Fault Lines

How the University Replaced the Church as the Home of Liberal Morality

大学如何取代教堂,成为自由派道德的新家园
As progressive Americans have become more secular, the academy has become their primary moral training ground. The results have not been good.
随着美国进步派日益世俗化,大学成了他们首要的道德训练场。结果并不理想。
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Illustration by Mark Harris; Source photographs from Getty

During the past several weeks, I have been making the argument that progressive movements in America need to strengthen their connection to communities of faith and center their work in the church, as earlier progressive movements have done. In the past decade, millions of Americans have taken to the streets on behalf of social justice, but this has not led to much in the way of real change. The accomplishments of the civil-rights movement in the nineteen-fifties and sixties and of the Sanctuary Movement in the eighties depended, in part, on the infrastructure, moral clarity, and greater purpose of the church.

过去几周,我一直在主张,美国的进步运动需要加强与信仰群体的联系,并以教会为中心开展工作,正如早期的进步运动所做的那样。过去十年,数百万美国人走上街头,为社会正义发声,但这并未带来多少实质性的改变。上世纪五六十年代的民权运动和八十年代的庇护运动所取得的成就,部分依赖于教会的基础设施、道德明晰性和更高的目标。

But this argument raises a question that I haven’t addressed. If it’s true that those earlier movements drew inspiration and leadership from the church, and if it’s also true that young liberals are increasingly secular, then where does that progressive energy come from? Why do young people participate in politics today, either through voting or through protest, in high numbers? What institution taught them a sense of morality, gave them words to express their outrage, and offered them the space and infrastructure to imagine a different world?

但这一论点引出了一个我尚未触及的问题。如果说早期的社会运动确实从教会汲取了灵感与领导力,而当代年轻自由派又日益趋向世俗化,那么这种进步主义的能量究竟源自何处?为何如今的年轻人仍以前所未有的规模参与政治——无论是通过投票还是街头抗议?是什么样的机构塑造了他们的道德观念,赋予他们表达愤怒的语言,并提供了想象另一个世界的空间与组织基础?

The answer is obvious: the university. In the past thirty or so years, the academy has replaced the church as the center of the liberal moral imagination, providing the sense of a community bound by ethics, a firmament of texts and knowledge that should inform action, and a meeting space for like-minded people. This isn’t an entirely new development, of course—American history is full of student-protest movements—but, rather, a consolidation of the university’s influence. Young people not only stopped going to church in large numbers, they also got fewer and fewer union jobs—and unions were the other institution in America that has historically produced a great deal of progressive change. College, particularly for middle-class and upper-middle-class kids, is now often the first and perhaps only place where young people are told that they are part of a community of their choosing, one that will prepare them to be “leaders of tomorrow” and instill in them a moral and ethical code of conduct.

答案显而易见:大学。过去三十年间,高等教育机构已取代教会,成为自由派道德想象的中心——它提供伦理共同体意识,构建指导行动的文本与知识体系,并为志同道合者创造相聚空间。这并非全新现象(美国历史上学生抗议运动层出不穷),而是大学影响力的集中体现。年轻人不仅大规模脱离教会,获得工会职位的机会也日益减少——而工会恰是美国历史上推动进步变革的另一重要机制。对中产及中上阶层青年而言,大学如今常是他们首次(或许也是唯一)被告知自己属于自选共同体的场所,这个共同体将培养他们成为“明日领袖”,并灌输道德行为准则。

So, if we accept that the university has become the incubator for social-justice movements in America, is it actually good at this job?

那么,如果我们承认大学已成为美国社会正义运动的孵化器,它真的擅长这份工作吗?

I began thinking about this question while reading about the effects of education on political polarization. It’s a familiar story by now: the more years of education you’ve received, the more likely you are to be a Democrat. In the past few election cycles, this correlation has become more robust. A number of conservative commentators, including Roger Kimball, Peter Wood, and Chris Rufo, maintain that political conformity overtook élite institutions of higher learning and turned every seminar room into some radical struggle session where students dutifully read Karl Marx and bell hooks. Even if you disagree, as I do, with their prescriptions to root out so-called radicalism wherever they find it, you can recognize that what they’re describing is not imaginary. In 1969, around the height of anti-Vietnam War protests and the Third World Liberation Front movement on campuses, the faculty at American universities were closer in political alignment to the general public. This held true until the end of the century, when a combination of factors—including the expansion of the social sciences, which tend to attract more liberals—led to the left-leaning academy that you see today. The extreme effects of this shift have been especially visible at élite universities; according to one conservative group’s report, seventy-seven per cent of faculty at Yale, for example, are or have largely supported Democrats, compared with just three per cent who are Republicans. But most forms of higher education have seen at least a doubling of its liberal-to-conservative gap since the nineties.

