The Lede

Sheltering in Jerusalem and Looking at the Iran War

在耶路撒冷避难,遥望伊朗战争
Will Donald Trump sustain Benjamin Netanyahu’s preëmptive wars?
唐纳德·特朗普会支持本雅明·内塔尼亚胡的先发制人战争吗?
Jerusalem at nighttime with airstrike lines in the sky.
Photograph by Ammar Awad / Reuters

There is a Hebrew word for “squeezed,” sachut, which also means “being played.” In Jerusalem, after more than a week of the war that the United States and Israel launched on Iran, that state of mind seems inescapable. In the German Colony neighborhood, where my family lives, the constant, low growl of fighter jets has become a kind of white noise. Schools are closed, as are restaurants that don’t have shelters, but banks and shopping centers are open at unpredictable hours. Day and night, smartphones deliver a tone, piercing enough to start dogs trembling, alerting us to incoming missiles or drones. There are fewer alerts now, but they come episodically. We then listen for a chorus of sirens, which means that a missile or drone is headed to our general area. The German Colony is in the city center, just a mile or so from the Al Aqsa Mosque, so not a likely target for Islamic forces. But if a missile is shot down overhead, large pieces of shrapnel will be falling.

希伯来语中有一个词叫“sachut”,意为“被挤压”,也指“被玩弄”。在耶路撒冷,美国和以色列对伊朗发动的战争持续一周多后,这种心境似乎无处不在。在我家所在的德国侨民区,战斗机持续低沉的轰鸣已成为一种背景噪音。学校已经停课,没有防空洞的餐馆也已歇业,但银行和购物中心仍在不定时营业。昼夜不停,智能手机总会发出刺耳的警报声——尖锐到足以让狗颤抖——提醒我们有导弹或无人机来袭。现在警报少了些,但仍会不时响起。接着我们会听到此起彼伏的防空警报,这意味着导弹或无人机正朝我们这片区域飞来。德国侨民区位于市中心,距离阿克萨清真寺仅一英里左右,不太可能成为伊斯兰武装力量的目标。但如果导弹在头顶被拦截,大块弹片就会从天而降。

When the sirens sound, we rush down to a dank shelter, once a water cistern, under our building. On the stairs, we might hear the deafening pops of the launch of intercepting missiles, followed by distant, staccato thuds—or, more ominously, sustained rumbles. About half of the roughly three hundred missiles fired at Israel by March 10th reportedly carried cluster bombs. In the shelter, neighbors banter or trade dark punch lines. After ten or fifteen minutes, we check our phones for an all-clear or reports of where warheads may have gotten through. Later, we listen to security pundits and military experts telling us which Iranian leaders or installations have been “eliminated.” But they offer no answers for the most important questions, and seem to think them academic to people running to shelters: What can be achieved by this war? How will we end it—and not soon have to refight it? Why was it even necessary?

警报响起时,我们冲向楼下潮湿的防空洞——那是我们楼底下曾经的蓄水池。在楼梯上,我们可能会听到拦截导弹发射时震耳欲聋的砰砰声,接着是远处断断续续的轰隆声——或者更不祥的,持续不断的隆隆声。据报道,截至3月10日,向以色列发射的大约三百枚导弹中,约有一半携带了集束炸弹。在防空洞里,邻居们闲聊着,或是交换着黑色幽默。十到十五分钟后,我们查看手机,确认警报解除,或是查看弹头可能突破防线的报道。之后,我们听着安全专家和军事专家告诉我们哪些伊朗领导人或设施已被“清除”。但对于最重要的问题,他们却给不出答案,而且似乎认为这些问题对跑向防空洞的人们来说只是纸上谈兵:这场战争能实现什么?我们将如何结束它——而不是很快又要重新开战?为什么这场战争甚至是必要的?

Ostensibly, the primary reason for a preëmptive war is Iran’s nuclear program, which, President Donald Trump says, menaces the United States and Israel as well as their European and Middle Eastern allies. (Given Iran’s special animus for Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insists, the threat is existential.) Connected to that is Iran’s ballistic-missile program. But the two programs are distinct and have different valence for the two partners waging this war.

