The Weekend Essay

Losing Faith in Atheism

无神论信仰的失落
I spent years searching for a livable secular world view, but none of them quite offered the value of belief.
多年来,我一直在寻找一种可实践的世俗世界观,但始终未能找到能与信仰相提并论的精神价值。
tree leaves pendulum nature
Illustration by David Ope

Early in my freshman year of college, a speeding car struck my twin brother, Jim, on a street near our campus. These were pre-cellphone days, but I happened to be in my dorm room when the call came in, so I got to ride with my brother in the ambulance. Our sister, Alice, who was in the year ahead of us, soon arrived at the hospital.

大学一年级刚开学不久,我双胞胎兄弟吉姆在校园附近的街道上被一辆疾驰的汽车撞倒。那还是手机尚未普及的年代,但电话打来时我碰巧在宿舍,于是得以陪他一起上了救护车。比我们高一年级的姐姐爱丽丝很快也赶到了医院。

Shortly after the orderlies wheeled Jim away to be intubated, an intensive-care doctor explained to me and Alice that our brother was suffering from acute respiratory failure. This man, whom we’d never seen before, casually added that Jim was unlikely to make it to morning. Then he continued on his rounds. The first thing we did, once he’d left, was pray.

护工刚把吉姆推去插管,一位重症监护医生就告诉我和爱丽丝,我们的兄弟患上了急性呼吸衰竭。这位素未谋面的医生轻描淡写地补充说,吉姆很可能撑不到天亮,说完便继续查房去了。待他离开后,我们做的第一件事就是祈祷。

We’d been raised in a devout Catholic home, attending Mass every Sunday and on holy days of obligation, saying grace before meals, prayers before bed, and rosaries on long car rides, constantly adding sick or troubled loved ones to our intentions list. At the hospital, praying together was a distraction, but it was also an act that we believed to have some power to help our brother live through the night.

我们成长在一个虔诚的天主教家庭,每周日与宗教节日必去望弥撒,餐前要感恩,睡前要祷告,长途行车时念诵玫瑰经,总不忘为病痛或困顿的亲人献上祈愿。在医院里,共同祈祷能让我们暂时分心,但我们也相信这举动确实蕴含着某种力量,能帮助我们的兄弟熬过漫漫长夜。

As it happens, he did live through it. His recovery was long—months stretching into years—but ultimately complete. I thanked God for that. But the memory of that first night, when I thought I was losing him forever, stayed with me. The recognition of radical human vulnerability pushes some people toward belief, but for me it had the opposite effect. On campus that spring, I started skipping Mass. This proved to be the initial step on a path that eventually led to my rejection of the faith in which I’d been raised. An answered prayer made me an atheist.

事实上,他确实挺了过来。康复之路漫长——数月延展为经年——但终究痊愈了。我为此感谢上帝。但那个我以为将永远失去他的夜晚,始终萦绕心头。对人类极端脆弱性的体认将某些人推向信仰,于我而言却适得其反。那年春天在校园里,我开始缺席弥撒。这成为我背离自幼所奉信仰的第一步。一次应验的祈祷,反而使我成了无神论者。

In many ways, those years—the turn of the twenty‑first century—were an ideal time to be a budding unbeliever. In 2004, an unknown writer named Sam Harris published “The End of Faith,” a short polemic on the existential threat that religion posed to Western civilization. In rapid succession, Richard Dawkins’s “The God Delusion” (2006), Daniel Dennett’s “Breaking the Spell” (2006), and Christopher Hitchens’s “God Is Not Great” (2007) followed Harris’s book onto best-seller lists, and the so-called Four Horsemen became the public face of a resurgent New Atheism. But I quickly discovered that I was not the audience for these books. I wasn’t looking to talk my way out of a belief in God—I was already out. I wanted to know what to believe in instead.

