。我们这个时代的科技大亨和创新者中,不少人自视为新奥本海默。当人工智能成熟之时,它或许会迎来自己的卡洛或罗兹。与此同时,凯文·鲁斯清晰明快的纪实作品《AGI编年史:人工超级智能竞赛内幕》足以胜任。

Roose is a classic beat reporter, having covered technology for outlets including the Times, The Atlantic, New York, and NPR. Recently, he bolted from the Times to work independently, and, these days, he is co-hosting a podcast, with Casey Newton, called “Machine Gods.” Among the most interesting A.I. podcasters around—on “Dwarkesh Podcast,” “No Priors,” and “Latent Space,” to name a few—Roose stands out for his ability to tell a story with narrative drive. He breaks things down neatly and clearly for the non-expert.

鲁斯是典型的条线记者,曾为《纽约时报》、《大西洋月刊》、《纽约》杂志和全国公共广播电台等媒体报道科技新闻。最近,他离开《纽约时报》独立发展,如今与凯西·牛顿共同主持一档名为《机器之神》的播客。在当下最有趣的人工智能播客主播中——比如“Dwarkesh播客”、“无先验”和“潜空间”等——鲁斯以叙事驱动讲故事的能力脱颖而出。他能把复杂的事情拆解得干净利落、清晰明了,让外行也能听懂。

I spoke with Roose for The New Yorker Radio Hour just before Anthropic, Dario Amodei’s A.I. outfit, made what has turned out to be the largest initial public offering of all time. And, of course, while Amodei and his colleagues were coming into their many billions, Jensen Huang, the former king of the Nvidia empire, which has by many metrics powered the A.I. revolution, was appealing to his old board of directors to let him back in after his humbling. On the utopian-to-doomer scale, Roose is . . . hopeful. Or, as they say on the Sabbath Gasbag shows, cautiously optimistic. His interlocutor, by nature, is less so. We had a lot to talk about.

我在《纽约客广播时间》与鲁斯对话,恰逢达里奥·阿莫迪的人工智能公司Anthropic完成了史上最大规模的首次公开募股。当然,就在阿莫迪和他的同事们跻身亿万富翁行列之际,英伟达帝国的昔日之王黄仁勋——从多个指标看,正是英伟达驱动了人工智能革命——在遭遇挫折后,正在恳求他的老董事会让他回归。在乌托邦主义者到末日论者的光谱上,鲁斯的态度是……抱有希望。或者,用安息日清谈节目的话说,谨慎乐观。而他的对话者,天性使然,则没那么乐观。我们有很多话要谈。

Anthropic is just going public. In their filing paperwork for the first half of 2026, they reported a revenue of $16.3 billion and a net loss of $80.7 billion. The company is also on the hook for $900 billion in future obligations for chips and data-center leases. How do they make the math make sense?

Anthropic刚刚上市。在2026年上半年的申报文件中,他们报告了163亿美元的营收和807亿美元的净亏损。这家公司还背负着9000亿美元的未来芯片和数据中心租赁义务。这笔账怎么算得通?

Basically, the bet that investors are making on Anthropic is that it will continue to grow at something close to the rate that it has been growing for the last several years. This is a company that has been growing faster than any company at its scale in the history of capitalism. Four or five years ago, they had essentially no revenue. Three years ago, they had tens of millions in revenue, and it’s been growing tenfold every year for the last three or four years. Not ten per cent; ten times.

基本上,投资者对Anthropic下的赌注是,它将继续以接近过去几年增长速度的水平扩张。这家公司的增长速度超过了资本主义历史上任何同等规模的企业。四五年前,他们几乎没有收入。三年前,他们的收入只有几千万美元,而过去三四年里,每年增长十倍。不是百分之十,是十倍。

That is due, in large part, to the popularity of their models for coding and other white-collar work. And the bet is that this growth just continues—that as these tools get better and more helpful, that more white-collar knowledge workers will incorporate them into their work, and developers will be paying much more, because usage will continue to go up.

这在很大程度上归功于他们的模型在编程和其他白领工作中的受欢迎程度。赌注在于这种增长会持续下去——随着这些工具变得更好、更有用,更多的白领知识工作者会把它们融入工作,开发者会支付更多费用,因为使用量会持续上升。

The math doesn’t make sense if you think that A.I. is already as popular and widely adopted as it will ever be. It starts to make more sense if you anticipate that what has been happening for the past few years will keep happening—which is that the models get better and more people use them.

如果你认为人工智能已经达到了它所能达到的普及和采用顶峰,这笔账就算不通。但如果你预期过去几年发生的事会继续发生——模型变得更好,更多人使用它们——这笔账就开始说得通了。

Some companies out here in Silicon Valley are already spending more on A.I. tokens than they are on payroll. So the long-term bet is that the economy essentially switches over from running primarily on human labor and paying human salaries to running on A.I. labor and paying token prices.

硅谷的一些公司在人工智能代币上的支出已经超过了工资支出。所以长期赌注是,经济基本上从主要依靠人类劳动和支付人类工资,转向依靠人工智能劳动和支付代币价格。

If that in fact is the right bet to make, give me a picture of the economy on an A.I. basis, as opposed to human labor. What’s it going to look like?

如果这确实是正确的赌注,给我描绘一下以人工智能为基础、而非以人类劳动为基础的经济图景。它会是什么样子?

