The Lede

Israel’s Gulf-State Gamble in the Iran War

以色列在伊朗战争中的海湾国家赌注
Benjamin Netanyahu has predicted that the conflict could draw Israel closer to its Arab neighbors. That may be wishful thinking.
本雅明·内塔尼亚胡曾预言,这场冲突可能让以色列与阿拉伯邻国走得更近。这或许只是一厢情愿。
Two people looking at a destroyed building in Tel Aviv.
Photograph by Ohad Zwigenberg / AP

A few days ago, the war that Israel and the United States launched against Iran entered its third week, and Israelis made bleary-eyed preparations for Shabbat. Throughout the country, sleep has been scant. Iran has retaliated against the attacks by sending missiles and drones to all parts of Israel, from north to south, so people have moved from their homes to stay close to fortified bomb shelters. Some families sleep in schools or in train stations. Iran’s attacks are much diminished from the war’s onset—its rate of missile fire has decreased by ninety per cent—but the explosions arrive in the middle of the night, and in pre-dawn hours, at intervals that seem designed to fray the nerves.

几天前,以色列和美国对伊朗发动的战争进入第三周,以色列人睡眼惺忪地准备安息日。全国上下,睡眠都成了奢侈品。伊朗通过向以色列各地——从北到南——发射导弹和无人机来报复袭击,人们因此离开家园,搬到加固的防空洞附近。一些家庭睡在学校或火车站里。伊朗的攻击比起战争初期已大幅减弱——导弹发射率下降了百分之九十——但爆炸总在午夜和黎明前袭来,间隔时间似乎精心设计过,就是要让人神经崩溃。

The anxieties increased with the opening of a new front. Not long after Israel assassinated Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, his allies in Hezbollah entered the fight, dragging the Lebanese public into a war that they had no interest in joining. Israel responded with an extraordinary campaign of strikes on Beirut and beyond, killing, by now, more than eight hundred and fifty people. Inside Israel, Hezbollah’s offensive has compounded existing concerns: Iranian missiles have a roughly ten-minute lead time before they hit, but missiles from Hezbollah are near and immediate, with, at times, mere seconds of advance notice.

随着新战线的开辟,焦虑情绪进一步加剧。在以色列刺杀伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊后不久,其盟友真主党便加入战局,将本无意卷入战争的黎巴嫩民众拖入泥潭。以色列随即对贝鲁特及周边地区发动了规模空前的打击行动,截至目前已造成超过八百五十人死亡。在以色列境内,真主党的攻势加剧了原有的担忧:伊朗导弹从发射到命中约有十分钟预警时间,而来自真主党的导弹近在咫尺且瞬息即至,有时预警时间仅有数秒。

Israel’s government has done what it can to give the impression of normalcy. Just days into the conflict, Bezalel Smotrich, the far-right finance minister, reopened the economy, in what critics saw as an attempt to limit the war’s financial impact during an election year. With schools shuttered across the country, parents were expected to resume work while their children stayed home and the bombardments continued. Yet Operation Roaring Lion, as it is known, is extremely popular in Israel. Ninety-three per cent of Jewish Israelis support the war, according to a survey by the Israel Democracy Institute. By and large, they view the Iranian nuclear threat as existential, even though Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hailed a bombing campaign on Iran’s nuclear facilities just last summer as a “historic victory.”

以色列政府尽其所能营造一切如常的表象。冲突爆发仅数天后,极右翼财政部长贝扎莱尔·斯莫特里赫就宣布重启经济,批评者认为这是在选举年试图限制战争对财政的冲击。当全国学校停课之际,家长们被要求复工,而孩子们则留在家中,空袭仍在持续。然而这场被称为“雄狮怒吼行动”的军事行动在以色列极受欢迎。以色列民主研究所的调查显示,93%的犹太裔以色列人支持这场战争。总体而言,他们将伊朗核威胁视为生存危机,尽管总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡去年夏天才将轰炸伊朗核设施的行动誉为“历史性胜利”。

The Israelis who support the war hope that it will help usher in a new Middle East, built on alliances with countries that have previously been, at least publicly, hostile toward Israel. In 2020, the Abraham Accords normalized ties between Israel and four Arab states—but not Saudi Arabia, the most strategically important of them. Netanyahu has been pursuing a deal with Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince, ever since. By all accounts, the two countries were inching close to an agreement in the fall of 2023, when Hamas-led attacks, on October 7th, killed roughly twelve hundred Israelis.

