Letter from Havana

Is Cuba Next?

古巴会是下一个吗?
Trump’s campaign to topple foreign adversaries encounters a battered but defiant regime.
特朗普推翻外国政权的行动,遭遇了一个饱经风霜却依然顽抗的政权。
Trash on the street
Photograph by Natalie Keyssar for The New Yorker

At the end of January, Havana was struck by a frente frío, a cold front that blew off the ocean and plunged the island into unaccustomed wintry weather. As high winds sent waves crashing over the seaside promenade, the city’s inhabitants wrapped themselves in whatever warm clothing they had, or else huddled inside against the chill.

一月底,哈瓦那遭遇了一场冷锋(frente frío)袭击。这股从海上吹来的寒流让整座岛屿陷入罕见的寒冬天气。狂风卷起巨浪,猛烈拍打着海滨步道。城里的人们纷纷裹上能找到的所有厚衣服,要么就瑟缩在室内,躲避刺骨的寒意。

On the afternoon of the twenty-ninth, a group of senior Latin American diplomats were among those taking refuge from the weather. They had met at an ambassador’s residence, to discuss a new executive order from Donald Trump that declared Cuba a threat to “the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” The diplomats were shocked by its contents. “The perversion of the language is incredible,” one said. “Word by word, it’s harsher than the language that Kennedy used to talk about the Soviet missiles”—the crux of a standoff, in 1962, that brought the world close to a nuclear conflagration.

二十九日下午,一群拉丁美洲高级外交官正在一处避雨。他们聚在一名大使的官邸,讨论唐纳德·特朗普发布的一项新行政命令,该命令宣称古巴对“美国的国家安全和外交政策构成威胁”。外交官们对命令内容感到震惊。“语言的扭曲令人难以置信,”其中一人说,“逐字逐句,比特肯尼迪谈论苏联导弹时用的措辞还要严厉”——1962年那场将世界推向核战争边缘的对峙,其核心正是苏联导弹。

Trump’s order had asserted, without any evidence, that Cuba “destabilizes the region through migration and violence,” promotes schemes “to harm the United States and support hostile countries,” and provides sanctuary to Hamas and Hezbollah. He vowed to cut the island off from oil imports and warned that any other nation that sought to supply fuel would be punished.

特朗普在毫无证据的情况下宣称,古巴“通过移民和暴力破坏地区稳定”,推行“损害美国利益、支持敌对国家的计划”,并为哈马斯和真主党提供庇护。他誓言切断古巴的石油进口,并警告任何试图向古巴供应燃料的国家都将受到惩罚。

Podcast: The New Yorker Radio Hour
David Remnick talks with Jon Lee Anderson.

播客:《纽约客》广播小时 大卫·雷姆尼克对话乔恩·李·安德森

For most Cubans, the order meant that their already difficult lives were about to get considerably worse. For months, the island had faced daily electricity blackouts owing to a lack of fuel, along with severe shortages of food, water, and medicine. Economic activity had all but stopped, and the government, which was essentially broke and unable to secure new loans, had been incapable of providing solutions. Even garbage collection was virtually nonexistent, with huge mounds of refuse piling up on street corners. In the past eighteen months, three powerful hurricanes have destroyed countless homes and vast expanses of cropland, displacing more than a million people. When the executive order came, Cuba was on life support; Trump’s action effectively shut the oxygen off.

对大多数古巴人而言,这道行政命令意味着他们本已艰难的生活将雪上加霜。数月来,由于燃料短缺,这个岛国每天面临停电,食品、饮用水和药品也严重匮乏。经济活动几乎停滞,而实质上已破产且无法获得新贷款的政府根本无力解决问题。就连垃圾清运也近乎瘫痪,街角堆积着如山的废弃物。过去十八个月里,三场强飓风摧毁了无数房屋和大片农田,导致逾百万人流离失所。当行政令颁布时,古巴已如病危者靠生命维持系统苟延残喘;特朗普的举措无异于直接拔掉了输氧管。

The diplomats had been meeting regularly to monitor Trump’s Cuba policy, which they viewed with increasing alarm. “They say they want to harm the government, not the people,” one told me. “Well, this is harming the people.” On January 3rd, U.S. Special Forces had abducted the Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro, from Caracas, in a raid that many Cubans regarded as both an act of imperialist aggression and a warning. For decades, Venezuela had been Cuba’s greatest sponsor; along with Mexico, it provided about seventy per cent of the island’s oil. After Maduro was seized, the U.S. military imposed what amounted to a blockade, intercepting tankers carrying Venezuelan oil to Cuba. Analysts predicted that the island’s petroleum reserves would run out in a matter of weeks. At Havana’s few functioning gas stations, vehicles lined up for as long as twenty-six hours. With supplies dwindling, the government instituted an emergency gas quota of five gallons a day, shortened school hours and government workweeks, and suspended some medical procedures in hospitals.

外交官们定期会面,密切关注特朗普的古巴政策,他们对此愈发感到不安。“他们声称要打击的是政府,而非人民,”一位外交官告诉我,“但眼下受苦的正是人民。”1月3日,美国特种部队突袭加拉加斯,劫走了委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗。许多古巴人视此举为帝国主义侵略行径,也是一记警钟。数十年来,委内瑞拉与墨西哥同为古巴最重要的援助国,两国提供了该岛约七成的石油。马杜罗被捕后,美军实施实质封锁,拦截所有向古巴运送委内瑞拉石油的油轮。分析人士预测,古巴的石油储备将在数周内耗尽。在哈瓦那少数尚在运营的加油站,车辆排队等候时间长达26小时。随着供应日益减少,政府实施了每日5加仑的紧急汽油配额,缩短了学校课时与政府工作时间,并暂停了部分医院的诊疗服务。
A street.
With gasoline scarce, residents use horse-drawn carts for transportation.
由于汽油短缺,居民们改用马车出行。
Photograph by Natalie Keyssar for The New Yorker

Meanwhile, Trump issued a series of celebratory messages. “Cuba looks like it is ready to fall,” he told reporters. Asked whether he intended to intervene there, he demurred. “I don’t think we need any action,” he said. “It’s going down.” A few days later, he was back to posting threats on Truth Social: “THERE WILL BE NO MORE OIL OR MONEY GOING TO CUBA – ZERO! I strongly suggest they make a deal, BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.” He insisted that Cuba was desperate to negotiate. “They have no money,” he said at one point. “They have no anything right now.”

与此同时,特朗普发布了一系列庆祝性的信息。“古巴看起来快要垮了,”他告诉记者。当被问及是否打算干预时,他避而不答。“我认为我们不需要采取任何行动,”他说,“它正在垮掉。”几天后,他又回到Truth Social上发布威胁:“不会再有一滴石油或一分钱流向古巴——零!我强烈建议他们达成协议,趁现在还来得及。”他坚称古巴迫切希望谈判。“他们没有钱,”他一度说道,“他们现在什么都没有。”

The President of Cuba, Miguel Díaz-Canel, issued a defiant statement. “Those who turn everything into a business deal, even human lives, have no moral standing to call out Cuba,” he said. The Communist Party newspaper, Granma, ran a photograph of a crowd waving Cuban flags under the headline “Nobody Tells Us What to Do.” This turned out to be bluster, just as Trump’s statements were. Representatives of the Cuban government were already in negotiations with the U.S. about the countries’ relationship, and about the future of the island. In March, Díaz-Canel finally acknowledged the talks, describing them as a diplomatic exchange between two sovereign nations. He said that the goal was to “identify the bilateral problems that need a solution,” adding, “This is a very sensitive process that is being approached with responsibility and great sensitivity.” Trump cast the talks instead as a matter of personal domination. “I do believe I’ll be having the honor of taking Cuba,” he said. “I think I can do anything I want with it.”

古巴总统米格尔·迪亚斯-卡内尔(Miguel Díaz-Canel)发表了一份挑衅声明。“那些把一切都变成交易、甚至把人的生命也变成交易的人,没有道德资格指责古巴,”他说。古巴共产党机关报《格拉玛报》刊登了一张人群挥舞古巴国旗的照片,标题是“没人能对我们指手画脚”。事实证明这只是虚张声势,就像特朗普的声明一样。古巴政府代表已经在与美国就两国关系和古巴的未来进行谈判。今年3月,迪亚斯-卡内尔终于承认了这些会谈,称这是两个主权国家之间的外交交流。他说,目标是“找出需要解决的双边问题”,并补充说,“这是一个非常敏感的过程,我们正以负责任和高度敏感的态度来处理。”而特朗普则将谈判视为个人主导的问题。“我相信我将有幸拿下古巴,”他说,“我想我可以对它为所欲为。”

When I visited Cuba earlier this year, the formerly bustling old city of Havana was nearly deserted. Since 2021, an estimated one in five Cubans has left the island, seeking a better life. Tourism has collapsed, too, removing a main source of foreign revenue and leaving a listless, despondent air. The Plaza de Armas, a sixteenth-century square that once drew crowds of visitors, was virtually empty, occupied by an elderly woman sitting alone, a man blowing softly into a trumpet, and a legless man in a wheelchair, staring into a fenced-off garden in the middle of the square. The stillness was broken only by the arrival of a local character known as La Marquesa, who strode across the plaza, wearing a cream-colored skirt and blouse and a white sun hat, shouting that he was the “boss of everything.”

