Q. & A.

How Pakistan Became a Major Player in Peace Negotiations Between the U.S. and Iran

巴基斯坦如何成为美伊和谈的关键斡旋者
The Pakistani military has wooed Donald Trump, and fallen out with its former Taliban allies, as it looks to wield more influence in the region.
巴基斯坦军方一边向特朗普示好,一边与昔日的塔利班盟友决裂,试图在该地区施加更大影响力。
Syed Asim Munir speaking into Marco Rubio's ear in oval office
Source photograph by Yuri Gripas / Abaca / Bloomberg / Getty

Since the United States and Israel began attacking Iran, in late February, Pakistan’s government has emerged as a surprising broker of ceasefire negotiations. In addition to helping communicate some of Donald Trump’s demands to the Iranians, Pakistan has offered to host peace talks between the two countries, in Islamabad. It’s all part of the surprisingly warm relationship between Trump and Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Army chief, who, despite the veneer of “civilian supremacy,” is the most powerful man in the country. Munir has led the Pakistani state’s charm offensive, while cracking down on domestic dissent, and Trump has reacted positively. (The President’s relationship with Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister of Pakistan’s biggest adversary, India, has cooled since Trump’s first term.) But can Pakistan really help broker peace, and what does its recent conflict with the Afghan Taliban, its onetime client, mean for the region?

自二月底美国与以色列开始对伊朗发动攻击以来,巴基斯坦政府出人意料地成为停火谈判的斡旋者。除了协助向伊朗方面传达唐纳德·特朗普的部分要求外,巴基斯坦还主动提出在伊斯兰堡为两国提供和谈场所。这一切都源于特朗普与巴基斯坦陆军参谋长阿西姆·穆尼尔之间令人惊讶的亲密关系——尽管披着“文官至上”的外衣,穆尼尔才是这个国家最具实权的人物。在压制国内异议声音的同时,穆尼尔领导着巴基斯坦政府的外交魅力攻势,而特朗普对此反应积极。(相较特朗普首个任期,美国总统与巴基斯坦最大对手印度的总理纳伦德拉·莫迪的关系已明显转冷。)但巴基斯坦真能促成和平吗?这个国家近期与其昔日代理人阿富汗塔利班的冲突,又将对地区局势意味着什么?

I recently spoke by phone with Aqil Shah, the author of the book “The Army and Democracy: Military Politics In Pakistan,” a professor of political science at McDaniel College, and a visiting faculty member in the security-studies program at Georgetown University. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed how Pakistan’s military won over Trump, how the military consolidated so much power in Pakistani politics, and what the collapse in relations between the Taliban and Pakistan’s military says about the country’s foreign policy.

我最近通过电话采访了阿基尔·沙阿(Aqil Shah)。他是《军队与民主:巴基斯坦的军事政治》一书的作者,现任麦克丹尼尔学院政治学教授,并兼任乔治城大学安全研究项目的客座教师。在我们的对话中(为简洁清晰起见,内容经过编辑),我们探讨了巴基斯坦军方如何赢得特朗普的青睐,军方如何在巴基斯坦政治中巩固如此巨大的权力,以及塔利班与巴基斯坦军方关系的破裂如何折射出该国的外交政策走向。

How has the Pakistani military establishment been so successful at wooing the Trump Administration, and how has it inserted itself into negotiations to potentially end the war in Iran?

巴基斯坦军方建制派是如何成功赢得特朗普政府青睐的,又是如何介入可能终结伊朗战争的谈判进程的?

Historically, the Pakistani Army has been a fulcrum of U.S.-Pakistan relations. But the Pakistani-American relationship has waxed and waned over time. During the Biden Administration, Pakistan had become a virtual pariah in Washington, or had been reduced to a nonentity, as the United States left Afghanistan and saw India as a means of countering China. But I think it was really the Pakistan-India crisis in May of 2025, when Pakistan and India engaged in limited armed conflict, that changed things, because Pakistan openly embraced Trump’s mediation of the fight, whereas Narendra Modi and company bristled at it. India said there was no role for outside mediation because the Indian approach to the Pakistan-India conflict was that it was a bilateral issue. Whereas Pakistan, under Munir, cleverly tapped into Trump’s need for adulation and praise, and the Pakistanis called him a global peacemaker, and publicly nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Trump has brought this up several times. He likes to say that Munir is the best field marshal, and he says that Munir told him that he saved millions of lives. So they basically, at the expense of India, have achieved something unexpected.