表面上看,这场先发制人的战争主要针对伊朗的核计划。美国总统唐纳德·特朗普声称,该计划对美国、以色列及其欧洲和中东盟友构成威胁。(鉴于伊朗对以色列怀有特殊敌意,以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡坚称,这种威胁关乎以色列的存亡。)与此相关的是伊朗的弹道导弹计划。但这两个计划性质不同,对发动这场战争的两个伙伴而言,其意义也各不相同。

The Iranian regime’s supply of enriched uranium that is believed to have survived Israel’s twelve-day attack on its nuclear installations last June—which Trump ended by employing B-2s to target critical enrichment sites (declaring them “obliterated”)—might eventually be used to make bombs. But, on March 2nd, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Rafael Mariano Grossi, said, “We don’t see a structured program to manufacture nuclear weapons” in Iran. On March 11th, Amos Yadlin, the former head of military intelligence, acknowledged that Iran has had no active plan to “weaponize” enriched uranium since 2003. More important, there was another way to address the issue: a strict inspection regime, much like the one that Trump, at Netanyahu’s urging, walked away from in 2018. (There is also, critically, Israel’s second-strike capacity—nukes nested in cruise missiles and Dolphin-class submarines off the Mediterranean coast.) The day before the war began, the Omani Foreign Minister, Sayyid Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, who was mediating U.S.-Iranian talks, told CBS that a new nuclear deal was “within our reach.”

伊朗政权所拥有的浓缩铀据信在去年六月以色列对其核设施长达十二天的袭击中幸存下来——当时特朗普动用B-2轰炸机打击关键浓缩设施(宣称已将其“彻底摧毁”)才结束了这场袭击——这些浓缩铀最终可能被用于制造核弹。但3月2日,国际原子能机构总干事拉斐尔·马里亚诺·格罗西表示,伊朗“未见有组织化的核武器制造计划”。3月11日,以色列前军事情报局局长阿莫斯·亚德林承认,自2003年以来伊朗从未制定过将浓缩铀“武器化”的积极计划。更重要的是,解决该问题另有他途:建立严格的核查机制,这与2018年特朗普在内塔尼亚胡敦促下退出的协议框架极为相似。(至关重要的是,以色列还拥有二次打击能力——部署在地中海沿岸巡航导弹和海豚级潜艇中的核武器。)战争爆发前一天,正在斡旋美伊谈判的阿曼外交大臣巴德尔·本·哈马德·布赛迪向哥伦比亚广播公司表示,新的核协议“触手可及”。

The missile program is another matter. Iran’s conventional warheads pose no imminent threat to the U.S., and their threat to U.S. bases and allies in the Gulf, which has become lethal since the start of this war, was only contingent before it. But, for Israel, their threat is tangible—and ongoing. Iran’s stockpiling of missiles portends wars of attrition, like the current one, in which each side tries to wear the other down. Thus, Israel—preëmptively or in response to attacks—aims to eliminate Iran’s missile launchers and vast production facilities; Iran aims to degrade Israel’s economic life and endanger international shipping. But neither side seems positioned to win a decisive victory.

导弹计划则是另一回事。伊朗的常规弹头对美国并不构成迫在眉睫的威胁,它们对美国在波斯湾的基地及盟友的威胁——自本轮战争爆发以来已变得致命——此前也只是偶发性的。但对以色列而言,这种威胁却是切实存在且持续不断的。伊朗囤积导弹预示着消耗战的可能,就像当前这场战争一样,双方都试图拖垮对方。因此,以色列——无论是先发制人还是作为反击——都旨在摧毁伊朗的导弹发射装置和庞大的生产设施;而伊朗则试图破坏以色列的经济命脉并危及国际航运。但双方似乎都无法取得决定性胜利。

Militarily, Iran appears to be at an obvious disadvantage. Its air defense was decimated in October, 2024—when Israel attacked after Iran fired missiles to retaliate against Israel’s aerial assassination of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in Lebanon—and then again in June. As the Times correspondent Mark Mazzetti has noted, “Netanyahu began to see the costs of going to war with Iran as lower,” which helped to “sell the United States [on] getting involved.” The assassinations of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and many top officials in this war’s opening days may have seemed to confirm an accelerating asymmetry