I think it looks a lot like my company. I’m starting a startup, Machine Gods Media. We are a six-person company right now. In our Slack, where we communicate all day, we have six humans and probably a dozen agents. And the agents are doing things we don’t know how to do ourselves. They’re writing code. I just got back from what I jokingly call our engineering department, but it’s really just a bunch of Claudes running around. They’re building tools, helping with scheduling and coördination, with all of the pieces that go into making podcasts, aside from the actual talking into a microphone.

我觉得它很像我的公司。我正在创办一家初创公司,机器之神传媒。我们目前是一家六人公司。在我们全天沟通用的Slack里,有六个人类和大概十几个智能体。这些智能体在做我们自己不会做的事情。它们在写代码。我刚从我戏称为工程部的地方回来,其实就是一群Claude在四处忙活。它们在构建工具,帮助安排日程和协调工作,处理制作播客所需的所有环节——除了真正对着麦克风说话。

What would those be? Is it so complex that you need Claude to do it?

那些是什么环节?复杂到需要Claude来做吗?

It turns out to be pretty complex. For example, we have all these deliverables. When you have a show, it needs to get delivered in all these different formats. Apple needs one format, Spotify needs one format, and YouTube needs another format. And it’s all got captions, and titles, and descriptions, and metadata. And all that used to have to be done by hand. Now we have this tool that does it all for us.

事实证明相当复杂。比如,我们有所有这些交付物。当你做一档节目,它需要以各种不同的格式交付。苹果要一种格式,Spotify要一种格式,YouTube又要另一种格式。而且全都要配字幕、标题、描述和元数据。所有这些过去都得手工完成。现在我们有一个工具替我们全部搞定。

Tell me how that works for a big law firm, as opposed to a six-person podcasting outfit.

告诉我这对一家大型律所意味着什么,而不是一家六人播客公司。

It might not be a big law firm. It might actually be a small law firm, in terms of the human payroll and footprint. It might be a law firm that only has ten people, but, using A.I., they have access to essentially unlimited amounts of paralegal, junior-associate-quality labor. And so they can do, with ten people, what a more traditional firm might need a thousand people for. That may or may not be possible—there might be gaps in what these models do that might make them unsuited to that level of integration. But that’s the bet that investors are making. It’s not just that Anthropic will continue to grow or that its models will get better, but that A.I. will become the foundation of a new kind of company that will be built on top of A.I.

可能不是大型律所。从人力工资和规模来看,实际上可能是一家小型律所。可能是一家只有十个人的律所,但借助人工智能,他们可以获得几乎无限的律师助理和初级律师水平的劳动力。所以他们用十个人就能完成传统律所需要一千人才能完成的工作。这也许可行,也许不可行——这些模型可能存在某些能力缺口,使其不适合那种程度的整合。但这就是投资者下的赌注。不仅仅是Anthropic会继续增长或它的模型会变得更好,而是人工智能将成为一种建立在其上的新型公司的基础。

How many of these companies can prevail in the new world of A.I.? We have Anthropic and OpenAI, among others. Who’s in the lead and why?

在人工智能的新世界里,有多少家公司能够胜出?我们有Anthropic和OpenAI,还有其他一些。谁领先,为什么?

Right now there are two clear frontier labs: OpenAI and Anthropic. I would say that, of the two, Anthropic may be slightly ahead; its models are considered better by some metrics. But those two are definitely the front-runners. Then there’s a small-to-medium drop-off before Google DeepMind, which to my mind is the third frontier lab. And then there’s a pretty steep drop after that—to Meta, SpaceX, the Chinese open-model companies, and some other players.

目前有两个明确的前沿实验室:OpenAI和Anthropic。我会说,两者之中,Anthropic可能略占上风;按照某些指标,它的模型被认为更优秀。但这两家绝对是领跑者。然后有一个中小幅度的落差,才到谷歌DeepMind,在我看来它是第三个前沿实验室。再往后落差就相当大了——到Meta、SpaceX、中国的开源模型公司,以及其他一些参与者。

What do I get out of using Anthropic’s Claude, as opposed to OpenAI’s ChatGPT?

使用Anthropic的Claude,与使用OpenAI的ChatGPT相比,我能得到什么不同的东西?

I use both of them—I’m pretty promiscuous. I find that some are better for some tasks than for other tasks. I use Claude to write code and to get editorial feedback on my writing. I don’t use A.I. to write, but I do use it to help me revise and edit—

我两个都用——我挺不专一的。我发现有些模型更适合某些任务,有些适合另一些。我用Claude写代码,也用它来获取对我写作的编辑反馈。我不用人工智能来写作,但我确实用它来帮助我修改和编辑——

As an editor, I have to stop you there. Do you get editorial feedback that is any good, as compared to when you wrote for the New York Times, or when you wrote your book?

作为编辑,我得在这里打断你。你得到的编辑反馈,跟你为《纽约时报》写作或写书时相比,质量好吗?

I’ve been blessed and fortunate to have some of the most amazing human editors in my career, including at the Times and at F.S.G., where I published my book. So I hope they’re plugging their ears when they hear this next part: A.I. has gotten really good at editing.

我很幸运,职业生涯中拥有一些最出色的人类编辑,包括在《纽约时报》和出版我书的法勒、斯特劳斯和吉鲁出版社。所以我希望他们听到下面这段话时捂住耳朵:人工智能在编辑方面已经变得非常出色。

You’re killing me here, Kevin.