今年早些时候我到访古巴时,曾经繁华的哈瓦那老城几乎空无一人。自2021年以来,估计每五个古巴人中就有一人离开这座岛屿,去追寻更好的生活。旅游业也已崩溃,这夺走了古巴的主要外汇来源,留下一种无精打采、沮丧绝望的气氛。十六世纪修建的兵器广场曾吸引大批游客,如今却几乎空荡荡的,只有一位独坐的老妇人、一个轻轻吹着小号的男人,以及一个坐在轮椅上的无腿男子,他正凝视着广场中央一处被栅栏围起来的花园。这片寂静被一位当地名人打破,他被称为“侯爵夫人”,大步穿过广场,身穿奶油色裙子和衬衫,头戴白色遮阳帽,高喊着自己是“一切的主宰”。

Everyone I talked with was organizing their days around dealing with the crisis. Leonardo Padura, Cuba’s best-known novelist, told me about his frustrated efforts to buy a home power station for his elderly mother-in-law, to provide light when the electricity goes out. Many of the island’s young people have left, and the elderly struggle to care for themselves. One friend couldn’t secure enough fuel to drive to the market for food, and couldn’t find medicine for a heart condition, so I brought some with me. Another, a widow in her late seventies, was hobbled by chikungunya, a mosquito-borne disease that causes painful swelling of the joints and extremities. (An anti-inflammatory was available on the black market, but at an unthinkable price.) Malnutrition and a breakdown in public-health services have led to an increase in viral illnesses. Since last autumn, tens of thousands of Cubans have been afflicted by chikungunya, along with dengue fever and Oropouche.

我接触的每个人都在围绕应对危机来安排日常生活。古巴最著名的小说家莱昂纳多·帕杜拉(Leonardo Padura)向我讲述了他为年迈岳母购买家用发电站的徒劳努力——当电力中断时,这台设备本可提供照明。岛上许多年轻人已经离开,老年人艰难地独自生活。一位朋友因无法获得足够燃料驾车去市场采购食物,又找不到治疗心脏病的药物,我便随身带了些药品过去。另一位年近八旬的寡妇则因基孔肯雅热而步履蹒跚,这种蚊媒疾病会导致关节和四肢疼痛肿胀(黑市上虽有消炎药出售,但价格令人咋舌)。营养不良与公共卫生服务的崩溃导致病毒性疾病激增。自去年秋季以来,已有数万古巴人遭受基孔肯雅热、登革热和奥罗普切热的多重侵袭。

Amid the crisis, President Díaz-Canel could offer only more of the same. Díaz-Canel took office in 2018, as Raúl Castro’s handpicked successor. He is sixty-five, a burly man with the slicked-back silver hair of a college basketball coach. Before Raúl elevated him, he was a provincial Party boss in Villa Clara—an unassuming apparatchik, so humble that he sometimes rode a bicycle to work. As the first President in half a century who is not a member of the Castro family, he has been careful to present himself as a loyalist. He routinely refers to Raúl—who remains the island’s crucial political voice, despite being ninety-four and officially retired—as his jefe máximo. When he ran for election, his campaign put up billboards with an image of Díaz-Canel and the Castro brothers alongside the slogan “Continuity.”

危机当前,总统迪亚斯-卡内尔(Díaz-Canel)能给出的方案却只是老调重弹。2018年,迪亚斯-卡内尔作为劳尔·卡斯特罗(Raúl Castro)钦点的接班人上任。他现年六十五岁,身材魁梧,一头银发向后梳得油亮,活像大学篮球队教练。在被劳尔提拔之前,他是比亚克拉拉省的党委书记——一个低调的官僚,谦逊到有时会骑自行车上班。作为半个世纪以来首位非卡斯特罗家族的总统,他始终谨慎地展现自己的忠诚。他习惯称劳尔为“最高领袖”——尽管这位老人已九十四岁高龄且正式退休,却仍是古巴政坛的关键声音。当年竞选时,他的竞选团队在广告牌上印出迪亚斯-卡内尔与卡斯特罗兄弟的合影,配文写着“传承”。

As President, Díaz-Canel has widely been seen as hapless and jinxed. The month after he took office, a plane crash in Havana killed a hundred and twelve people. A devastating tornado landed the next year, and in 2022 an explosion from a suspected gas leak destroyed Havana’s historic Hotel Saratoga, killing forty-seven people. There was the COVID-19 pandemic, which vitiated the health-care system and the tourism sector; there was also a string of explosive nationwide protests, in 2021, which the government harshly put down, helping to spur the exodus. The electrical grid was decrepit, and blackouts were commonplace. Díaz-Canel blamed Cuba’s economic struggles, as the Castros had, on crippling U.S. sanctions, which have been in place since 1962.

作为古巴总统,米格尔·迪亚斯-卡内尔(Miguel Díaz-Canel)被普遍视为无能且时运不济。他上任次月,哈瓦那发生空难,造成112人丧生。次年一场毁灭性龙卷风席卷古巴,2022年疑似燃气泄漏引发的爆炸又摧毁了哈瓦那历史悠久的萨拉托加酒店,导致47人死亡。新冠疫情重创了医疗体系和旅游业;2021年接连爆发的全国性抗议活动遭政府严厉镇压,反而加剧了移民潮。电网老化严重,停电成为家常便饭。与卡斯特罗兄弟如出一辙,迪亚斯-卡内尔将古巴的经济困境归咎于美国自1962年起实施的严厉制裁。

By early this year, Cuba was clearly weakened, and Trump always likes to negotiate from a position of strength. (As his Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, recently said about the U.S. bombardment of Iran, “We are punching them while they’re down, which is exactly how it should be.”) But Republicans were divided over the approach. America’s policy toward Cuba has been influenced for decades by Cuban American leaders in Miami, who have insistently ruled out negotiating with the Castro government. Last year, I saw Representative Carlos Giménez, an influential figure in Florida politics, and he likened the regime to a cancer, which needed to be forcibly extracted from the body.

今年年初,古巴显然已显疲态,而特朗普向来喜欢在优势地位上谈判。(正如他的国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯最近谈及美国对伊朗的轰炸时所说:“我们趁其病要其命,这正是应有的方式。”)但共和党内部对此策略存在分歧。数十年来,美国对古巴政策一直深受迈阿密古巴裔领袖的影响,他们始终拒绝与卡斯特罗政府谈判。去年我见到佛罗里达州政坛颇具影响力的众议员卡洛斯·希门尼斯时,他将古巴政权比作必须从肌体中强行切除的毒瘤。

Trump’s Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, grew up in Florida, the son of Cuban immigrants. For most of his career, he held a similarly uncompromising position on the regime. In 2015, he wrote, “We must never forget that the only true form of independence for the Cuban people is freedom and democracy, and we must recommit our state and nation to the goal of helping them achieve that vital objective.” But, now that Rubio works for a President whose foreign policy is almost entirely transactional, he has often been willing to amend his old views. Rather than force out the Cuban government, the U.S. would try to choke it into submission. “We would love to see the regime there change,” Rubio told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this winter. “That doesn’t mean we’re going to make a change.”

特朗普的国务卿马可·卢比奥(Marco Rubio)在佛罗里达州长大,父母是古巴移民。在其职业生涯的大部分时间里,他对古巴政权都持同样强硬的立场。2015年他曾写道:“我们绝不能忘记,对古巴人民而言唯一真正的独立形式就是自由与民主,我们必须让我们的州和国家重新致力于帮助他们实现这一重要目标。”但如今,为一位外交政策几乎完全以交易为导向的总统效力,卢比奥常常愿意修正自己过去的观点。美国不再试图推翻古巴政府,而是试图通过经济扼制迫其屈服。“我们当然乐见那里的政权发生改变,”今年冬天卢比奥在参议院外交关系委员会听证会上表示,“但这不意味着我们会主动促成改变。”

During my visit, everyone I talked to was worried about the country’s vulnerability, but few were worried about whether the government would survive. As I arrived to visit one friend, who had spent decades in the service of the Revolution, he peered around the door and cracked, “Where’s Delta Force?”—a reference to the military unit that had snatched Maduro a few weeks earlier. He laughed bitterly. “I don’t care anymore how it happens, but this situation has to end.”

在我访问期间,每个交谈对象都忧心于国家的脆弱性,却几乎无人担心政府能否存续。当我前去拜访一位为革命事业奉献数十载的老友时,他透过门缝张望,苦笑着调侃道:“三角洲部队呢?”——暗指几周前差点活捉马杜罗的那支特种部队。他凄然一笑:“我不在乎以何种方式结束,但这种局面必须终结。”

As the oil blockade dragged on, Trump sometimes talked about “being kind” to Cuba. If this meant anything, it seemed to mean that he wasn’t rushing to launch a military strike. There was little incentive for one, especially when the U.S. had a large share of its military forces tied up in the war in Iran. Cuba has no unifying leader to remove, and not much oil to seize; its most valuable resources are cobalt, tobacco, nickel, and waterfront real estate. (One friend there asked, half joking, whether an attack could be averted by offering Trump beachside property in Varadero, the island’s most famous resort destination. “El Trump Varadero,” he said. “It has a ring to it.”)

随着石油封锁持续,特朗普有时会谈到对古巴“友善些”。如果这话有什么含义,似乎意味着他并不急于发动军事打击。美国实在缺乏动武的动机——尤其当美军主力深陷伊朗战场之时。古巴既没有需要推翻的统一领袖,也没有多少石油可掠夺;这个国家最宝贵的资源是钴、烟草、镍和滨海地产。(当地一位朋友半开玩笑地问我,如果把古巴最著名的度假胜地巴拉德罗的海滨地产送给特朗普,能否避免战争。“就叫'特朗普巴拉德罗',”他说,“听起来挺像回事。”)

Last spring, Trump’s special envoy for Latin America, Mauricio Claver-Carone, called for “surgical” and “creative” measures to reshape Cuba. (Claver-Carone has since left the Administration, but several sources told me that he remains a key White House intermediary in Latin America.) Along with the oil embargo, the “surgical” measures included restricting tourists’ access to the island and deterring other countries from hiring Cuban doctors, a major revenue source for the regime. These efforts were augmented with a series of “creative” interventions. After Hurricane Melissa devastated eastern Cuba, in October, Ambassador Mike Hammer arranged for humanitarian aid—but he delivered it through the Catholic Church, circumventing the Cuban government and undercutting its own relief efforts. This winter, the Trump Administration enabled several American firms to sell fuel oil to companies in Cuba. Rubio made clear that they were forbidden to offer the oil to the government; the goal was to empower private enterprise at the expense of the state. At a dinner in January, Hammer gleefully predicted that the regime would fall before the year’s end.