在许多方面,二十一世纪之交的那几年,正是崭露头角的无神论者生逢其时的年代。2004年,一位名不见经传的作家萨姆·哈里斯(Sam Harris)出版了《信仰的终结》,这本短小精悍的论战之作,论述了宗教对西方文明构成的生存威胁。随后,理查德·道金斯(Richard Dawkins)的《上帝的错觉》(2006年)、丹尼尔·丹尼特(Daniel Dennett)的《破除魔咒》(2006年)和克里斯托弗·希钦斯(Christopher Hitchens)的《上帝并不伟大》(2007年)相继登上畅销书榜,这四位所谓的“四骑士”成为新无神论复兴运动的公众面孔。但我很快发现,自己并非这些书的目标读者——我并不需要说服自己放弃对上帝的信仰,因为我早已不再信神。我想知道的是,不信神之后,该信什么。

If I was still in search of beliefs, many atheists would object, I hadn’t really gotten over my religious upbringing. A good atheist deals not in faith but in facts, not in belief but in knowledge. Yet I could find no obvious factual, knowledge-based answer to the question that was most pressing to me: How am I to live?

若说我仍在追寻信仰,许多无神论者会反驳,我其实并未真正摆脱宗教教养的烙印。真正的无神论者不依赖信念而依据事实,不诉诸信仰而依靠知识。然而,面对那个最令我困扰的问题——我该如何生活?——我找不到任何基于事实与知识的明确答案。

I don’t mean to suggest that the New Atheists had no moral sense. On the contrary, they were largely fuelled by moral outrage at the needless suffering religion caused. But the nature of morality was seemingly the only thing about which they did not care to argue. They thought it simply self‑evident that we desire pleasure over pain for ourselves, and that any decent person wished the same for others. One of religion’s greatest harms, they believed, was that it turned people away from this basic intuition. Of the Four Horsemen, only Harris aspired to a “science of good and evil” which could subject moral claims to the same rational scrutiny as all other claims, but his chapter on the topic quickly devolves into an argument about the indefensibility of pacifism and the moral necessity of government torture. (It was a strange time.)

我并非暗示新无神论者缺乏道德感。恰恰相反,他们很大程度上是被宗教造成的不必要苦难所激发的道德义愤所驱动。但道德的本质似乎是他们唯一不愿深究的议题。他们认为人天生趋乐避苦是不言自明的,任何正派人都希望他人亦能如此。在他们看来,宗教最大的危害之一就是使人背离这种基本直觉。四位“骑士”中,唯有哈里斯(Sam Harris)曾试图建立一套“善恶科学”,将道德主张置于与其他主张同等的理性审视之下,但他论述该主题的章节很快便沦为关于和平主义站不住脚、政府酷刑具有道德必要性的诡辩。(那真是个荒诞的年代。)

Anyway, I wasn’t really looking for practical guidance. To ask “How am I to live?” is to inquire as to not just what is right but what is good. It is to ask not just “What should I do?” but “How should I be?” The most generous interpretation of the New Atheist view on this question is that people ought to have the freedom to decide for themselves. On that, I agreed completely, but that left me right where I’d started, still in need of an answer.

不过,我真正寻求的并非实用指南。“我该如何生活?”这个问题,不仅关乎何为正确,更关乎何为良善;不仅追问“我该做什么”,更叩问“我该成为怎样的人”。新无神论者对此最宽厚的解读是:人应当拥有自主抉择的自由。对此我完全赞同,但这恰恰让我回到了原点——我依然需要一个答案。

Setting down the popular polemics of the day, I began to read modern philosophy, which I understood to be the primary means by which humans have sought secular answers to life’s questions. I read the philosophers most frequently cited as models by modern‑day atheists—John Locke, David Hume, John Stuart Mill—as well as those whom meaning‑hungry young people habitually embrace as secular gurus: Friedrich Nietzsche, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Albert Camus. But I also read philosophers who are mostly read just by other philosophers.