历史上,巴基斯坦军队一直是美巴关系的支点。但美巴关系始终起伏不定。拜登执政时期,随着美国撤出阿富汗并将印度视为制衡中国的手段,巴基斯坦在华盛顿几乎沦为弃儿,或者说已变得无足轻重。但真正改变局面的,我认为是2025年5月的印巴危机——当时两国爆发了有限武装冲突。巴基斯坦公开欢迎特朗普介入调停,而纳伦德拉·莫迪及其同僚对此反应激烈。印度坚称外部调解毫无必要,因为印方将印巴冲突视为双边问题。反观穆尼尔领导下的巴基斯坦,则巧妙地利用了特朗普对奉承与赞美的渴求,称他为“全球和平缔造者”,并公开提名其角逐诺贝尔和平奖。特朗普多次提及此事,总爱说穆尼尔是最杰出的陆军元帅,还说穆尼尔告诉他“你拯救了数百万人的生命”。就这样,他们以牺牲印度为代价,取得了意想不到的成果。

In terms of the conflict with Iran, Pakistan has always seen itself as a sort of leader of the Muslim world. And so it has used this opportunity, because of its relationship with Trump or privileged access to Trump, and the fact that it borders Iran and is also fifteen to twenty per-cent Shia, to try this balancing act. It has been done with deft diplomacy of some sort, but it’s really flattery as foreign policy.

在与伊朗的冲突问题上,巴基斯坦始终自视为穆斯林世界的某种领导者。因此它利用这个机会——凭借与特朗普的关系或接触特朗普的特权通道,加之与伊朗接壤且国内什叶派人口占百分之十五到二十的现实——试图施展这种平衡术。这确实需要某种巧妙的外交手腕,但本质上是以谄媚为外交政策。

The military has been the central power in Pakistan since the country was founded in 1947, but over the past few years it has imprisoned the former Prime Minister Imran Khan and taken an even more central and autocratic role. To what degree has that allowed the military to seize the initiative with Trump?

自1947年建国以来,军队始终是巴基斯坦的核心权力支柱。然而过去几年间,军方不仅监禁了前总理伊姆兰·汗(Imran Khan),更以日益集权且专断的姿态掌控政局。这种权力扩张在多大程度上帮助巴基斯坦军方在与特朗普的互动中占据了主动权?

At the time of the India-Pakistan crisis, the military’s public reputation and legitimacy was quite low. There was an economic crisis, and there was naked repression. There had been a rigged election before that, and they had jailed Khan, Pakistan’s most popular leader. But the conflict last year was where Munir pitched himself or projected himself as the victor of that war. And that revived the Army’s, or at least Munir’s, legitimacy as the solid leader and national hero who had saved Pakistan. The vast majority of Pakistanis think Pakistan won that war. So in that sense the crisis helped Munir consolidate his power. They were able to curb some of the dissent around Khan. They’d already crushed his party, but the criticism faded away, somewhat.

印巴危机爆发时,巴基斯坦军方的公众声誉和合法性已跌至谷底。经济陷入困境,政治镇压赤裸裸上演。此前选举被操纵,军方还监禁了巴基斯坦最受欢迎的领导人伊姆兰·汗。但去年的冲突让穆尼尔得以将自己塑造成那场战争的胜利者。这重振了军队——至少是穆尼尔个人——作为拯救巴基斯坦的坚实领导者和民族英雄的合法性。绝大多数巴基斯坦民众认为巴基斯坦赢得了那场战争。从这个意义上说,这场危机帮助穆尼尔巩固了权力。军方得以压制部分围绕伊姆兰·汗的异议声音——尽管早已摧毁其政党,但批评声浪只是略有消退。

And I think the military has used that confidence that it gained from the war, both domestically, to further consolidate its power, and externally. After the crisis, Munir was promoted to field marshal, and he was then elevated to the new office of the Chief of Defense Forces, which basically gives him control over the entire military. And it was also that crisis in which they were able to really effectively endear themselves to Trump by anointing him as the global peacemaker.

