Under Review

How Mary Kay Built an Empire Out of Other Women’s Dreams

玫琳凯如何用其他女性的梦想建起一个帝国
The founder of the global cosmetics empire feminized the sale of cure-all lotions and potions—and gave the girlboss her first shot of good press.
这位全球化妆品帝国的创始人,将包治百病的乳液和药水的销售变得女性化——并让“女老板”第一次获得了正面报道。
A woman wearing sunglasses in a pink Cadillac.
Photograph by Ed Lallo / Getty

The go-getter woman needs a better alibi, or else to quit telling stories. Is that Kamala Harris, peeping out from beneath her collapsed tent, smugly threatening the American people with another run? Harris cannot read a room, apparently, but then there’s always the point at which a go-getter woman, like her male analogues in government or business—not that, in our era, these institutions are much distinguished—grows unaccustomed to spaces unpeopled with acolytes. Were she inclined to take in the outside air, she might discern a years-in-the-making change in the wind. The go-getter woman, or girlboss, as that type is now known, has worn out her welcome, and it is not only the misogynists—cleverly and less cleverly disguised—who feel this way. Today, in contrast with ten and twenty and thirty years ago, her tale of freedom is rather suspect, for it is a freedom known not to trickle down.

进取型女性需要一个更好的托词,否则就别再讲故事了。那是卡玛拉·哈里斯吗?从她倒塌的帐篷下探出头来,得意洋洋地用再次参选威胁美国人民?哈里斯显然不会察言观色,但话说回来,进取型女性——就像她在政府或商界的男性同行一样(在我们这个时代,这些机构已没什么区别)——总有那么一个时刻,会变得不习惯没有追随者簇拥的空间。如果她愿意呼吸一下外面的空气,或许能察觉到风向已变,这变化酝酿了多年。进取型女性,或如今所称的“女老板”,已经耗尽了人们的欢迎,而且有这种感觉的不仅仅是那些巧妙或不太巧妙伪装的厌女者。今天,与十年、二十年、三十年前不同,她的自由故事相当可疑,因为这是一种已知不会向下滴涓的自由。

In this era of cultural politics that progressive millennials refer to as Woke 2.0, the excesses of corporate so-called feminism are as plain as the enhanced faces cropping up around us. Ubiquitous images of the White House press secretary, Karoline Leavitt, and of Lauren Sánchez Bezos have, in tandem with word of young men imbibing eugenics alongside their creatine, renewed a certain public’s fascination with how an orientation premised upon whiteness, gender essentialism, and wealth accumulation makes for bizarre faces. Yet it would be wise to cast our gaze beyond the unblended eyeshadow and the tight skin of what’s been labelled Republican makeup and Mar-a-Lago face. A beauty doctrine of conspicuous consumption and empowerment of the few finds followers both left and right of center.

在这个被进步派千禧一代称为“觉醒2.0”的文化政治时代,企业所谓女权主义的过度行为,就像我们周围日益增多的整容脸一样显而易见。白宫新闻秘书卡罗琳·莱维特和劳伦·桑切斯·贝索斯无处不在的形象,加上年轻男性在服用肌酸的同时摄入优生学说的消息,重新点燃了某些公众的好奇心:一种以白人身份、性别本质主义和财富积累为前提的取向,如何造就了怪异的面孔。然而,我们最好将目光投向那些被贴上“共和党妆容”和“海湖庄园脸”标签的、眼影晕染不均、皮肤紧绷的现象之外。一种炫耀性消费和赋权少数人的美容教条,在中间派左右两边都能找到追随者。

The writer and professional trend forecaster Ayesha A. Siddiqi has written of our ramping confluence of beauty and health, of the compulsory and product-laden habits that exemplify this era of bipartisan austerity, of public health whittled into personal maintenance. Beauty routines, promulgated as a measure of the good life, provide what Siddiqi describes as a “theater of exception” from inequality. Empowerment is sourced from what goes on the skin. A decade ago, we blasphemed Audre Lorde in calling such consumerist rituals “self-care” and claiming them as feminist; this template was made trendy fifty-three years earlier by Mary Kathlyn Wagner Rogers, not yet known as Mary Kay, who founded her eponymous cosmetics line in 1963 and whose entrepreneurial triumphs would drape the usual salesman’s maxims in diamonds, wigs, and lots and lots of pink. She did not invent the sale of cure-all lotions and potions—snake oil has a long tail in American life—but she did feminize it, giving the proto-girlboss her first shot of good press.