凯文,你这是在要我的命。

I know. Look, I’m not here to tell reassuring fictions. I’m here to tell uncomfortable truths. I had a council of Claudes that would look at my chapters before I submitted them to F.S.G., and give me feedback from various perspectives. I would assign one to be the dyed-in-the-wool A.I. skeptic, and one to be an A.I. historian that knew all of the technical details about the history of these labs. And I would get the feedback in the form of these long dossiers. Maybe ninety per cent of it was crap, but ten per cent was great. My council of Claudes actually caught a few mistakes that would’ve otherwise made it into—

我知道。听着,我不是来讲述令人安心的虚构故事的。我是来讲令人不安的真相的。我有一个Claude顾问团,在我把章节提交给出版社之前,它们会审阅我的章节,从不同角度给我反馈。我会指派一个扮演彻头彻尾的人工智能怀疑论者,另一个扮演熟悉这些实验室全部技术细节的人工智能历史学家。然后我会收到以长篇档案形式呈现的反馈。也许百分之九十都是垃圾,但百分之十非常棒。我的Claude顾问团确实抓出了几个错误,否则那些错误就会出现在——

Whoa, whoa, whoa. Ninety per cent of the comments were crap, and you think that’s good editorial counsel?

等等,等等,等等。百分之九十的评论都是垃圾,你还觉得这是好的编辑意见?

Well, how much of what your editors give you is useful?

那你的编辑给你的东西有多少是有用的?

One hundred per cent!

百分之百!

[Laughs.] Well, maybe it’s just my vanity that makes me think it’s only ten per cent useful. But I do feel like, if you’re willing to wade through a bunch of subpar feedback, you can actually find good stuff in there.

[笑。] 好吧,也许只是我的虚荣心让我觉得只有百分之十有用。但我确实觉得,如果你愿意在一堆平庸的反馈中筛选,你确实能找到好东西。

The P.R. that I get is that Anthropic is the good company, as you suggest. The job interviews even have a moral dimension. Whereas OpenAI is quite a different thing. Is that fair?

我得到的公关信息是,正如你所暗示的,Anthropic是好公司。连面试都有道德维度。而OpenAI则是完全不同的东西。这种说法公平吗?

That’s the image that has been portrayed.

那是被塑造出来的形象。

What’s the reality?

现实是什么?

The reality is that Anthropic and OpenAI are locked in this race together. I think we have been focussing on the wrong question with respect to these companies. I’ve spent time with Sam Altman, with Dario Amodei, and with many leaders and researchers at these companies. We in the tech press are used to asking the question of “Are the people running these companies good and trustworthy?” To my mind, that’s less useful than looking at the technology itself.

现实是,Anthropic和OpenAI被锁定在同一场竞赛中。我认为我们一直在关注关于这些公司的错误问题。我和山姆·奥特曼、达里奥·阿莫迪,以及这些公司的许多领导者和研究人员都相处过。我们科技媒体习惯问的问题是:“经营这些公司的人是否善良、值得信赖?”在我看来,这不如审视技术本身有用。

A good, moral, ethical person could still build an A.I. model that goes rogue and kills millions of people. On the other side of the coin, someone who is totally craven and corrupt could manage to produce an incredibly ethical A.I. model with all of the proper guardrails. I don’t know that it makes sense to fit the image of the founder or the C.E.O. onto the over-all impression we have of these companies.

一个善良、有道德、有操守的人,仍然可能造出一个失控并杀死数百万人的AI模型。反过来说,一个完全卑劣腐败的人,也可能设法制造出一个带有所有适当防护措施的、极其合乎伦理的AI模型。我不确定把创始人或CEO的形象套用在我们对这些公司的整体印象上是否有意义。

In your book, which is fascinating, you write that a surprising number of people who work in these A.I. companies joined because they were . . . terrified. They decided that, if A.I. was going to be built, it would be better for it to be built by people who were scared, who were alarmed, who were cautious, so that the appropriate measures against disaster would be taken. Is there any evidence that these people, who are terrified, are having a significant impact within the companies—to hold them back, restrain them, to modify?

在你那本引人入胜的书里,你写道,在这些AI公司工作的人中,有惊人数量的人加入是因为他们……感到恐惧。他们认定,如果AI注定要被造出来,那么由那些害怕的人、警觉的人、谨慎的人来造会更好,这样就会采取适当的措施来防范灾难。有没有证据表明,这些感到恐惧的人在公司内部产生了重大影响——去拉住他们、约束他们、做出修正?

Absolutely. It’s almost impossible to imagine a counterfactual, because the companies were started by people who were terrified of A.I. Sam Altman and Elon Musk started OpenAI, in 2015, because they were scared that Demis Hassabis and Google DeepMind were going to win the race to A.G.I., artificial general intelligence. And then, several years later, Dario Amodei and six of his co-workers at OpenAI left to start Anthropic because they were terrified of the technology, and they didn’t trust Sam Altman to build it safely.

绝对有。几乎无法想象一个反事实的情境,因为这些公司本身就是由对AI感到恐惧的人创立的。山姆·奥特曼和埃隆·马斯克在2015年创办OpenAI,是因为他们害怕德米斯·哈萨比斯和谷歌DeepMind会赢得通往AGI——通用人工智能——的竞赛。几年后,达里奥·阿莫迪和他在OpenAI的六名同事离开,创办了Anthropic,因为他们对这项技术感到恐惧,而且他们不信任山姆·奥特曼能安全地建造它。

This is a recurring motif in the modern A.I. industry: people who are scared of A.I., and who don’t believe their bosses or rivals are taking enough steps to contain it, break off and start their own companies. They say, “We’re going to be the safe A.G.I. company. Those other guys are going to blow up the world if they do it, but we can be trusted.”

