Open Questions

Is Science Accelerating?

科学在加速吗?
Until recently, experts thought it was slowing down. Then you-know-what appeared.
直到最近,专家们还以为它在放缓。然后,那个东西出现了。
beakers with figures inside
Illustration by Josie Norton

What was American life like a hundred years ago? The economist Robert J. Gordon offers a vivid picture in his book “The Rise and Fall of American Growth,” from 2016. In 1926, Gordon writes, there were almost no paved roads west of the Mississippi. Fewer than one in ten homes had an electric refrigerator. (A typical one cost the equivalent of ten thousand dollars today.) If you lived in Muncie, Indiana, the odds were one in four that your house had no running water, and one in three that it had no sewer connection. Life was rough by our standards. And yet, Gordon shows, scientific and technological progress was obvious everywhere. Thousands of new hospitals were being constructed, many with cutting-edge X-ray departments. Ninety-three per cent of Iowa farmers owned automobiles, even though the automobile itself had begun to appear only three decades before. 1926 was the year it became possible for an ordinary person to travel on an airplane; it was also when an inventor named Clarence Birdseye perfected frozen food, making the consumption of fish affordable in landlocked places. The way people lived was clearly better than how their parents had lived.

一百年前的美国生活是什么样子?经济学家罗伯特·J·戈登在他2016年的著作《美国增长的兴衰》中描绘了一幅生动的图景。戈登写道,1926年,密西西比河以西几乎没有铺装道路。不到十分之一的家庭拥有电冰箱。(一台典型冰箱的价格相当于今天的一万美元。)如果你住在印第安纳州的曼西,你家里没有自来水的概率是四分之一,没有接通下水道的概率是三分之一。以我们的标准来看,生活是艰苦的。然而,戈登指出,科技进步的迹象随处可见。成千上万的新医院正在兴建,许多配备了最先进的X光科室。爱荷华州百分之九十三的农民拥有汽车,尽管汽车本身在三十年前才刚刚出现。1926年,普通人第一次有可能乘坐飞机旅行;也是在这一年,一位名叫克拉伦斯·伯宰的发明家完善了冷冻食品技术,使内陆地区的人们也能负担得起鱼类消费。人们的生活方式明显比他们父辈的时代更好。

This rapid “epochal transformation,” Gordon writes, actually continued for a whole century, stretching from 1870 to 1970. It was powered by five “Great Inventions”—electricity, urban sanitation, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, internal-combustion engines, and signal transmission. The Great Inventions, in turn, were based on foundational discoveries in physics, biology, medicine, chemistry, math, and other fields. “What makes the period 1870–1970 so special is that these inventions cannot be repeated,” Gordon writes. The germ theory of disease, which Louis Pasteur advanced in the eighteen-eighties, led to sweeping changes in pretty much every aspect of life, and yet it could be discovered only once. The principle of electromagnetism unlocks everything from engines to radios, but there aren’t infinite, similarly powerful principles to uncover and apply. The staircase of science—or at least this flight of it—appears to have only so many steps.

戈登写道,这种迅猛的“划时代变革”实际上持续了整整一个世纪,从1870年一直延伸到1970年。它由五项“伟大发明”驱动——电力、城市卫生、化学品与药品、内燃机和信号传输。而这些伟大发明又建立在物理学、生物学、医学、化学、数学等领域的基础性发现之上。“1870至1970年这段时期之所以如此特殊,是因为这些发明无法被重复,”戈登写道。路易·巴斯德在十九世纪八十年代提出的疾病细菌学说,几乎在生活的方方面面引发了翻天覆地的变化,但它只能被发现一次。电磁学原理解锁了从发动机到收音机的一切,但并没有无限多个同样强大的原理等着被发掘和应用。科学的阶梯——或者至少是这一段阶梯——似乎只有那么多级台阶。