作家兼专业趋势预测师阿伊莎·A·西迪基曾写到我们日益融合的美容与健康,写到那些强制性的、充斥着产品的习惯,它们体现了这个两党紧缩时代的特征,写到公共卫生被削减为个人保养。美容流程被宣扬为美好生活的一种衡量标准,提供了西迪基所描述的、一种脱离不平等的“例外剧场”。赋权来源于涂抹在皮肤上的东西。十年前,我们亵渎了奥德丽·洛德,将这种消费主义仪式称为“自我关怀”,并宣称它们是女权主义的;这种模式在五十三年前就被玛丽·凯瑟琳·瓦格纳·罗杰斯变得流行,那时她还不叫玫琳凯。她于1963年创立了同名化妆品系列,她的创业成功将常见的推销员格言披上了钻石、假发和大量的粉红色。她并没有发明包治百病的乳液和药水的销售——万灵油在美国生活中源远流长——但她确实将其女性化了,给了初代“女老板”第一次正面报道的机会。

Mary Kay’s rise—as relayed in speeches, company literature, and news outlets that seldom check their facts—reads like myth. A new book, however, intends to surface biography from beneath self-styled allegory: “Selling Opportunity,” by Mary Lisa Gavenas. Mary Kay sold much throughout her life, culminating in a line of products whose touted rejuvenating properties, preached by downline saleswomen numbering in the thousands, would amass her a personal fortune of ninety-eight million dollars, with her namesake company reporting $2.8 billion in revenue in 2022. But makeup paled beside the greater sell: women’s selling (for) themselves. The Mary Kay line made only a few women aside from her very rich. It left generations of others with dreams and stockpiles of unsold makeup, keeping them fed by what, in the U.S., emulates nourishment: faith in a personal success that will transcend our collective condition.

玫琳凯的发迹史——通过演讲、公司宣传资料和很少核实事实的新闻媒体传播——读起来像个神话。然而,一本新书意图从自我包装的寓言之下,浮现出真实的人生:“出售机会”,作者是玛丽·丽莎·加维纳斯。玫琳凯一生推销过很多东西,最终成就了一个产品系列,其宣传的回春功效,由成千上万的下线女销售员鼓吹,为她个人积累了九千八百万美元的财富,她同名的公司在2022年报告了28亿美元的收入。但与更大的推销相比,化妆品相形见绌:那就是女性为(代表)自己销售。玫琳凯的产品线只让除她之外的极少数女性变得非常富有。它留给几代人的是梦想和堆积如山的未售出化妆品,用在美国等同于滋养的东西喂养着她们:对一种将超越我们集体状况的个人成功的信念。

She was born in a good firmament for coming-up stories. At the dawn of the twentieth century, Texas was booming with boomtowns—Houston, say, where a hop, skip, and twenty or so miles got one to Cypress, a fountain not of oil but of hot springs. Resorts, and their sulfurous “miracle cures,” were the rage. Alex and Lula Wagner found work on the grounds of the Hot Well Hotel with hopes of hitting pay dirt. But their boom had not happened by the time their fourth child, listed in Harris County records as a “healthy white female” and later named Mary Kathlyn, arrived the night after her mother’s shift on May 12, 1918. Nor had it when Spanish influenza arrived shortly thereafter. Nor would it ever. This was one disappointment of many for the Wagners, who “never seemed to own land, never seemed to be working for themselves,” Gavenas writes. “Scheme after scheme ended with banks and business partners suing for garnishment.”

她出生在一个适合出人头地故事的好时代。二十世纪初,德克萨斯州因新兴城市而繁荣——比如休斯顿,从那里走一小段路,大约二十多英里,就能到达赛普拉斯,那里涌出的不是石油,而是温泉。度假村及其含硫的“神奇疗法”风靡一时。亚历克斯和卢拉·瓦格纳在温泉酒店找到了工作,希望能发家致富。但当他们的第四个孩子在1918年5月12日,她母亲下夜班后的那个晚上出生时,他们的暴富梦还没实现。这个孩子在哈里斯县的记录中被列为“健康的白色女性”,后来取名玛丽·凯瑟琳。不久后西班牙流感来袭时,暴富梦也没实现。而且永远也不会实现。这对瓦格纳夫妇来说,只是众多失望中的一个,他们“似乎从未拥有过土地,似乎从未为自己工作过,”加维纳斯写道。“一个又一个的计划,都以银行和商业伙伴起诉要求扣押工资而告终。”

They were the sort of working-class whites for whom race was the safety net of last resort; it meant that, when the family relocated to Houston proper, overpaying many times over for a mortgage in the Sixth Ward, its youngest member would benefit from the educational movement taking hold of the burgeoning city’s white schools. Beginning in the nineteen-twenties, millions of dollars were poured into making those schools great, with a new curriculum foregrounding civics and self-improvement. Ideal students were thought to excel “with little or no assistance from the teacher,” bolstering Houston’s renown as the seat of self-made prosperity in America. Teen-age Mary Kay was an A student, collecting distinctions in speaking and typing. When she was fourteen, her exemplary citizenship won her an American Legion School Award. She finished high school early, at sixteen, and matriculated into marriage, as was common; Mary Kay’s era, Gavenas reminds us, was seldom promising even for girls of her pluck. Women’s work inside the home, no less now than then, doesn’t pay, and women’s work outside the home hardly did. Nor would Mary Kay have made an attractive candidate for underpaid domestic work in others’ homes, “not when Houston was bursting with Mexicans, African Americans, and desperate Dust Bowl refugees,” as Gavenas phrases it. But Mary Kay did not begrudge marriage. She would later tell of grabbing her man, whom she dubbed the “Elvis Presley of Houston,” with both hands. They eloped—and on a hot, dry July day, in 1934, Mary Kathlyn Wagner became Mrs. Julius Ben Rogers. The name would not stick.