这是现代AI产业中反复出现的主题:害怕AI的人,不相信自己的老板或竞争对手采取了足够措施来遏制它,于是脱离出去创办自己的公司。他们说:“我们要做安全的AGI公司。那些家伙要是来做,会把世界炸掉,但我们可以被信任。”

Some of this, it seems to me, has to do with personality, and how that personality is projected to the wider world through the press. Sam Altman projects one kind of personality, and Dario Amodei perhaps another. Tell me a little about those differences and what effect they have.

在我看来,其中一些与个性有关,以及这种个性如何通过媒体投射到更广阔的世界。山姆·奥特曼投射出一种个性,达里奥·阿莫迪或许是另一种。给我讲讲这些差异以及它们产生的影响。

Sam Altman is a master salesman and fund-raiser. That is his superpower. From a very young age, he was a networker; he was close to major dealmakers in Silicon Valley, and extremely talented at raising money. He ran Y Combinator, the startup incubator, before leaving to become the C.E.O. of OpenAI. His reputation is that of an extremely ambitious, high-E.Q. people pleaser. As someone once told me, his superpower is being able to zero in on exactly what you want to hear and give it to you. That has served him well in some instances and poorly in others, such as when his board decided that he was lying to them and tried to fire him. It has also contributed to his reputation as somewhat two-faced or duplicitous.

山姆·奥特曼是推销和筹款的大师。这是他的超能力。从很年轻的时候起,他就是个善于经营人脉的人;他与硅谷的重要交易撮合者关系密切,在融资方面天赋异禀。他经营过创业孵化器Y Combinator,之后离开去担任OpenAI的首席执行官。他的名声是一个极其雄心勃勃、高情商、善于取悦他人的人。正如有人曾告诉我的,他的超能力是能够精准锁定你想听的话,然后说给你听。这在某些情况下帮了他大忙,在另一些情况下则害了他,比如当他的董事会认定他在对他们撒谎并试图解雇他时。这也助长了他有些两面三刀或口是心非的名声。

What about Dario?

达里奥呢?

Dario is very high-I.Q., stubborn, and neurotic. He’s a moral absolutist, with a strong belief in what is good and right and righteous. He’s also a brilliant scientist who foresaw many of today’s A.I. trends and dynamics years before anyone else. His superpower—and his kryptonite—is that he cannot lie. Someone close to him once told me, “Dario is a guy who cannot tell a lie to save his life, which is an asset for us on even-numbered days and a liability on odd-numbered days.”

达里奥智商极高,固执,而且神经质。他是一个道德绝对主义者,对什么是善、什么是正确、什么是正义有着坚定的信念。他也是一位杰出的科学家,比任何人都早几年预见了当今AI的许多趋势和动态。他的超能力——也是他的致命弱点——是他不会撒谎。一个与他关系密切的人曾告诉我:“达里奥是个为了保命也说不出谎的人,这对我们来说,逢双日是资产,逢单日是负债。”

How does that work?

这怎么讲?

Sometimes it leads to him standing his ground and standing up for his principles. When the Pentagon says, “We want to use Claude for whatever we want to do,” he’s the guy who has the cojones to stand up to them, while everyone else is busy trying to snivel and get on their good side.

有时这导致他坚守立场、捍卫自己的原则。当五角大楼说“我们想用Claude做任何我们想做的事”时,他是那个有胆量顶回去的人,而其他所有人都在忙着谄媚讨好、试图博取好感。

The Pentagon banned the use of Claude.

五角大楼禁止使用Claude。

Yes. And a lot of people at Anthropic saw that and admired Dario for standing his ground, even when it would have been expedient for him to say whatever it took to make Pete Hegseth happy. But it also leads to these incredible moments. Remember that press briefing outside the White House, where all these A.I. C.E.O.s were standing in a semicircle? Dario was practically jumping out of his skin, unable to conceal his displeasure at having to stand alongside these cowards. He couldn’t hide it. It was written all over his face. So, I think that’s what they meant by an asset on even-numbered days and a liability on odd-numbered days.

是的。Anthropic的很多人看到这一点,钦佩达里奥坚守立场,即便当时说些让皮特·赫格塞斯高兴的话对他更有利。但这也导致了那些令人难以置信的时刻。还记得白宫外的那场新闻发布会吗?所有那些AI公司的CEO站成半圆形?达里奥几乎坐立不安,无法掩饰他不得不与这些懦夫站在一起的不快。他藏不住。全写在脸上了。所以,我想这就是他们所说的逢双日是资产、逢单日是负债的意思。

What has stood out most for you in Anthropic’s I.P.O. and the way this has all gone?

在Anthropic的IPO以及整个过程中,最让你印象深刻的是什么?

I think about the absolute rocket-ship trajectory this company has been on, more than any other company I’ve ever covered, and perhaps more than any company that has ever existed.

我想到的是这家公司火箭般的上升轨迹,超过了我报道过的任何一家公司,也许超过了有史以来任何一家公司。

The first time I visited Anthropic to report on them was three years ago. Three years—not that long ago. They had a hundred and fifty employees, working out of a cramped office in Jackson Square, in San Francisco. They didn’t even have a sign-in desk. You just took the elevator up and started walking around. They had no plans to make money. They weren’t a commercial enterprise and had barely released a product. They were a bunch of A.I.-safety-obsessed nerds who seemed genuinely worried about the technology.