支持这场战争的以色列人希望,它能帮助迎来一个以以色列与先前至少公开敌视它的国家结盟为基础的新中东。2020年,《亚伯拉罕协议》实现了以色列与四个阿拉伯国家的关系正常化——但其中最具战略重要性的沙特阿拉伯不在其列。自那以来,内塔尼亚胡一直在寻求与沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼达成协议。各方消息都表明,两国在2023年秋天已接近达成协议,但哈马斯在10月7日发动的袭击导致约1200名以色列人丧生。

The war that Israel waged in response drew the world’s attention to the issue of a Palestinian state—something that Netanyahu and his government have refused to address. Leaders in the Gulf who had been willing to sideline the issue now faced populations newly galvanized by it. Nevertheless, Netanyahu seems to be counting on moderate Arab states to join Israel against Iran. Watching television news in Israel these days, it’s easy to think that normalization with Saudi Arabia is on the horizon, and that an expansion of the Abraham Accords is only a matter of time. Days into the war, in an interview with Fox News, Netanyahu predicted that toppling the Iranian regime would enable “many more peace treaties” in the region. The Times of Israel, citing anonymous senior officials, reported that Gulf countries would soon join the coalition fighting against the Islamic Republic. An analyst for the newspaper Maariv wrote about a “renewed convergence of interest” among Israel and “moderate Arab states.” Another, in a right-leaning newspaper, observed that “Israel’s status as a regional power is strengthening.”

以色列为回应袭击而发动的战争,将世界的目光重新聚焦于巴勒斯坦建国问题——这正是内塔尼亚胡及其政府长期回避的议题。那些曾试图搁置此问题的海湾国家领导人,如今面对的是因此事而重新激愤的民众。尽管如此,内塔尼亚胡似乎仍寄望于温和的阿拉伯国家能与以色列联手对抗伊朗。近日观看以色列电视新闻,人们很容易产生一种印象:与沙特阿拉伯的关系正常化已近在眼前,《亚伯拉罕协议》的扩展只是时间问题。战争爆发数日后,内塔尼亚胡在接受福克斯新闻采访时预言,推翻伊朗政权将促使该地区“缔结更多和平条约”。《以色列时报》援引匿名高级官员的消息称,海湾国家即将加入对抗伊朗伊斯兰共和国的联盟。《新消息报》一位分析人士撰文谈及以色列与“温和阿拉伯国家”之间“利益再度趋同”;另一家右翼报纸的评论员则指出“以色列作为地区强国的地位正在巩固”。

Experts who study the Middle East caution that this is little more than wishful thinking. “The euphoria in the television studios, all this talk about a nascent coalition, couldn’t be further from reality,” Yoel Guzansky, who leads the Gulf research team at the Institute for National Security Studies, in Israel, told me. He acknowledges that Israel and the Gulf countries face a common threat from the Iranian regime—but, he said, Netanyahu’s argument that countering this threat will somehow encourage a peace alliance is unfounded: “I have no idea what he’s basing this on.”