我认为军方利用了从这场战争中获得的信心,对内进一步巩固权力,对外也是如此。危机过后,穆尼尔晋升为陆军元帅,随后被擢升至新设立的国防军总司令一职,这基本上让他掌控了整个军队。也正是通过那场危机,他们得以通过将特朗普奉为“全球和平缔造者”的方式,有效地赢得了特朗普的欢心。

Is there any danger for the Pakistani military in being seen as too close to a leader whose dealings with the Muslim world are probably not that popular in Pakistan, or has the distaste that Trump’s shown recently for India and Modi outweighed that?

巴基斯坦军方若被视为与一位同伊斯兰世界打交道方式在巴基斯坦国内可能并不受欢迎的领导人间关系过密,是否存在风险?抑或特朗普近期对印度和莫迪表现出的反感已抵消了这种风险?

I would say that, as far as domestic dissent is concerned, or the unpopularity of Trump is concerned, it seems like the military’s been able to mute much of the dissent. The India angle likely trumps that card, as does the idea of Pakistan as this indispensable power that is trying to help solve this U.S.-Iran war. The P.T.I., Khan’s party, has criticized Munir for cozying up to Trump, but at the end of the day foreign policy is the exclusive preserve of the military. And I think the military has really successfully pitched itself to the Pakistani public as this leader of the Muslim world—that it’s really Pakistan that’s the pivotal player in the region with the capacity, the willingness, and the power to punch above its weight at the expense of India.

就国内异议或特朗普不受欢迎而言,军方似乎已经成功压制了大部分反对声音。而印度因素很可能盖过这张牌,巴基斯坦作为不可或缺的力量试图帮助解决美伊战争这一理念同样如此。伊姆兰·汗领导的正义运动党曾批评穆尼尔(Asim Munir)与特朗普走得太近,但归根结底,外交政策始终是军方的专属领域。我认为军方确实成功地向巴基斯坦民众塑造了自身作为穆斯林世界领袖的形象——真正能在本地区发挥关键作用、有能力有意愿且能以印度为代价实现超实力发挥的,正是巴基斯坦。

One interesting aspect here is Pakistan’s relationship to Saudi Arabia. Despite the fact that Pakistan has nuclear weapons, and Saudi Arabia does not, Pakistan is a much poorer country and has, for a long time, looked to Saudi Arabia for financial assistance. How much do you think Pakistan’s relationship with Saudi Arabia dictates what Pakistan is trying to do here in terms of negotiations with Iran?

这里一个有趣的方面是巴基斯坦与沙特阿拉伯的关系。尽管巴基斯坦拥有核武器而沙特没有,但巴基斯坦要贫穷得多,长期以来一直依赖沙特的经济援助。您认为巴基斯坦与沙特的关系在多大程度上决定了巴基斯坦在与伊朗谈判中的立场?

It’s crucial because, as you know, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a defense agreement or defense pact, which, at least from what we know, establishes that if Saudi Arabia were attacked, primarily by Israel, Pakistan would defend it. And Pakistan has extended or will extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia. So Pakistan is already in an awkward position because the Saudis are being attacked. And I think the worst nightmare would be for Pakistan to have to do something militarily for Saudi Arabia against Iran. I don’t think that’s going to happen, but I think they want to avoid that and keep this relationship with the United States, but also try to make sure that this region is not unstable. They also don’t want to have to take sides in the Saudi-Iran conflict, in part, because of the population of Shia Muslims domestically.

这一点至关重要,因为正如您所知,巴基斯坦与沙特阿拉伯签署了防务协议,根据目前公开的信息,该协议规定若沙特(主要遭受以色列攻击时)遭到袭击,巴基斯坦将提供防卫。巴基斯坦已经并将继续将其核保护伞延伸至沙特。因此,沙特当前遭受袭击的现状已使巴基斯坦陷入尴尬境地。我认为最糟糕的噩梦莫过于巴基斯坦被迫为沙特对伊朗采取军事行动——虽然我认为这种情况不会发生,但巴方显然希望避免这种局面,既想维持与美国的关系,也试图确保该地区局势稳定。他们同样不愿在沙特与伊朗的冲突中选边站队,部分原因在于其国内存在相当数量的什叶派穆斯林人口。

Still, Pakistan is completely or largely dependent on Saudi largesse, and has been for the longest time. And so they are really trying to hedge and balance, to make sure that the economic benefits from Saudi Arabia continue.