我第一次去Anthropic做报道是三年前。三年——并不算久。他们有一百五十名员工,在旧金山杰克逊广场一个拥挤的办公室里工作。他们连前台签到桌都没有。你直接坐电梯上去,然后开始四处走动。他们没有赚钱的计划。他们不是商业企业,几乎还没有发布任何产品。他们是一群痴迷于AI安全的书呆子,似乎真的对这项技术感到担忧。

If you had told me on that first visit that, three years later, this company would go public at a valuation of more than a trillion dollars and become one of the largest companies in the world, I would have laughed in your face. It seemed so unlikely that they would go from a little hundred-and-fifty-person startup to a company with, I think, more than five thousand employees, and one of the biggest in the world.

如果在我第一次去的时候你告诉我,三年后这家公司会以超过一万亿美元的估值上市,成为世界上最大的公司之一,我会当面嘲笑你。他们从一家一百五十人的小初创公司变成一家我认为拥有五千多名员工、全球最大的公司之一,这看起来太不可能了。

There’s perhaps a too easy confidence in the world of long-form journalism that what we do is special—that gathering information, analyzing it, and presenting it in narrative form is something A.I. simply won’t be able to do. Whereas asking for the ten best restaurants in Seattle is easy enough: you can scrape that information off the internet and present it. Are we living in a dream?

在长篇新闻界,也许有一种过于轻易的自信,认为我们所做的工作是特殊的——收集信息、分析信息、以叙事形式呈现信息,是AI根本无法做到的。而查询西雅图最好的十家餐厅则容易得多:你可以从互联网上抓取信息然后呈现出来。我们是不是活在梦里?

I think we are. I think there will still be a market for human-authored work—there’s just something about A.I. writing that is hollow and generic. But what’s interesting is that researchers have conducted blind tests in which people are shown two snippets of writing and asked which they prefer. Most of the time, when they don’t know which is which, people prefer the A.I.-generated work.

我觉得是的。我认为人类创作的作品仍然会有市场——AI写的东西就是有一种空洞和套路的感觉。但有趣的是,研究人员做过盲测,给人们看两段文字,问他们更喜欢哪一段。大多数时候,当人们不知道哪段是哪段时,他们更喜欢AI生成的作品。

Really?

真的吗?

But when people learn which one was A.I. and which one was human-written, the preference swaps.

但当人们知道哪一段是AI写的、哪一段是人写的之后,偏好就反转了。

So, what does that tell you?

那这说明了什么?

Almost everyone likes the human-written one.

几乎所有人都喜欢人写的那一段。

They like the idea of the human-written one, but they might not innately like the human one at all.

他们喜欢的是“人写的”这个概念,但他们未必天生就喜欢人写的内容本身。

I think the future of at least some writing will involve humans sticking their names on A.I.-generated literature because they don’t want to break that connection, that spell, with the audience.

我认为至少一部分写作的未来会是:人类把自己的名字署在AI生成的文字上,因为他们不想打破与读者之间的那种联结,那种魔力。

That is not entirely reassuring, Kevin.

凯文,这并不完全令人安心。

I’m sorry. I wish I had a rosier view.

抱歉。我也希望我的看法能更乐观一些。

On the continuum from doomers, people who believe A.I. will kill us all, to those who are absolutely sanguine about this whole thing—who think it’s going to be great and we’re going to work one day a week and spend the rest of our time sunning ourselves and, I don’t know, whistling—you are pretty sanguine about this subject, and the opposite of a doomer. Am I right?

在从末日论者——认为AI会杀死我们所有人的人——到对这一切完全乐观的人——认为一切都会很好,我们每周工作一天,其余时间晒太阳,我也不知道,吹口哨——的光谱上,你对这个话题相当乐观,是末日论者的反面。我说得对吗?

I am an optimist by temperament. I believe that we can and should thread this needle, but we’ve got a lot of work to do.

我天性是个乐观主义者。我相信我们能够也应该穿过这个针眼,但我们还有很多工作要做。

What concerns you the most?

你最担心的是什么?

Right now, what concerns me is an intelligence explosion. That’s a term in the A.I. industry for what could happen after A.I. becomes capable of building A.I. It’s sometimes called “recursive self-improvement.” It’s the idea that an A.I. model becomes superhuman at developing other A.I. models, capable of doing the entire workload of a senior research engineer at OpenAI or Anthropic. That hasn’t happened yet, but some people, including at METR, a credible third-party organization, believe it could happen within the next year. At that point, you could use A.I., in a closed, no-human environment, to train more capable A.I. models.

眼下,我担心的是智能爆炸。这是人工智能行业里的一个术语,指的是人工智能具备构建人工智能的能力之后可能发生的事。有时也叫“递归式自我改进”。意思是,一个人工智能模型在开发其他人工智能模型方面变得超人一等,能干完OpenAI或Anthropic一位资深研究工程师的全部工作量。这还没有发生,但包括可信的第三方机构METR在内的一些人认为,未来一年内就可能出现。到那时,你就可以在一个封闭、无人的环境里,用人工智能去训练能力更强的人工智能模型。

What are the potential disasters, in concrete terms, that could come out of that manifestation?

具体来说,这种局面可能带来哪些灾难?

If these people are right—and let’s caveat that they might not be—but if we were to see, say, a decade’s worth of improvements in A.I. capabilities compressed into a single year, because all of this could happen at machine speed rather than at human speed, I think we’d be looking at systems that start breaking a lot of things all at once. We’re already seeing some of this with cyberattacks, the incident involving Hugging Face, and the U.S. government scrambling to contain threats to critical infrastructure from these A.I. models. Imagine that, but times ten or times a hundred. There’s just a base rate of chaos and instability—

如果这些人说得对——我们先声明,他们也可能说错——但假如我们真的看到,原本需要十年才能实现的人工智能能力提升被压缩到一年之内,因为这一切都可能以机器速度而非人类速度发生,我想我们面对的将是各种系统同时开始大量出问题。我们已经看到了一些苗头:网络攻击、涉及Hugging Face的事件,以及美国政府手忙脚乱地遏制这些人工智能模型对关键基础设施构成的威胁。想象一下那种局面,再乘以十倍或一百倍。混乱和不稳定本来就有个基础概率——

And, at the same time, a very low propensity toward regulation.