放下时下流行的论战文章,我开始阅读现代哲学——在我看来,这是人类为生命问题寻求世俗答案的主要途径。我既读了那些被当代无神论者奉为圭臬的哲学家——约翰·洛克、大卫·休谟、约翰·斯图尔特·密尔,也读了那些渴望意义的年轻人惯常追捧的世俗导师:弗里德里希·尼采、路德维希·维特根斯坦、阿尔贝·加缪。但我也读那些几乎只在哲学圈内流传的思想家。

Even when I was struggling with the most challenging of these works, the reading felt urgent to me. I wasn’t submitting papers or getting grades; I wasn’t looking to earn a degree or to pursue a career. I wasn’t even trying to impress people at literary parties. (For that, I had thousand‑page postmodern novels.) I was just trying to figure things out. Immanuel Kant’s three “critiques” are often cited as the works that first made philosophy inaccessible to nonspecialists, but in Kant’s opinion he was addressing very straightforward questions—What can I know?, What must I do?, and What may I hope? I was decidedly a nonspecialist, and these were the questions I wanted answered.

即便是在啃这些著作中最艰涩的部分时,阅读于我仍有一种紧迫感。我不需要提交论文,也不求分数;我不为学位,也不为职业。我甚至没想过要在文学聚会上炫耀学识(要干这个,我有的是上千页的后现代小说)。我只是想弄明白一些事。伊曼努尔·康德的三部《批判》常被视为将哲学变得让非专业人士难以接近的开端,但在康德看来,他探讨的其实是非常直白的问题——我能知道什么?我应当做什么?我可以希望什么?我无疑是个门外汉,而这些问题正是我想寻求答案的。

Among other things, this reading taught me that atheists do hold beliefs, not just about morals and ethics but about how the world actually is and how humans fit into it. Of course, not all atheists hold the same beliefs—just as not all theists do—but I found that modern atheist belief tends to cluster into two broad traditions.

这番阅读让我明白,无神论者确实持有信仰——不仅关乎道德伦理,更关乎世界的真实样貌以及人类在其中的位置。当然,并非所有无神论者都秉持相同的信念,正如有神论者之间也存在分歧。但我发现,现代无神论思想大致可归为两大传统脉络。

The most prevalent atheist world view goes by many names—empiricism, positivism, physicalism, naturalism—but the term that best captures the fullness of its present‑day iteration, as I see it, is scientific materialism. Roughly speaking, this view holds that the material world is all that exists, that humans can know this world through sense perception, that the methods of science allow us to convert the raw data of these perceptions into general principles, and that these principles can be both tested and put to practical use by making predictions about future events.

如今最流行的无神论世界观有许多名称——经验主义、实证主义、物理主义、自然主义——但在我看来,最能体现其当代完整形态的术语是科学唯物主义。粗略而言,这种观点认为:物质世界是唯一存在的实在;人类可以通过感官知觉认识这个世界;科学方法使我们能够将这些感知的原始数据转化为普遍原理;这些原理既可以通过预测未来事件来检验,也可以付诸实际应用。

As world views go, scientific materialism has a lot to say for it. It tells us that humans are capable, without any supernatural aid, of coming to understand, and ultimately to master, all of reality. It tells us that the store of human knowledge is constantly increasing and continuously improving our material conditions. To this end, it points to the astonishing human progress that has occurred in the time of science’s reign. And it encourages us to enjoy the fruits of this progress as much as possible, since our life here on earth is the only one we’ll get.

作为一种世界观,科学唯物主义自有其道理。它告诉我们,人类无需任何超自然力量的帮助,就有能力理解并最终掌控全部现实。它告诉我们,人类知识的宝库在不断增长,持续改善着我们的物质条件。为此,它指向科学统治时代所发生的惊人进步。它还鼓励我们尽情享受这些进步的果实,因为尘世生活是我们唯一拥有的生命。

Most people who subscribe to scientific materialism take it to be so obviously correct that it could not be denied by any rational person who truly understood it. But my reading showed me that this world view has its shortcomings. The most basic is perhaps inherent to any world view at all: it rests on a set of principles which often can’t be proven, even by the standards of proof the world view embraces. The general principle that all real knowledge is derived from sense perception of material facts cannot itself be derived from the perception of facts in the world, and thus can’t really be sanctioned by scientific materialism’s own methods. Indeed, no general principle can be. The very legitimacy of deriving general principles from the particulars of experience can never be established from experience without already having the principle in hand.