去年春天,特朗普的拉丁美洲特使毛里西奥·克拉弗-卡罗内(Mauricio Claver-Carone)呼吁采取“精准”且“富有创意”的措施来重塑古巴。(克拉弗-卡罗内现已离开政府,但多位消息人士告诉我,他仍是白宫在拉丁美洲的重要中间人。)除了石油禁运,“精准”措施还包括限制游客前往该岛,并阻止其他国家雇佣古巴医生——这是该政权的主要收入来源。这些努力还辅以一系列“富有创意”的干预措施。去年10月,飓风梅利莎摧毁古巴东部后,大使迈克·哈默(Mike Hammer)安排了人道主义援助——但他通过天主教会提供援助,绕过了古巴政府,削弱了其自身的救灾工作。今年冬天,特朗普政府允许几家美国公司向古巴企业出售燃料油。卢比奥明确表示,禁止这些公司向古巴政府提供石油;其目标是以牺牲国家为代价来扶持私营企业。在一月份的晚宴上,哈默曾得意地预测,该政权将在年底前垮台。

Cuba has been through hard times before. The mythos of the Revolution is built around the people’s ability to endure. In the nineties, I lived in Havana with my family during the Special Period in the Time of Peace, as Fidel Castro called the ruinous years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With Cuba’s main patron gone, the economy imploded and oil imports plummeted. Unable to find fuel, Cubans rode Flying Pigeon bicycles that Castro had imported from China, or they walked. In the countryside, oxen replaced tractors; horse-drawn cabs became common in towns. Eventually, the government jury-rigged transport by welding together buses to create long vehicles called camellos—camels—for their distinctive humps. But there weren’t enough camellos to go around, so people often had to wait hours for one to arrive.

古巴经历过艰难时期。革命的神话建立在人民的忍耐力之上。上世纪九十年代,苏联解体后,古巴经济陷入困境,菲德尔·卡斯特罗称之为“和平时期的特殊阶段”。当时我和家人住在哈瓦那。随着主要援助国的消失,古巴经济崩溃,石油进口锐减。由于找不到燃料,古巴人骑着卡斯特罗从中国进口的飞鸽牌自行车,或者干脆步行。在乡村,耕牛取代了拖拉机;城镇里,马车变得常见。最终,政府将公交车焊接在一起,制造出被称为“骆驼车”的长型交通工具,因其独特的驼峰状车顶而得名。但骆驼车数量有限,人们常常要等上好几个小时才能等到一辆。
Buildings.
Amid frequent blackouts, only those who can afford generators can keep their lights on.
在频繁停电的情况下,只有买得起发电机的人才能让灯继续亮着。
Photograph by Natalie Keyssar for The New Yorker

As the government lost its ability to provide, people who had jewelry or antiques sold them to whoever would pay. Prostitution, long considered a bygone evil of the capitalist era, became rampant again. Malnutrition encouraged an epidemic of a blinding disease called optic neuropathy. Several people I knew died by suicide, and one day a young woman leaped in front of my car, trying to kill herself; I managed to swerve away just in time.

随着政府逐渐丧失供给能力,人们开始将珠宝或古董卖给任何愿意出价的人。卖淫——这个长期被视为资本主义时代遗毒的现象——再度猖獗。营养不良导致一种名为视神经病变的致盲性疾病大规模流行。我认识的几个人相继自杀身亡,某天甚至有位年轻女子突然扑向我的车头企图轻生,我猛打方向盘才勉强避开。

In 1993, Fidel Castro took emergency steps to ameliorate the crisis: he legalized the U.S. dollar, allowed limited private enterprise, and grudgingly tolerated an increase in tourism, which he despised. It wasn’t enough to assuage the tensions. In the summer of 1994, rioting broke out along Havana’s seawall. For a few hours, the unrest threatened to spread through the city, until Castro appeared before the rioters, and his near-mythical presence—along with a detachment of stick-wielding loyalists—calmed the mob.

1993年,菲德尔·卡斯特罗采取紧急措施以缓解危机:他将美元合法化,允许有限的私营企业,并勉强容忍了他所厌恶的旅游业增长。但这并不足以平息紧张局势。1994年夏天,骚乱在哈瓦那的海堤沿线爆发。数小时内,动荡有蔓延至全城的危险,直到卡斯特罗出现在骚乱者面前——他那近乎神话般的威严,加上一队手持棍棒的忠诚追随者,最终平息了暴乱。

That evening, Castro announced on television that anyone who wanted to leave Cuba could do so. In the next three weeks, as many as thirty-five thousand Cubans took to the sea in improvised boats, trying to reach Florida. It was a chaotic exodus. From my neighborhood, we could see entire families setting off on precarious rafts. Hundreds of migrants are believed to have drowned on the way, but thousands of others were rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard. The son of a Cuban friend made it to Key West on a Windsurfer, after nineteen hours on the water.

当晚,卡斯特罗在电视上宣布,任何想离开古巴的人都可以离开。接下来的三周里,多达三万五千名古巴人乘坐临时拼凑的船只出海,试图抵达佛罗里达。这是一场混乱的大逃亡。从我们社区就能看到,整家整户的人乘着岌岌可危的筏子出发。据信有数百名移民在途中溺亡,但另有数千人被美国海岸警卫队救起。我一位古巴朋友的儿子,在海上漂流十九小时后,竟驾着一块风帆冲浪板抵达了基韦斯特。

Cuba’s emergency truly subsided only after Hugo Chávez was elected President of Venezuela, in 1998. Chávez and Castro signed a pact in which Venezuela agreed to provide Cuba with oil, in exchange for thousands of Cuban doctors, teachers, sports instructors, and security agents. Chávez once described Castro to me as “a beacon”—a father figure who had convinced him that socialism was the way forward for humanity. The alliance grew so close that people joked that Venezuela and Cuba had merged into a new revolutionary entity, “Cubazuela.” After Maduro succeeded Chávez, who died, from cancer, in 2013, a downturn in global oil prices devastated Venezuela’s economy. Maduro continued sending oil, but far less of it—by 2025, about a third of what Cuba imported, with Mexico supplying much of the rest. Since Maduro’s capture, in January, Cuba has been on its own again. This time, there is no charismatic leader to pacify the angry citizens.

古巴的危机真正平息,是在1998年乌戈·查韦斯当选委内瑞拉总统之后。查韦斯与卡斯特罗签署协议,委内瑞拉同意向古巴提供石油,以换取数千名古巴医生、教师、体育教练和安全人员。查韦斯曾向我形容卡斯特罗是“一座灯塔”——这位父亲般的人物使他确信,社会主义是人类前进的方向。两国联盟日益紧密,以至于人们戏称委内瑞拉和古巴已合并成一个新的革命实体“委内古拉”。2013年查韦斯因癌症去世后,马杜罗继任总统,全球油价下跌重创了委内瑞拉经济。马杜罗继续向古巴输送石油,但数量大幅减少——到2025年,委内瑞拉供油量仅占古巴进口量的三分之一左右,其余大部分由墨西哥供应。自今年1月马杜罗被捕以来,古巴再次陷入孤立无援的境地。这一次,再也没有富有魅力的领导人来安抚愤怒的民众了。

On January 27th, Díaz-Canel joined several thousand student loyalists, soldiers, and senior leaders at La Escalinata, a grand stone staircase that leads to the entrance of the University of Havana. They were there for the March of the Torches, an annual tribute to José Martí, Cuba’s ultimate nationalist hero. Martí, a journalist and a poet, was an essential figure in the nineteenth-century war of independence, in which Cuban élites revolted against the Spanish colonists. As the fighting stretched on for decades, Martí helped rally his peers. “How beautiful it is to die when one dies fighting in defense of the fatherland,” he once wrote. In 1895, he took part in a cavalry charge on the Spaniards and was killed on his first day in battle.

1月27日,迪亚斯-卡内尔与数千名学生骨干、士兵和高级领导人一起,聚集在通往哈瓦那大学入口的宏伟石阶——埃斯卡利纳塔。他们前来参加“火炬游行”,这是每年向古巴的民族英雄何塞·马蒂致敬的活动。马蒂是一位记者兼诗人,也是19世纪古巴独立战争中的关键人物,当时古巴精英阶层奋起反抗西班牙殖民者。随着战争持续数十年,马蒂帮助团结了他的同胞。“为保卫祖国而战死,是多么壮丽啊,”他曾这样写道。1895年,他参与了一次对西班牙人的骑兵冲锋,并在战斗的第一天阵亡。

Spain was finally forced out in 1898, when the United States took the side of the Cubans—only to deny them sovereignty, by making Cuba a de-facto U.S. protectorate and then by intervening repeatedly to prop up friendly autocrats. But the legend of Martí endured; he became Cuba’s “Apostle,” and a bust of his image had a prominent place in schoolyards across the island. Cuban politicians are still careful to present themselves as devotees of Martí, and sacrificing for la patria is a consecrated ideal. In 1953, six months before Fidel Castro launched his insurrection against the U.S.-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista, he led a torchlight procession in Havana, to commemorate the centenary of Martí’s birth. It has been replicated ever since.