尽管如此,巴基斯坦完全或很大程度上依赖沙特的慷慨援助,而且长期以来一直如此。因此,他们确实在努力对冲和平衡,以确保来自沙特的经济利益得以延续。

But I imagine the economic costs of the war continuing are only going to get more dire for Pakistan, right?

但我想,战争持续下去给巴基斯坦带来的经济代价只会越来越沉重,对吧?

Oh, yeah. Pakistan is almost entirely dependent on oil and gas from the Persian Gulf. So that’s obviously an economic choke point. And Pakistan almost defaulted on its international debt obligations a few years ago. So they’re not out of the woods economically. And the war is obviously going to make, or has already made, things worse because they had to raise fuel prices, which obviously hurts the people on the street, the daily-wage earners, and much of Pakistan’s informal service economy. So Pakistan’s role in negotiations is strategic geopolitically, but also clearly economic.

没错。巴基斯坦几乎完全依赖波斯湾的石油和天然气供应,这显然是其经济命脉所在。几年前,巴基斯坦险些出现国际债务违约,至今仍未走出经济困境。而这场战争无疑会——或者说已经——让情况雪上加霜,因为他们不得不提高燃料价格,这直接冲击了街头百姓、日薪劳动者以及巴基斯坦庞大的非正规服务经济。因此,巴基斯坦在谈判中的角色既是地缘政治上的战略考量,也明显关乎经济存续。

One thing that you did not mention about Trump’s relationship with the Pakistani government is the degree to which the Pakistanis are paying off Trump or people close to him. This is a situation where the Pakistani military—because of its control over the country—can do things for Trump that the government of Sweden or even India probably cannot. How much is this a part of what’s going on?

关于特朗普与巴基斯坦政府的关系,有一点您没有提及——巴基斯坦方面向特朗普或其身边人士输送利益的程度。由于巴基斯坦军方实际掌控着该国,他们能为特朗普做到瑞典甚至印度政府都难以办到的事。这在当前局势中究竟占据多大分量?

I think in addition to the charm and flattery angle, Munir and the Army have tried to pitch Trump on having a partnership between the Pakistani state’s crypto venture, and the Trump family’s crypto company, World Liberty Financial. Munir also literally had a case full of minerals that he showed to Trump at the White House. So Pakistan is pitching itself as a reservoir for all these critical minerals or rare-earth deposits, and even for oil and petroleum. And they have invested heavily in lobbying firms that are very close to Trump and his allies and partners. Steve Witkoff was actually able to negotiate a deal to redevelop the Roosevelt, a shuttered hotel in New York owned by Pakistan.

我认为,除了魅力和奉承之外,穆尼尔和军方还试图向特朗普推销一个合作方案:让巴基斯坦政府的加密货币项目与特朗普家族的加密货币公司“世界自由金融”建立伙伴关系。穆尼尔甚至真的在白宫向特朗普展示了一整箱矿物样本。因此,巴基斯坦正将自己定位为这些关键矿物或稀土矿床——甚至石油资源——的储备库。他们还在游说公司上投入巨资,这些公司与特朗普及其盟友、合作伙伴关系密切。史蒂夫·维特科夫实际上已经谈成了一项交易,要重新开发罗斯福酒店——这是巴基斯坦在纽约拥有的一家已停业的酒店。

So obviously there is the angle of them trying to exploit the pay-to-play nature of the Trump Administration as much as they can. I don’t know how much this critical minerals stuff is actually going to pan out, but Trump has mentioned this, and there’s been some movement with the Pakistani military’s so-called Frontier Works Organization, which does engineering and construction work. And Pakistan has joined the Board of Peace, which has a fee of a billion dollars. So I think it’s both the charm of Munir and the military, but also, if there is anything Trump likes, it’s enriching himself and his buddies and his family.