他们是那种将种族视为最后安全网的工薪阶层白人;这意味着,当全家搬到休斯顿市区,在第六区以高出许多倍的价格抵押贷款买房时,家里最小的成员将受益于在这座新兴城市白人学校中推行的教育运动。从二十世纪二十年代开始,数百万美元被投入使这些学校变得优秀,新课程强调公民意识和自我提升。理想的学生被认为能够“在很少或没有老师帮助的情况下”表现出色,这巩固了休斯顿作为美国白手起家致富之都的声誉。十几岁的玫琳凯是优等生,在演讲和打字方面屡获殊荣。十四岁时,她模范的公民表现赢得了美国军团学校奖。她十六岁提前高中毕业,然后按当时的惯例步入婚姻;加维纳斯提醒我们,玫琳凯所处的时代,即使对她这样有勇气的女孩来说,也鲜有前途。女性在家中的劳动,现在和那时一样,没有报酬,而女性在家庭之外的工作也几乎没有报酬。玫琳凯也不会成为在别人家从事低薪家务劳动的有吸引力的候选人,“休斯顿到处都是墨西哥人、非裔美国人和绝望的沙尘暴难民,”正如加维纳斯所表述的那样。但玫琳凯并不抱怨婚姻。她后来会讲述自己如何用双手抓住了她的男人,她称他为“休斯顿的埃尔维斯·普雷斯利”。他们私奔了——在1934年一个炎热干燥的七月天,玛丽·凯瑟琳·瓦格纳成了朱利叶斯·本·罗杰斯太太。这个名字没有用多久。

The nineteen-year-old Ben Rogers, whom the sixteen-year-old Mary Kay thought to be “a tremendous catch,” possessed “no property, no prospects, no savings.” That condition was little changed by marriage or the couple’s first child, born within a week of Mary Kay’s seventeenth birthday, in 1935, or their second, born the following year. In 1938, Mary Kay’s father died of a heart attack, and her husband assumed his position at the local grocery store. Rogers was no provider—he soon fled the gig. Traditional values were not allotting their promised dividends. The family needed money.

十九岁的本·罗杰斯,被十六岁的玫琳凯认为是“一个极好的结婚对象”,却“没有财产,没有前途,没有积蓄”。这种情况并没有因为婚姻或这对夫妇的第一个孩子而改变多少,孩子于1935年在玫琳凯十七岁生日后一周内出生,第二个孩子次年出生。1938年,玫琳凯的父亲死于心脏病,她的丈夫接手了他在当地杂货店的工作。罗杰斯不是养家的人——他很快就逃离了这份工作。传统价值观没有兑现它们承诺的回报。家里需要钱。

Mary Kay had tried her hand at direct, door-to-door sales before. She was once enchanted with a Depression-era racket called the “Child Psychology Bookshelf”: badly printed, seldom-used encyclopedias filled with moral tales, sold on installment plans to poor mothers wanting the best for their children. (Her network of neighbors, friends, and the congregation of the Tabernacle Baptist Church that the family attended, who later complained about the quality of what they’d been sold, was wrung dry after nine months.) After Rogers left his job at the store, husband and wife had a go at a similar scheme, shilling aluminum cookware for the company Wear-Ever Aluminum (still extant as WearEver Cookware). They employed a sales technique that would become known as the party plan, a method that worked by leveraging ideals of American domesticity: In someone’s home, a husband rhapsodizes about the company’s products—the superior taste and added nutrition of food prepared in them; the wife, meanwhile, proves at least part of that claim by cooking something right there. “Mr. and Mrs. Rogers were instructed never to use the word buy,” but, rather, “adopt, invest, place in your home,” Gavenas writes. In the event of pushback, the couple might gently tsk, “The health of your children is worth more than the price of a few miserable pots and pans.”

玫琳凯以前尝试过直接上门推销。她曾迷恋过大萧条时期一个叫“儿童心理学书架”的骗局:印刷粗糙、很少使用的百科全书,里面充满了道德故事,以分期付款的方式卖给那些希望给孩子最好东西的贫穷母亲。(她的邻居、朋友以及全家参加的会幕浸信会的会众网络,后来抱怨他们买到的东西质量太差,九个月后就被榨干了。)罗杰斯辞去商店的工作后,夫妻俩尝试了一个类似的计划,为Wear-Ever Aluminum公司(至今仍以WearEver Cookware之名存在)推销铝制炊具。他们采用了一种后来被称为“派对计划”的销售技巧,这种方法通过利用美国理想中的家庭生活来运作:在某人家里,丈夫热情洋溢地介绍公司的产品——用这些产品烹制的食物味道更好、营养更丰富;与此同时,妻子则通过当场烹饪来至少证明部分说法。“罗杰斯夫妇被教导永远不要使用‘买’这个词,”而是用“采用、投资、安置在您家中,”加维纳斯写道。如果遇到抵触,这对夫妇可能会温和地咂舌说:“您孩子的健康比几个可怜的锅碗瓢盆的价格更值钱。”