大多数信奉科学唯物主义的人都认为它显然正确,任何真正理解它的理性之人都无法否认。但我的阅读告诉我,这种世界观也有其缺陷。最根本的缺陷或许是任何世界观都固有的:它建立在一系列往往无法被证明的原则之上,即便按照该世界观自身所认可的证明标准也是如此。一切真正的知识都源自对物质事实的感官知觉这一普遍原则,本身无法从对世界事实的知觉中推导出来,因此也无法真正得到科学唯物主义自身方法的认可。事实上,任何普遍原则都无法如此。从经验的具体事例中推导出普遍原则,其正当性本身永远无法从经验中确立,除非你已经事先掌握了该原则。

This so-called problem of induction was first identified not by any counter-Enlightenment reactionary but by the Scottish empiricist David Hume. Earlier empiricists like Locke and Francis Bacon believed that the physical sciences should still be grounded partly in metaphysical belief. Hume became one of modern atheism’s great intellectual heroes by rejecting this idea. But he didn’t substitute some other foundation in its place. Instead, he argued that we should simply do without foundations entirely, apart from the rather shaky ones of custom, habit, and expedience. That has been more or less the scientific-materialist answer to the problem ever since: scientific materialism just works.

这个所谓的归纳法问题,最初并非由任何反启蒙的反动派提出,而是苏格兰经验主义者大卫·休谟发现的。洛克和弗朗西斯·培根等早期经验主义者认为,自然科学仍应部分建立在形而上学信念之上。休谟因否定这一观点,成为现代无神论的重要思想先驱。但他并未用其他基础取而代之,而是主张我们应当彻底放弃基础——除了习俗、习惯和权宜之计这些相当不牢靠的根基。自那以后,科学唯物主义对此问题的回应大抵如此:科学唯物主义就是行得通。

If by “works” one means that it can be put to good use, this is unquestionably so. But, if we mean that it captures within its frame all the notable features of our experience, that’s a different matter. In fact, what materialism can’t adequately capture is experience itself. Consciousness is not material, not publicly available through sense perception, not subject to the kind of observation that scientific materialism takes as the hallmark of knowledge. By the standards of the materialist world view, it simply doesn’t exist. For me, this limitation proved fatal. I spent far too much time within the confines of my mind to accept a world view that told me whatever was going on in there wasn’t real.

如果说“有效”指的是它能够派上好的用场,这无疑是正确的。但如果我们指的是它能在其框架内捕捉我们经验中所有显著特征,那就是另一回事了。事实上,唯物主义无法充分把握的正是经验本身。意识不是物质性的,无法通过感官感知公开获取,也不受科学唯物主义视为知识标志的那种观察方式的约束。按照唯物主义世界观的标准,它根本不存在。对我而言,这种局限性是致命的。我在自己头脑的疆域里耗费了太多时光,无法接受一个告诉我那里发生的一切都不真实的世界观。

Luckily, I’d by then come into contact with the other great family of modern atheist belief, which I eventually came to call romantic idealism. This is the atheism of Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger and their existentialist descendants, which begins in precisely the place where scientific materialism leaves off, with the will of the subjective, conscious agent. At its most extreme, romantic idealism treats each of us as willing our own world into being, creating the reality in which we live. Even when it does not go quite this far, it treats our subjective experience as the proper subject of knowledge, in fact the only thing we can ever be said to know.

幸运的是,那时我已接触到现代无神论的另一大思想谱系——后来我称之为浪漫唯心主义。这是尼采与海德格尔及其存在主义后裔所持的无神论,它恰恰始于科学唯物主义止步之处:始于主观意识主体的意志。在最极端的形式中,浪漫唯心主义将我们每个人都视为通过意志召唤自身世界的主体,创造着我们栖居的现实。即便未走向如此极端,它也将我们的主观体验视为知识的正当对象——事实上,是我们唯一能宣称认知的事物。

Romantic idealism arose in the post‑Enlightenment era, and it grew in opposition to the principles of Enlightenment rationality as much as it did to religious authority. Although atheism is often associated with hyperrationality, this form of it is unapologetically irrational. In place of reason, observation, and scientific study, it valorizes emotion, imagination, and artistic creativity. The ethics of romantic idealism are an ethics of authenticity: the greatest good is not maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain but living in a way that is true to our subjective reality. The movement rejects religious belief not for being empirically false but for being a ready‑made and inherited response to existential problems that we must work out for ourselves. The appeal of this world view—particularly for a young person engaged in just such a working out—should be obvious, and I soon found myself in thrall to it.

