The Lede

How Putin Views Trump’s War in Iran

普京如何看待特朗普对伊朗的战争
Russia’s President is profiting from rising oil prices, but he’s also facing a hard new reality: he’s no longer the lead disruptor of the postwar global order.
俄罗斯总统正从油价上涨中获利,但他也面临着一个严峻的新现实:他不再是战后全球秩序的主要破坏者。
Figure wearing suit speaks at a microphone
Photograph by Ebrahim Noroozi / AP

In January, a few days after U.S. commandos raided the fortified compound of the Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro, and flew him in handcuffs to New York, Donald Trump told the Times, “I don’t need international law.” The only limit on his global powers, he said, was “my own morality. My own mind.” Not long after, Trump claimed that Greenland’s strategic location and reserves of critical minerals made it too valuable to remain outside of direct U.S. control. (“You defend ownership. You don’t defend leases,” he said.) Last month, Trump oversaw the launch of the Board of Peace, a body of more than two dozen member countries with the stated mission of reconstructing Gaza, which Trump has advertised as a possible replacement for the United Nations. Now, most dramatically, the U.S. and Israel have started a war against Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the very first day.

今年一月,在美国突击队突袭委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗的坚固官邸、将其铐上手铐押往纽约数日后,唐纳德·特朗普告诉《纽约时报》:“我不需要国际法。”他说,自己全球权力的唯一限制是“我自身的道德准则。我自己的头脑。”不久后,特朗普宣称格陵兰的战略位置与关键矿产储备使其价值过高,不应继续处于美国直接控制之外。“你要捍卫的是所有权,而非租赁权,”他说。上个月,特朗普主持启动了“和平委员会”——这个由二十多个成员国组成的机构宣称以重建加沙为使命,特朗普更将其宣传为可能取代联合国的组织。如今最令人震惊的是,美国与以色列已对伊朗开战,并在首日就击毙了最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊。

For many years, the conventional wisdom on Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, was that he hungered for a world in which power and interests, not norms or international law, drove state behavior. Ideas like empire and spheres of influence were not anachronisms or pejoratives but descriptors of how geopolitics functions in practice. Large countries with strong militaries could impart their will on smaller ones; institutions were to be bypassed and weakened, freeing superpowers to act.

多年来,关于俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京的主流观点认为,他渴望一个由权力和利益而非规范或国际法驱动国家行为的世界。帝国和势力范围等概念并非不合时宜的贬义词,而是对地缘政治实际运作方式的描述。拥有强大军力的大国可以将意志强加于小国;国际机构应当被绕过和削弱,从而让超级大国自由行动。

In the wake of Khamenei’s killing, Putin offered pro-forma objections to “armed Israeli-American aggression,” calling the “assassination” of Iran’s Supreme Leader a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law.” But, on a more fundamental level, Putin was facing an unsettling new reality: his vision of the world was coming to pass, except he had been deprived of authorship and influence. “This was supposed to be the Putin model,” Hanna Notte, the director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and the author of a forthcoming book on Russian foreign policy, told me. “The irony is, now that it’s Trump who is carrying it out, it only exposes the limits of Russian power.”

哈梅内伊遇刺后,普京对“武装的以色列-美国侵略”提出了形式上的抗议,称伊朗最高领袖的“暗杀”是“对人类道德和国际法所有准则的玩世不恭的践踏”。但在更根本的层面上,普京正面临一个令人不安的新现实:他构想的世界正在成为现实,只是他本人被剥夺了创造者的身份和影响力。“这本应是普京模式,”詹姆斯·马丁防扩散研究中心欧亚防扩散项目主任汉娜·诺特告诉我,她即将出版一本关于俄罗斯外交政策的著作。“讽刺的是,现在由特朗普来执行这一模式,反而暴露了俄罗斯力量的局限性。”

Before the war, Russia saw Iran as an important part of its larger project to create alternative alliances and centers of power. The so-called North-South Transport Corridor is a joint project to link Russian and Iranian ports with those in India to move goods and freight while bypassing U.S. sanctions. Last year, Iran signed a free-trade agreement with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, a sign that Moscow was continuing to extend its influence beyond the post-Soviet space. Russia and Iran also linked their two national payment systems, a test case in the Kremlin’s pursuit of “de-dollarization” deals with other nations. “I don’t know if you’d quite call Iran a partner, ally, or friend,” a foreign-policy source in Moscow said. “But it has been a valuable asset.”