与此同时,监管的意愿却非常低。

For now. But I think that could change very quickly. In fact, I believe part of the reason the Democrats won the midterms so decisively was—

目前是这样。但我认为这可能会很快改变。事实上,我相信民主党之所以能在中期选举中赢得如此干脆,部分原因就是——

Anxiety about A.I.

对人工智能的焦虑。

People had anxiety about A.I. So things could change pretty quickly on this. As unpopular as A.I. might be right now, I expect it to be even more unpopular. Right now we’re seeing this massive backlash against A.I. Unemployment is still under five per cent. It was not at all intuitive to me that we would see this level of backlash before any of the widespread job losses arrived.

人们对人工智能感到焦虑。所以这方面的情况可能变得很快。尽管人工智能现在可能已经很不受欢迎,我预计它还会更不受欢迎。眼下我们正看到对人工智能的大规模反弹。失业率还在百分之五以下。在大规模失业到来之前就看到这种程度的反弹,对我来说完全不是直觉能想到的。

Well, because you’re reading about it every two seconds, and you’re seeing reports on it on television and YouTube. There’s an anticipatory anxiety about it.

嗯,因为你每两秒钟就会读到相关报道,电视上和YouTube上也能看到。这是一种预期性的焦虑。

But think about how much more anxiety there would be if people were actually losing their jobs en masse. I desperately want that not to happen, but, to me, the timing of this backlash has been a little surprising, because it seems like there’s still a lot more risk out there to be priced in.

但想想看,如果人们真的开始大规模失业,焦虑会有多严重。我非常不希望那种情况发生,但对我来说,这次反弹出现的时机有点出人意料,因为外面似乎还有大量风险没有被计入。

Now, I think you have to be impressed that we’ve gotten this far in our conversation without having mentioned Jensen Huang. What do you make of this? What did we just see? My God, it’s like the worst James Bond plot you have ever experienced.

说到这里,我想我们聊了这么久还没提到黄仁勋,这本身就挺了不起。你怎么看这件事?我们刚刚看到了什么?天哪,这简直是你经历过的最烂的詹姆斯·邦德剧情。

It really is. It’s dime-store stuff. This is a guy who has been so central to the A.I. boom. Nvidia’s G.P.U.s are the reason we have any of this today.

确实如此。简直是地摊货级别的情节。这个人在人工智能热潮中一直处于核心位置。英伟达的GPU是我们今天拥有这一切的原因。

Tell us what a G.P.U. is.

给我们讲讲什么是GPU。

G.P.U. is a graphics-processing unit. Basically, a modern A.I. chip is descended from these things that gamers used to stick in their PCs to render backgrounds and polygons better. And Jensen Huang is the reason that those chips are now the most valuable commodity in the world—so valued that we’ve had to pass special export controls to prevent China from getting access to them, because, if compute is the determining factor between success and failure, we don’t want them to get our most powerful chips.

GPU是图形处理器。基本上,现代人工智能芯片是从游戏玩家过去插在个人电脑里、用来更好地渲染背景和多边形的那种东西演变而来的。而黄仁勋就是让这些芯片成为当今世界最有价值商品的人——价值高到我们不得不通过专门的出口管制来阻止中国获得它们,因为如果算力是决定成败的因素,我们就不想让他们拿到我们最强大的芯片。

Do you figure they have it anyway?

你觉得他们反正也搞到手了吗?

It sure seems like they’ve gotten a bunch of them anyway. And the question is—

看起来他们确实已经搞到了一批。问题是——

Thanks to Alice Huang?

多亏了黄爱丽丝?

Well, there’s this whole gray market of cutouts in Malaysia, Singapore, and other countries. They’ll buy a bunch of Nvidia chips because they’re allowed to buy them—they’re not China—and then they’ll either set up a data center and give Chinese companies remote access to it, or, in some cases, they’ll just smuggle the chips into China. And one of the major questions going forward is how much of this Jensen Huang knew about. Was he aware that Nvidia chips were being smuggled into China? And how much did his relationship with Alice Huang and Megaspeed factor into that?

嗯,在马来西亚、新加坡和其他国家有一整套灰色市场的中间人。他们会买一堆英伟达芯片,因为他们被允许购买——他们不是中国——然后要么建一个数据中心,让中国公司远程接入,要么在某些情况下直接把芯片走私到中国。而今后的一个主要问题是,黄仁勋对其中多少情况知情。他是否知道英伟达芯片正被走私到中国?他与黄爱丽丝以及Megaspeed的关系在多大程度上与此有关?

So, what are the ramifications of this?

那么,这件事会带来什么后果?

I mean, we’ll see where Jensen Huang ends up. He’s now saying he would like to return to Nvidia. I suspect that won’t work.

我的意思是,我们等着看黄仁勋的结局吧。他现在说自己想回到英伟达。我怀疑那行不通。

I’d like to win the Super Bowl, too, but I don’t think that’s happening.