浪漫主义理想主义兴起于后启蒙时代,其发展既是对宗教权威的反叛,亦是对启蒙理性原则的抗拒。尽管无神论常与极端理性主义相联,这种形态的浪漫主义却坦然拥抱非理性。它摒弃理性、观察与科学研究,转而推崇情感、想象与艺术创造力。浪漫主义理想主义的伦理核心在于本真性——至善不在于追求极乐或规避痛苦,而在于活出与主观现实相契的生命姿态。这场思想运动否定宗教信仰,并非因其缺乏经验证据,而是因其将现成的、承袭而来的答案强加于本需亲身求索的存在困境。这种世界观对正处探索阶段的年轻人具有天然的吸引力,而我也很快为之倾倒。

Like scientific materialism, romantic idealism does not have a solid foundation in any provable universal truth. But it revels in this condition: it is the lack of any such foundation that makes it possible for each of us to construct our own truth. This relativism carries clear dangers. Since the time of Locke, empiricism has been closely linked with political liberalism, whereas romantic idealism is associated with rather darker political forces. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one of the founders of Romanticism, was a great inspiration for the French Revolution’s Reign of Terror. He argued that liberalism’s supposed universal rights were covers for bourgeois self-interest. This argument was later developed at great length by Nietzsche, one of several thinkers in this tradition who inspired the rise of fascism.

正如科学唯物主义一样,浪漫唯心主义也缺乏任何可证实的普遍真理作为坚实基础。但它恰恰陶醉于这种状态:正是这种基础的缺失,使得我们每个人都有可能构建属于自己的真理。这种相对主义显然蕴含着危险。自洛克时代以来,经验主义始终与政治自由主义紧密相连,而浪漫唯心主义则与更为阴暗的政治力量相关联。作为浪漫主义奠基人之一的让-雅克·卢梭,曾为法国大革命的恐怖统治提供了重要思想源泉。他指称自由主义所标榜的普遍权利不过是资产阶级私利的遮羞布。这一论点后来被尼采加以详尽阐发——这位思想传统中的代表人物,连同该谱系的其他思想家,共同为法西斯主义的兴起提供了精神养料。

A more basic problem with romantic idealism occurs on the personal level: building meaning from scratch turns out to be an incredibly difficult task. The romantic-idealist approach is fraught with fear and trembling, a fact it doesn’t deny. It is not a route to happiness; indeed, it seems to hold the goal of happiness in contempt. (“Mankind does not strive for happiness,” Nietzsche wrote. “Only the Englishman does that.”) Many romantic-idealist writers have been fascinated by the “problem” of suicide—the problem, in their view, being that there’s no good reason not to do it.

浪漫理想主义还有一个更根本的问题,它发生在个人层面:从零开始构建意义,结果证明是一项极其困难的任务。浪漫理想主义的道路充满了恐惧与战栗,这一点它并不否认。它并非通往幸福之路;事实上,它似乎对幸福这一目标嗤之以鼻。(尼采曾写道:“人类并不追求幸福。只有英国人才那样做。”)许多浪漫理想主义作家都对“自杀”这个“问题”着迷——在他们看来,问题在于,没有充分的理由不去自杀。

It was this element of romantic idealism which finally led to my rejection of it. I grew tired of being unhappy and anxious all the time, of constantly questioning whether life was worth the trouble. One cause of the feeling, for me, was that the materialists had it right on an important point: there is, indeed, a world outside our heads that cannot be ignored or overpowered through force of will, and denying this is a recipe for misery.