What happens after the biggest discoveries have been made, explored, and put to use? Arguably, the rate of progress slows, and dramatic transformation becomes harder to achieve. The practice of science itself also changes. In recent decades, economists and other researchers have explored a field that they call “metascience”—the study of why the pace of scientific discovery increases or decreases. They point out that, although more scientific papers are being published, fewer are truly disruptive; more patents are granted, but a smaller number are for “breakthrough” inventions. Increasingly, science is conducted inside enormous bureaucracies that favor cautious, incremental research. Grants are awarded mainly to sure bets; power concentrates among august institutions and scientists. In a 2020 paper, the economists Nicholas Bloom, Charles I. Jones, John Van Reenen, and Michael Webb asked, “Are ideas getting harder to find?” They observed that the number of researchers required to double the speed of computer chips was eighteen times larger than it had been in the early nineteen-seventies. For a long time, they concluded, progress had emerged from “a constant flow of new ideas.” Now that flow has slowed.

当最重大的发现被做出、探索并投入使用之后,会发生什么?可以说,进步的速度会放缓,剧烈的变革会变得更难实现。科学实践本身也在发生变化。近几十年来,经济学家和其他研究者探索了一个他们称之为“元科学”的领域——研究科学发现的速度为何会加快或减慢。他们指出,尽管发表的科学论文越来越多,但真正具有颠覆性的论文却越来越少;获批的专利越来越多,但属于“突破性”发明的比例却越来越小。科学越来越多地在偏爱谨慎、渐进式研究的庞大官僚体系内部进行。资助主要流向稳操胜券的项目;权力集中在德高望重的机构和科学家手中。在2020年的一篇论文中,经济学家尼古拉斯·布鲁姆、查尔斯·I·琼斯、约翰·范·里宁和迈克尔·韦伯提出了一个问题:“好点子是不是越来越难找了?”他们观察到,要将计算机芯片的速度翻倍,所需的研究人员数量是二十世纪七十年代初的十八倍。他们总结道,长期以来,进步源于“新思想的持续流动”。如今,这股流动已经放缓。

Is this how life feels in 2026? Does it seem to you that scientific and technological progress has plateaued? It’s true that the iPhone Duo is only somewhat exciting. But, on the other hand, there is now a pancreatic-cancer pill and a melanoma vaccine. In Massachusetts, a man named Tim Andrews lived for the better part of a year while relying on a gene-edited kidney grown inside a pig. Norwegian salmon farms now use underwater A.I.-controlled laser robots to kill sea lice; in France, a startup has made tiny drones that can do the same for mosquitoes in your back yard. “Technological evolution is still accelerating,” the computer scientist John von Neumann wrote, in a 1955 essay, toward the end of Gordon’s spectacular century. In that particular essay, von Neumann was thinking mainly of nuclear power, machine automation, and climate control—technologies that have progressed slowly or fizzled out. And yet computer science, a field to which he made foundational contributions, has made steady—and now startling—new advances. The question of whether science is slowing or accelerating is complicated by its essential unpredictability. And because science is an interpersonal, interwoven enterprise, progress in one area can enable it in others, in ways that might not be easy to foresee.

2026年的生活给人这样的感觉吗?在你看来,科技进步是否已经停滞?诚然,iPhone Duo只是略微令人兴奋。但另一方面,现在已经有了胰腺癌药丸和黑色素瘤疫苗。在马萨诸塞州,一位名叫蒂姆·安德鲁斯的男子依靠一颗在猪体内培育的基因编辑肾脏活了将近一年。挪威的三文鱼养殖场现在使用由人工智能控制的水下激光机器人来杀灭海虱;在法国,一家初创公司制造出了能在你家后院对蚊子做同样事情的微型无人机。“技术演进仍在加速,”计算机科学家约翰·冯·诺依曼在1955年的一篇文章中写道,那正是戈登所描述的辉煌世纪接近尾声之时。在那篇文章中,冯·诺依曼主要思考的是核能、机器自动化和气候控制——这些技术进展缓慢或已无疾而终。然而,计算机科学这个他做出过奠基性贡献的领域,却取得了稳步——如今甚至令人瞠目的——新进展。科学究竟在放缓还是在加速,这个问题因其本质上的不可预测性而变得复杂。而且,由于科学是一项人际交织、相互关联的事业,一个领域的进步可以推动其他领域的进步,其方式可能并不容易预见。