1898年,西班牙终于被迫退出,当时美国站在了古巴人一边——却剥夺了他们的主权,将古巴变成事实上的美国保护国,并一再干预以扶持亲美独裁者。但马蒂的传奇经久不衰;他成为古巴的“使徒”,其半身像在古巴各地的校园里占据着显要位置。古巴政客至今仍小心翼翼地以马蒂信徒自居,为祖国牺牲是神圣的理想。1953年,在菲德尔·卡斯特罗发动反对美国支持的独裁者富尔亨西奥·巴蒂斯塔的起义前六个月,他曾在哈瓦那领导了一场火炬游行,以纪念马蒂诞辰一百周年。此后,这一传统延续至今。
Two angels throwing frogs down from Heaven and one angel is looking thoughtfully into the distance.
“It’s a plague—don’t overthink it. Just grab a frog and throw.”
“这是瘟疫——别想太多。抓只青蛙扔下去就是了。”
Cartoon by Daniel Kanhai
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This year’s march—dubbed the Anti-Imperialist Centenary March of the Torches, because 2026 is the hundredth anniversary of Castro’s birth—had an air of defiance. Flags billowed. A young crooner sang a patriotic ballad, and the crowd swayed along. Litza Elena González Desdín, the head of the government-aligned student federation, gave an impassioned speech from the top of the stairs, rallying whatever remained of the Revolution’s true believers. “Compatriots, we are living through very turbulent times, in which the empire and its emperor, Donald Trump, want to impose an order of bombs, kidnappings, persecution, destruction, and death, and intend to drag us back to destructive fascism,” she said. She denounced “the cowardly military aggression of the United States against Venezuela” and “the kidnapping of the President of that sister nation.” She reminded the marchers that their country had also paid a blood sacrifice: dozens of Cuban bodyguards, secretly assigned to protect Maduro, had been killed. “We will never forget that on January 3rd, in the darkest hours of the early morning, Cubans physically lost thirty-two of our bravest sons,” she said.

今年的游行被命名为“反帝百年火炬游行”——因为2026年是卡斯特罗诞辰一百周年——空气中弥漫着抗争的气息。旗帜猎猎飘扬。一位年轻歌手吟唱着爱国歌曲,人群随之轻轻摆动。政府支持的学生联合会主席莉察·埃琳娜·冈萨雷斯·德斯丁(Litza Elena González Desdín)在台阶顶端发表慷慨激昂的演讲,试图凝聚革命信仰者残存的力量。“同胞们,我们正经历动荡的时代,美帝国及其皇帝唐纳德·特朗普企图用炸弹、绑架、迫害、毁灭和死亡强加秩序,意图将我们拖回毁灭性的法西斯主义,”她说道。她谴责“美国对委内瑞拉怯懦的军事侵略”以及“对兄弟国家总统的绑架”,并提醒游行者,古巴也付出了血的代价:数十名被秘密派去保护马杜罗的古巴保镖丧生。“我们永远不会忘记,在1月3日黎明前最黑暗的时刻,古巴在肉体上失去了三十二位最勇敢的儿子,”她说。

In the past half century, Cuba and the U.S. have engaged in many proxy battles—in Grenada, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and the Congo—but the last time that their soldiers fought directly was in 1961, during the Bay of Pigs invasion, a disastrous American defeat that encouraged a profound schism between the two countries. The killing of the guards in Caracas felt similarly momentous. This time, though, the Cubans had lost, undermining the long-standing myth of their battlefield invincibility. The U.S. forces had killed more than eighty people, including Cubans and Venezuelan service members, while sustaining no losses. Trump later crowed that Maduro’s defenses had been overwhelmed with a top-secret weapon that he called the Discombobulator.

过去半个世纪,古巴和美国在格林纳达、玻利维亚、尼加拉瓜、安哥拉、埃塞俄比亚和刚果等地打过许多代理人战争,但两国士兵最后一次直接交战是在1961年的猪湾入侵期间——那场灾难性的失败让美国深受打击,也加剧了两国间的深刻裂痕。加拉加斯卫兵被杀事件同样具有重大意义。但这一次,古巴人输了,他们战无不胜的神话就此破灭。美军击毙了包括古巴人和委内瑞拉军人在内的八十多人,自己却无一伤亡。特朗普后来得意洋洋地宣称,马杜罗的防线是被一种他称为“混乱制造器”的绝密武器攻破的。

González Desdín, the student leader, acknowledged none of this when she talked about the fallen guards. “They are a constant inspiration for our generation,” she said. “They are paradigms of the history of the struggle for a united America, for an ever more sovereign homeland. To them, honor and glory forever.” A military band played a patriotic tune, and the marchers began to make their way through the city, bearing torches and chanting old revolutionary slogans: “Socialism or Death,” “I Am Fidel.” As they sang and shouted about honor, sacrifice, and the fatherland, they seemed like adherents of a religion in which the rewards are realized only in the hereafter.

学生领袖冈萨雷斯·德斯丁(González Desdín)谈及牺牲的卫兵时,对这些只字未提。“他们是我们这一代人永恒的激励,”她说,“他们是争取美洲团结、争取更独立自主祖国的斗争史上的典范。荣誉与荣耀永远属于他们。”军乐队奏响爱国乐曲,游行队伍开始穿行城市,人们手持火炬,高呼着古老的革命口号:“不社会主义,毋宁死”“我是菲德尔”。当他们歌唱着、呼喊着荣誉、牺牲与祖国时,仿佛某种宗教的信徒——而那种宗教的报偿,只在彼岸才能实现。
People on stage.
Fidel Castro fostered a revolutionary mythos based on resilience and hope. Now there is no unifying leader to rally people.
菲德尔·卡斯特罗以坚韧和希望为基础,培育了一种革命神话。如今已没有能凝聚人心的统一领袖。
Photograph from AP

Other Cubans were less able to sustain themselves on faith. When the lack of electricity interfered with classes at the university, angry students gathered on La Escalinata for a sit-in. Across Havana, people protested the lack of food and power by banging on pots and pans—a noisy, time-honored tactic known as the cacerolazo. In the city of Morón, which has been afflicted by long stretches without electricity and by an outbreak of chikungunya, a peaceful march turned violent when it reached the offices of the Communist Party. Residents stormed the building and threw furniture from a second-floor window. Out on the street, they set a bonfire with the furniture, while people chanted “Freedom!”

另一些古巴人则难以仅凭信念支撑自己。当电力短缺影响到大学课程时,愤怒的学生聚集在拉埃斯卡利纳塔台阶举行静坐抗议。在哈瓦那各处,人们敲击锅碗瓢盆抗议食物与电力短缺——这种喧闹而历史悠久的抗议方式被称为“锅碗瓢盆示威”。在莫龙市,长期停电与基孔肯雅热疫情已让当地不堪重负,一场和平游行在抵达共产党办公室时演变为暴力冲突。居民冲进大楼,将家具从二楼窗户扔出。街头,人们用这些家具点燃篝火,高呼“自由!”

The remains of the thirty-two guards were flown to Havana’s José Martí International Airport and received in a solemn military ceremony, presided over by Raúl Castro, who rarely appears in public nowadays. The ashes of four officers from Havana were interred in the Necrópolis Cristóbal Colón, an ornate nineteenth-century cemetery where many of Cuba’s leading figures are buried. Four simple nameplates on stone plaques marked the men’s graves. Bouquets of flowers piled up nearby.

三十二名警卫的遗骸被运抵哈瓦那的何塞·马蒂国际机场,并在庄严肃穆的军礼仪式中安放。如今鲜少公开露面的劳尔·卡斯特罗亲自主持了仪式。其中四名来自哈瓦那的军官骨灰被安葬在克里斯托瓦尔·科隆公墓——这座建于十九世纪的华丽陵园里长眠着许多古巴重要人物。四块朴素的石碑上镌刻着逝者的姓名,墓前堆满了鲜花。

A few days later, Russia’s interior minister, Vladimir Alexandrovich Kolokoltsev, came and paid his respects to the fallen soldiers. Kolokoltsev’s visit was a gesture at the persistence of old Cold War affiliations. Cuba’s Army continues to use Russian-made weapons, and the two countries’ security services have maintained relationships. Near the cemetery, a bronze plaque marks the place where Fidel Castro gave a historic speech on April 16, 1961. The day before, seven Cubans had been killed in Havana, when U.S. warplanes attacked an airfield in preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion. Castro had always described himself as a “secular humanist.” Now he declared “the socialist nature of the Cuban Revolution.”

几天后,俄罗斯内务部长弗拉基米尔·亚历山特罗维奇·科洛科利采夫(Vladimir Alexandrovich Kolokoltsev)前来向阵亡士兵致敬。科洛科利采夫的访问象征着冷战时期结盟关系的延续。古巴军队至今仍使用俄制武器,两国安全部门也保持着联系。墓地附近立着一块铜牌,标记着菲德尔·卡斯特罗在1961年4月16日发表历史性演讲的地点。就在前一天,七名古巴人在哈瓦那遇难——当时美军战机为猪湾入侵做准备,袭击了一处机场。卡斯特罗始终自称“世俗人文主义者”,但那天他宣告了“古巴革命的社会主义性质”。

The most visible legacies of Cuba’s Soviet era are bleak Moscow-style apartment blocks that serve as Havana’s version of social housing and the ancient Ladas that rumble through the streets, when there is gas to run them. Near the gritty port of Regla is a park where a huge bronze sculpture of Vladimir Lenin’s face, installed in 1984, stares out from a hillside. Below it are eleven sculptures of pale, faceless figures, with arms outstretched as if in homage. Today, the park is visited mostly by lovers who use its overgrown grounds for trysts. Russian tourists come to Cuba, but flights were suspended in February because there wasn’t enough fuel for their planes to get home.