显然,他们正试图充分利用特朗普政府“付费参与”的运作模式。虽然我不确定这些关键矿产项目最终能有多大成效,但特朗普确实提及过此事。巴基斯坦军方所谓的“边境工程组织”——一个负责工程建设的机构——近期已有所动作。此外,巴基斯坦还加入了“和平委员会”,这个组织的入会费高达十亿美元。所以我认为,这既是穆尼尔(Munir)和军方的魅力攻势,也契合了特朗普的一贯作风——毕竟,如果说特朗普有什么特别钟爱的事,那莫过于为自己、亲信和家人谋取利益了。

And, aside from the economic angle or financial angle, Pakistan also quietly handed over an ISIS leader who was involved in an attack when the Americans were leaving Afghanistan and was detained by the Pakistani military last Spring. Trump mentioned that in an address to Congress. And Trump likes wins.

除了经济和金融层面的考量,巴基斯坦还悄然移交了一名“伊斯兰国”(ISIS)头目。此人曾参与美军撤离阿富汗期间发动的袭击,去年春天被巴基斯坦军方拘捕。特朗普在国会演讲中提及此事——他向来热衷于展示胜利成果。

Can you talk about the role Pakistan’s military plays in the economy?

巴基斯坦军方在经济中扮演的角色,可以说是既深入又广泛。他们不仅通过庞大的商业帝国——包括银行、房地产、制造业等——直接参与经济活动,还通过退休将领在关键国企和监管机构任职,对国家经济政策施加着无形却深远的影响。这种“军事-商业复合体”的模式,既为军队提供了独立于国家预算的财政自主性,也引发了关于公平竞争、资源分配透明度的持续争议。

The Pakistani military has always had a commercial empire, but a few years ago it established what’s known as the Special Investment Facilitation Council. The idea behind it is that foreign investment in Pakistan is subject to too much red tape, and this allows the Army to take the front seat and say, “If you want to invest in Pakistan, we are your one-window operation.” So all foreign investments, whatever trickles into Pakistan, are in the hands of the military, and the military’s also taken over mining operations in Waziristan. So in addition to its own commercial ventures, the Army has recently institutionalized its role in how Pakistan conducts economic relations and investment, meaning the Army’s really in the position to make these decisions.

巴基斯坦军方一直拥有自己的商业帝国,但几年前又成立了所谓的“特别投资促进委员会”。其背后的理念是,巴基斯坦的外国投资面临太多繁文缛节,而该委员会能让军方走上前台表态:“若想在巴基斯坦投资,我们就是您的一站式服务平台。”于是所有流入巴基斯坦的外国投资都掌握在军方手中,军方还接管了瓦济里斯坦的采矿业务。因此除了自身的商业项目,军方最近还将其在巴基斯坦经济关系和投资领域的角色制度化——这意味着军方实际上掌控着这些决策权。

And the civilian government is just completely dependent on the military for its legitimacy after the rigged election. It no longer pretends that it’s actually a civilian government. It’s very happy with the fact that the military’s been able to suppress Imran Khan, who was a threat to the ruling party, the P.M.L.N. And the P.M.L.N. Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, has always been a pragmatic, let’s-work-with-the-Army guy. He’s happy to be in the back seat and let Munir drive foreign policy, but also economic management.

在操纵选举之后,文职政府完全依赖军方来维持其合法性。它不再假装自己是一个真正的文职政府。军方成功镇压了伊姆兰·汗(Imran Khan)——他对执政党穆斯林联盟(谢里夫派)(P.M.L.N.)构成了威胁——这一事实令文职政府非常满意。而穆斯林联盟(谢里夫派)的总理谢赫巴兹·谢里夫(Shehbaz Sharif)向来是个务实派,主张与军方合作。他乐于退居幕后,让穆尼尔(Munir)来主导外交政策,同时也掌管经济事务。

You mentioned that the Biden Administration had lost interest in Pakistan. The main reason the U.S. was able to ignore Pakistan during that period was because America pulled out of Afghanistan, in 2021. For twenty years, up until that point, America had been working together with Pakistan, in a flawed way, to combat the Taliban. Can you talk a little bit about what’s happened with Pakistan-Afghanistan relations since then?

你提到拜登政府对巴基斯坦失去了兴趣。美国之所以能在那个时期忽视巴基斯坦,主要是因为美国在2021年撤出了阿富汗。在那之前的二十年里,美国一直与巴基斯坦以某种不完美的方式合作,共同打击塔利班。你能谈谈自那以后巴基斯坦与阿富汗关系的发展吗?