A cartoon equation for science might go like this: B (brainiacs) + M (money) x T (technology) = D (discovery). Needless to say, it isn’t that simple. The brainiacs can be arranged in all sorts of organizations and hierarchies; the money can flow to the right ones or the wrong ones. The technology can be employed correctly or incorrectly; the discoveries can result in smarter brainiacs, more money, and better technology, or they can die on the vine. Fields and methods, meanwhile, can be young or grown-up, flexible or ossified, fashionable or passé. “At the time I was starting, lots and lots of things were just opening up,” Eve Marder, a neuroscientist who began her career in the nineteen-seventies, told me. “I started just after the time when someone could put an electrode anywhere in any nervous system and see something that no one had ever seen before—which is very, very different from the much more mature science that we have today.” For neuroscientists now, she went on, “what constitutes ‘success’ or ‘new knowledge’ has changed, and the incentive structures have also changed.” Marder recalled going to her first neuroscience conference, which had around five hundred attendees, allowing her to meet many of the most important figures in the field. Today, the big annual meeting put on by the Society for Neuroscience typically hosts around twenty thousand researchers.

科学的简化公式可以写成这样:B(聪明人)+ M(金钱)× T(技术)= D(发现)。不用说,事情没那么简单。聪明人可以组成各种各样的组织和层级;金钱可以流向对的人,也可以流向错的人。技术可以被正确使用,也可以被错误使用;发现可以造就更聪明的头脑、更多的金钱和更好的技术,也可能胎死腹中。与此同时,领域和方法可以是年轻的或成熟的,灵活的或僵化的,时髦的或过时的。“在我刚起步的时候,有太多太多的东西正在打开,”伊芙·马尔德告诉我,她是一位神经科学家,职业生涯始于二十世纪七十年代。“我开始的时候,刚好过了那个阶段——那时任何人都可以把电极插进任何神经系统的任何位置,看到从来没有人见过的东西——这和今天成熟得多的科学非常非常不同。”她接着说,对现在的神经科学家来说,“什么算‘成功’或‘新知识’已经变了,激励机制也变了。”马尔德回忆起她参加的第一届神经科学会议,大约有五百名与会者,这让她得以见到该领域许多最重要的人物。而今天,神经科学学会举办的大型年会通常有两万名左右的研究人员参加。

Marder is now an eminent scientist: her lab, at Brandeis University, studies how individual neurons connect to create stable circuits that can survive and function over time. She has won major awards, supervised large numbers of scientists and graduate students, and participated in research projects of varying sizes. “We have a very complicated challenge in science today, which is that there are some things that can only be done by ‘big science,’ ” she said. “If you’re doing ‘small science,’ with small groups of people, then the ones who make mistakes can be very easily corrected or can self-correct. But, if you do big science poorly, somebody can make a bad decision and take everyone down a bad path.”

马尔德现在是一位杰出的科学家:她在布兰迪斯大学的实验室研究单个神经元如何连接起来,形成能够长期存活并发挥功能的稳定回路。她获得过重要奖项,指导过大量科学家和研究生,并参与过规模各异的研究项目。“今天的科学面临一个非常复杂的挑战,那就是有些事情只有‘大科学’才能做,”她说。“如果你做的是‘小科学’,和一小群人一起工作,那么犯错的人很容易被纠正,或者可以自我纠正。但是,如果你把大科学做砸了,有人可能会做出一个糟糕的决定,把所有人都带上一条错误的路。”

In a big-science world, researchers often work in large consortia that cross institutional and disciplinary lines. They collaborate to gather vast quantities of data, hoping that it will be amenable to analysis now and in the future. Young scientists can find themselves assimilated, Borg-style, into these expansive projects and the institutions that make them possible. “A student who goes into a field is captivated by ideas,” Marder said. “They want to discover something, to create something, just like a philosopher wants to think something no one’s ever thought. And then they are socialized by having to get to the next step, or get the next fellowship. They start worrying about who they have to please—and that can flow down and change the science that they’re willing or able to do.” Some young scientists “are very stubborn, and will continue to be independent and innovative, and become leaders in their fields,” Marder went on. But “a lot of very creative people get driven out.”

