The Lede

Iran’s Desperate, High-Risk Survival Strategy

伊朗孤注一掷的高风险生存策略
The regime in Tehran knows it likely can’t win the war, but it can certainly globalize the pain of the conflict—even if it’s ultimately at its own expense.
德黑兰政权深知自己很可能无法赢得这场战争,但它完全有能力将冲突的痛楚蔓延至全球——即便最终代价将由自身承担。
A destroyed building is on fire firefighters stand and look towards it
Photograph by Tomer Neuberg / AP

Days after Israel and the United States launched a bombing campaign that decimated the upper echelons of Iran’s leadership—killing the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and more than forty top officials, according to the Israeli military—the regime in Tehran has shown little sign of breaking. Instead, Iran has been launching waves of drones and missiles across the Middle East, in an escalation that has plunged the whole region into war. Iran-linked strikes hit U.S. positions in various Gulf countries, and even reached a British air base in Cyprus. NATO was pulled into the action, on Wednesday, when it shot down a ballistic missile that was headed toward Turkey.

以色列和美国发动空袭、摧毁伊朗领导层高层几天后,德黑兰政权几乎没有显示出崩溃的迹象。据以色列军方称,空袭造成伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊和40多名高级官员死亡。相反,伊朗一直在中东各地发动一波又一波的无人机和导弹袭击,这种升级使整个地区陷入战争。与伊朗有关的袭击击中了美国在多个海湾国家的位置,甚至到达了英国在塞浦路斯的空军基地。周三,北约击落了一枚飞往土耳其的弹道导弹,被卷入了这场行动。

The Iranian regime had vowed retribution after Khamenei’s death. “You have crossed our red line and must pay the price,” Iran’s speaker of parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, told the U.S. and Israel, in a televised address. “We will deliver such devastating blows that you yourselves will be driven to beg.” But it’s Iran’s neighbors that have been feeling the brunt of the pain so far. The attacks have elicited a rare response from the militaries of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia: Qatar said it downed at least two Iranian fighter jets, and Emirati authorities said they have intercepted hundreds of Iranian drones and ballistic missiles. Officials in these countries insist that their inventory of defense munitions can cope with the Iranian onslaught, but there are fears that as the conflict drags on, stockpiles could run low. The missile math may not be in their favor: it costs far less for Iran to launch a cheap drone than it does for the U.S. and its regional partners to shoot it out of the sky. “A war of attrition that exhausts missile defense inventories is the most beneficial outcome for Tehran,” the Soufan Center, a global intelligence consultancy, noted in a recent analysis. “Iran knows this is a war it cannot ‘win’ militarily, but the regime in Tehran may believe they can survive it.”

伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊遇刺身亡后,伊朗政权誓言报复。伊朗议会议长穆罕默德-巴吉尔·卡利巴夫在电视讲话中对美国和以色列说:“你们已经越过了我们的红线,必须付出代价。我们将给予你们毁灭性的打击,让你们自己不得不求饶。”但到目前为止,伊朗的邻国首当其冲。这些袭击引发了阿拉伯联合酋长国、卡塔尔、科威特和沙特阿拉伯军方的罕见回应:卡塔尔称其击落了至少两架伊朗战斗机,阿联酋当局称其拦截了数百架伊朗无人机和弹道导弹。这些国家的官员坚称,他们的防御弹药库存足以应对伊朗的进攻,但有人担心,随着冲突的持续,库存可能会减少。导弹数量可能对他们不利:伊朗发射廉价无人机的成本远远低于美国及其地区合作伙伴将其击落的成本。全球情报咨询公司苏凡中心在最近的一份分析报告中指出:“一场消耗导弹防御库存的消耗战对德黑兰来说是最有利的结果。伊朗知道这是一场它无法在军事上'获胜'的战争,但德黑兰政权可能相信他们能够在这场战争中幸存下来。”

Disruptions in the Gulf region will be felt all over the world: Dubai is the Middle East’s most important port; a significant proportion of the world’s crude oil, methanol, and fertilizer is exported through the Strait of Hormuz; Qatar’s liquid-natural-gas exports provide a fifth of global supply (and the state’s energy company has suspended all production amid security fears, creating a spike in prices); the region’s airports connect much of South Asia and Africa to the rest of the globe. For the remnants of the Iranian regime—and, especially, the hard-line members of the Revolutionary Guard, who control much of the state’s weaponry—the strategy is clear. They hope to raise the stakes of the war so much that U.S. allies pressure President Donald Trump to change course. “We had no choice but to escalate and start a big fire so everyone would see,” an Iranian regime insider told the Financial Times. “When our red lines were crossed in violation of all international laws, we could no longer adhere to the rules of the game.”