研究中东问题的专家警告说,这不过是一厢情愿。以色列国家安全研究所海湾研究团队负责人约埃尔·古赞斯基(Yoel Guzansky)告诉我:“电视演播室里的那种兴奋,所有关于新兴联盟的讨论,都与现实相去甚远。”他承认,以色列和海湾国家都面临着来自伊朗政权的共同威胁,但他表示,内塔尼亚胡关于对抗这一威胁将促进和平联盟的说法毫无根据:“我不知道他这是基于什么。”

Earlier this month, the United Arab Emirates closed its Embassy in Tehran, and its President, Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, called Iran an enemy of the country—a dramatic shift in tone from the Emiratis, who have traditionally been solicitous toward Iran. An alliance of Gulf states known as the Gulf Cooperation Council vowed to take “all necessary measures” to defend their territories from Iranian attacks. Despite the escalating rhetoric, though, not a single Gulf state has severed diplomatic ties with Iran, let alone publicly joined the war against it.

本月早些时候,阿拉伯联合酋长国关闭了驻德黑兰大使馆,其总统穆罕默德·本·扎耶德·阿勒纳哈扬称伊朗是该国的敌人——阿联酋长期以来对伊朗一直保持谨慎态度,此番表态堪称戏剧性转变。由海湾国家组成的海湾合作委员会誓言将采取“一切必要措施”保卫领土免受伊朗攻击。然而尽管言辞不断升级,至今没有任何一个海湾国家与伊朗断绝外交关系,更遑论公开加入对抗伊朗的战争。

Elie Podeh, a Middle East scholar at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, expressed surprise at the Gulf countries’ response, “or rather lack of one.” Discord between the Gulf and Iran has been growing for years. In 2010, a Qatari emir argued, in private correspondence released by WikiLeaks, that the Iranians could not be trusted. Recently, an adviser to the Emirati President pointed out that Iran had violated a non-aggression pact with the Gulf states, what he called a “gentlemen’s agreement.” In the first ten days of the war, it launched some two thousand drones across the Gulf, more than half of them targeting the U.A.E. Its bombardments struck a U.S. base there; civilian areas in Dubai and Abu Dhabi have also been hit. “I would expect there to be a military response, even if only symbolic,” Podeh said.

耶路撒冷希伯来大学的中东学者埃利·波德(Elie Podeh)对海湾国家的反应——“或者说,缺乏反应”——表示惊讶。海湾国家与伊朗之间的不和已持续多年。2010年,维基解密披露的私人信件显示,一位卡塔尔埃米尔曾表示伊朗人不可信任。近日,阿联酋总统的一位顾问指出,伊朗违反了与海湾国家达成的互不侵犯协定,他称之为“君子协定”。战争爆发前十日,伊朗向海湾地区发射了约两千架无人机,其中半数以上以阿联酋为目标。其轰炸袭击了当地的美军基地,迪拜与阿布扎比的民用区域也遭波及。“我本以为会看到军事回应,哪怕是象征性的。”波德说道。

A close read of media reports suggests that Israeli officials are trying to publicly draw their Persian Gulf counterparts into aiding the anti-Iran coalition. Several days ago, the Jerusalem Post reported that the Emiratis had attacked a desalination plant in Iran, citing a source “familiar with the details.” An Emirati official quickly denounced the report as “fake news.” When Israeli media reported early in the war that Qatar had struck inside Iran, after an attempted attack on Doha’s international airport, the Qatari foreign ministry issued a denial, clarifying that his country had not joined the “campaign targeting Iran.”

仔细阅读媒体报道可以发现,以色列官员正试图公开拉拢波斯湾国家加入反伊朗联盟。几天前,《耶路撒冷邮报》援引“熟悉内情人士”的消息称,阿联酋袭击了伊朗一座海水淡化厂。阿联酋官员随即谴责该报道为“假新闻”。战争初期,以色列媒体曾报道卡塔尔在遭遇多哈国际机场未遂袭击后对伊朗境内实施了打击,卡塔尔外交部随即发表声明予以否认,澄清该国并未加入“针对伊朗的行动”。

Some experts believe that there is private coördination between the Gulf states and the U.S.-Israeli coalition, but the Gulf states clearly do not want to appear to be taking sides. Their caution is understandable, Podeh told me. Despite the bellicose language coming out of Washington and Jerusalem about the necessity of reshaping Iran’s government, Iran’s neighbors in the Gulf “have come to the conflict with the assumption that the Iranian regime will not disappear,” Podeh said.