在大科学的世界里,研究人员往往在跨越机构和学科界限的大型联合体中工作。他们合作收集海量数据,希望这些数据现在和将来都能被分析。年轻科学家可能会发现自己像博格人一样被同化进这些庞大的项目以及使之成为可能的机构中。“一个进入某个领域的学生是被思想吸引的,”马尔德说。“他们想要发现点什么,创造点什么,就像哲学家想要思考一个从来没有人思考过的问题。然后他们被社会化了,因为他们必须迈出下一步,或者拿到下一笔奖学金。他们开始担心要取悦谁——这种担忧会向下渗透,改变他们愿意做或能够做的科学。”一些年轻科学家“非常固执,会继续保持独立和创新,成为各自领域的领导者,”马尔德接着说。但“很多非常有创造力的人被挤走了。”

If the scale of modern science can dwarf individual scientists, it can also sideline their contributions. “Right now, on my desk in my office, I have a huge pile of really important papers by brilliant people that I don’t have time to read—there’s too many of them,” Michael Levin, a biologist at Tufts, told me. “I conclude, by symmetry, that nobody has time to read my papers, either. That raises the question: Who the hell am I writing all this for?” Levin, who studies bioelectric computation—the process through which cells communicate and make collective decisions—believes that science is, in fact, accelerating: one sign is that “it’s becoming more and more difficult to stay apprised of the important things.” In a 2005 paper titled “The Burden of Knowledge and the ‘Death of the Renaissance Man,’ ” the economist Benjamin F. Jones explored this paradox. Since “knowledge accumulates as technology progresses,” he wrote, there is ever more to know, and so the “educational burden” on researchers increases; eventually, it becomes harder not just to know everything but to know what’s needed for you, in particular, to push knowledge forward. Ironically, science may be slower precisely because it’s moving quickly in too many directions.

如果说现代科学的规模会让个体科学家显得渺小,那么它也可能让他们的贡献被边缘化。“现在,我办公室的书桌上堆着一大摞才华横溢的人写的重要论文,我没有时间读——太多了,”塔夫茨大学的生物学家迈克尔·莱文告诉我。“我由此对称地推断,也没有人有时间读我的论文。这就引出了一个问题:我到底是在为谁写这些东西?”莱文研究生物电计算——即细胞之间交流并做出集体决策的过程——他认为科学实际上正在加速:一个迹象就是“越来越难跟上重要进展的步伐”。在2005年一篇题为《知识的负担与“文艺复兴人的消亡”》的论文中,经济学家本杰明·F·琼斯探讨了这个悖论。他写道,由于“知识随着技术进步而积累”,需要知道的东西越来越多,因此研究者的“教育负担”也在增加;最终,不仅通晓一切变得更难,就连弄清楚你自己具体需要什么来推动知识前进也变得更难。具有讽刺意味的是,科学之所以更慢,恰恰可能是因为它在太多方向上跑得太快。

Organizational and communicative challenges exist alongside what might be called problems of ambition: science can be slow simply because, at this point, its aims are Olympian. Kristin Persson, a materials scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, explained one overarching goal in her field: predicting how different arrangements of atoms will behave under different conditions, so that they can be combined into new and useful materials. “For a very long time, we’ve been trying to do what some people call multi-scale modelling,” she said. “You start out with atoms and electrons, and you have an equation for behavior on that length scale and time scale. Then you take those properties and you feed them into higher-scale equations.” The approach, she said, has “never really taken off, because of what’s lost in translation every time you move from one set of equations to the next.”