从军事角度看,伊朗显然处于劣势。其防空系统在2024年10月遭到重创——当时伊朗为报复以色列在黎巴嫩空袭真主党领袖哈桑·纳斯鲁拉而发射导弹,随后遭到以色列反击——同年六月再度受创。正如《纽约时报》记者马克·马泽蒂所言:“内塔尼亚胡开始认为与伊朗开战的代价正在降低”,这有助于“说服美国介入”。战争初期最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊及众多高官遇刺身亡,似乎印证了这种加速失衡的态势。

But Israel is at other disadvantages. Its high-tech economy depends on advanced global networks, which are seriously disrupted by wars. Israel’s attack on Iran in June shuttered Israel’s non-essential businesses; it froze trade, travel, and tourism for a month, forced the cancellation of conferences showcasing Israeli startups, and temporarily shut down the country’s natural-gas fields. Schools were closed, as they are today. The wars have hastened the departure of some of Israel’s most educated people for jobs in American, European, and Australian companies, universities, and hospitals. (During the past three years of Netanyahu’s government, beginning with his assault on the judiciary and continuing into the prolonged war in Gaza, some two hundred thousand Israelis have left the country.)

但以色列也面临其他劣势。其高科技经济依赖先进的全球网络,而战争严重扰乱了这些网络。以色列六月对伊朗的袭击导致该国非必要企业停摆;贸易、旅行和旅游业冻结长达一个月,迫使展示以色列初创企业的会议取消,并暂时关闭了该国天然气田。学校停课,如今亦然。战争加速了部分以色列最优秀人才流向美国、欧洲和澳大利亚的企业、大学和医院。(在內塔尼亚胡政府执政的过去三年里——从他攻击司法系统开始,到加沙漫长战争持续期间——约二十万以色列人离开了这个国家。)

Moreover, with Iran, Israel must patrol the skies of a nation that has a population close to the size of Turkey’s and a landmass roughly the size of Alaska’s with about two hundred aircraft (the number that reportedly participated in the initial February attack on Iran) that need to fly to targets more than a thousand miles away and be refuelled in the air. Meanwhile, Israel’s home-front command must shoot down missiles and penetrating drones that cost as little as twenty thousand dollars each with intercepting missiles that typically cost four million dollars and take far longer to manufacture. Besides, much of Iran’s missile-production infrastructure is deep underground, where most Israeli and U.S. bombs cannot reach. So the highest priority of Israel’s Air Force is to destroy missile-launch facilities on the ground; on Monday, the I.D.F. claimed to have knocked out perhaps eighty per cent of them. But, over time, they can be rebuilt and installed in new sites.

此外,面对伊朗,以色列必须在一个国土面积与阿拉斯加相当、人口接近土耳其的国家上空执行巡逻任务,而以色列仅能出动约两百架战机(据报今年二月首次袭击伊朗时动用的数量)。这些战机需要飞行一千多英里才能抵达目标,且必须在空中加油。与此同时,以色列后方指挥部必须用造价通常高达四百万美元、生产周期漫长的拦截导弹,去击落单价可能仅两万美元的导弹和穿透式无人机。更何况,伊朗大部分导弹生产设施深埋地下,以色列和美国多数炸弹难以触及。因此,以色列空军的首要任务是摧毁地面导弹发射设施;周一,以色列国防军宣称可能已摧毁其中约八成。但假以时日,这些设施仍能在新址重建。

Prior to the calamitous war following the attacks of October 7, 2023, Israel fought five wars with Hamas, between 2008 and 2021. Vexingly, the war with Iran is reproducing in macrocosm what those wars taught in microcosm. “Look how quickly” Iranian security forces in Tehran are “taking on characteristics that resemble the Gaza Strip,” Ohad Hemo, Channel Twelve’s Arab-affairs correspondent, said on March 3rd. “Revolutionary Guards and Basij”—the volunteer paramilitary civilian force under the Guards—“are evacuating their headquarters, leaving their bases, and looking for cover in mosques and schools.” And their firing of ballistic missiles across Israel recalls Hamas’s firing of rockets into Israeli border towns. Israel’s response to those earlier wars, periodically “mowing the lawn” (as I.D.F. commanders infamously put bombarding Gazan installations, tunnels, and command posts), seems mirrored in the Israeli Air Force’s Iran campaign, except that now it’s undertaking to mow a distant pasture. And although Netanyahu kept the post-October 7th war going far longer than even prominent voices in the security establishment believed necessary, resulting in thousands more civilian deaths and many more of Gaza’s buildings and infrastructure destroyed, Hamas is still in power, with little ability to attack Israel, for now—but enough to intimidate Gazans. There is a lesson here, too.