海湾地区的动荡将波及全球:迪拜是中东最重要的港口;全球很大一部分原油、甲醇和化肥通过霍尔木兹海峡出口;卡塔尔的液化天然气出口占全球供应量的五分之一(该国能源公司出于安全担忧已暂停所有生产,导致价格飙升);该地区的机场将南亚和非洲大部分地区与世界其他地区连接起来。对于伊朗政权的残余势力——尤其是控制着该国大部分武器的革命卫队强硬派成员——来说,战略是明确的。他们希望提高战争的赌注,让美国的盟友向唐纳德·特朗普总统施压,迫使他改变路线。一位伊朗政权内部人士告诉英国《金融时报》:“我们别无选择,只能升级局势,点燃一场大火,让所有人都看到。”“当我们的红线被越过,违反了所有国际法时,我们不能再遵守游戏规则了。”

Israel and the U.S. don’t seem that interested in the rules of the game, either. They are launching bombardments across a wide swath of Iran, which have killed at least twelve hundred and thirty people, according to the Iranian Red Crescent Society. That includes dozens of schoolgirls in the coastal city of Minab, who were killed in an apparent bombing of their school, which was near a Revolutionary Guard naval base. Israel has already dropped more than five thousand bombs on Iran since the start of the conflict. The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, exulted in the punishing campaign, saying that Operation Epic Fury—as the Administration has named it—had unleashed twice as much air power over Iran than the “shock and awe” phase of the U.S.’s 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Department of Defense recently released a video of an Iranian frigate being torpedoed off the Sri Lankan coast by a U.S. submarine—the first torpedo launched in combat by a U.S. submarine since the Second World War. The sinking, which appears to have killed at least half of the roughly hundred and eighty Iranian sailors onboard, is legally dubious, and raises awkward diplomatic questions for India, which had hosted the Iranian vessel as part of a broader set of maritime exercises to which the U.S. was also invited. For Hegseth, it’s all part of the magic of what he likes to call American “warfighting.” The U.S. and Israel have eviscerated Iran’s Navy and Air Force, and are steadily degrading Iran’s command structure and military assets, including a network of subterranean missile “cities” housing Iran’s arsenal. On Wednesday, analysts at the Long War Journal said there had been a decline in Iranian ballistic-missile launches, likely owing to the efficacy of U.S.-Israeli strikes. “This was never meant to be a fair fight, and it is not a fair fight,” Hegseth said, at a briefing that day. “We are punching them while they’re down, which is exactly how it should be.”

以色列和美国似乎对游戏规则也不太感兴趣。他们正在伊朗大片地区发动轰炸,据伊朗红新月会称,已造成至少一千二百三十人死亡。其中包括沿海城市米纳布的数十名女学生,她们显然是在学校遭遇轰炸时丧生的,该校靠近革命卫队的一个海军基地。自冲突开始以来,以色列已向伊朗投下超过五千枚炸弹。美国国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯对这场惩罚性行动欢欣鼓舞,称政府命名的“史诗之怒”行动在伊朗上空释放的空中力量,是美国2003年入侵伊拉克“震慑”阶段的两倍。国防部近日发布了一段视频,显示一艘伊朗护卫舰在斯里兰卡海岸附近被美国潜艇用鱼雷击沉——这是二战以来美国潜艇首次在战斗中发射鱼雷。这次击沉事件造成船上约一百八十名伊朗水手中至少半数丧生,其合法性存疑,并给印度带来了棘手的外交问题——印度曾接待这艘伊朗舰艇,作为一系列海上演习的一部分,而美国也受邀参加了这些演习。对赫格塞斯而言,这一切都是他所谓美国“作战艺术”魔力的体现。美以两国已重创伊朗海军和空军,并持续削弱伊朗的指挥体系和军事资产,包括藏匿伊朗武器库的地下导弹“城市”网络。周三,《长期战争杂志》的分析师表示,伊朗弹道导弹发射数量有所下降,这很可能归因于美以打击的效果。“这从来就不是一场公平的战斗,现在也不是,”赫格塞斯在当天的简报会上说,“我们就是在他们倒下时继续出拳,这正是应有的方式。”