Go-getter that Mary Kay was—and that her husband wasn’t—she was soon back at it, solo this time. The iron was hot: direct-sales companies were embracing women like her, married women whose domestic situations necessitated additional and remunerative labor that would not disturb those domestic situations. (The beauty-products company Avon, an outlier, had boasted a legion of saleswomen since 1886.) Stanley Home Products welcomed women into its salesforce in 1939. Ads recruited “women with knowledge of tidy housekeeping,” dangling the promise of as much as thirty-five dollars a week in earnings. Mary Kay sent two dollars to the company and received in return a demonstration case filled with its products. It was meant to coax twenty dollars worth of orders per party they hosted. That number was still a pipe dream weeks later when, as the story goes, Mary Kay borrowed twelve dollars to hightail it to Dallas for a Stanley sales rally. The lender, a friend, thought the money would be better spent on essentials. “True, she had demonstrated no aptitude for selling,” Gavenas writes. “But Stanley sales literature assured her that didn’t matter. Gumption was what counted.” At the rally, Mary Kay watched a Corpus Christi housewife crowned Queen of Sales and awarded an alligator handbag for her efforts, and she resolved to be in her place by the following year.

玫琳凯是个进取的人——而她丈夫不是——她很快又重操旧业,这次是单干。时机正好:直销公司正在接纳像她这样的女性,那些家庭状况需要额外有偿劳动、但又不能扰乱家庭生活的已婚女性。(美容产品公司雅芳是个例外,自1886年起就拥有了一支庞大的女销售员队伍。)斯坦利家居用品公司在1939年欢迎女性加入其销售队伍。广告招募“懂得整洁持家的女性”,并承诺每周收入可高达三十五美元。玫琳凯给公司寄去两美元,收到了一个装满其产品的展示箱。这个展示箱旨在每次她们举办的派对上促成价值二十美元的订单。几周后,这个数字仍然是个白日梦,据说,玫琳凯借了十二美元,匆匆赶往达拉斯参加斯坦利的销售动员大会。借钱给她的朋友认为,这笔钱最好花在生活必需品上。“没错,她没有表现出任何销售天赋,”加维纳斯写道。“但斯坦利的销售资料向她保证,那不重要。重要的是进取心。”在动员大会上,玫琳凯看到一位科珀斯克里斯蒂的家庭主妇被加冕为“销售女王”,并因她的努力获得了一个鳄鱼皮手提包作为奖励,她下定决心要在第二年取代她的位置。

By the nineteen-forties, the rebranding of the American salesman as an independent go-getter was well under way, powered by his—and her—exclusion from New Deal labor protections. As the journalist Bridget Read writes in her shrewd and chilling “Little Bosses Everywhere: How the Pyramid Scheme Shaped America,” from 2025, direct-sales companies, faced with a safety net and minimum wage that might ameliorate conditions for workers at the executives’ expense, lobbied for the exclusion of their workforce from the Social Security Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act. Swayed, Congress agreed that the direct-selling industry, along with agriculture and domestic service, was made of not employees—to whom benefits and protections were owed—but “independent contractors,” to whom nothing was owed, not even from the entities profiting from their labor. (Today, the Direct Selling Association, formerly the N.A.A.C., still recounts this sleight-of-hand politicking as a benevolent maneuver.) Direct sales was presented as a way of taking ownership of one’s fortunes, a fashionable spin on a precarious livelihood made possible by the amalgamation of two quasi-scientific movements: the pedagogy of salesmanship, and the doctrine of positive thinking as mind cure, which promoted ideas about individuals’ ability to manifest the good life for themselves. These converging programs were espoused by, among others, an unexceptional talent named Dale Carnegie, who changed the spelling of his name to suggest affinity with the steel magnate before authoring the 1936 “How to Win Friends and Influence People,” and Napoleon Hill, a fraudster whose 1937 book, “Think and Grow Rich,” attributed the source of the wealthy’s wealth to what we might today call good vibes.

到了二十世纪四十年代,将美国推销员重塑为独立进取者的进程已全面展开,其动力来自于他们——无论男女——被排除在新政劳工保护之外。正如记者布里奇特·里德在她2025年出版的、敏锐而令人不寒而栗的《到处都是小老板:传销如何塑造美国》中所写,面对可能以高管利益为代价改善工人条件的安全网和最低工资,直销公司游说将他们的劳动力排除在《社会保障法》和《公平劳动标准法》之外。国会被说服,同意直销行业,连同农业和家政服务业,并非由应享有福利和保护的“雇员”组成,而是由“独立承包商”组成,对他们不承担任何义务,即使是那些从他们的劳动中获利的实体也不例外。(如今,直销协会,前身为N.A.A.C.,仍然将这种偷梁换柱的政治操作叙述为一种仁慈之举。)直销被呈现为一种掌控自己命运的方式,是对一种不稳定生计的时髦包装,这种生计之所以可能,得益于两种准科学运动的融合:推销术的教育学,以及作为心灵疗法的积极思考教义,后者宣扬个人有能力为自己显化美好生活的理念。这些交汇的项目得到了不少人的拥护,其中包括一个资质平平的名叫戴尔·卡内基的人,他改了名字的拼写以暗示与那位钢铁大亨有亲缘关系,随后在1936年撰写了《如何赢得朋友和影响他人》;还有拿破仑·希尔,一个骗子,他1937年的书《思考致富》将富人财富的来源归因于我们今天可能称之为“良好氛围”的东西。