一些专家认为,海湾国家与美国-以色列联盟之间存在私下协调,但海湾国家显然不愿表现出选边站队的姿态。波德赫告诉我,这种谨慎是可以理解的。尽管华盛顿和耶路撒冷方面不断发出好战言论,声称必须重塑伊朗政权,但海湾地区的伊朗邻国“在介入这场冲突时,始终秉持着一个前提认知——伊朗现政权不会消失”,波德赫如是说。

The war does seem to be causing some realignments. Ehud Yaari, a well-sourced analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, has reported that Qatar intends to expel Hamas leaders from its territory over their refusal to condemn Iranian attacks. Whether or not that happens, a new landscape is emerging, in which Tehran’s proxies—in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran itself—are in retreat. “If you look at it through a fifty-year lens, these Shiite organizations have suffered a severe blow,” Podeh said.

这场战争似乎确实在引发一些重新结盟。华盛顿近东政策研究所消息灵通的分析师埃胡德·亚阿里(Ehud Yaari)报告称,由于哈马斯领导人拒绝谴责伊朗的袭击,卡塔尔打算将其驱逐出境。无论此事是否成真,一个新的格局正在浮现——伊朗在黎巴嫩、叙利亚、伊拉克乃至其本土的代理人势力正在退却。“从五十年的长镜头来看,这些什叶派组织遭受了沉重打击,”波代说。

Rather than benefit from such changes in the Middle East, though, Israel risks establishing itself as a “regional bully that is out of control,” Guzansky, of the I.N.S.S., told me. He added that Arab countries see Israel asserting military dominion over the Middle East, “and they want to counterbalance it.” One way to do that would be to forge closer ties with Turkey, as Saudi Arabia did recently, much to Netanyahu’s consternation. The fear is that, by warming up to Turkey, whose leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has been increasingly hostile toward Israel, these states will be driven further away from it.

然而,以色列非但未能从这些中东变局中获益,反而可能将自己塑造成一个“失控的地区恶霸”,以色列国家安全研究所的顾赞斯基告诉我。他补充说,阿拉伯国家看到以色列正在中东建立军事霸权,“它们想要制衡这种力量”。其中一个方法就是与土耳其建立更紧密的联系,正如沙特阿拉伯最近所做的那样,这让内塔尼亚胡大为震惊。令人担忧的是,这些国家与土耳其走近——土耳其领导人雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安对以色列的敌意与日俱增——可能会使它们进一步疏远以色列。

Dennis Ross, a longtime U.S. diplomat to the region, called the breadth of Iran’s attacks a “rude awakening” for the Gulf states. But, he said, “Does that mean that we’re on the brink of normalization? The answer is no.” He did predict that the strikes would encourage greater military integration between the Gulf, the U.S., and Israel. For one thing, the Gulf states are eager to acquire Iron Beam technology—a system, developed by an Israeli company, that uses high-energy lasers to intercept missiles and drones.

美国在该地区的资深外交官丹尼斯·罗斯(Dennis Ross)称,伊朗袭击的规模令海湾国家“猛然惊醒”。但他表示:“这是否意味着我们即将迎来关系正常化?答案是否定的。”他预测,这些袭击将推动海湾国家、美国和以色列之间加强军事整合。举例而言,海湾国家正迫切希望获得“铁束”(Iron Beam)技术——这套由以色列公司研发的系统能利用高能激光拦截导弹和无人机。

But Ross doesn’t believe that the current state of affairs will lead to a political opening. “In Israel, there is not sufficient appreciation for how this government is perceived,” he said. Many leaders in the Gulf once held a measure of respect for Netanyahu; they were pleased when he resisted the Obama Administration’s nuclear deal with Iran, and they supported his belligerent remarks against it before Congress, in 2015. “Bibi’s speech may have been a disaster in America, but in the Gulf states it was an enormous sign of respect for him,” Ross said. “That’s all gone.”