古巴苏联时代最显眼的遗迹,是那些莫斯科风格的灰暗公寓楼——它们构成了哈瓦那版的社会住房,以及那些在街上隆隆作响的老旧拉达车——前提是有汽油可烧。在雷格拉港附近,有一座公园,1984年落成的巨大青铜列宁头像雕塑从山坡上凝视远方。下方是十一尊苍白无面的雕像,双臂伸展,仿佛在致敬。如今,这座公园的访客主要是情侣,他们利用杂草丛生的场地幽会。俄罗斯游客仍会来古巴,但航班已于二月停飞,因为飞机没有足够的燃料返航。

Russia has behaved cagily in the current conflict. Perhaps because Vladimir Putin wants to avoid provoking Trump into giving more aid to Ukraine, he refrained from condemning Maduro’s removal, and he responded to the blockade of Cuba with a tepid statement calling the policy “unacceptable.” In February, Russia dispatched a tanker, the Sea Horse, but then diverted it as the U.S. tightened the blockade. Last week, with the conflict in Iran depleting American military resources, another Russian tanker, the Anatoly Kolodkin, headed across the Atlantic in Cuba’s general direction.

俄罗斯在当前的冲突中表现得颇为谨慎。或许是因为弗拉基米尔·普京希望避免刺激特朗普向乌克兰提供更多援助,他并未谴责马杜罗被推翻一事,对古巴遭封锁的回应也仅是一份温和的声明,称该政策“不可接受”。今年二月,俄罗斯曾派遣“海马号”油轮,但在美国加强封锁后改变了航向。上周,随着伊朗冲突消耗着美国的军事资源,另一艘俄罗斯油轮“阿纳托利·科洛德金号”正朝着古巴的大致方向横渡大西洋。
A sculpture.
Near the port of Regla, a sculpture of Lenin peers down from a hillside. Installed in the nineteen-eighties, it endures mostly as an oddity.
在雷格拉港附近,一座列宁雕像从山坡上俯视下方。它安装于二十世纪八十年代,如今主要作为一件奇特的景观留存下来。
Photograph by Natalie Keyssar for The New Yorker

Cuba has few other allies that might come to its aid. For a short time after the raid on Venezuela, Mexico sent oil, but in January it abruptly cancelled a scheduled shipment. Mexico’s President, Claudia Sheinbaum, claimed that the change of plans resulted from a “sovereign decision” by the state oil company, Pemex—never mind that Pemex operates under Sheinbaum’s control. She emphasized that she would continue sending humanitarian aid, and the next month the Mexican Navy delivered two shiploads of supplies: powdered milk, beans, and hygiene products, but no oil.

古巴几乎没有其他盟友可能伸出援手。在委内瑞拉遭袭后的短暂时间里,墨西哥曾输送石油,但今年一月突然取消了一次计划中的运输。墨西哥总统克劳迪娅·辛鲍姆声称计划变更是国家石油公司Pemex作出的“主权决定”——尽管Pemex完全在她的掌控之下运作。她强调将继续提供人道主义援助,次月墨西哥海军确实送去了两船物资:奶粉、豆类和卫生用品,唯独没有石油。

The Cuban government’s desperation has encouraged actions that further alienated influential friends. In November, it froze the bank holdings of foreign embassies and businesses with hard-currency accounts, apparently because it needed the cash. One acquaintance who is close to the Party élite told me that he had seven million dollars sequestered, crippling his business. It was worse for others, he said: he’d heard of companies that lost access to tens of millions. He shrugged. “You know what?” he said. “I’m not expecting to get the money back.” At the end of our meeting, he pulled me into a tight hug and whispered a prognosis for the regime: “This is over.”

古巴政府的绝望促使它采取了一些行动,进一步疏远了那些有影响力的朋友。去年11月,政府冻结了外国使馆和企业在硬通货账户中的银行存款,显然是因为它需要现金。一位与党内精英关系密切的熟人告诉我,他有700万美元被扣押,导致他的生意陷入瘫痪。他说,其他人的情况更糟:他听说有些公司损失了数千万美元。他耸了耸肩。“你知道吗?”他说,“我不指望能拿回这笔钱。”在我们会面结束时,他紧紧地拥抱了我,低声对这个政权做出了预测:“一切都结束了。”

When I talked to Cubans about the crisis, many spoke euphemistically about “change.” Some referred to the U.S. incursion in Venezuela, where Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez and other regime leaders had been allowed to stay in power as long as they assented to Trump’s demands. One influential Cuban said that the Venezuelan model had had a huge psychological impact, showing that there could be pragmatic change without displacing the regime. “I don’t mean that they should do something similar to what they did in Caracas, coming in with helicopters and shooting people,” he said. “But the fact that they found people to work with there plants the idea that perhaps something similar could be possible here.”

当我与古巴人谈论这场危机时,许多人用“变革”这个委婉说法来指代。有人提及美国对委内瑞拉的介入——在那里,副总统德尔茜·罗德里格斯(Delcy Rodríguez)等政权领导人只要同意特朗普的要求,就能继续掌权。一位有影响力的古巴人表示,委内瑞拉模式产生了巨大的心理冲击,它表明即使不推翻政权,也可能实现务实的变革。“我不是说他们应该照搬加拉加斯那套,开着直升机扫射民众,”他说,“但他们在那里找到了合作对象,这个事实让人不禁设想:类似的情况或许也能在这里发生。”

A former senior aide to Chávez and Maduro suggested that the situation in Venezuela was nothing to aspire to. He told me wryly, “Venezuela is quickly becoming the Puerto Rico of the twenty-first century”—a virtual American colony, led by an avowed socialist in coöperation with a right-wing American President. “Who could have imagined this outcome?” he asked. “It’s so bizarre.”

查韦斯和马杜罗的一位前高级幕僚暗示,委内瑞拉的现状并不值得向往。他语带讽刺地告诉我:“委内瑞拉正迅速成为二十一世纪的波多黎各”——一个由公开宣称的社会主义者与右翼美国总统合作领导的、事实上的美国殖民地。“谁能料到这种结局?”他问道,“简直匪夷所思。”

Still, it offered powerful Cubans hope that their lives could be improved without too much upheaval. A European diplomat on the island told me, “Because of Venezuela, guys here now think that they can hang on after all.” But, the diplomat asked, “who’s going to run this country in a pro-capitalist, pro-U.S. fashion? Who’s our Delcy?” His colleagues were placing bets. One candidate was Oscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga, who was recently made Deputy Prime Minister and given a seat in the National Assembly—a prerequisite for Presidential candidates. Pérez-Oliva, who also serves as the minister of foreign trade, is a grandnephew of Fidel and Raúl Castro. The diplomat reasoned, “If Raúl tells the Army and security services, ‘He’s the one who is going to do the transition,’ they’ll go along with it.” On the other hand, a link to the Castros would be an impediment with the Americans. Perhaps the smarter bet was the Prime Minister, Manuel Marrero Cruz—a pro-development former head of tourism, with ties to the military. “Even though he’s not well liked, he’s in an interesting position,” the diplomat said. “I’ve tried him out as an option on the Americans, and they haven’t pushed back.”

尽管如此,这仍给古巴民众带来了强烈的希望:他们的生活或许能在不经历太大动荡的情况下得到改善。一位驻古巴的欧洲外交官告诉我:“因为委内瑞拉的先例,这里的人现在觉得他们终究能挺过去。”但他随即问道:“谁能以亲资本主义、亲美的方式治理这个国家?谁会是我们的德尔茜?”他的同事们正在下注。候选人之一是奥斯卡·佩雷斯-奥利瓦·弗拉加,他最近被任命为副总理并获得了国民议会议席——这是成为总统候选人的前提条件。兼任外贸部长的佩雷斯-奥利瓦是菲德尔·卡斯特罗和劳尔·卡斯特罗的侄孙。这位外交官分析道:“如果劳尔告诉军队和安全部门'他就是那个要领导转型的人',他们会配合的。”但另一方面,与卡斯特罗家族的关联可能成为与美国打交道的障碍。或许更明智的选择是押注总理曼努埃尔·马雷罗·克鲁斯——这位亲发展的前旅游部长与军方关系密切。“尽管他不太受欢迎,但处境很微妙,”外交官说,“我试探过美国人对他作为选项的态度,他们没有反对。”

Rubio has said that the transformation of Venezuela will have three parts: stabilization, recovery, and a transition to functional democracy. This model seems difficult to apply to Cuba. Even if negotiations with the U.S. yield an agreement to hold elections, Cuba has no organized political opposition that could run against the Communist Party, let alone take over the country. As a friend in Havana pointed out, there is no local equivalent of María Corina Machado, the opposition leader who helped encourage the intervention in Venezuela. The best-known dissidents are dead, imprisoned, or in exile, too far removed from recent politics to be taken seriously. The likelier scenario is that the next ruler will come from within the existing power structure—which, my friend suggested, means that little will change.

卢比奥曾表示,委内瑞拉的转型将分为三个阶段:稳定局势、恢复元气,以及向有效运作的民主制度过渡。这套模式似乎很难套用到古巴身上。即便与美国谈判达成举行选举的协议,古巴也没有任何有组织的政治反对派能够与共产党竞争,更不用说接管国家了。正如哈瓦那的一位朋友所指出的,古巴没有像委内瑞拉反对派领袖玛丽亚·科里纳·马查多那样的人物——正是她推动了外部势力对委内瑞拉的干预。古巴最著名的异见人士要么已离世,要么身陷囹圄,要么流亡海外,他们与当下的政治现实太过疏离,难以被认真对待。更可能的情况是,下一任统治者将从现有权力结构中产生——我的朋友认为,这意味着一切都不会有太大改变。

The Trump Administration’s main counterpart in negotiations is Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, Raúl Castro’s grandson and personal bodyguard. Rodríguez Castro is known as El Cangrejo—the Crab—reportedly because he was born with six fingers on one hand. El Cangrejo is forty-one, with a boxer’s build and the Roman nose and square jaw of his great-uncle Fidel. Despite the Castro clan’s preference for maintaining an austere life style in public, images have emerged of Rodríguez Castro at parties, travelling abroad on private jets, and hanging out on yachts with women in swimsuits. The air of abandon is not limited to partying. In 2022, he allegedly drove his car into a young mother and toddler who were standing on a rural roadside in eastern Cuba. Their injuries required emergency surgery and follow-up care, and though Rodríguez Castro promised to look after them, the mother has denounced him on social media for abandonment.