战前,俄罗斯将伊朗视为其打造替代性联盟和权力中心这一宏大计划的重要组成部分。所谓的“南北运输走廊”是一个联合项目,旨在连接俄罗斯和伊朗的港口与印度港口,以绕过美国制裁运输货物。去年,伊朗与俄罗斯主导的欧亚经济联盟签署了自由贸易协定,这表明莫斯科正将其影响力持续扩展到后苏联空间之外。俄罗斯和伊朗还对接了两国的国家支付系统,这是克里姆林宫与其他国家达成“去美元化”协议的试点案例。“我不确定是否该称伊朗为伙伴、盟友还是朋友,”莫斯科一位外交政策消息人士表示,“但它确实是宝贵的资产。”

In 2022, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine stalled, Russia and Iran deepened their military relationship, but only to a point. Russian forces relied on Iranian-supplied drones and related technology to compete on the battlefield and inflict damage on Ukrainian cities; these days, Russia has set up extensive drone production at home, making more advanced models than the Iranians could provide, and so it doesn’t need Iran’s help in the way it once did. Last year, Moscow and Tehran signed a wide-ranging treaty, known as a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” but the agreement did not contain explicit security provisions. (A similar pact that Russia signed with North Korea in 2024, by comparison, does stipulate that the two countries would aid each other in the event of an attack.)

2022年,在俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵陷入僵局后,俄罗斯与伊朗深化了军事关系,但仅止于此。俄军依靠伊朗提供的无人机及相关技术,在战场上与乌军抗衡,并对乌克兰城市造成破坏;如今,俄罗斯已在国内建立了大规模的无人机生产线,制造出比伊朗所能提供的更先进的型号,因此不再像过去那样需要伊朗的帮助。去年,莫斯科与德黑兰签署了一项名为“全面战略伙伴关系”的广泛条约,但该协议并未包含明确的安全条款。(相比之下,俄罗斯在2024年与朝鲜签署的类似协议则明确规定,两国在遭受攻击时将相互援助。)

Still, Khamenei’s death represented Russia’s third loss of an important geopolitical client in a little over a year: in December, 2024, Bashar al-Assad, a longtime Russian ally, whom the Kremlin had protected to varying degrees for more than a decade, was forced from power by rebel militias (he’s now thought to be living in an exclusive gated community in Moscow); a year later, Maduro, Putin’s principal ally in South America, was captured by the U.S. Both former leaders were, like Khamenei, essential to Russia’s efforts to bypass existing multilateral frameworks, governing everything from trade to security, that the Kremlin had viewed as the domain of the U.S. It was as if Putin’s project to undermine the world order was being blown apart by an even greater disruption.

然而,哈梅内伊之死意味着俄罗斯在短短一年多时间里失去了第三位重要的地缘政治代理人:2024年12月,长期受俄罗斯支持、十多年来得到克里姆林宫不同程度庇护的巴沙尔·阿萨德被反叛民兵赶下台(据信他目前居住在莫斯科一处戒备森严的高档社区);一年后,普京在南美的主要盟友马杜罗被美国抓获。这两位前领导人——与哈梅内伊一样——对俄罗斯试图绕开现有多边框架(涵盖从贸易到安全的各个领域,克里姆林宫曾视其为美国势力范围)的努力至关重要。这仿佛意味着,普京颠覆世界秩序的计划正被一场更剧烈的动荡撕得粉碎。

The result is that Russia not only looks like a second-order power but one that is, perhaps unexpectedly, longing for the bygone world of rules, norms, and institutions. “We have all lost what we call international law,” Putin’s spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, said in response to the U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran. The foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, called on the U.S. to “explain its plans and how these correspond with the rules that essentially existed earlier.” As the Moscow foreign-policy source put it, “The current paradigm seems to be that the U.S. does what it wants, and no one else, Russia included, can do much about it.”

结果是,俄罗斯不仅看起来像个二流强国,而且——或许出人意料地——它还在怀念那个规则、规范和制度尚存的旧世界。普京的发言人德米特里·佩斯科夫在回应美国和以色列对伊朗的袭击时说:“我们都失去了所谓的国际法。”外交部长谢尔盖·拉夫罗夫则呼吁美国“解释其计划,以及这些计划如何与早先存在的规则相吻合”。正如莫斯科外交政策消息人士所言:“当前的范式似乎是,美国为所欲为,而其他国家,包括俄罗斯在内,都无能为力。”

Since 2022, Russia’s goals of achieving military and political victory in Ukraine have, in truth, consumed nearly the whole of the country’s efforts and interests on the international stage. “The outcome of that war will represent the ultimate verdict on Russian power and how it is seen in the world,” Notte said. “By definition, that means that other theatres and conflicts end up deprioritized.” Trump is seen in Moscow as Russia’s best hope for delivering a favorable outcome in Ukraine. That still remains Putin’s only real strategy: keep up the fight and keep increasing the costs for both Ukraine and Europe until Trump brings them to their senses. “Our leadership is so focussed on the question of Ukraine, everything else looks secondary in comparison,” the Moscow foreign-policy source said. “If there remains any chance at all that Trump can help with Ukraine, that’s enough of an argument not to create problems for yourself in other areas.”