在2023年10月7日袭击事件引发灾难性战争之前,以色列曾在2008年至2021年间与哈马斯进行过五次战争。令人困扰的是,与伊朗的战争正在宏观层面重演那些战争在微观层面揭示的教训。“看看德黑兰的伊朗安全部队多么迅速地'呈现出加沙地带般的特征',”以色列十二频道阿拉伯事务记者奥哈德·赫莫在3月3日表示,“革命卫队和巴斯基民兵”——隶属于革命卫队的志愿准军事组织——“正在撤离总部,离开基地,躲进清真寺和学校寻求掩护。”他们向以色列全境发射弹道导弹的行为,也让人想起哈马斯向以色列边境城镇发射火箭弹的场景。以色列对此前那些战争的应对方式——周期性“修剪草坪”(正如以色列国防军指挥官对轰炸加沙设施、隧道和指挥所的行径那臭名昭著的比喻)——似乎正映射在以色列空军对伊朗的行动中,只不过如今要修剪的是远方的草场。尽管内塔尼亚胡将10月7日后的战争拖延得比安全机构内权威人士认为必要的时长更久,导致数千平民额外丧生、加沙更多建筑与基础设施被毁,哈马斯却依然掌权,目前虽无力攻击以色列,却足以恫吓加沙民众。这其中同样蕴含着值得深思的教训。

One might have concluded, given Israel’s predictable jeopardy, that a diplomatic initiative to prevent this war would have been tried long ago. In March, 2022, before Netanyahu regained power, then Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken hosted a summit in Israel with the Abraham Accord signatories Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Morocco, reportedly with Saudi blessing. The leaders explored, among other things, something along the lines of a Middle Eastern NATO, to contain Iran. But a process of this kind has always meant engaging the Palestine Authority and entertaining a pathway to a Palestinian state, and that has meant abandoning annexation of the West Bank—a prospect that is anathema to Israel’s religious extremists, who are now settling what they call Judea and Samaria, and with whom Netanyahu has been allied since he began his career.

考虑到以色列可预见的危险处境,人们或许会认为,防止这场战争的外交努力早就该尝试了。2022年3月,在内塔尼亚胡重新掌权之前,时任以色列外长亚伊尔·拉皮德和美国国务卿安东尼·布林肯在以色列主持了一场峰会,与会者包括《亚伯拉罕协议》签署国巴林、阿拉伯联合酋长国和摩洛哥,据称沙特阿拉伯也对此表示支持。与会领导人探讨了包括建立中东版北约在内的构想,以遏制伊朗。但此类进程始终意味着要与巴勒斯坦权力机构接触,并为建立巴勒斯坦国开辟道路——这便意味着放弃吞并约旦河西岸。对以色列的宗教极端分子而言,这种前景是绝对无法接受的。他们如今正定居于所谓的“犹地亚和撒马利亚”,而内塔尼亚胡自政治生涯伊始便与这些人结为盟友。

The choice of war, however, requires a U.S. partnership of a different kind, because Israel cannot stand against Iran alone. Trump seems aligned for now, though it’s not clear that he’s signed up to get Israel out of the specific danger of wars of attrition. Facing mounting opposition at home, and increasingly pressured oil markets, it’s not clear that he’ll stick to anything other than what appeals to his capricious, self-aggrandizing impulses. In January, after all, Trump encouraged Iranian protesters to come out in force, posting that “help is on the way.” (The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Iran estimated that at least five thousand people were killed by Iranian security forces during the protests, and, according to medical sources she consulted, as many as twenty thousand.) A month later, his idea of help, apparently, is the extensive bombing of the country in which, according to Iran’s U.N. envoy, thirteen hundred civilians have been killed, along with a demand for “unconditional surrender.” Trump also called for the intervention of Kurdish forces from Iraq, then changed his mind.