特朗普政府在谈判中的主要对手是劳尔·吉列尔莫·罗德里格斯·卡斯特罗(Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro)——劳尔·卡斯特罗的孙子兼私人保镖。罗德里格斯·卡斯特罗被称为“螃蟹”,据说是因为他出生时一只手有六根手指。这位四十一岁的“螃蟹”有着拳击手般的体格,高挺的罗马鼻和方下巴酷似他的叔祖父菲德尔。尽管卡斯特罗家族在公开场合偏好保持简朴的生活方式,但罗德里格斯·卡斯特罗在派对上狂欢、乘坐私人飞机出国旅行、与身着泳衣的女性在游艇上消遣的照片仍不时流出。这种放纵气息不仅限于娱乐场合。2022年,据称他驾车撞上了站在古巴东部乡村路边的年轻母亲和幼儿。伤者需要紧急手术和后续治疗,尽管罗德里格斯·卡斯特罗承诺会照顾他们,但这位母亲仍在社交媒体上谴责他撒手不管。

Around Havana, Rodríguez Castro is rumored to be involved in a variety of money-making schemes. He is also understood to look after the family interests in GAESA, an opaque entity that is among the country’s most powerful institutions. GAESA is the Spanish-language acronym for the Business Administration Group—an all-encompassing conglomerate owned and operated by Cuba’s armed forces. Raúl Castro created GAESA during the Special Period to give the military a way to sustain itself; El Cangrejo’s father took over in 1996 and ran it until his death, in 2022. Over the years, it has grown to include dozens of businesses, involved in everything from construction, hotels, and tourism to port logistics, fishing, and commercial imports, as well as retail stores and financial services—notably, the hard-currency remittances on which many Cubans depend. It is also thought to own an array of companies and properties in Panama, where El Cangrejo often visits.

在哈瓦那,人们私下议论罗德里格斯·卡斯特罗(Rodríguez Castro)参与了各种赚钱的勾当。据信他还负责照管家族在GAESA的利益——这个不透明的实体是古巴最有权势的机构之一。GAESA是西班牙语“企业管理局”的缩写,这个包罗万象的企业集团由古巴武装部队全权拥有和运营。劳尔·卡斯特罗在“特殊时期”创建了GAESA,为军队开辟自给自足的途径;“螃蟹”的父亲于1996年接手管理,直至2022年去世。多年来,它已发展成为涵盖数十家企业的庞大网络,业务范围从建筑、酒店、旅游业到港口物流、渔业、商业进口,以及零售商店和金融服务——特别是许多古巴人赖以生存的硬通货汇款业务。据信该集团还在巴拿马拥有众多公司和房产,而“螃蟹”经常前往该国。

Analysts estimate that GAESA controls at least forty per cent of Cuba’s economy, and has revenues equal to three times the state budget. Last year, the Miami Herald published leaked documents indicating that it had billions of dollars stashed in foreign bank accounts, beyond the reach of the civilian government. By all appearances, Díaz-Canel leads a rubber-stamp administration, while Raúl acts as the shadow President and El Cangrejo as his aide-de-camp. According to someone who knows Díaz-Canel personally, he would like to open up Cuba’s economy, but has repeatedly been thwarted by GAESA, which does not want competition.

分析人士估计,古巴军事商业集团(GAESA)控制着古巴至少40%的经济,其收入相当于国家预算的三倍。去年,《迈阿密先驱报》刊登的泄露文件显示,该集团在外国银行账户中藏匿了数十亿美元资金,不受文职政府管辖。种种迹象表明,迪亚斯-卡内尔领导的政府只是橡皮图章,劳尔才是幕后总统,而“螃蟹”则是他的副官。据一位与迪亚斯-卡内尔熟识的人士透露,他本想开放古巴经济,却屡遭古巴军事商业集团阻挠——该集团不愿面对竞争。

In mid-February, a senior Administration official downplayed the meetings with Rodríguez Castro, telling Axios, “I wouldn’t call these negotiations as much as discussions about the future.” A few days later, sources confirmed to the Herald that U.S. officials had met with Rodríguez Castro in St. Kitts, on the sidelines of a security conference for Caribbean nations. Afterward, Rubio suggested that some lingering influence from the old regime could be acceptable for a time. “Cuba needs to change,” he said. “It doesn’t have to change all at once.”

二月中旬,一位政府高级官员向Axios淡化处理与罗德里格斯·卡斯特罗的会面,称“与其说是谈判,不如说是关于未来的讨论”。几天后,消息人士向《先驱报》证实,美国官员在圣基茨岛加勒比国家安全会议期间与罗德里格斯·卡斯特罗进行了会晤。会后,卢比奥暗示旧政权的一些残余影响暂时可以接受。“古巴需要改变,”他说,“但不必一步到位。”

The same day as the conference in St. Kitts, a speedboat stolen from a Florida marina entered Cuban waters, carrying ten heavily armed exiles on a mission to overthrow the regime. As the boat approached the shoreline, it was intercepted by a Cuban Coast Guard cutter, and a firefight broke out. Four of the men were killed, and the others were injured; one died a few days later. Cuban officials decried the episode as a terrorist attack but refrained from blaming the U.S. Rubio avoided accusations, too, and said that the U.S. would conduct its own investigation.

就在圣基茨会议的同一天,一艘从佛罗里达州码头盗走的快艇驶入古巴水域,船上载有十名全副武装的流亡者,意图推翻古巴政权。快艇接近海岸线时,被一艘古巴海岸警卫队巡逻艇拦截,双方随即爆发枪战。四名袭击者当场死亡,其余人员受伤,其中一人在几天后不治身亡。古巴官员谴责这是一起恐怖袭击,但并未将矛头指向美国。鲁比奥也回避了指责,表示美国将自行展开调查。

Both governments seem conscious that the relationship between the two countries has often turned on isolated, almost flukish incidents. In Bill Clinton’s first term as President, his efforts to improve relations were disrupted when an anti-Castro organization in Florida flew two Cessnas into Cuban airspace. Cuban MIGs scrambled and shot the planes down, killing four people, including three U.S. citizens.

两国政府似乎都意识到,两国关系常常因孤立、近乎偶然的事件而急转直下。比尔·克林顿在首个总统任期内,曾致力于改善美古关系,却因佛罗里达州一个反卡斯特罗组织派遣两架塞斯纳飞机闯入古巴领空而受挫。古巴米格战机紧急升空将其击落,造成四人死亡,其中包括三名美国公民。

Amid the uproar that followed, Clinton was obliged to sign the Helms-Burton Act—a law sponsored by right-wing Republicans to codify their opposition to Communist Cuba. Among its measures, it made displacing the Castro regime the official policy of the United States, extended the 1962 trade embargo indefinitely, and placed sanctions on foreign companies that did business with Cuba. Helms-Burton could be repealed only with approval from Congress, but Clinton suspended its most punitive provision, Title III, by invoking “waiver authority” every six months—a routine carried on by George W. Bush and Barack Obama. In 2019, Trump allowed this provision to proceed, and two years later he reinstated an old measure declaring Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism.

在随之而来的喧嚣中,克林顿被迫签署了《赫尔姆斯-伯顿法》——这部由右翼共和党人推动的法案,将他们反对共产主义古巴的立场正式写入法律。该法案规定推翻卡斯特罗政权成为美国的官方政策,将1962年开始的贸易禁运无限期延长,并对与古巴有商业往来的外国公司实施制裁。只有国会批准才能废除《赫尔姆斯-伯顿法》,但克林顿通过每六个月行使一次“豁免权”,暂停了该法案最具惩罚性的第三章条款——这一惯例在小布什和奥巴马任内得以延续。2019年,特朗普允许该条款生效;两年后,他恢复了将古巴列为“支持恐怖主义国家”的旧有措施。

In discussions about the Trump Administration’s policy on Cuba, Rubio has repeatedly invoked Helms-Burton, which specifies that there cannot be a transitional government if Fidel or Raúl Castro still hold power. Yet the Administration is evidently willing to allow Raúl to exert influence through his grandson. It did, however, suggest in March that Díaz-Canel resign to facilitate negotiations—a gesture that would allow Trump to claim victory while leaving the regime essentially intact.