组织和沟通方面的挑战与可以称之为雄心问题的东西并存:科学之所以缓慢,可能仅仅是因为到了今天,它的目标已经高如奥林匹斯山。加州大学伯克利分校的材料科学家克里斯汀·佩尔松解释了该领域的一个总体目标:预测不同的原子排列在不同条件下的行为,以便将它们组合成新的有用材料。“很长一段时间以来,我们一直在尝试做人们所说的多尺度建模,”她说。“你从原子和电子开始,在那个长度尺度和时间尺度上有一个描述行为的方程。然后你把这些性质提取出来,输入到更高尺度的方程中。”她说,这种方法“从来没有真正起飞过,因为每次从一组方程转到下一组方程时,都会在转换中丢失一些东西。”

It’s hard, in other words, to precisely predict the behavior of matter at every scale. The theoretical basis for such predictions was established a century ago—in 1926, as it happens—by the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, who devised a single equation describing how electrons interact under the laws of quantum mechanics; it’s relatively simple to solve for small numbers of electrons, but becomes unwieldy as atoms add up. If you want to use it at a large scale, you can solve it only approximately, unless you want your computer to calculate for billions of years. Science is full of such bottlenecks: places where dramatic insights, some long-standing, can’t yet yield practical results.

换句话说,要在每一个尺度上精确预测物质的行为是很困难的。这种预测的理论基础建立于一个世纪前——恰好是1926年——由物理学家埃尔温·薛定谔奠定,他设计了一个单一方程来描述电子在量子力学定律下的相互作用;对于少量电子,这个方程相对容易求解,但随着原子数量增加,它就变得难以驾驭。如果你想在大尺度上使用它,就只能近似求解,除非你愿意让计算机计算数十亿年。科学中充满了这样的瓶颈:一些戏剧性的洞见,有些已经存在很久,却还无法产生实际成果。

Today’s computers may not be fast enough to effortlessly apply Schrödinger’s Equation—but they are, apparently, fast enough to read and think. Accordingly, Levin told me, scientists are using artificial intelligence to respond to the burden of knowledge. “They take that stack of papers and put it through an A.I., and say, ‘Summarize this for me,’ ” he said. Levin regards it as a useful innovation, wielded by experts, that might itself be accelerated. “If all my work is going to get filtered through an A.I., then why am I putting out a traditional paper, with all of this stuff we do for each other—with the freaking grammar, and the PDFs, and the figures, which the A.I. has to take apart?” he asked. He anticipates a near future in which the form of the scientific paper becomes A.I.-ready, with old knowledge ably surfaced by artificial intelligence alongside new work. “There are amazing authors with amazing sets of papers from twenty, thirty years ago that nobody knows today,” he said. “Theoretically, that information is there somewhere, but, if nobody knows it and nobody uses it, then do we really have it?”

今天的计算机可能还不够快,无法轻松应用薛定谔方程——但它们显然已经快到能够阅读和思考了。因此,莱文告诉我,科学家们正在使用人工智能来应对知识的负担。“他们把那一摞论文交给人工智能,说,‘帮我总结一下,’”他说。莱文认为这是一项有用的创新,由专家来驾驭,而且它本身可能还会加速。“如果我所有的工作都要经过人工智能的过滤,那我为什么还要发表传统论文,做那些我们为彼此做的所有事情——那些该死的语法、PDF和图表,人工智能还得把它们拆开?”他问道。他预计在不久的将来,科学论文的形式将变得适配人工智能,旧知识能够被人工智能熟练地调取出来,与新工作并列呈现。“有些了不起的作者,在二三十年前写下了不起的系列论文,今天却无人知晓,”他说。“理论上,那些信息就在某个地方,但如果没有人知道它,没有人使用它,那我们真的拥有它吗?”

It could be that some version of this transformation is already under way. Scientists are increasingly using large language models not just to read papers but to write them: studies from last year, when A.I. was less capable, found that many researchers had experienced writing-productivity boosts of between thirty-three and fifty per cent, and submissions to journals and to conferences are up, in some cases dramatically. Meanwhile, in a study titled “AI Article Reviews Dominate Human Peer Reviews at Their Best,” two Harvard researchers, Gary King and Steven Worthington, show that peer reviews performed by L.L.M.s “are now better, by every measure we could construct, than reviews written by well-compensated human experts”; they’re even “judged to be of unusually high quality by journal editors and authors.” It’s possible to discern, in these developments, a new rhythm of scientific communication.