然而,选择战争需要美国以另一种方式结盟,因为以色列无法独自对抗伊朗。特朗普目前似乎站在以色列一边,但尚不清楚他是否承诺帮助以色列摆脱消耗战的特定危险。面对国内日益高涨的反对声浪和压力渐增的石油市场,除了迎合自己反复无常、自我膨胀的冲动外,他是否会坚持任何立场尚不明确。毕竟今年一月,特朗普曾鼓动伊朗抗议者大规模上街,发文称“援助已在路上”。(联合国伊朗问题特别报告员估计,抗议期间至少有五千人被伊朗安全部队杀害;据她咨询的医疗消息源称,死亡人数可能高达两万。)一个月后,他所谓的“援助”显然变成了对这个国家的大规模轰炸——据伊朗驻联合国特使称,空袭已造成一千三百名平民丧生,同时美方还要求伊朗“无条件投降”。特朗普还曾呼吁伊拉克境内的库尔德武装介入,随后又改变了主意。

Nevertheless, the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei to succeed his father as Supreme Leader suggests that, however questionable his ability to reëstablish a chain of command, the hard-liners in the regime are doubling down. Iran’s President, Masoud Pezeshkian, hinted that some countries have begun “mediation efforts” to end the war. That could be a chance for Trump to declare victory and leave. “This was just an excursion into something that had to be done,” he said in a press conference on Monday. “We’re getting very close to finishing that, too.” And this: “Our enemies see what price we exact for aggression against us, I’m sure they’ll draw the conclusion.”

然而,选择穆杰塔巴·哈梅内伊接替其父担任最高领袖表明,无论他重建指挥链的能力多么令人质疑,政权内的强硬派都在加倍下注。伊朗总统马苏德·佩泽什基安暗示,一些国家已开始“调解努力”以结束战争。这可能是特朗普宣布胜利并抽身的机会。“这只是对必须处理之事的短暂介入,”他在周一的新闻发布会上说,“我们也即将完成此事。”他还表示:“敌人看到我们会为遭受的侵略索取何种代价,我相信他们会得出结论。”

Actually, that last statement was not from Trump on Monday but from Netanyahu in May, 2021, at the close of that war with Hamas—more than two years before October 7th. Trump may keep shifting objectives, but for Netanyahu the inexorable goal still seems to be regime change, much the way that “total victory” against Hamas has been. For the Prime Minister, existential war is on brand. “A few months ago, Netanyahu described Israel as a modern Sparta,” the Haaretz security correspondent Amos Harel wrote on Monday. “But to preserve its militarist identity, a Sparta requires permanent military friction.”

实际上,最后那句话并非特朗普本周一的言论,而是内塔尼亚胡在2021年5月与哈马斯战争结束时所说——那是在10月7日事件的两年前。特朗普或许会不断变换目标,但对内塔尼亚胡而言,不可动摇的目标似乎始终是政权更迭,正如他对哈马斯所追求的“彻底胜利”。对这位总理来说,关乎存亡的战争正是其政治品牌的底色。“几个月前,内塔尼亚胡将以色列描述为现代斯巴达,”《国土报》安全事务记者阿莫斯·哈雷尔本周一写道,“但为了维持其军国主义身份,斯巴达需要永久的军事摩擦。”

“Bibi postures as Churchill,” the veteran journalist Eliezer Yaari—a former combat pilot—told me. “Cigars in hand—blood, sweat, and tears until the imaginary ‘absolute victory.’ In Jerusalem, we have relative quiet since the war broke out. But I speak with my children in Tel Aviv, and with friends running to shelters five times a night. They don’t feel like Spartans. They feel the anxiety of enduring this for weeks and months on end.” ♦

“内塔尼亚胡摆出丘吉尔的姿态,”资深记者、前战斗机飞行员埃利泽·亚阿里(Eliezer Yaari)告诉我。“雪茄在手——'热血、辛劳、眼泪和汗水',直到那虚幻的'彻底胜利'。自战争爆发以来,耶路撒冷还算相对平静。但我和特拉维夫的孩子们通话,听朋友们说他们一晚上要跑五次防空洞。他们并不觉得自己像斯巴达勇士。他们感受到的是焦虑——这种日子要持续数周乃至数月,看不到尽头。” ♦

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