自2022年以来,俄罗斯在乌克兰实现军事和政治胜利的目标,实际上已消耗了该国在国际舞台上几乎全部的精力和利益。“这场战争的结果将代表对俄罗斯实力及其在世界眼中形象的最终裁决,”诺特表示。“这必然意味着其他地区和冲突最终会被降级处理。”在莫斯科看来,特朗普是俄罗斯在乌克兰取得有利结果的最大希望。这仍然是普京唯一真正的战略:继续战斗,不断增加乌克兰和欧洲的代价,直到特朗普让他们清醒过来。“我们的领导层如此专注于乌克兰问题,相比之下其他一切看起来都是次要的,”莫斯科外交政策消息人士说。“只要特朗普还有一斯科能帮助解决乌克兰问题,这就足以成为不在其他领域给自己制造麻烦的理由。”

A day after Putin denounced Khamenei’s killing, Peskov expressed “deep disappointment” that U.S. talks with Iran had failed, while also making it clear that Russia “highly values the mediation efforts of the United States” in Ukraine. Russia is reportedly maintaining some of its commitments to Iran, providing the regime with intelligence for targeting U.S. forces and installations in the Middle East. “If the U.S. helps Ukraine with this, I don’t see why Russia can’t do the same,” the Moscow foreign-policy source said. But, they added, “it’s obvious the Kremlin doesn’t want to greatly upset Trump, and will err on playing it safe in avoiding red lines.”

普京谴责哈梅内伊遇刺事件次日,克里姆林宫发言人佩斯科夫对美伊谈判破裂表示“深感失望”,同时明确表示俄罗斯“高度评价美国在乌克兰问题上的斡旋努力”。据报道,俄罗斯仍在履行对伊朗的部分承诺,向德黑兰政权提供用于定位美军及其中东设施的情报。莫斯科外交政策消息人士称:“既然美国能这样帮助乌克兰,我不明白俄罗斯为何不能效仿。”但他补充道:“显然克里姆林宫不愿过度触怒特朗普,在规避红线时将倾向于谨慎行事。”

In the meantime, Russia is pursuing whatever advantages it can from the war in Iran. The U.S. is burning through its stock of air-defense interceptors, one of the most crucial weapons for Ukraine—the more that are fired over the skies of the Middle East, the less there are to defend those above Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Dnipro. Khamenei’s son Mojtaba has been appointed Iran’s new Supreme Leader, but whatever political regime survives the war will likely be more vulnerable than ever. “A weak, unstable, battered Iran is exactly the kind of state that will need Russia, and China, all the more,” Notte said. “There’s much for Russia not to like about this war, but seeing as it happened they want to reap the maximum benefits.”

与此同时,俄罗斯正试图从伊朗战争中攫取一切可能的利益。美国正在快速消耗其防空拦截弹库存——这是乌克兰最关键的武器之一。在中东上空发射的拦截弹越多,用于保卫基辅、哈尔科夫和第聂伯罗上空的拦截弹就越少。哈梅内伊之子莫杰塔巴已被任命为伊朗新任最高领袖,但无论战后幸存的是何种政治体制,都可能比以往更加脆弱。“一个虚弱、动荡、饱受摧残的伊朗,恰恰是那种更需要俄罗斯和中国的国家,”诺特指出,“这场战争中有许多俄罗斯不愿看到的局面,但既然已经发生,他们就想获取最大利益。”

Above all, the war is yielding enormous profits for Russia on the global energy markets. Around a third of Russia’s budget depends on oil and gas sales. Before the bombing began, oil was trading below seventy dollars a barrel; it later spiked to nearly a hundred and twenty, though it has since settled at around ninety dollars. Apart from crude-oil prices, Russia’s exports avoid the bottleneck currently choking the Strait of Hormuz, by travelling via the Bosphorus or through overland pipelines. Earlier this winter, China and India were demanding a discount of between twenty and thirty dollars a barrel on Russian crude, a reflection of sanctions and shipping risks; now, with Russia’s sudden reëmergence as an essential supplier, its oil has been trading at a premium in some markets. Alexandra Prokopenko, a former adviser at Russia’s central bank and a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, told me that, if current prices hold, Russia stands to net an additional three and a half billion dollars in revenue a month—as much as a third of the estimated total monthly cost of the war in Ukraine.