我还想赢超级碗呢,但我觉得那也不会发生。

In the short term, it means that the entire industry will have to approach things slightly differently. For many years, Jensen Huang has been the sole guy with control of the commodity that everyone in A.I. needs—the key ingredient. His relationships really determined who got how many of Nvidia’s latest chips. It was not a pure auction market. It was, like, “Oh, Alice Huang and I are friends, so I’ll save some of these chips for Megaspeed.” Or, “Elon Musk and I go way back. I’ll give him a big allotment.”

短期来看,这意味着整个行业都不得不以略微不同的方式行事。多年来,黄仁勋一直是唯一掌控着人工智能领域人人都需要的这种商品的人——那个关键原料。他的关系网真的决定了谁能拿到多少英伟达最新芯片。这不是一个纯粹的拍卖市场。更像是,“哦,黄爱丽丝和我是朋友,所以我给Megaspeed留一些芯片。”或者,“埃隆·马斯克和我交情很深。我给他一大笔配额。”

Who benefitted most from the relationship?

谁从这种关系中受益最大?

Elon Musk has gotten a very large allotment of chips that was maybe out of step with his company’s importance in A.I. because he and Jensen Huang are old friends. I think Sam Altman has benefitted from a close relationship with Jensen Huang.

埃隆·马斯克拿到了非常大的一批芯片配额,这或许与他的公司在人工智能领域的重要性并不相称,因为他和黄仁勋是老朋友。我认为萨姆·奥尔特曼也从与黄仁勋的密切关系中受益。

Dario Amodei and Anthropic have actually not had a close relationship with Jensen Huang. As I reported in my book, there was a very tense meeting between Dario Amodei and Jensen Huang—it was the first time they’d met, and Jensen was basically grandstanding about how big the data center they were going to build was, while Dario was peppering him with somewhat rude questions. “Oh, how big is it going to be? What order of magnitude? Where are you going to get the power?” And eventually Dario mutters to someone sitting next to him that Jensen is acting Trump-like, and the two of them didn’t like each other for a long time.

达里奥·阿莫代伊和Anthropic实际上与黄仁勋关系并不密切。正如我在书中所报道的,达里奥·阿莫代伊和黄仁勋之间有过一次非常紧张的会面——那是他们第一次见面,黄仁勋基本上是在炫耀他们要建的数据中心有多大,而达里奥则不断抛出一些略显无礼的问题。“哦,它会有多大?什么数量级?你从哪里弄到电力?”最后达里奥对坐在旁边的人嘀咕说,黄仁勋表现得像特朗普,此后很长一段时间,这两人互相看不顺眼。

If Dario didn’t have that kind of access for Anthropic, how has he prevailed anyway?

如果达里奥为Anthropic争取不到那种渠道,他又是怎么走到今天的?

They have adopted a very unusual compute strategy—they have essentially gotten a little bit from everyone. They have a bunch of Amazon chips called Trainium. They rent a bunch of chips from Google, and they have a bunch of Nvidia chips, too. Rather than tethering themselves to one chip company or one hyperscaler, they have drawn from all of them to varying degrees. But they’re compute-constrained just like everyone else in the industry. They wish they had more data centers. They wish they had more chips. No one’s got enough.

他们采用了一种非常不寻常的算力策略——基本上是从每家都拿一点。他们有一批亚马逊的Trainium芯片。他们从谷歌租用一批芯片,也有一批英伟达芯片。他们没有把自己绑在某一家芯片公司或某一家超大规模云服务商身上,而是不同程度地从所有这些来源获取资源。但他们和业内所有人一样受到算力限制。他们希望有更多数据中心。他们希望有更多芯片。谁都不够用。

I think it’s fair to say that when the internet and the iPhone first appeared we had no real concept of what an unregulated experiment on human consciousness and behavior these things would represent, on all kinds of levels—whether it was about reading, concentration, mental health, or how we related to each other. Here we are again, on the brink of another revolution that is arguably much greater—something vastly more complicated. Despite your optimism, in terms of human relations and the way we live our lives, what are you expecting in the next decade or so?

我想可以这么说,当互联网和iPhone刚出现时,我们完全没有意识到,这些东西会在各个层面上——无论是阅读、专注力、心理健康,还是我们彼此相处的方式——构成一场对人类意识和行为不受监管的实验。现在我们又站在另一场革命的边缘,而这场革命可以说要宏大得多——复杂程度也高得多。尽管你很乐观,但在人际关系和我们生活方式方面,你预计未来十年左右会发生什么?

A decade is so long from now, David.

大卫,十年太遥远了。

That’s fair.

说得有道理。

I struggle to think about what the world will look like in a year.

我连一年后的世界会是什么样都很难想象。

Really?

真的吗?

I do. I think parts of it will look largely the same. I will still probably drop my kid off at school, go to the grocery store. There will be parts of my life that are much the same.

真的。我觉得有些部分会大体保持不变。我大概还是会送孩子上学,去杂货店买东西。我生活中的某些部分会跟现在差不多。

But when you and I talk next Thanksgiving, what will we have experienced? What changes will have been brought into our lives over the course of a year?

但等到明年感恩节我们再聊的时候,我们会经历些什么?一年之内,我们的生活会迎来哪些变化?

If the next year plays out in a way that is thoughtful, I think we will have put in place vastly more guardrails.

如果接下来这一年以一种深思熟虑的方式展开,我认为我们会建立起多得多的防护栏。

Where do you get your confidence that thoughtfulness is anywhere in abundance in the U.S. government, or anywhere else?

你凭什么相信美国政府或其他任何地方有足够的深思熟虑?