正是这种浪漫理想主义的成分,最终让我对其产生了排斥。我厌倦了终日郁郁寡欢、焦虑不安,厌倦了不断质疑人生是否值得这般折腾。于我而言,这种感受的根源之一在于:唯物主义者在一个关键点上确实是对的——在我们头脑之外,确实存在着一个无法被忽视、也无法凭借意志力去征服的世界;否认这一点,只会招致痛苦。

After nearly twenty years of searching unsuccessfully for a livable atheist world view, I began, in my mid-thirties, to entertain the possibility that atheism itself might be part of the problem. There were many steps from here to my eventual return to robust belief, but I started with the notion that for me the authentic life might be one of faith—one that recognized the existence of both the external material world and the internal ideational world and sought to reconcile them, and one that accepted an absolute foundation to things and attempted to understand, in some provisional and imperfect way, the nature of this foundation and what it wanted from me.

在近二十年徒劳地寻找一种可堪生活的无神论世界观后,三十多岁的我开始思考,无神论本身或许就是问题所在。从这一念到最终重拾坚定信仰,其间经历了许多阶段,但我最初的起点是这样一个想法:对我而言,真实的生活或许应当是一种信仰生活——既要承认外部物质世界与内部观念世界的存在并寻求二者的和解,也要接受万物有其绝对根基,并尝试以某种暂时且不完美的方式,去理解这个根基的本质及其对我的期许。

Roughly a decade has now passed since my return to theistic belief. Barring some extreme change, this second period of faith will soon have lasted longer than my years of atheist wandering. Yet those years will always be with me, and I’m grateful for them. They have made me understand the world around me, one lately marked by sorrow and despair, in a radically different way than I would have otherwise.

距离我重拾有神论信仰,已过去大约十年。除非发生什么剧变,这第二段信仰期很快就要超过我当年作为无神论者四处漂泊的年头了。但那段岁月将永远与我同在,我对此心怀感激。正是那段经历,让我以一种若非如此绝无可能的方式,理解了周遭的世界——一个近来充满悲伤与绝望的世界。

The signal predicament of our era is the global rise of illiberalism and intolerance. Secular liberals who have observed these forces with quite justified horror have often linked them to a familiar enemy: religion. In their view, Christian nationalism is one of the primary ideologies behind right‑wing illiberalism. Meanwhile, they tend to see the strain of left‑wing thought which rejects universalist liberal principles as equally under the sway of a kind of faith—the “cult” or “Church” of identity politics. (Richard Dawkins, of “The God Delusion,” speaks for many of them when he declared “woke” to be a “latter‑day Torquemadism . . . with its own religiously enforced dogma.”)

我们时代的核心困境,是全球范围内非自由主义与不宽容思潮的兴起。世俗自由派以完全正当的忧惧注视着这股力量,常将其与一个熟悉的敌人联系起来:宗教。在他们看来,基督教民族主义是右翼非自由主义背后的主要意识形态之一。与此同时,他们倾向于将那种拒斥普世自由主义原则的左翼思潮,视为同样受某种信仰的支配——即身份政治的“膜拜团体”或“教会”。(《上帝的错觉》作者理查德·道金斯为许多人代言,他曾宣称“觉醒主义”是“现代的宗教裁判……有其自身通过宗教强制推行的教条”。)

“Religion” is a famously malleable sociological category, but, if we stick to the criterion of theistic belief, the argument that modern‑day illiberalism is primarily a religious movement does not really hold up. Perhaps the crudest way to make the point would be simply to note that the rise of illiberalism has gone hand in hand with a decline of theistic belief and religious practice—both in the United States and around the world. The avatar of American illiberalism, Donald Trump, is the first President in generations who does not even pretend to be influenced or motivated by Christian faith. Trump is best understood as our first Nietzschean President, a man who explicitly embraces the will to power as the ultimate value, a force to which even the truth must give way.