Unlike Stanley’s profits, the influence of Carnegie et al. on the company’s honchos did trickle down. Dealers like Mary Kay were meant to think of themselves as being on a perpetual climb toward self-determination. Mary Kay, ever the A student, memorized self-improvement literature and company aphorisms, delivered in sermonic lessons such as “A Program of Self-Analysis,” which instructed sellers to inquire of themselves, “What’s the matter with me?” and “What’s holding me back?” Sloganeering was the lingua franca of what adherents referred to as the Stanley Opportunity. Gatherings, whether the yearly “pilgrimages” to the expansive Stanley Park headquarters in Westfield, Massachusetts, or the weekly (and mandatory) sales meetings among local dealers, were affirming sing-alongs, aimed at curating that feeling that we would now, with some skepticism, call “community.” Every touchpoint with the company gave Mary Kay the sense of a mission that was, Gavenas writes, “not about peddling toilet bowl brushes and E-Z Cleaner but about improving yourself and serving your fellow man.”

与斯坦利的利润不同,卡内基等人对公司头头们的影响确实向下渗透了。像玫琳凯这样的经销商被教导要将自己视为在不断攀登通往自我决定之路。玫琳凯,永远是优等生,熟记自我提升文献和公司格言,这些格言以布道式的课程传授,比如“自我分析计划”,它指示销售员问自己:“我有什么问题?”和“是什么在阻碍我?”口号是追随者所称的“斯坦利机会”的通用语。各种聚会,无论是每年去马萨诸塞州韦斯特菲尔德广阔的斯坦利公园总部的“朝圣”,还是当地经销商之间每周(且强制性的)销售会议,都是令人振奋的集体合唱,旨在营造那种我们现在会带着几分怀疑称之为“社群”的感觉。与公司的每一次接触都让玫琳凯感到一种使命感,加维纳斯写道,这“不是关于兜售马桶刷和E-Z清洁剂,而是关于提升自我和服务同胞。”

This gospel was not unique. The Stanley Opportunity touted but one brand of “evangelical capitalism,” Gavenas explains, “that all but ignored product information, minimized the mechanics of selling, and failed to mention monetary reward or other quantifiable goals.” As the nation steered into wartime and beyond, innumerable new companies would spring up and tailor their own version of the good word. Their products, supplements and cleaning supplies and cosmetics, inspired near-synonymous claims about health, beauty, and happiness. But, of course, the ultimate sell, the one that would carry such businesses and their offshoots through feast and especially famine, was the optimism of opportunity itself, a shot at the good life in crazy times, for sellers and customers both. And, as Mary Kay would find, the real U.S. dollars are reaped in making those parties one and the same.

这种福音并非独一无二。“斯坦利机会”鼓吹的只是“福音派资本主义”的一个品牌,加维纳斯解释说,“它几乎忽略了产品信息,最小化了销售技巧,并且没有提及金钱回报或其他可量化的目标。”随着国家驶入战时及战后,无数新公司涌现出来,量身定制它们自己的福音版本。它们的产品,补充剂、清洁用品和化妆品,引发了关于健康、美丽和幸福的几乎同义的主张。但是,当然,最终的推销,那个将支撑这些企业及其分支度过繁荣、尤其是饥荒的推销,是机会本身的乐观主义,是在疯狂时代获得美好生活的一次机会,对销售员和顾客都是如此。而且,正如玫琳凯将会发现的那样,真正的美元是在让这两方合二为一时赚到的。

Throughout the forties and fifties, Mary Kay inhaled Stanley as a life force. She got the hundred-plus product line down pat. She booked anywhere between one and four parties a day, regaling housewives with demonstrations and prizes she paid for herself (along with samples, transportation, and child care). She smilingly tilted her head and perfected pushiness without the verboten hard sell, adopting a “girlish” concern in reminding her hostess “of the social consequences of reneging.” She sang the benefits of selling, emphasizing the wife- and mother-friendly flexibility of the gig, leaving off its unrewarded drudgery. She attended sales meetings and rallies and trekked to Westfield yearly. She won the coveted title of Queen of Sales—she did not, however, receive the coveted alligator bag. The area manager had swapped the prize, one version of the story went. The disappointment did not stop Mary Kay from marrying the manager, who was also her boss, in 1946, the year after divorcing her first husband.

在整个四十年代和五十年代,玫琳凯将斯坦利作为一种生命力来汲取。她将一百多种产品线弄得滚瓜烂熟。她每天预订一到四场派对,用自己掏钱买的(还有样品、交通和育儿费用)演示和奖品来取悦家庭主妇们。她微笑着歪着头,在不使用禁忌的强行推销的情况下,练就了完美的催促技巧,用一种“少女般的”关切提醒女主人“食言会带来的社交后果”。她歌颂销售的好处,强调这份工作对妻子和母亲友好的灵活性,略去了其没有回报的苦差事。她参加销售会议和动员大会,每年长途跋涉去韦斯特菲尔德。她赢得了梦寐以求的“销售女王”称号——然而,她没有收到那个梦寐以求的鳄鱼皮包。一种说法是,区域经理调换了奖品。这次失望并没有阻止玫琳凯在1946年嫁给这位经理,他也是她的老板,那是在她与第一任丈夫离婚一年后。