在讨论特朗普政府对古巴政策时,卢比奥多次援引《赫尔姆斯-伯顿法》——该法案明确规定,只要菲德尔·卡斯特罗或劳尔·卡斯特罗仍掌权,过渡政府就不可能成立。然而,美国政府显然愿意允许劳尔通过其孙辈施加影响力。不过,政府今年三月确实曾建议迪亚斯-卡内尔辞职以推动谈判——这种姿态既能让特朗普宣称胜利,又能让古巴政权基本保持原状。

Ric Herrero, the head of the Cuba Study Group, a policy and advocacy organization based in Washington, D.C., argued that Rubio’s immediate priority is to stabilize Cuba’s economy, which means making a deal with the existing power structure. This has historically been an unpopular prospect in Florida’s Cuban community, but Trump was helping change perceptions. “Every day, Trump is saying, ‘We’re talking to the Cuban leaders,’ and by doing that he’s normalizing the idea,” Herrero said. “A month ago, the Miami Cubans were, like, ‘Don’t negotiate with Communists! Patria o muerte!’ Now they’re, like, ‘In Marco we trust.’ ”

总部位于华盛顿特区的政策与倡导组织“古巴研究小组”负责人里卡多·埃雷罗(Ric Herrero)指出,卢比奥当前的首要任务是稳定古巴经济,这意味着必须与现有权力结构达成协议。这在佛罗里达州古巴裔社区历来是个不受欢迎的设想,但特朗普正在帮助改变人们的观念。“特朗普每天都在说'我们正与古巴领导人对话',通过这种方式,他正在使这种想法常态化,”埃雷罗表示,“一个月前,迈阿密的古巴裔民众还在高呼'不要与共产主义者谈判!誓死捍卫祖国!'如今他们却说'我们信任马可'。”

Herrero went on, “No one wants to precipitate a collapse in Cuba, because that would require sending in troops—the whole nine yards. What the blockade is about is ‘We have a bigger dick than you,’ and pushing them to the negotiating table. They want to make it clear to the Cubans that ‘It’s game over, guys—you have become a dependency of the United States. Your money comes from remittances from Miami, and your food is mostly imported from the United States. Now your oil is going to be administered by the United States, too.’ ”

埃雷罗接着说:“没人想引发古巴的崩溃,因为那将意味着要派兵——全套军事干预。封锁的本质是'我们比你们更强硬',逼他们回到谈判桌前。他们想向古巴人表明:'游戏结束了,伙计们——你们已经沦为美国的附庸。你们的钱来自迈阿密的汇款,你们的食物大多从美国进口。现在你们的石油也将由美国掌控。'”

Ever since the Revolution, Miami Cubans have dreamed of returning to Cuba and reversing its effects. Trump has encouraged their ambitions—or has at least facilitated acts of symbolic revenge. Title III of Helms-Burton allows lawsuits against companies that knowingly use property that was seized during the Revolution. The U.S. Supreme Court is now considering a series of suits enabled by the law. These include a billion-dollar claim by ExxonMobil for the confiscation of its assets in Cuba and another, for four hundred million dollars, against Florida-based cruise ships for using expropriated port facilities. Many other suits are pending on behalf of families that lost businesses or homes. In response to pressure from Miami lawmakers and exile groups, Florida has reopened a criminal investigation into Raúl Castro’s role in shooting down the two Cessnas in 1996.

自革命以来,迈阿密的古巴人一直梦想着回到古巴,扭转革命的后果。特朗普鼓励了他们的雄心——或者至少为象征性的复仇行为提供了便利。《赫尔姆斯-伯顿法》第三章允许对明知故用地使用革命期间被没收财产的公司提起诉讼。美国最高法院目前正在审议根据该法提出的一系列诉讼。其中包括埃克森美孚因资产在古巴被没收而提出的10亿美元索赔,以及针对佛罗里达州邮轮公司使用被征用港口设施而提出的4亿美元索赔。还有许多代表失去企业或家园的家庭提起的诉讼正在审理中。迫于迈阿密立法者和流亡团体的压力,佛罗里达州已重新启动对劳尔·卡斯特罗在1996年击落两架塞斯纳飞机事件中所扮演角色的刑事调查。

Last Monday, Pérez-Oliva, the foreign-trade minister, announced that the island would open its economy to the Cuban diaspora. “This extends beyond the commercial sphere,” he said. “It also applies to investments—not only small investments but also large investments, particularly in infrastructure.” It is unclear how many investors will see attractive opportunities in a largely defunct state where the military fiercely guards its control over a substantial part of the economy. Tourism is the most viable way for Cuba to make money quickly, but the island is far from being able to support major development. The Cuban economist Ricardo Torres, a research fellow at American University, said, “The big difference with Venezuela is that Cuba has nothing. In Venezuela, however much was ripped off by those in government, at least it always had oil. But Cuba is truly bankrupt, and it needs everything. Whoever enters the government there is going to have to sit down on the first day and wonder, Who is going to give me a billion dollars so that the whole country doesn’t go dark next week?” Torres predicted that Cuba’s power plants would have to be razed and rebuilt; it could cost ten billion dollars to reconstruct the grid. Housing was another huge problem. About half of the island’s Soviet-built public apartment blocks were decrepit and would have to be knocked down. “Who’s going to pay for it?” Torres asked. “Some will have to be paid by the American taxpayer.”

上周一,外贸部长佩雷斯-奥利瓦(Pérez-Oliva)宣布,古巴将向海外侨民开放经济。“这不仅限于商业领域,”他说,“也适用于投资——不仅是小额投资,也包括大型投资,尤其是在基础设施方面。”在这个经济基本瘫痪、军队牢牢掌控大部分经济命脉的国家,有多少投资者能看到诱人的机会,尚不清楚。旅游业是古巴快速赚钱最可行的途径,但该国远不具备支持大规模开发的能力。美利坚大学研究员、古巴经济学家里卡多·托雷斯(Ricardo Torres)表示:“古巴与委内瑞拉最大的区别在于,古巴一无所有。在委内瑞拉,无论政府官员侵吞了多少财富,至少那里一直有石油。但古巴确实破产了,它需要一切。无论谁上台执政,第一天就得坐下来思考:谁能给我十亿美元,好让全国下周不至于陷入黑暗?”托雷斯预测,古巴的发电厂必须推倒重建;重建电网可能需要一百亿美元。住房是另一个巨大难题。岛上约半数苏联时期建造的公共公寓楼已破败不堪,必须拆除。“谁来买单?”托雷斯问道,“其中一部分恐怕还得由美国纳税人承担。”

Despite the regime’s sacralization of the past, the Revolution is fading, as private enterprise takes over for the failing state. In the new Cuba, there is less concern about keeping up the appearance of class solidarity. During the Special Period, Fidel Castro was said to have filled in his swimming pool, convinced that he should not enjoy luxuries while the people were struggling. His ministers were expected to be equally austere; in the nineties, I saw one of his Vice-Presidents crossing Havana at the wheel of a rattletrap Lada. Nowadays, rich Cubans drive imported Audis and Ram trucks. Their homes have large generators that supply electricity, while their poorer neighbors’ homes remain unlit.

尽管政权将过去神圣化,但革命正在褪色,私营企业正在接管失败的国家。在新古巴,人们不再那么关心维持阶级团结的表象。在特殊时期,据说菲德尔·卡斯特罗填平了自己的游泳池,因为他坚信人民在挣扎时自己不应享受奢侈。他的部长们也被要求同样节俭;九十年代,我曾见过他的一位副总统开着一辆破旧的拉达轿车穿越哈瓦那。如今,富有的古巴人开着进口的奥迪和公羊卡车。他们的家中配备大型发电机供电,而较贫穷的邻居家中依然一片漆黑。

Around Havana, there are still a few old billboards with slogans that exalt the common good, but they seem increasingly like expressions of nostalgia. “Together we can build a better world,” one reads on the way to José Martí airport. From there, a flight to Miami takes about an hour, but it is a journey to a different world.

哈瓦那周边仍有一些旧广告牌,上面写着颂扬共同利益的标语,但它们越来越像怀旧的表达。在前往何塞·马蒂机场的路上,一块广告牌上写着:“携手共建更美好世界”。从那里飞往迈阿密大约需要一小时,但这是一趟通往另一个世界的旅程。

For half a century, Cuban immigrants who managed the trip to the U.S. were regarded as fugitives from Communism and granted special legal status. Since Trump returned to office, thousands of Cubans have been deported, treated almost as contemptuously as “illegals” from other nations. Last April, Heidy Sánchez, a forty-four-year-old Cuban living in Tampa, was forcibly separated from her seventeen-month-old daughter when she showed up for an immigration check-in. Sánchez was taken away in shackles, and her daughter was left behind with her husband, a U.S. citizen. Sánchez had entered the country illegally five years earlier, but had been working to gain legal status. At the time of her deportation, she was employed as a nursing assistant.

半个世纪以来,成功抵达美国的古巴移民一直被视作逃离共产主义的流亡者,享有特殊法律地位。自特朗普重返白宫以来,已有数千名古巴人被驱逐出境,他们几乎像其他国家的“非法移民”一样遭受轻蔑对待。去年四月,四十四岁的坦帕居民海蒂·桑切斯(Heidy Sánchez)在参加移民例行报到时,被迫与她十七个月大的女儿分离。桑切斯戴着镣铐被带走,女儿则留给了身为美国公民的丈夫。五年前她非法入境,但一直在努力争取合法身份。被驱逐时,她正担任护理助理的工作。

I visited Sánchez at her current apartment, in a housing complex in San José de las Lajas, southeast of Havana. She wept several times as she recounted her ordeal. During her deportation flight, she said, she had continued producing breast milk, but no one would give her a towel, so her shirt grew soaked. In Cuba, she developed a routine: she made video calls to her daughter several times a day, if the electricity allowed, talking to her when she woke up in the morning and again at bedtime, to read her a story. Her daughter didn’t understand where her mother had gone and sometimes cried out for her. Sánchez tried to explain that she was just away at work, but her daughter wasn’t reassured. During my visit, Sánchez called, but the girl was upset and wouldn’t talk. On the screen, I could see her standing across the room, holding a toy in one hand.