这种转变的某种版本可能已经在进行中。科学家们越来越多地使用大语言模型,不仅用来读论文,也用来写论文:去年的研究——当时人工智能的能力还不如现在——发现许多研究人员的写作效率提升了百分之三十三到百分之五十,期刊和会议的投稿量也在上升,有些情况下上升幅度还很大。与此同时,在一项题为《人工智能文章评审在其最佳状态下超越人类同行评审》的研究中,两位哈佛大学研究者加里·金和史蒂文·沃辛顿表明,由大语言模型完成的同行评审“在我们能构建的每一项指标上都优于报酬优厚的人类专家所写的评审”;它们甚至“被期刊编辑和作者评价为质量异常之高”。从这些发展中,可以辨认出一种新的科学交流节奏。

L.L.M.s work with language: it’s not surprising that they can be used to process information. But what about the actual labor of science, which is concrete, empirical, and often outrageously time-consuming? “There’s a lot of ‘donkey work,’ ” Persson, the materials scientist at Berkeley, said. Experiments must be done painstakingly, over and over, for years, and even then they can produce unpredictable results; a brilliant young researcher might spend her whole postdoc on the creation of a statistical model that’s immediately bested by someone else’s. Scientific progress is slow, in part, because there aren’t that many passionate, hyper-educated people willing to devote themselves to hands-on, detail-oriented, ruthlessly competitive, and often fruitless labor.

大语言模型处理的是语言:它们能被用来处理信息并不令人意外。但科学本身的劳动——具体的、经验性的、往往极其耗时的劳动——又怎么样呢?“有大量的‘苦力活’,”伯克利的材料科学家佩尔松说。实验必须年复一年地反复进行,费尽心力,即便如此也可能产生不可预测的结果;一位才华横溢的年轻研究者可能把整个博士后阶段花在构建一个统计模型上,而这个模型立刻就被别人的模型超越了。科学进步之所以缓慢,部分原因就在于没有那么多充满热情、受过高等教育的人愿意投身于这种亲力亲为、注重细节、竞争残酷且常常徒劳无功的工作。

It’s clear, at this point, that A.I. can automate some of the donkey work. “We have a bunch of computational neuroscientists in my lab, and every last one of them says, ‘I can now do in a week what would have taken me six months,’ ” Marder, the neuroscientist at Brandeis, told me. Materials scientists use computer simulations that can easily run off the rails. “When I was a graduate student, I logged in late at night to see if my simulation had worked out,” Persson said; she’d then spend untold hours troubleshooting. Now, she explained, “L.L.M.s are learning from errors in the simulations and applying their corrections autonomously to keep them on track.” This leaves time-constrained researchers free to focus on higher-level questions.

到了现在,很明显人工智能可以自动化一部分苦力活。“我实验室里有一群计算神经科学家,他们每一个人都说,‘我现在一周能做完以前要花六个月的事情,’”布兰迪斯的神经科学家马尔德告诉我。材料科学家使用计算机模拟,而这些模拟很容易跑偏。“我读研究生的时候,深夜登录系统看我的模拟有没有成功,”佩尔松说;然后她会花无数个小时排查问题。现在,她解释说,“大语言模型正在从模拟中的错误中学习,并自主应用修正来让它们保持在正轨上。”这让时间紧张的研究人员得以专注于更高层次的问题。

The advantages may go beyond vibe coding. A.I. systems “are so helpful at solving problems because they can try lots of things,” Michael Brenner, a professor of applied math and physics at Harvard who also helps direct A.I. science efforts for Google, told me. At Google, Brenner led the development of a system called Empirical Research Assistance (ERA), which scientists can use to create data-analysis tools. In many ways, ERA also addresses the burden of knowledge: researchers pose questions to it, and provide it with data, and it responds by trying and mixing different extant methods of analysis in numberless combinations, discovering new paths to progress. (Researchers have used ERA to create improved disease-forecasting models, for example.) “It’s like swapping and flipping, flipping and swapping the pieces, and trying to figure out something that actually works,” Brenner said. The power of the system, he went on, was “not Einsteinian but Edisonian”: it consisted in the novel application of known ideas.