Thoughtful, or maybe just self-interested. I think we have a deep desire to remain in control of our society, of our government, of our surroundings, of our lives. We still want to be in the driver’s seat. And as long as we recognize that A.I. is not just a tool or a hype bubble but is actually, in some sense, a type of entity that could displace us at the top of the intelligence ladder . . . We could be the second-smartest thing on earth a year from now, and I think we have a lot to do between now and then. But my hope would be that we look back and say, “Wow, that was a crazy year, and a bunch of cybersecurity incidents happened, and we fixed a bunch of stuff just in time, and it was like Y2K. It could have been this major crisis, but we averted it through heroic effort and late nights at the computer terminal.” That, I think, is the good outcome.

深思熟虑,或者也许只是出于自身利益。我认为我们有一种深切的渴望,想要继续掌控我们的社会、我们的政府、我们的环境、我们的生活。我们仍然想坐在驾驶座上。只要我们认识到,人工智能不仅仅是一种工具或一个炒作泡沫,而是在某种意义上是一种可能取代我们登上智能阶梯顶端的实体……一年之后,我们可能成为地球上第二聪明的东西,而我认为从现在到那时,我们有很多事要做。但我的希望是,将来回望时我们会说:“哇,那真是疯狂的一年,发生了一堆网络安全事件,我们赶在最后一刻修复了一堆问题,就像千年虫一样。它本可能成为一场重大危机,但我们通过英勇的努力和深夜守在电脑终端前的奋战,把它化解了。”我认为,那就是好的结局。

That’s a lot of close calls to endure and still be an optimist.

要经历这么多千钧一发的时刻,还能保持乐观,真不容易。

We’ve done it before.

我们以前做到过。

When?

什么时候?

Y2K, the Cold War. The Industrial Revolution played out over seventy-five or eighty years, but we muddled through. It did not lead to human extinction.

千年虫,冷战。工业革命持续了七八十年,但我们磕磕绊绊地熬过来了。它并没有导致人类灭绝。

A lot of people talk about a kill switch for A.I., as if, when things get out of hand, suddenly somebody goes to a special room and turns a switch and A.I. is turned off and things can settle down, and whatever is broken can be fixed. What is a kill switch? Is it an imaginary construct or is it a real thing?

很多人谈论人工智能的“终止开关”,好像一旦事情失控,就会有人突然走进一个特殊房间,扳动一个开关,人工智能就被关掉了,一切就能平息下来,坏掉的东西也能修好。什么是终止开关?它是一个虚构的概念,还是真实存在的东西?

It’s an imaginary construct. I think it comes from science-fiction movies or thrillers where—

它是一个虚构的概念。我觉得它来自科幻电影或惊悚片,那里——

That’s where I get all my best stuff.

我最好的东西都是从那儿来的。

The red lights in the control room start blinking, and the engineer sprints over to the server rack and yanks out the cord—

控制室里的红灯开始闪烁,工程师冲向服务器机架,一把拔掉电源线——

Clips the blue wire instead of the red wire. Bruce Willis always chooses correctly.

剪蓝线而不是红线。布鲁斯·威利斯总是选对。

Unfortunately, that is not how modern A.I. systems are running. They are distributed across huge numbers of servers and data centers. And there’s been some research into how these things can actually replicate themselves on smart devices, like smart ovens and toasters in your home. We can’t just pull the plug if it might mean taking down some huge chunk of computers across the world.

遗憾的是,现代人工智能系统并不是这样运行的。它们分布在大量服务器和数据中心上。而且已经有一些研究探讨这些东西如何在智能设备上自我复制,比如你家里的智能烤箱和烤面包机。如果拔掉插头可能意味着让全世界一大片计算机瘫痪,那我们就不能简单地一拔了之。

In a few years, are we going to be at twenty-five-per-cent unemployment?

几年后,我们的失业率会达到百分之二十五吗?

I hope not. I hope we will continue to find useful and valuable things to do, but I think a lot of that depends on the decisions we make not just as a public sector, as the government, as regulators, but as employers and business leaders. I mean, do you fire your human workers as soon as they’re no longer technically adding anything to the organization, or do you retrain them for some other part of the job? I hope that we have enlightened leaders out there who will see it as part of their responsibility not to conduct layoffs as soon as it’s technically feasible.

我希望不会。我希望我们能继续找到有用、有价值的事情去做,但我认为这在很大程度上取决于我们做出的决定——不仅是作为公共部门、政府、监管者,也是作为雇主和商业领袖。我的意思是,你是等人类员工在技术上不再为组织增加任何价值时就立刻解雇他们,还是把他们重新培训到其他岗位上去?我希望我们有一些开明的领导者,他们会把不在技术上可行的那一刻就裁员视为自己责任的一部分。

Where does your sense of confidence, whether in the government or the private sector, reside?

你对政府或私营部门的信心从何而来?

My confidence resides in the public, actually. As recipients, users, and, in some cases, victims of this technology, we are not powerless or impotent. We have seen large, society-altering technological transformations turn out great, because people made it turn out great. My optimism also comes from the general belief that technology usually makes our lives better in the long run. ♦

我的信心其实来自公众。作为这项技术的接受者、使用者,在某些情况下也是受害者,我们并不是无能为力或软弱无力的。我们见过大规模、改变社会的技术变革最终走向成功,因为人们让它走向了成功。我的乐观也来自一个普遍信念:从长远来看,技术通常会让我们的生活变得更好。♦

The New Yorker Radio Hour is a co-production of WNYC Studios and The New Yorker.

《纽约客广播时间》由WNYC Studios与《纽约客》联合制作。

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