What sympathy there may have been for a cornered, bruised Iranian regime among its neighbors has faded in the face of Tehran’s escalation. A Gulf official, who spoke to me anonymously, said Iran’s strategy was “counterproductive,” given recent attempts at rapprochement made by some Arab monarchies, and their support for Tehran’s diplomatic track with Washington. Now, whenever this conflict ends, those monarchies will instead focus on protecting themselves against future Iranian threats, and will deepen military partnerships with outside powers—take, for example, recent defense pacts signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and between the U.A.E. and India. “What’s happened to the Gulf will have long-term ramifications in terms of security realignment and relationships with Iran,” the official said.

面对德黑兰的升级行动,其邻国对这个陷入困境、伤痕累累的伊朗政权可能曾有过的同情已逐渐消退。一位不愿具名的海湾官员告诉我,考虑到一些阿拉伯君主国最近试图与伊朗和解,并支持德黑兰与华盛顿的外交进程,伊朗的策略“适得其反”。如今,无论这场冲突何时结束,这些君主国都将转而专注于保护自己免受伊朗未来的威胁,并深化与外部大国的军事伙伴关系——例如,最近沙特阿拉伯与巴基斯坦、阿联酋与印度签署的防务协议。“海湾地区发生的事将对安全重组和与伊朗的关系产生长期影响,”这位官员说。

“Iran has killed any chance of reconciliation with the Gulf,” Marwan Muasher, a former foreign minister and deputy Prime Minister of Jordan, told me. Before the war, some Arab interlocutors had been quietly lobbying the White House against such action, in part out of fear that a direct war against Iran would yield an even more unstable and chaotic status quo in Tehran. Better the devil you know than the one you don’t, the thinking went. “But now they know the devil and they know this devil has no red lines,” Ali Shihabi, a prominent Saudi commentator, told me, suggesting that the Iranian regime “had placed a Sword of Damocles over the Gulf.” The barrage of drones and missiles from Iran, Shihabi added, has “emboldened the voices of those within the Gulf who say that this regime should be degraded as much as possible.”

“伊朗已经扼杀了与海湾国家和解的任何可能性,”约旦前外交大臣兼副首相马尔万·穆阿舍尔告诉我。战前,一些阿拉伯国家的对话者曾悄悄游说白宫不要采取此类行动,部分原因是担心与伊朗直接开战会导致德黑兰出现更不稳定和混乱的局面。他们认为,已知的魔鬼总比未知的魔鬼要好。“但现在他们知道了这个魔鬼,而且知道这个魔鬼没有红线,”沙特著名评论员阿里·希哈比告诉我,暗示伊朗政权“在海湾地区悬起了一把达摩克利斯之剑”。希哈比补充说,伊朗发射的无人机和导弹“让海湾国家内部那些主张应尽可能削弱该政权的声音更加大胆了”。

That degradation proceeds apace amid the U.S.-Israeli campaign, though much remains unclear about the final goal, and about the most plausible way out of the conflict. Though some Trump officials claim that they’re not engaged in a regime-change war, Trump told reporters on Thursday that he had “to be involved” in the appointment of Khamenei’s successor, which sounds an awful lot like regime change. Israel, meanwhile, appears content to keep battering the Islamic Republic, whatever the downstream consequences, while also mustering a new offensive into southern Lebanon against Hezbollah. Enabled by the U.S., Israel now bestrides the Middle East as a paramount hegemon: its military tool kit and reach is unmatched, its status as the region’s sole nuclear power is unchallenged, and its ability to strike with impunity at perceived threats far from its borders is unchecked. By midweek, Israeli officials were briefing reporters about plans to potentially balkanize Iran by boosting support to anti-regime Iranian Kurdish factions operating across the country’s western border with Iraq.