但罗斯并不认为当前局势会带来政治转机。“以色列国内对国际社会如何看待本届政府缺乏足够认识,”他说。海湾国家的许多领导人曾对内塔尼亚胡抱有几分敬意——当他抵制奥巴马政府与伊朗的核协议时,他们感到欣慰;2015年他在美国国会发表针对该协议的强硬演说时,他们也表示支持。“比比(内塔尼亚胡)的演讲在美国或许是场灾难,但在海湾国家,这被视为对他极大的尊重,”罗斯说,“如今这些都已烟消云散。”

The Israeli government has not moved on the issue of Palestinian statehood, and it has “actively inflamed the West Bank,” Ross pointed out. After Netanyahu’s ruthless prosecution of the war in Gaza, in which more than seventy thousand Palestinians have been killed, the Gulf-state leaders who once respected Netanyahu no longer trust him, Ross said. “They think that Smotrich and Ben-Gvir”—another far-right minister in Netanyahu’s government—“define what Israel will do.” Netanyahu tends to play down the influence of these extremist figures, Ross said, but the impunity with which Jewish settlers have carried out attacks against Palestinian villagers in the West Bank demonstrates how beholden he is to them.

罗斯指出,以色列政府在巴勒斯坦建国问题上毫无进展,且“主动加剧了约旦河西岸的紧张局势”。内塔尼亚胡在加沙发动了残酷的战争,导致超过七万名巴勒斯坦人死亡,罗斯表示,那些曾经尊重内塔尼亚胡的海湾国家领导人如今已不再信任他。“他们认为斯莫特里赫和本-格维尔——内塔尼亚胡政府中另外两位极右翼部长——决定了以色列的行动方向。”罗斯说,内塔尼亚胡倾向于淡化这些极端主义分子的影响力,但犹太定居者在约旦河西岸袭击巴勒斯坦村民却能逍遥法外,这恰恰表明他对这些人的依附程度。

“The Saudis were very close to reaching an understanding with Israel,” Ross added. “Today that won’t satisfy them. They need more, and Israel can only offer less.” In a survey conducted by the Washington Institute last year, Saudis were asked how they would view the establishment of diplomatic ties and peace with Israel. Only one per cent viewed it as a positive step, compared with forty-one percent who had viewed it positively five years earlier.

罗斯补充道:“沙特曾非常接近与以色列达成谅解。如今,这已无法令他们满意。他们需要更多,而以色列能给予的却更少。”华盛顿研究所去年的一项调查显示,当被问及如何看待与以色列建立外交关系及实现和平,仅有1%的沙特受访者视其为积极举措,而五年前这一比例曾达41%。

The notion that public opinion does not matter in a monarchy such as Saudi Arabia is gravely mistaken, Guzansky said. Its crown prince is deftly attuned to public sentiment, fearing unrest. That sentiment has shifted decidedly against Israel and for the Palestinian cause, and there is no reason to think that a military campaign aimed at Iran will reverse it. “In a week, in a month, when this war is over, the cameras will turn back to Gaza,” Guzansky continued. The devastating effects of Israel’s war there will resurface. So, too, will the demand that Israel work toward a two-state solution. “Can the Israeli government even say it?” ♦

古赞斯基指出,那种认为沙特阿拉伯这样的君主制国家不在乎民意的观点大错特错。该国王储对公众情绪极为敏感,唯恐社会动荡。如今沙特民意已明显转向反对以色列、支持巴勒斯坦事业,没有理由认为一场针对伊朗的军事行动能扭转这种趋势。“一周后,一个月后,当这场战争结束,镜头将重新转向加沙,”古赞斯基继续说道。以色列在加沙造成的毁灭性影响将再度浮现,要求以色列推动两国方案的国际呼声也将重新响起。“以色列政府敢提这个词吗?” ♦

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