我是在阅读有关教育对政治极化影响的文章时开始思考这个问题的。如今这已是耳熟能详的故事:接受教育的年限越长,成为民主党人的可能性就越大。在过去几个选举周期中,这种关联性愈发显著。包括罗杰·金博尔(Roger Kimball)、彼得·伍德(Peter Wood)和克里斯·鲁福(Chris Rufo)在内的多位保守派评论家坚称,政治趋同性已席卷精英高等教育机构,将每间研讨室都变成了某种激进的斗争会场——学生们在那里循规蹈矩地研读卡尔·马克思与贝尔·胡克斯(bell hooks)的著作。即便你像我一样不认同他们“铲除所谓激进主义”的解决方案,也必须承认他们所描述的现象并非虚构。1969年正值校园反越战抗议与第三世界解放阵线运动的高峰期,当时美国大学教师的政治倾向与普通民众更为接近。这种态势持续到上世纪九十年代末,随着社会科学(该领域往往吸引更多自由派)扩张等多重因素影响,才形成了如今我们所见的左倾学界。这种转变的极端效应在精英大学尤为明显:据某保守团体报告显示,耶鲁大学有77%的教师正在或曾长期支持民主党,而共和党支持者仅占3%。但自九十年代以来,绝大多数高等教育机构中自由派与保守派的比例差距至少扩大了一倍。

Wood argues that colleges are not only staffed with a disproportionate number of radicals who indoctrinate the students but also have turned everything from dormitory management to the dining halls over to the left. In this view, even students who might disagree with their radical professors will eventually succumb to progressive politics because it is embedded in every part of campus life. Wood and others—such as John McWhorter, who, in his book “Woke Racism,” contends that “wokeness” has become a religion on college campuses—understand that the contemporary university functions in some respects as a church, and they believe that it has taken up a dangerous and wrongheaded set of doctrines. (Wood co-authored a three-hundred-and-seventy-page study on my alma mater, Bowdoin College, because he believed that the school had become hostile to the teachings of Western civilization.) These critics do not want to change the basically religious function of the university so much as they want to swap out the sermons.

伍德认为,大学不仅充斥着不成比例的激进教员向学生灌输思想,更将宿舍管理到食堂运营的一切事务都交给了左翼。在这种观点下,即使学生可能不认同其激进教授的观点,最终仍会屈服于进步主义政治,因为它已渗透到校园生活的每个角落。伍德和其他人——例如约翰·麦克沃特在其著作《觉醒种族主义》中主张“觉醒主义”已成为大学校园里的宗教——都意识到当代大学在某些方面发挥着类似教会的作用,并认为它已接纳了一套危险而错误的教义。(伍德曾与人合著了一份长达三百七十页关于我的母校鲍登学院的研究报告,因为他认为该校已对西方文明的传统教导充满敌意。)这些批评者与其说是想改变大学基本的宗教功能,不如说是想更换布道的内容。

I would argue something more fundamental. Rather than fighting about so-called viewpoint diversity in higher education, and swapping different ideologies back and forth to match our political beliefs, we need to ask whether the university should have this role at all. To answer the question posed at the start of this column: the university is not good at incubating social-justice movements, or acting as a moral and ethical center of our culture. This is not only because its priests are mostly cloistered faculty but because not everyone goes to college, and many of those who do attend community colleges and commuter schools that do not play this role. The élite public and private universities are intentionally exclusionary, which is why seemingly every one of their commencement speakers talks about the assembled, in their caps and gowns, as the future leaders of America and the best of the best. The institutions that are fostering supposedly egalitarian politics limit upward mobility as much as they facilitate it. This has encouraged a type of blinkered and oftentimes unambitious style of activism among young people, which asks for many changes but does not challenge the system that provides them with their own lofty status.

我认为问题更为根本。与其争论高等教育中所谓的观点多样性,或是根据政治信仰来回切换不同意识形态,我们不如先问一问:大学是否应该承担这样的角色?回答本文开头提出的问题:大学并不擅长孵化社会正义运动,也不适合充当我们文化的道德伦理中心。这不仅因为它的“神职人员”大多是深居简出的学者,更因为并非人人都上大学,而许多上大学的人就读的是社区学院和通勤学校,这些机构并不扮演这种角色。精英公立和私立大学本质上是排他性的——难怪几乎每所这类学校的毕业典礼演讲者,都会对着台下头戴学位帽、身穿长袍的毕业生们,称他们为美国的未来领袖、人中龙凤。这些培养所谓平等主义政治的机构,在促进社会流动性的同时,也在同等程度上限制着这种流动性。这助长了一种狭隘且往往缺乏雄心的青年行动主义:他们要求诸多改变,却从不挑战赋予他们崇高地位的那个体系。

This underlying contradiction doesn’t mean that students don’t care about all the suffering in the world, nor does it disqualify their dissent. But it does sometimes limit their moral scope. While studying campus movements such as the Third World Liberation Front of the late sixties and early seventies, I was struck by how many of their demands were about college life. This was, on one level, pragmatic—college students at San Francisco State and Berkeley might not be able to stop American imperialism, but they could at least force their universities to create ethnic-studies departments and change some of their admissions practices, at least at the margins. The anti-apartheid movements of the eighties decried the racism of the South African system, but mainly demanded changes in how specific universities managed their investments.