在美国和以色列的联合行动中,伊朗的衰落进程正在加速,尽管最终目标以及最可行的冲突解决途径仍不明朗。尽管一些特朗普政府官员声称他们并未参与政权更迭战争,但特朗普周四告诉记者,他“必须介入”哈梅内伊继任者的任命,这听起来与政权更迭无异。与此同时,以色列似乎乐于继续打击伊斯兰共和国,无论后续后果如何,同时还在集结新的攻势,准备进入黎巴嫩南部打击真主党。在美国的支持下,以色列如今已成为中东地区至高无上的霸主:其军事装备和影响力无人能及,作为该地区唯一核国家的地位无可撼动,且能肆无忌惮地打击其认定的境外威胁。截至本周三,以色列官员已向记者透露计划,可能通过加强对伊朗西部与伊拉克边境活动的反政权库尔德派系的支持,来分裂伊朗。

Ethnic insurgencies may present the most realistic internal threat to the Iranian regime, which has quashed civil society and pro-democracy protest movements for years. But they present no platform for actually bringing down the Islamic Republic. A popular uprising, which Trump insisted should follow the U.S.’s bombardments, is nowhere in sight. Experts also believe that the death and destruction wrought by the U.S.-Israeli campaign may galvanize domestic support for the regime, even from an Iranian populace that is fed up with its oppressive theocracy and stagnant revolutionary project. “Those who loathe the clerical establishment may still recoil at the spectacle of foreign jets in Iranian skies and the explicit declaration that their state is to be dismantled,” Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, a scholar of the international politics of the Middle East, wrote in the London Review of Books. “External assault does not erase internal grievance, but it can reorder it. Anger at the regime may be temporarily subordinated to anger at the attacker.” The anonymous Gulf official said this was something that many of the Gulf states had warned the Trump Administration about: “If your goal is regime change, bombing will unite them.”

多年来,伊朗政权镇压了公民社会和亲民主抗议运动,而民族叛乱可能是对其最现实的内部威胁。但它们并没有为真正推翻伊斯兰共和国提供平台。特朗普坚称,美国的轰炸之后应该发生一场民众起义,但目前还看不到任何迹象。专家们还认为,美国和以色列的行动造成的死亡和破坏可能会激发国内对该政权的支持,即使是那些已经厌倦了其压迫性神权统治和停滞不前的革命项目的伊朗民众也是如此。中东国际政治学者埃斯坎达尔·萨德吉-博鲁杰迪在《伦敦书评》中写道:“那些憎恨神权统治的人,可能仍然会对外国战机出现在伊朗上空,以及明确宣布他们的国家将被瓦解的景象感到震惊。外部攻击不会消除内部的不满,但可以重新调整它。对政权的愤怒可能会暂时让位于对攻击者的愤怒。”这位匿名的海湾官员说,这是许多海湾国家曾警告特朗普政府的事情:“如果你的目标是政权更迭,轰炸会让他们团结起来。”

Danny Citrinowicz, a former Israeli defense-intelligence officer with expertise on Iran, wrote on social media on Thursday that, despite the immense regional pressure on Iran, its surviving leadership “assesses that its capacity for absorption and persistence is higher than that of its adversaries,” and that “time ultimately works in its favor.” Muasher, the former Jordanian foreign minister, argued that the strategic difficulty of defeating and replacing the Iranian regime may prove too confounding for a trigger-happy White House that seems more invested in the spectacle of victory than in the complex project of building peace. Within the U.S., there’s minimal appetite, even among Republicans, for deploying boots on the ground, or for an open-ended intervention that could continue through multiple election cycles. “Trump is not going to implement a one-year, two-year strategy,” Muasher said. “I think that Iran’s calculation is that Trump is not patient, that Trump is going to move on.” ♦

前以色列国防情报官员、伊朗问题专家丹尼·西特林诺维奇周四在社交媒体上写道,尽管伊朗面临巨大的地区压力,但其幸存领导层“评估认为,其承受和坚持的能力高于对手”,且“时间最终对其有利”。约旦前外交大臣穆阿谢尔则认为,击败并取代伊朗政权的战略难度,对于一个似乎更热衷于胜利场面而非复杂和平建设进程、动辄扣动扳机的白宫而言,可能过于棘手。在美国国内,即使共和党内部也极少有人愿意派遣地面部队,或支持可能持续多个选举周期的无限制干预。“特朗普不会实施为期一年、两年的战略,”穆阿谢尔说,“我认为伊朗的盘算是特朗普缺乏耐心,他会转移注意力。” ♦

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