The lucky and smitten man was C. B. Eckman, at fifty-five, a grandfather next to his twenty-eight-year-old bride (also a literal grandfather), with the physique and health issues to match, though he at least had a good job, as a salaried leader within the Stanley organization. Ensconced in the moneyed neighborhood of Maple Springs, Mary Kay, by then a mother of three, could hire Black help, freeing more time for Stanley and, as she spun it, better homemaking. “Being a working mother helped me to remember my priorities,” she would later say. “God first, family second, career third.” Her selling and recruiting were enhanced by her new situation, her attire zhuzhed with hats and fur. She attended Stanley-sponsored affairs on her husband’s arm, which sufficed for the sales-minded couple’s date nights. When he died of a heart attack in 1947, just shy of a year into their marriage, Mary Kay filed the will the next morning, though it was a year before the estate was discharged to her. Even then, with enough Stanley stock to be “comfortable,” her hustle did not stop.

这个幸运又痴迷的男人是C.B.埃克曼,五十五岁,在他二十八岁的新娘旁边像个祖父(实际上也确实是祖父),体格和健康问题也与之相配,不过他至少有一份好工作,是斯坦利组织内领薪水的领导。安顿在富人区枫泉后,玫琳凯,那时已是三个孩子的母亲,可以雇佣黑人帮佣,为斯坦利腾出更多时间,并且,正如她所包装的那样,能更好地持家。“做一个职业母亲帮助我记住了我的优先事项,”她后来说。“上帝第一,家庭第二,事业第三。”她的销售和招募工作因她的新处境而得到加强,她的着装用帽子和皮草点缀得更加光鲜。她挽着丈夫的手臂参加斯坦利赞助的活动,这对以销售为导向的夫妇来说,就算是约会之夜了。1947年,他因心脏病去世,距他们结婚不到一年,玫琳凯第二天早上就提交了遗嘱,尽管一年后遗产才交付给她。即使那时,拥有足够的斯坦利股票可以“舒适”生活,她的忙碌也没有停止。

Eckman is one of several husbands who disappeared in the recruitment parable the entrepreneuse made out of her life story. And fair enough—call it a woman’s prerogative to strike her men from the record. In 1952, Mary Kay left Stanley and opened territories across the U.S. for a home-décor outfit named World Gift. After her first year, her region accounted for more than half of the company’s business. She was taking home a thousand dollars a month and was soon made national training director. Along with her fourth husband, Charles Weaver, Mary Kay moved into a modern home on easy street—Houston’s Glenbrook Valley—and bought a Cadillac. (She kept both the home and the car after their divorce, in 1960.) She was finally made to pause when a hemifacial spasm landed her on the operating table for brain surgery. That got her into wearing wigs.

埃克曼是这位女企业家从自己人生故事中编织的招募寓言里消失的几位丈夫之一。这也无可厚非——可以说,将她的男人从记录中抹去是女人的特权。1952年,玫琳凯离开了斯坦利,为一家名为World Gift的家居装饰公司在美国各地开拓市场。第一年之后,她负责的区域就占了公司业务的一半以上。她每月拿回家一千美元,并很快被任命为全国培训总监。连同她的第四任丈夫查尔斯·韦弗,玫琳凯搬进了休斯顿格伦布鲁克谷富人区的一栋现代住宅,并买了一辆凯迪拉克。(1960年离婚后,她保留了房子和车。)一次半面痉挛让她躺上了脑部手术的手术台,这才终于迫使她停了下来。那件事让她开始戴假发。

In direct selling, it’s common for disgruntled talent to spin off into their own show. The products among these companies are not too unique for replication—the sell is what matters. And then there is something about the model, with profits and benefits siphoned upward, that inclines a dissatisfied person toward working harder for the promised reward; those who become skeptical, however, might see something rotten in the system and want to change it or believe that they should top the pile themselves. For Mary Kay, the latter of these rationales seems to have been clothed in the guise of the former, though the precise catalyst for establishing her own outfit remains indeterminate. According to one version of the story (a motivating hit during seventies-era recruiting for Mary Kay), she decided to leave World Gift after training a young man to be her superior in a position that had been denied to her. Gavenas, however, argues that the promotion was not at issue, but, rather, World Gift’s plan to copy the franchise model of a supplement company called Nutri-Bio, which operated according to what we would today understand to be a multilevel-marketing scheme. Mary Kay’s opposition to the scheme, if true, would be ironic, considering she was already engaged to a former national field director of Nutri-Bio, George Hallenbeck, who was laying plans for her to launch a cosmetics line in its image. (“Hallenbeck,” Gavenas writes, “represented multilevel marketing at its most grandiose.”)