好处可能不止于“氛围编程”。哈佛大学应用数学与物理学教授迈克尔·布伦纳告诉我,人工智能系统“之所以如此擅长解决问题,是因为它们可以尝试很多东西。”布伦纳同时协助指导谷歌的人工智能科学工作。在谷歌,布伦纳领导开发了一个名为“实证研究辅助”(ERA)的系统,科学家可以用它来创建数据分析工具。在许多方面,ERA也在应对知识的负担:研究人员向它提出问题,并提供数据,它则通过无数种组合来尝试和混合不同的现有分析方法,发现通往进步的新路径。(例如,研究人员已经使用ERA创建了改进的疾病预测模型。)“就像把拼图块换来换去、翻来翻去,试图找出真正有效的东西,”布伦纳说。他接着说,这个系统的力量“不是爱因斯坦式的,而是爱迪生式的”:它在于对已知思想的新颖应用。

Could A.I. offer even more in the way of novelty, contributing to the automated production of new data, new knowledge, and new theories? Both Levin and Persson described automated laboratories as a logical next step. Currently, Persson said, the creation of new experimental data is extraordinarily expensive and time-intensive—but robots, she argued, could be used “to produce data at scale,” which could then be analyzed by existing A.I. models or used to train new ones. (This data, she noted, might also have the advantage of being unusually consistent and free from human error.) “We’re going to get lab automation,” Levin said. “Then there’s going to be no more concern with hallucination or confabulation—the A.I.s are going to try stuff, and it either works or it doesn’t. At that point, once they have the ability to actually test out the consequences of their hypotheses, the loop is going to accelerate, and all this is going to go exponential.” This vision—in which A.I. speeds up not just the collection and analysis of data but the generation of hypotheses and the design of experiments—represents one of the more radical acceleratory possibilities for science. Levin suggested one major obstacle: “A.I. has been obviously trained on human output where conventional theories are overrepresented,” he said. To arrive at “unconventional ideas”—the kinds that lead to full-throttle acceleration, and to world-changing invention—it would have to become less consensus-driven.

人工智能能否在创新方面提供更多,为自动生成新数据、新知识和新理论做出贡献?莱文和佩尔松都把自动化实验室描述为合乎逻辑的下一步。佩尔松说,目前新实验数据的产生极其昂贵且耗时——但她认为,机器人可以被用来“大规模生产数据”,然后由现有的人工智能模型进行分析,或用于训练新模型。(她指出,这些数据可能还有一个优势,就是异常一致且没有人为错误。)“我们将会实现实验室自动化,”莱文说。“到那时,就再也不用担心幻觉或胡编乱造了——人工智能会去尝试,要么成功,要么失败。到了那个节点,一旦它们有能力真正检验自己假设的后果,这个循环就会加速,一切都会呈指数级增长。”这一愿景——人工智能不仅加速数据的收集和分析,还加速假设的生成和实验的设计——代表了科学最激进的加速可能性之一。莱文指出了一个主要障碍:“人工智能显然是在人类产出上训练的,而传统理论在其中被过度代表了,”他说。要得出“非常规的想法”——那些能带来全速加速和改变世界的发明的想法——它就必须变得不那么以共识为导向。

If dramatic scientific acceleration occurs, it will be significant on at least three levels. First, there’s the question posed by John von Neumann, the computer scientist, in his 1955 essay: “Can we survive technology?” Today, the concept of a technological “singularity” is easily taken to refer to a single Promethean moment, such as the invention of superintelligent A.I. But the concept, which is often credited to von Neumann, can have a simpler meaning. New technologies are frequently hard to manage; as more of them pop up, their management gets more and more difficult, until they become, in aggregate, unmanageable. How many simultaneous “upgrades” can society withstand? This problem concerned von Neumann precisely because he was writing toward the tail end of the century of invention described in “The Rise and Fall of American Growth.” If we are entering such a period again, we need to be as concerned as he was with the problem of technology management. We need to shift from a fetishization of disruption to a fascination with control.