“宗教”是一个众所周知、极具延展性的社会学范畴,但如果我们坚持以有神论信仰作为衡量标准,那么将现代非自由主义运动主要视为宗教运动的论点其实站不住脚。或许最直白的论证方式就是指出:无论是在美国还是全球范围内,非自由主义思潮的兴起始终与有神论信仰及宗教实践的衰落相伴而行。美国非自由主义的代表人物唐纳德·特朗普,是近几代总统中首位甚至不屑假装受基督教信仰影响或驱动的人。我们不妨将他理解为首位尼采式总统——这个人公然拥抱权力意志作为终极价值,甚至要求真理也必须为这种力量让路。

Many of the young and highly educated cohorts who populate the portions of the left most suspicious of universal liberal values are also among those least likely to identify as religious believers. In a different manner than Trump, they hold that so-called objective “truths” are the expression of power dynamics—tools used by the élite to oppress the marginalized. In place of these truths, they champion the importance of identity and authenticity. In other words, large groups of both the left and the right have become romantic idealists, and they have come to pose the same challenge to liberalism and scientific rationalism that romantic idealism has always posed to these traditions.

在左翼阵营中,对普世自由主义价值观最为怀疑的群体,往往由年轻且受过高等教育的世代构成,他们同时也是最不可能自认为宗教信仰者的群体。与特朗普的方式不同,他们主张所谓的客观“真理”不过是权力关系的表达——是精英阶层用以压迫边缘群体的工具。他们摒弃这些真理,转而推崇身份认同与真实性的重要性。换言之,无论是左翼还是右翼,都有大批群体已蜕变为浪漫理想主义者,他们正对自由主义与科学理性主义构成挑战——这种挑战,正是浪漫理想主义历来对这些传统所构成的挑战。

Meanwhile, the failure of these traditions to respond adequately to the challenge is bound up with the problem identified by their earliest proponents: they have a very hard time articulating their foundational justification. When liberalism runs smoothly, it does a remarkable job delivering the goods it promises. For most people, this is a sufficient achievement to quiet any worries about its philosophical underpinnings. But when many people within liberal societies do not feel that the system is working, when the practical case for liberalism comes into question, secular liberals don’t have much else to go on.

与此同时,这些传统未能充分应对挑战,与其最早支持者指出的问题密不可分:它们很难阐明自身存在的根本理由。当自由主义运转顺畅时,它确实能出色兑现其承诺。对大多数人而言,这一成就足以平息对其哲学根基的忧虑。但当自由社会中的许多人感觉体系失灵、自由主义的实践价值受到质疑时,世俗自由主义者便再无其他依凭。

For early liberals like Locke, it seemed obvious that liberalism—like empiricism—needed to be grounded in faith, even as it sought to enshrine tolerance for different varieties of belief. For Locke, the fact that we have immortal souls subject to eternal punishment and reward means that it’s irrational to submit to a government that denies God’s will as we understand it, no matter how much coercive power that government has. At the same time, Locke had the empiricist’s healthy suspicion that we could never have metaphysical certainty about what the Creator’s will was, which meant that no person should impose his answer to that question on another. It is for these reasons that faith must be treated as a matter of personal conscience, but also more generally that a regime grounded in a social contract must be one that respects individual freedoms. Our status as creatures of God confers on us certain rights that can’t be handed over as part of the social contract, rights that are at once natural and inalienable.

对于洛克这样的早期自由主义者而言,自由主义——如同经验主义——显然需要植根于信仰,即便它同时致力于确立对不同信仰形式的宽容。在洛克看来,人类拥有不朽的灵魂,将承受永恒的惩罚或奖赏,这意味着服从一个违背我们所理解的上帝旨意的政府是非理性的,无论这个政府拥有多么强大的强制力。与此同时,洛克秉持着经验主义者清醒的怀疑精神:我们永远无法获得关于造物主意旨的形而上学确证,这意味着任何人都不能将自己的答案强加于他人。正因如此,信仰必须被视为个人良知范畴的事务;更广泛而言,植根于社会契约的政体必须是尊重个人自由的政体。我们作为上帝造物的身份,赋予了我们某些不可让渡的权利——这些权利既是天赋的,也是不可剥夺的,它们不能作为社会契约的一部分被交出。

Many of the Founding Fathers held this same view. But, after Hume, liberals came increasingly to find even the barest invocation of metaphysical principles to be an embarrassment. The great post-Humean liberal theorist Jeremy Bentham called the idea of natural rights “nonsense,” and the idea of inalienable natural rights “nonsense on stilts.” Some liberals have tried to hold on to such abstract concepts without the metaphysical framework in which they make sense, but many eventually came to the Humean conclusion that liberalism could simply do without foundations, so long as it got the job done.