Once the Americans left, if you recall, Pakistan really became the global cheerleader for the Taliban, going around the world saying, “You must accept this regime. It’s going to be inclusive. It’s going to blah, blah, blah, blah.” The fundamental problem here is that the Pakistani Taliban (T.T.P.), which launched attacks against Pakistan, and the Afghan Taliban, which Pakistan supported, are primarily two sides of the same coin. They have the same ideology. Yes, they have different structures and leadership, but the T.T.P. is now firmly ensconced in Afghanistan, and the Afghan Taliban is doing to Pakistan what Pakistan did to the Americans by giving the T.T.P. sanctuary. So the relationship has gone from “the Taliban have liberated Afghanistan” to “Taliban are terrorists and this is an open war,” and even talk of regime change in Afghanistan. And the T.T.P. has now used this safe haven in Afghanistan to launch massive attacks on Pakistan, and not just in the north but also in major cities like Islamabad.

诸位想必还记得,美国人撤离后,巴基斯坦俨然成了塔利班的全球啦啦队长,四处奔走疾呼:“你们必须接受这个政权。它会包容各方。它会这样那样……” 根本问题在于,袭击巴基斯坦的巴基斯坦塔利班(T.T.P.)与巴基斯坦支持的阿富汗塔利班,本质上是一枚硬币的两面。他们秉持相同的意识形态。诚然,其组织架构和领导层各不相同,但如今巴塔已在阿富汗站稳脚跟,而阿塔正通过为巴塔提供庇护所,将当年巴基斯坦对美国人所为如法炮制还给巴基斯坦。于是两国关系从“塔利班解放了阿富汗”急转直下至“塔利班是恐怖分子,这是一场公开战争”,甚至出现要求阿富汗政权更迭的论调。巴塔则利用阿富汗这个安全港,对巴基斯坦发动大规模袭击,不仅限于北部地区,更蔓延至伊斯兰堡等主要城市。

This is a nightmare scenario for Pakistan. Pakistan’s previous policy, which was called “strategic depth,” was the idea that having Afghanistan with a friendly Islamist government in Pakistan’s back yard would dampen the influence of India, and it has backfired majorly.

对巴基斯坦而言,这无异于一场噩梦。该国先前奉行的“战略纵深”政策——即在自家后院扶持一个友好的伊斯兰主义政府来制衡印度影响力——如今已酿成严重的反噬。

Yes, although domestic terrorist attacks against Pakistanis have been going on for a very long time.

是的,尽管针对巴基斯坦人的国内恐怖袭击已经持续了很长时间。

Yeah.

是的。

And Pakistan would always say that it was the Pakistani Taliban that was doing this, and this branch of the Taliban was bad, while their Afghan Taliban allies were not bad, which annoyed the Americans. It is incredible that now they’ve flipped and recognized that the two branches of the Taliban are allied.

巴基斯坦总是说,是巴基斯坦塔利班干的,塔利班的这个分支很坏,而他们的阿富汗塔利班盟友并不坏,这让美国人很恼火。令人难以置信的是,现在他们翻脸了,承认塔利班的这两个分支是盟友。

The good/bad thing Pakistan was doing with the Taliban has completely collapsed, and now they’re saying that the Afghan Taliban regime, which they had supported, is a terrorist regime, and of course they have to say, “Well, it’s supported by India.” And India has cozied up to Afghanistan. But this is a mess made by Pakistan. You can’t burn your neighbor’s house or bomb your neighbor’s house and think nothing will happen to you. The T.T.P. has been fighting for some kind of Islamic Emirate in Pakistan and against the Pakistani Army for a long time, but after a school attack in Peshawar in 2014 things calmed down after the military cracked down. The real comeback for the T.T.P. came after the Americans left Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban came to power. That is when you saw a real spike in the level of terrorist attacks on civilians and soldiers within Pakistan. This recent spike, which is, I think, Pakistan’s main national-security threat right now, in addition to India, and is really about this relationship Pakistan cultivated with the Afghan Taliban that has basically backfired, with the Afghan Taliban now in no mood to give up its strategic allies for several reasons. The Afghan Taliban says to Pakistan, “Well, that’s your problem. We can facilitate the talks, but the T.T.P.’s not here. We don’t harbor them.” Again, it is the same thing that Pakistan used to say to the Americans.