如果科学出现戏剧性的加速,它至少在三个层面上意义重大。首先是计算机科学家约翰·冯·诺依曼在1955年的文章中提出的问题:“我们能否在技术中幸存下来?”今天,技术“奇点”的概念很容易被理解为某个普罗米修斯式的时刻,比如超级智能人工智能的发明。但这个通常被认为源自冯·诺依曼的概念,可以有一个更简单的含义。新技术往往难以管理;随着越来越多的新技术涌现,对它们的管理变得越来越困难,直到它们在总体上变得无法管理。社会能承受多少同时进行的“升级”?冯·诺依曼之所以关注这个问题,恰恰是因为他写作的时间正处于《美国增长的兴衰》所描述的发明世纪的尾声。如果我们再次进入这样一个时期,我们就需要像他一样关注技术管理的问题。我们需要从对颠覆的迷恋转向对控制的着迷。

Second, there’s the question of growth. In his book, Gordon shows how much life can improve when Great Inventions are changing the world. During the hundred years he describes, people got healthier and ate better; worked less and travelled farther; moved into bigger, more comfortable houses; and grew increasingly educated while exercising more personal freedom. The economy expanded because lives were expanding. But today, the United States, along with most of the Western world, is facing a crisis of growth. Populations are aging, and the ratio of workers to pensioners is falling. The costs of housing, food, education, health care, and other necessities are rising, as are our debts. “What are we going to do?” the economist Tyler Cowen asked, recently. “Plan A is that A.I. will help us grow more quickly, and we will manage to pay our bills. . . . There is no Plan B.” We need some new Great Inventions; an acceleration in science, enabled partly by A.I., is our most promising path to getting them.

其次是增长的问题。戈登在他的书中展示了当伟大发明改变世界时,生活能改善多少。在他所描述的一百年间,人们变得更健康,吃得更好;工作更少,走得更远;搬进更大、更舒适的房子里;受教育程度不断提高,同时享有更多的个人自由。经济之所以扩张,是因为生活在扩张。但今天,美国以及西方世界的大部分地区正面临增长危机。人口在老龄化,劳动者与退休人员的比例在下降。住房、食品、教育、医疗保健和其他必需品的成本在上升,我们的债务也在增加。“我们该怎么办?”经济学家泰勒·考恩最近问道。“A计划是人工智能帮助我们更快地增长,我们设法付清账单……没有B计划。”我们需要一些新的伟大发明;科学的加速——部分由人工智能促成——是我们获得这些发明最有希望的途径。

Finally, there’s the not-unimportant matter of human knowledge. Progress in science is good—but it doesn’t always feel good. Often, it centers not on the arrival of answers but on the proliferation of difficult questions. The same may be true for progress in the practice of science. Sudden advances in mathematics have led some mathematicians to say that their field has been “broken” by artificial intelligence. “I don’t think math is broken,” Brenner told me. “It’s hard for the community, and some of my math colleagues might disagree with me, but I think it’s a very exciting time in mathematics, a time to really rethink things and break new ground.” Persson agreed: “Maybe the mathematicians are having a rough time, but honestly I would congratulate them,” she said. “You should talk to some of my students: They see a lot of their mundane work going away. They can focus on fun things; they can do simulations they could never do before.” It was, she suggested, a great time to become a scientist. ♦

最后,还有一个并非无关紧要的问题:人类知识。科学的进步是好事——但它并不总是让人感觉良好。它往往不是围绕着答案的到来,而是围绕着难题的激增。科学实践方式的进步可能也是如此。数学领域的突飞猛进让一些数学家说,他们的领域已经被人工智能“搞坏了”。“我不认为数学被搞坏了,”布伦纳告诉我。“这对数学界来说很艰难,我的一些数学同事可能不同意我的看法,但我认为这是数学一个非常激动人心的时代,一个真正重新思考问题、开辟新天地的时代。”佩尔松也表示同意:“也许数学家们日子不好过,但说实话我会祝贺他们,”她说。“你应该和我的学生们谈谈:他们看到自己很多琐碎的工作正在消失。他们可以专注于有趣的事情;他们可以做以前从未做过的模拟。”她表示,现在正是成为科学家的好时代。 ♦

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