许多开国元勋也持同样观点。但自休谟之后,自由主义者日益发现,哪怕只是最浅层地援引形而上学原则都会令人难堪。后休谟时代的伟大自由主义理论家杰里米·边沁将自然权利斥为“胡言乱语”,而不可剥夺的自然权利更是“踩着高跷的胡言乱语”。部分自由主义者曾试图保留这些抽象概念,却剥离了使其具有意义的形而上学框架;但更多人最终得出了与休谟相同的结论:只要自由主义能实现其目标,完全可以不需要理论基础。

My own passage into and back out of unbelief—one marked by a close reading of works that earlier illiberal societies had attempted to suppress on religious grounds—has strengthened my liberal commitments. But it’s also made me acutely aware of liberalism’s very real limitations. As a means for allowing people with different conceptions of the good to live together fruitfully and peacefully, liberalism seems unmatched in human history. As a means of generating its own conceptions of goodness that feel compelling to most human beings, its record is quite mixed, perhaps because that’s not what it was ever designed to do.

我自身经历了一段从信仰到不信、又回归信仰的旅程——这段旅程的标志,是深入阅读了那些早先非自由社会曾试图以宗教理由压制的著作——这反而强化了我对自由主义的信念。但这也让我敏锐地意识到自由主义确实存在的局限。作为一种让拥有不同善观念的人们能够丰饶而和平地共处的方式,自由主义在人类历史上似乎无出其右。但作为一种能够产生自身关于善的观念、并能令大多数人信服的途径,它的记录则相当参差——或许因为这从来就不是它被设计来达成的目标。

What’s more, when liberals treat some version of scientific materialism as so self-evidently true that it must serve as the default context for public discourse; when they make allegiance to “reason” and “evidence,” as they define these terms, the price of admission into such discourse; and when they attempt to banish metaphysical or spiritual or even frankly religious talk from our politics and our culture, they are not practicing liberalism as its greatest exemplars understood it. They are eliminating from our shared vocabulary many of the concepts on which any justification for liberalism beyond the purely practical would have to depend.

更重要的是,当自由派将某种科学唯物主义视为不言自明的真理,并以此作为公共讨论的默认语境;当他们将效忠于“理性”与“证据”(按他们自己的定义)设定为参与此类讨论的入场券;当他们试图将形而上学、精神性甚至公开的宗教话语驱逐出我们的政治与文化领域时——他们践行的已非自由主义伟大典范所理解的那种理念。他们正从我们共享的语汇中抹去诸多概念,而这些概念恰恰是超越纯粹实用主义的自由主义赖以存在的根基。

I am not suggesting that the solution to our problems is for secular liberals to find God. But I am suggesting that religious believers be considered natural allies in the fight against irrational illiberalism, rather than its primary cause. This need not mean abandoning secularism, and it certainly doesn’t mean abandoning liberalism. It means, perhaps, seeing liberalism as so many liberals wish believers would see their faith: not as the expression of a universal truth to which every person must eventually submit but as a human construction—one of the finest we have ever made—worth defending even when it is helpless to defend itself, yet capable of being swept away by the same hands that built it in the first place. ♦

我并非主张世俗自由派应当皈依宗教才能解决我们的困境。但我想指出,宗教信徒理应被视为对抗非理性反自由主义思潮的天然盟友,而非其根源所在。这并不意味着要放弃世俗主义,更不意味着要背弃自由主义。或许,这需要我们以自由主义者期望信徒看待信仰的方式来看待自由主义本身:它并非某种普世真理的宣示——要求每个人都必须最终臣服——而是一种人类文明的建构,是我们创造过的最美好的建构之一。它值得我们捍卫,即便它无力自卫;它也可能被当初建造它的同一双手彻底摧毁。♦

This is drawn from “Why I Am Not an Atheist: The Confessions of a Skeptical Believer.”

本文节选自《我为何不是无神论者:一位怀疑论信徒的自白》。

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