在直销行业,心怀不满的人才自立门户是很常见的。这些公司之间的产品并非独一无二到无法复制——重要的是推销。而且,这种模式,随着利润和福利向上抽取,本身就倾向于让不满的人为承诺的回报更加努力地工作;然而,那些变得怀疑的人,可能会看到系统中腐烂的东西并想改变它,或者认为他们自己应该站在金字塔顶端。对玫琳凯来说,后一种理由似乎披着前一种的外衣,尽管建立她自己公司的确切催化剂仍不确定。根据故事的一个版本(七十年代玫琳凯招募时的一个激励性亮点),她在培训了一个年轻男子成为她的上司、担任一个她被拒绝的职位后,决定离开World Gift。然而,加维纳斯认为,问题不在于晋升,而在于World Gift计划复制一家名为Nutri-Bio的补充剂公司的特许经营模式,该公司按照我们今天所理解的传销计划运作。玫琳凯对该计划的反对,如果是真的,将具有讽刺意味,考虑到她已经与Nutri-Bio的前全国现场总监乔治·哈伦贝克订婚,而他正在为她制定计划,按照其形象推出一个化妆品系列。(“哈伦贝克,”加维纳斯写道,“代表了传销最浮夸的一面。”)

Hallenbeck—husband No. 5—died of a heart attack a month before Mary Kay Cosmetics was set to commence. Mary Kay pressed on, undeterred, and the company opened its doors on Friday, September 13, 1963, organized according to some version of what M.L.M. originators had dubbed the Plan. Mary Kay consultants hosted parties called beauty shows, promoting Mary Kay not merely as a series of products but as a life style activated by sharing—selling—the good word of Mary Kay. In terms of earnings, this latter messaging was crucial; as Mary Kay’s son and the company’s C.E.O., Richard Rogers, continually stressed, a consultant’s earnings would multiply as her recruits did. (One of Mary Kay’s first recruits would later write an exposé claiming that Rogers once divulged that “the real money” in Mary Kay was in recruiting, not makeup.) A consultant was, and is, urged to think of herself as a business, setting up a shop of recruits whose purchased inventory will boost her status in the eyes of the company, reflected in bonuses and sartorial milestones. (Beauty consultants who recruit at least three active distributors to their “downline” earn the honor of attiring themselves in matching red blazers; about six per cent achieve this preliminary level of status.) “Consultant,” as Read points out in “Little Bosses Everywhere,” became one of those “corporate sales-inflected euphemisms” within M.L.M.s—as did “sales.” In the world of Mary Kay, “sales” has always been an accounting of product purchased by its own sellers. How many “real customers” have ever purchased from Mary Kay? “No one actually knows,” Read writes.

哈伦贝克——第五任丈夫——在玫琳凯化妆品公司计划开业前一个月死于心脏病。玫琳凯毫不畏惧,继续推进,公司于1963年9月13日星期五开业,按照传销创始人称之为“计划”的某种版本组织起来。玫琳凯的美容顾问举办名为“美容秀”的派对,将玫琳凯不仅作为一系列产品,更作为一种通过分享——销售——玫琳凯福音而激活的生活方式来推广。在收入方面,后一种信息至关重要;正如玫琳凯的儿子兼公司首席执行官理查德·罗杰斯不断强调的那样,美容顾问的收入会随着她招募人数的增加而成倍增长。(玫琳凯最早招募的人之一后来写了一篇揭露文章,声称罗杰斯曾透露,玫琳凯的“真正钱途”在于招募,而不是化妆品。)美容顾问过去和现在都被敦促将自己视为一个企业,建立一个由招募来的人组成的店铺,这些人的进货将提升她在公司眼中的地位,反映在奖金和着装里程碑上。(招募至少三名活跃分销商加入其“下线”的美容顾问,有资格穿上配套的红色西装外套;大约百分之六的人能达到这个初步的地位级别。)正如里德在《到处都是小老板》中指出的那样,“顾问”成了传销中那些“企业销售色彩浓厚的委婉语”之一——“销售”也是如此。在玫琳凯的世界里,“销售”一直是对其销售员自己购买产品的核算。有多少“真正的顾客”曾从玫琳凯购买过产品?“实际上没人知道,”里德写道。

Gavenas occasionally veers from hagiography, usually in the form of small, critical quips, but does not linger on the uncertainty of Mary Kay’s sale numbers. She instead enumerates the accoutrements and evidence of a feminine empire—the famous pink Cadillacs awarded to top saleswomen during Seminar, a rapturous yearly conference, populated with skirted, wig-wearing acolytes—and details the company’s immense earnings, from a reported fifty-four million dollars in sales (to its own sellers) in 1978 to a hundred and sixty-seven million in 1980. “To women who had been unlucky for most of their lives, Mary Kay offered a dream that had nothing to do with rescue by a knight in shining armor, strokes of good fortune, or accidents of birth,” Gavenas writes. The fantasy the company offers has been sustained well past its founder’s death, in 2001.