最重要的是,这场战争正让俄罗斯在全球能源市场上获得巨额利润。俄罗斯约三分之一的预算依赖于石油和天然气销售。轰炸开始前,油价低于每桶七十美元;后来一度飙升至近一百二十美元,尽管目前已回落至九十美元左右。除了原油价格上涨,俄罗斯的出口还避开了当前扼住霍尔木兹海峡咽喉的瓶颈,通过博斯普鲁斯海峡或陆上管道运输。今年初冬,中国和印度曾要求俄罗斯原油每桶给予二十至三十美元的折扣,这反映了制裁和航运风险的影响;如今,随着俄罗斯突然重新成为关键供应国,其石油在一些市场上甚至出现了溢价。俄罗斯央行前顾问、卡内基俄罗斯欧亚中心研究员亚历山德拉·普罗科彭科告诉我,如果当前价格维持不变,俄罗斯每月有望净增三十五亿美元收入——这相当于俄罗斯在乌克兰战争每月总成本估算值的三分之一。

Russian oil supply is also essential to Trump, who desperately wants to avoid a prolonged and painful rise in energy prices. Last week, he granted India a temporary waiver from U.S. sanctions on Russian oil. Prokopenko said that the move contained an important message. “Before, the U.S. was very careful to coördinate sanctions policy with Western partners,” she reflected. “Now it just acts on its own.” Moreover, she added, “if you start to dilute the sanctions regime in one place, why not do it in another?”

俄罗斯的石油供应对特朗普同样至关重要,他迫切希望避免能源价格出现长期而痛苦的上涨。上周,他批准印度暂时豁免美国对俄罗斯石油的制裁。普罗科彭科表示,此举传递出重要信息。“此前,美国在协调制裁政策与西方伙伴关系时非常谨慎,”她分析道,“现在却开始单方面行动。”她进一步指出:“既然制裁机制已在一处出现松动,何不推及其他领域?”

On Monday, Trump and Putin had a phone call to discuss the war in Iran. Hours before the call, Putin had warned publicly that, because of stalled traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, the world was on the brink of a major energy crisis. Now he was offering to help broker a peace deal with Iran. Trump later said that he told Putin, “You could be more ​helpful by getting the Ukraine-Russia war over with.” At the same time, Trump announced that, to address energy supplies, he plans to ease sanctions on “some countries.” It appeared that Putin had won another exchange with Trump. But, Notte told me, a basic truth remains, with unpleasant implications in Moscow. “Trump doesn’t really ask Putin what he thinks,” she said. “He just acts as he likes.”

周一,特朗普与普京通电话讨论伊朗战争。通话前数小时,普京曾公开警告称,由于霍尔木兹海峡航运停滞,世界正濒临重大能源危机。此刻他主动提出协助斡旋伊朗和平协议。特朗普事后表示,他当时告诉普京:“如果你能结束乌克兰与俄罗斯的战争,可能会更有帮助。”与此同时,特朗普宣布为应对能源供应问题,计划放宽对“某些国家”的制裁。这似乎是普京在与特朗普的又一次交锋中占据上风。但诺特(Notte)向我指出,一个基本事实依然存在,且对莫斯科而言意味着不愉快的潜台词:“特朗普其实从不征询普京的意见,”她说,“他只是随心所欲地行事。”

The windfall from the energy trade may not ultimately change much for Russia’s strategic position. Its most pressing economic issues are inflation and the outsized role of military industry, neither of which can be solved by extra revenues alone. Prokopenko told me, “The Russian economy is stagnating not because there isn’t money but, rather, because it has become wrapped in knots due to the war in Ukraine.” Not long ago, Prokopenko thought that Putin could face an economic reckoning in early 2027. Whatever relief the war in Iran brings will be temporary. “He got lucky,” she said. “Maybe he can put that off a while longer.” ♦

能源贸易带来的意外之财,或许终究难以从根本上改变俄罗斯的战略处境。该国最紧迫的经济问题在于通货膨胀与军事工业的过度膨胀,而这两者都无法仅凭额外收入得以解决。普罗科彭科告诉我:“俄罗斯经济陷入停滞,并非因为缺乏资金,而是由于乌克兰战争使其陷入重重困局。”不久前,普罗科彭科曾认为普京可能在2027年初面临经济清算。伊朗战争带来的任何喘息都将是暂时的。“他运气不错,”她说,“或许能再拖延一阵。” ♦

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