我在桑切斯位于哈瓦那东南圣何塞-德拉斯拉哈斯一处住宅区的公寓里见到了她。在讲述这段磨难时,她几度落泪。她说,在被遣返的航班上,她仍在分泌乳汁,但没人给她毛巾,衬衫都被浸透了。回到古巴后,她形成了固定的作息:只要不断电,她每天会和女儿视频通话好几次——清晨女儿醒来时,晚上睡前讲故事时。女儿不明白妈妈去了哪里,有时会哭着找她。桑切斯试图解释自己只是外出工作,但女儿始终无法安心。我拜访期间,桑切斯拨通了视频电话,但小姑娘情绪低落不肯说话。透过屏幕,我看见她站在房间另一头,手里攥着玩具。
Graves.
Thirty-two Cuban guards were killed when U.S. forces abducted the Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro. Four of them were buried in the Necrópolis Cristóbal Colón, in Havana, where many of Cuba’s leading figures are interred.
美军绑架委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗时,三十二名古巴警卫遇难。其中四人被安葬在哈瓦那的克里斯托瓦尔·哥伦布公墓,古巴许多重要人物都长眠于此。
Photograph by Natalie Keyssar for The New Yorker

In Cuba, the United States no longer represents much more than the freedom to get by, or maybe one day get rich. And Cubans hoping for change—in their own country, and in its relationship with the U.S.—are conscious that efforts at renewal have failed repeatedly since the Revolution. A decade ago, Obama negotiated an economic opening not unlike the one that the Trump Administration is calling for now. His aides held protracted talks with Raúl Castro’s only son, Alejandro Castro Espín—known as El Tuerto, or One Eye, because his eye was injured during a military exercise in Angola. After Obama and Raúl Castro spoke directly, the two countries restored diplomatic relations in 2014.

在古巴,美国所代表的,无非是勉强度日、或许有朝一日发家致富的自由。那些渴望改变的古巴人——无论是本国的改变,还是与美国关系的改变——都心知肚明,自革命以来,革新的努力屡屡失败。十年前,奥巴马曾推动经济开放,与如今特朗普政府所呼吁的举措并无二致。他的助手们与劳尔·卡斯特罗的独子亚历杭特罗·卡斯特罗·埃斯平(Alejandro Castro Espín)进行了旷日持久的谈判——此人绰号“独眼龙”,因为在安哥拉的一次军事演习中眼睛受伤。在奥巴马与劳尔·卡斯特罗直接对话后,两国于2014年恢复了外交关系。

The opening was not without complications. Obama, in a triumphal visit to Havana in 2016, spoke expansively about the power of private enterprise and told the Cubans that they could have whatever people in Miami had. The regime, alarmed at the possibility of precipitous change, began to shut down coöperation and reassert control.

开放之路并非一帆风顺。2016年,奥巴马在哈瓦那进行了一次凯旋式的访问,他慷慨激昂地谈论私营企业的力量,并告诉古巴人民,他们可以拥有迈阿密人所拥有的一切。政权对可能发生的剧变感到警觉,开始停止合作并重新加强控制。

It is hard to know whether Obama’s opening would have succeeded in time. Trump abruptly ended the détente at the beginning of his first Presidential term. Still, his Administration seemed to find something worth emulating in the experiment. According to one account, Trump’s early outreach to the Cuban regime included talks in Mexico City between the C.I.A. and Alejandro Castro Espín.

我们很难判断奥巴马的破冰之举是否终将成功。特朗普在其首个总统任期伊始便骤然终止了这段缓和期。尽管如此,他的政府似乎仍从这场外交实验中找到了值得效仿之处。据一份记录显示,特朗普执政初期对古巴政权的接触行动中,曾包括中情局与亚历杭特罗·卡斯特罗·埃斯平在墨西哥城举行的会谈。

Ricardo Zúniga, who helped negotiate Obama’s opening as a senior National Security Council official, saw similarities and differences in the two Administrations’ efforts. “Obama was unwilling to contribute to the kind of humanitarian disaster we see unfolding in Cuba today,” he said. “These guys have a different outlook, to say the least.” Yet the harshness of Trump’s tactics, along with shifting world politics, had changed Cuban leaders’ calculus. “They are in much worse shape domestically,” Zúniga said. “Cuba’s international backers in Russia and China may see strategic value in the U.S. asserting control over its neighboring states, since they want to do the same thing. I don’t think they’re going to put a lot of oomph into keeping the regime afloat.”

曾作为国家安全委员会高级官员协助奥巴马政府谈判开启美古关系的里卡多·苏尼加(Ricardo Zúniga),看到了两届政府举措的异同。“奥巴马不愿造成如今在古巴上演的这类人道主义灾难,”他说,“而本届政府至少可以说,他们的看法有所不同。”然而特朗普强硬的手段,加上世界政治格局的变化,已经改变了古巴领导人的盘算。“他们的国内形势要糟糕得多,”苏尼加说,“古巴在俄罗斯和中国的国际支持者,或许会看到美国对其邻国施加控制的战略价值,因为他们也想做同样的事。我不认为他们会花多大力气来维持这个政权的运转。”

Zúniga doesn’t think that Cuban officials believe in the reforms they’re announcing, but they understand that they need to demonstrate flexibility. “Events in Cuba are less and less in the hands of the Cuban leadership,” he said. “Private companies are gradually taking over and doing what the government can’t. Imagine if they’re allowed to operate under more normal conditions.”

苏尼加(Zúniga)认为,古巴官员未必真心相信他们宣布的改革措施,但他们明白必须展现灵活性。“古巴的事态发展正越来越脱离古巴领导层的掌控,”他说,“私营企业正逐步接管并完成政府无力承担的事务。试想,如果它们能在更正常的条件下运作,会是什么景象。”

Yet there were profound risks. “If the current negotiations go nowhere and Cuba is left like a boiling pot, there could be horrific outcomes,” Zúniga said. “It’s easy to imagine a scenario where revolutionary oligarchs take a page from the Russians and turn state assets into personal assets. And, without oil, they’d use that other resource—developing Cuban beaches—and finance national and personal wealth through the largest money-laundering operation in the history of the region. How does any of that help the United States, or the Cuban citizens we’re supposed to be trying to help?”

然而风险依然深重。“如果当前谈判无果而终,古巴局势持续沸腾,后果可能不堪设想,”苏尼加说,“我们很容易设想这样的场景:革命寡头效仿俄罗斯模式,将国有资产转化为私人财富。在石油资源匮乏的情况下,他们会转而开发古巴海滩资源,通过本地区史上最大规模的洗钱运作,为国家和个人积累财富。这究竟对美国有何益处?对我们理应援助的古巴公民又有何帮助?”

Close observers of the island suggest that the negotiations are caught in an intractable dynamic. Rubio seems knowledgeable and committed to long-term political change, but Trump’s bullying rhetoric makes it difficult for Cuban leaders to compromise. In March, after Trump spoke about “taking” the island, Díaz-Canel responded with a warning. “In the face of the worst scenario, Cuba is accompanied by a certainty: any external aggressor will clash with an impregnable resistance,” he wrote.

古巴的密切观察者认为,谈判已陷入僵局。卢比奥似乎对长期政治变革颇有见地且态度坚定,但特朗普的霸凌式言论让古巴领导人难以妥协。今年三月,特朗普谈及“夺取”该岛后,迪亚斯-卡内尔随即发出警告:“面对最坏的情况,古巴怀有坚定的信念:任何外部侵略者都将遭遇不可逾越的抵抗。”

Joe Garcia, a former Democratic congressman from Florida who has been involved in Cuba-U.S. relations for decades, believed that the regime’s leaders would not easily accept the image of their country as a vassal state. “The Cubans have history,” he said last week. “They have fought all over the world. Thousands of their men fought and died in Central America and in the anti-colonial wars in Africa. And, for a little island in the Caribbean, they punch above their weight—or they did, at one point.” The Cuban officials hadn’t withdrawn from talks, but they were signalling that the political model was not subject to change. Like the Americans, they seemed more immediately concerned with their own prerogatives than with the suffering of the Cuban people. “They’re trying to figure out how to get through this,” Garcia said. “They’re dealing with Trump’s unpredictability on one side and their own imminent collapse on the other. But countries don’t collapse. They simply continue to go down.”

乔·加西亚(Joe Garcia)是佛罗里达州前民主党众议员,数十年来一直参与美古关系事务。他认为,古巴政权的领导人不会轻易接受自己的国家被视为附庸国。“古巴人有自己的历史,”他上周表示,“他们的足迹遍布世界。成千上万的古巴人在中美洲和非洲的反殖民战争中战斗并牺牲。作为加勒比海的一个小岛国,他们曾展现出超越体量的影响力——至少曾经如此。”古巴官员虽未退出谈判,但已明确表示其政治模式不容改变。与美国方面相似,他们似乎更关注自身特权,而非古巴人民的苦难。“他们正设法渡过难关,”加西亚说,“一边要应对特朗普的不可预测性,另一边则面临迫在眉睫的崩溃。但国家不会突然崩塌,只会不断沉沦。”

Last week, one of the Latin American diplomats in Cuba described a tenuous situation. “Not a drop of oil is entering the country,” he told me. Rationing had grown more severe, and it was not unusual for Havana to have electricity for only ninety minutes a day. “Health care, education, transportation—everything is in shambles,” the diplomat went on. “We’ve been living in uncertainty; now we’re entering a phase of danger. There’s a risk of famine, new viruses, environmental hazards, widespread uprisings, and that the Americans will take advantage and do something crazy. People are truly exhausted, weary, at the height of despair. But I think they love Cuba.” ♦

上周,一位驻古巴的拉美外交官向我描述了当地岌岌可危的现状。“这个国家一滴油都进不来,”他告诉我。物资配给制度愈发严苛,哈瓦那每天供电仅九十分钟的情况已不罕见。“医疗、教育、交通——所有系统都濒临崩溃,”这位外交官继续说道,“我们长期生活在不确定中;如今正步入危险阶段。饥荒、新型病毒、环境灾害、大规模骚乱都可能发生,美国人更可能趁机做出疯狂举动。人们真的精疲力竭了,疲惫不堪,陷入深度绝望。但我相信他们依然深爱着古巴。” ♦

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