巴基斯坦对塔利班采取的那种“好坏参半”的策略如今已彻底破产。现在他们宣称自己曾支持的阿富汗塔利班政权是恐怖主义政权,当然他们还得补上一句:“这背后有印度支持。”而印度确实与阿富汗关系日益密切。但这场乱局本就是巴基斯坦自己酿成的。你不能一边烧毁邻居的房屋、轰炸邻居的家园,一边指望自己能全身而退。巴基斯坦塔利班运动长期为在巴基斯坦建立伊斯兰酋长国而与巴军方作战,2014年白沙瓦校园袭击事件后,军方镇压曾让局势暂时平息。该组织的真正卷土重来是在美军撤离阿富汗、阿塔重掌政权之后。彼时巴基斯坦境内针对平民和军人的恐怖袭击才真正呈现激增态势。近期袭击浪潮——我认为这是巴基斯坦当前除印度外最主要的国家安全威胁——根源恰恰在于巴基斯坦与阿富汗塔利班培养的关系已遭反噬:出于多重考量,阿塔现在根本无意放弃其战略盟友。阿富汗塔利班对巴基斯坦的回应是:“那是你们自己的问题。我们可以协助对话,但巴基斯坦塔利班运动不在这里。我们并未庇护他们。”瞧,这套说辞正是巴基斯坦当年惯常对美国人使用的。

This has also had a horrific human cost, correct? How many Afghan immigrants has Pakistan deported in the last couple of years?

这确实造成了可怕的人道代价。过去几年间,巴基斯坦已驱逐了超过五十万阿富汗移民。

About two million since 2023. Some of them don’t even know Afghanistan. They’ve been in Pakistan for almost two generations. Their children were born here, they had lives here, and you just tell them tomorrow morning you have to pack up and leave. So, yeah, the humanitarian cost is horrendous. The Pakistani government says that all these terrorist attacks are happening because of these refugees, like they are some sort of Trojan horse, and they’re Afghans, not real Pakistanis. So it’s punishing the refugees, the people who have been here for over two decades or three decades, to put pressure on the Taliban.

自2023年以来已有约两百万人。他们中有些人甚至对阿富汗一无所知。这些人在巴基斯坦生活了近两代人。他们的孩子在这里出生,他们在这里建立了生活,而你却告诉他们明天早上就必须收拾行李离开。是的,人道主义代价是可怕的。巴基斯坦政府声称所有这些恐怖袭击都是因为这些难民,仿佛他们是某种特洛伊木马,说他们是阿富汗人而非真正的巴基斯坦人。这是在通过惩罚这些已在此生活二三十年的人们,向塔利班施压。

Do you sense anything in Pakistan’s current posture toward the United States or Afghanistan that suggests they’ve changed their mind about what Pakistan’s role should be in the world, or does this seem like just more of the same?

你是否从巴基斯坦当前对美国或阿富汗的姿态中,察觉到任何迹象,表明他们对于巴基斯坦在世界舞台上应扮演何种角色的看法已经改变?还是说,这看起来不过是老调重弹?

I don’t think this is a serious rethink of anything. Pakistan’s turn on the Afghan Taliban is a reckoning that didn’t come because of some deep internal strategic reassessment or something like that. The policies have been completely disastrous, and, because the Pakistan military is never held accountable for taking the country down the drain, it keeps repeating itself, right? It has really, really ruined Pakistan over the long haul in terms of its economy, in terms of its internal political stability, in terms of radicalizing parts of the population. And in terms of Trump they are smart enough to see the opportunity and grab it, but I don’t think this is really some sort of strategic pivot from what Pakistan is. ♦

我不认为这是任何意义上的严肃反思。巴基斯坦对阿富汗塔利班的转向,是一种迟来的清算,并非源于某种深刻的内部战略重估或类似原因。这些政策已造成彻底的灾难,而由于巴基斯坦军方从未因其将国家拖入泥潭而受到问责,它便不断重蹈覆辙,不是吗?从长远来看,它确实、确实毁掉了巴基斯坦——无论是经济、内部政治稳定,还是部分民众的激进化方面。至于特朗普,他们足够精明,看到了机会并抓住了它,但我认为这并非巴基斯坦自身真正的战略转向。♦

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