加维纳斯偶尔会偏离圣徒传式的写法,通常是以小的、批评性的俏皮话形式出现,但并没有在玫琳凯销售数字的不确定性上停留。她反而列举了一个女性帝国的装饰和证据——著名的粉色凯迪拉克,在年度狂热会议“研讨会”上颁发给顶级销售女郎,会上挤满了穿着裙子、戴着假发的追随者——并详细说明了公司巨大的收入,从1978年报告的(对其自身销售员的)五千四百万美元销售额,到1980年的一亿六千七百万美元。“对于那些一生中大部分时间都不幸的女性,玫琳凯提供了一个梦想,这个梦想与白马王子的拯救、好运的眷顾或出身的偶然无关,”加维纳斯写道。该公司提供的幻想,在其创始人于2001年去世后,依然长久地维持着。

But, as the years and the profits of the company amass, how are the actual women who are working for themselves, for the company, faring? There are currently more than 2.4 million Mary Kay independent sales representatives worldwide. Gavenas cites a 1993 case study—revised in 2009—that found that consultants earn an average twenty-four hundred dollars a year. In Canada, where, unlike in the U.S., M.L.M.s are required to disclose these figures, Mary Kay consultants averaged two hundred and eleven Canadian dollars (around a hundred and fifty U.S. dollars) of annual commission in 2023. None of this accounts for what women lose—the money sunk into recruitment, into trips and parties, into child care, and into all that unsold product. In her book, Read interviews a woman named Monique who “was sitting in a room in her house . . . surrounded by Mary Kay products, boxes arranged in precarious stacks in her closets and along her walls like the skyline of a pink cardboard city.” Monique had spent a decade and seventy-five thousand dollars on Mary Kay, earning an estimated five thousand total—at best—for that trouble. “She couldn’t even use the makeup herself anymore. It had started to give her hives, her face breaking out in red splotches when anything Mary Kay hit her skin.”

但是,随着岁月的流逝和公司利润的积累,那些为自己、为公司工作的真实女性们,境况如何呢?目前全球有超过240万玫琳凯独立销售代表。加维纳斯引用了一项1993年(2009年修订)的案例研究,该研究发现美容顾问平均年收入为2400美元。在加拿大,与美国不同,传销公司被要求披露这些数字,2023年玫琳凯美容顾问的平均年佣金为211加元(约合150美元)。这些都没有算上女性损失的钱——投入到招募、旅行和派对、育儿以及所有那些未售出产品中的钱。在她的书中,里德采访了一位名叫莫妮克的女性,她“坐在自己家里的一个房间里……被玫琳凯产品包围着,盒子在她壁橱里和沿着墙壁摇摇欲坠地堆叠着,像一座粉色纸板城市的天际线。”莫妮克在玫琳凯上花了十年时间和七万五千美元,为这些麻烦最多赚了估计总共五千美元。“她自己甚至不能再使用这些化妆品了。它开始让她起荨麻疹,任何玫琳凯产品一碰到她的皮肤,她的脸就会爆出红色斑点。”

The ubiquity of the Mary Kay name begets a strange opacity. Aside from SKUs, Seminar, and pink Cadillacs—what is the product? The name Mary Kay has always struck me as matronly; in the hours of beauty influencing I have ardently or inadvertently consumed, not once have any of its products received mention. Not once have I complimented a girlfriend or stranger on their beat and heard that name returned. I can only interpret this as indicative of the line’s use, or lack thereof.

玫琳凯名字的无处不在,导致了一种奇怪的不可见性。除了库存单位、研讨会和粉色凯迪拉克——产品到底是什么?玫琳凯这个名字总让我觉得像个大妈;在我热切或不经意间消费的数小时美妆 influencer 内容中,它的任何产品从未被提及过。我从未在称赞女友或陌生人的妆容时,听到过这个名字。我只能将此解读为该产品线使用情况,或者说缺乏使用情况的体现。

Gavenas’s final chapter accelerates into the internet age and the subsequent backlash against Mary Kay, once consultants and former consultants could exchange notes at a rapid pace. These women are gadflies to Gavenas, who doesn’t take their efforts to organize against the company seriously, writing that “backlash or no, direct selling wasn’t going anywhere.” Companies modelled after Mary Kay that have reprised empowerment babble for their founders’ gain are mentioned but receive scarce judgment. (Name-checked: LuLaRoe; not name-checked: the 2021 exposé docuseries “LuLaRich.”) In the acknowledgments, Gavenas writes that she is “neither pro nor con” on the topic of multilevel marketing. But don’t we know by now that neutrality on the topic of empire, even one drenched in pink, amounts to endorsement? “As the company celebrated its sixtieth year,” in 2023, “women in the U.S. averaged eighty-two cents for every dollar earned by men,” Gavenas concludes. What an inculpatory linking of clauses. ♦

加维纳斯的最后一章加速进入了互联网时代以及随后对玫琳凯的抵制,那时美容顾问和前美容顾问可以快速地交流信息。这些女性对加维纳斯来说是讨厌的家伙,她没有认真对待她们组织起来反对公司的努力,写道“不管有没有抵制,直销都不会消失。”那些效仿玫琳凯、为了创始人的利益而重复赋权空话的公司被提及,但几乎没有受到评判。(点名了:LuLaRoe;未点名:2021年的揭露性纪录片系列《LuLaRich》。)在致谢中,加维纳斯写道,她对传销这个话题“既不支持也不反对”。但我们现在难道还不知道,对帝国——即使是一个浸透了粉红色的帝国——保持中立,就等于认可吗?“在公司庆祝其六十周年之际,”在2023年,“美国女性的平均收入仅为男性每赚一美元的八十二美分,”加维纳斯总结道。这是多么能说明问题的分句连接啊。♦

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