这种内在的矛盾并不意味着学生们不关心世界上的苦难,也不意味着他们的抗议无效。但它确实有时会限制他们的道德视野。在研究上世纪六十年代末七十年代初的“第三世界解放阵线”等校园运动时,我惊讶地发现他们的许多诉求都围绕着校园生活。从某个层面看,这很务实——旧金山州立大学和伯克利分校的学生或许无力阻止美帝国主义,但至少能迫使学校设立族裔研究系,并在招生政策上做出些许改变。八十年代的反种族隔离运动谴责南非制度的种族主义,但主要诉求却是要求特定大学改变其投资管理方式。

From one perspective, these localized approaches are laudable: young people have concentrated on what they can actually change while remaining committed to larger, worthy political causes. But what we end up seeing, often, is a version of what the writer Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò calls “elite capture,” in which a well-intentioned, liberatory idea gets rerouted into litigating disputes among the culturally and economically wealthy. This capture doesn’t necessarily take place at the site of protest, when angry people gather in a public square, but in the processing of the event through the media, the academy, and the political system—institutions that are overwhelmingly made up of élite college graduates. Five and a half years ago, millions of people flooded the streets of American cities. But, once everyone went home, the abiding changes took place mostly in corporate H.R. departments and in the academy. Those who left their homes to protest the murder of George Floyd weren’t secretly focussed on the diversity statistics at Bank of America or on the faculty lounge at Wesleyan University, but that moment of mass dissent got processed through the media, the government, and corporate America. If so many modern protest movements produce such results, is it because the church of the university teaches you to resolve disputes internally without truly disrupting its hierarchy?

从某个角度看,这些本土化的行动值得称道:年轻人专注于他们实际能改变的事物,同时仍致力于更宏大的政治理想。但我们最终看到的,往往是作家奥卢费米·O·塔伊沃(Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò)所说的“精英攫取”现象——一个出于善意、追求解放的理念,最终演变成文化经济精英阶层内部的争端诉讼。这种攫取未必发生在抗议现场,当愤怒的人群聚集在广场时;而是发生在媒体、学术界和政治体系对事件的加工过程中——这些机构绝大多数由精英大学毕业生构成。五年半前,数百万人涌上美国城市的街头。但当人群散去,真正留存下来的改变主要发生在企业人力资源部门和学术机构。那些走上街头抗议乔治·弗洛伊德被谋杀的人们,并非暗中关注美国银行的多元化数据或卫斯理大学的教师休息室,但这场大规模异议运动正是通过媒体、政府和企业界的过滤机制被重新诠释。如果众多现代抗议运动都产生类似结果,是否因为大学这座圣殿教会人们在体制内部解决争端,却从不真正撼动其等级结构?

I won’t pretend to know the answer, but I am convinced that we should deëmphasize the university’s role in our moral life. This doesn’t mean that professors need to become bots who hand out information stripped clean of any political valence, nor does it mean that colleges must hire more faculty who will tout the virtues of Western civilization. Rather, we must unlearn the idea that the moral fate of the country depends on what a handful of kids at élite colleges learn in their classrooms. As long as the university is mostly a vehicle for class reproduction, the morality that it produces will be tailored for an audience of fellow college graduates. Is it any wonder that years of liberal theorizing on how to reach non-college-educated voters have failed? Education polarization can be best understood as a quasi-religious conflict: people on both sides of the divide do not really believe that they share the same values, morals, or sense of community. And why would they? When “church” costs upward of a hundred thousand dollars a year to attend, how do you sell its sermon to the masses? ♦

我无意假装自己知道答案,但我确信,我们应当淡化大学在道德生活中的角色。这并非要求教授变成只会分发剔除一切政治倾向的信息的机器,也并非要求大学聘用更多宣扬西方文明美德的教员。相反,我们必须摒弃这样一种观念:国家的道德命运取决于少数精英院校学生在课堂上学到什么。只要大学本质上仍是阶级再生产的工具,它所塑造的道德观就只会迎合大学毕业生这个群体。多年来,自由派理论家们关于如何争取未受过高等教育的选民的研究屡屡失败,这难道奇怪吗?教育分化最好被理解为一种准宗教冲突:鸿沟两侧的人们并不真正相信他们拥有相同的价值观、道德观或共同体意识。他们又怎么会相信呢?当“教堂”的入场券每年高达十万美元,你又如何向大众兜售它的布道?♦

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