Q. & A.

How Israel Used the War in Gaza to Accelerate Settlements in the West Bank

以色列如何利用加沙战争加速西岸定居点扩张
The Netanyahu government is pushing expansionist policies, while America looks the other way.
内塔尼亚胡政府正推行扩张主义政策,而美国对此视而不见。
A person moving a mattress near a disassembled home.
Photograph by Mahmoud Illean / AP

In the past several years, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has entrenched Israeli control of the West Bank, vastly increasing the number of “authorized” settlements and unauthorized outposts there. Violence against Palestinians in the West Bank has also increased, and more than a thousand people have been killed since October 7th, per the United Nations. President Donald Trump has half-heartedly warned the Netanyahu government against formally annexing the territory, but Netanyahu appears to believe that he can continue his expansionist policies without American sanction. Indeed, just over two weeks ago, the Trump Administration announced—via its Embassy in Jerusalem—that it would offer temporary passport services at two Israeli settlements in the West Bank to any U.S. citizens there.

过去几年,以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡巩固了对约旦河西岸的控制,大幅增加了该地区“经批准”的定居点和未经批准的哨站。联合国数据显示,自去年10月7日以来,约旦河西岸针对巴勒斯坦人的暴力事件也在增加,已有逾千人丧生。美国总统唐纳德·特朗普曾半心半意地警告内塔尼亚胡政府不要正式吞并该领土,但内塔尼亚胡似乎认为,即使没有美国的认可,他也能继续推行扩张政策。事实上,就在两周多前,特朗普政府通过其驻耶路撒冷大使馆宣布,将为约旦河西岸两个以色列定居点的任何美国公民提供临时护照服务。

To understand what is happening in the West Bank, I recently spoke by phone with Yehuda Shaul, a co-founder of Ofek: the Israeli Center for Public Affairs, an independent think tank based in Jerusalem; Shaul also co-founded Breaking the Silence, an organization of former Israeli soldiers which aims to spotlight life in Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed how the Israeli government exerts control over the West Bank, the merging of the settler movement and the military, and how October 7th and the war in Gaza accelerated settlement expansion in the West Bank.

为了解约旦河西岸正在发生什么,我最近通过电话采访了耶胡达·绍尔(Yehuda Shaul)。他是耶路撒冷独立智库“奥菲克:以色列公共事务中心”的联合创始人,也曾参与创立“打破沉默”组织——该组织由以色列退伍军人组成,旨在揭露以色列占领下巴勒斯坦领土的真实生活状况。以下是我们经过编辑整理的对话内容,探讨了以色列政府如何控制约旦河西岸、定居者运动与军队的合流,以及10月7日事件与加沙战争如何加速了西岸定居点的扩张。

Do you think that what’s been happening in the West Bank in the past several months is noticeably different from the past several decades?

你是否认为,过去几个月约旦河西岸发生的情况,与过去几十年相比,有着显著的不同?

I think a lot of what we see now is a continuation and an evolution of what we’ve seen for decades. But there are also parts of what we see now that are more revolutionary than evolutionary. The bottom line is that what we’ve been seeing is an acceleration of annexation at a significant pace, in a context where it is openly stated that the purpose is to bury the possibility of a future Palestinian state beside Israel.

我认为,我们如今目睹的许多现象,是过去数十年趋势的延续与演变。但其中也有一部分,与其说是演变,不如说更具革命性。关键在于,我们所见的是兼并进程的显著加速——而这一进程的背景,是有人公开宣称其目的在于彻底埋葬未来巴勒斯坦国与以色列并存的可能。

We see the massive acceleration of the policy of ethnic cleansing in the West Bank that goes beyond the forcible transfer of Palestinian communities to Israeli settlers. The goal in the West Bank is to create a homogenous ethnicity in a space that is being cleansed of Palestinians, and to expand the Israeli footprint there. That’s why I call it ethnic cleansing, and I don’t use this term lightly.

我们看到约旦河西岸的种族清洗政策正在急剧加速,其程度已远超将巴勒斯坦社区强行迁离、让以色列定居者占据土地的行为。在约旦河西岸,目标是在一片被“净化”掉巴勒斯坦人的土地上建立单一民族聚居区,并扩大以色列在那里的存在范围。这就是我称之为种族清洗的原因——我绝非轻率地使用这个词。

We see an attempt at confining the Palestinian population to smaller and smaller patches of land. About fifteen years ago, Israelis launched this campaign called the Battle for Area C. They’re trying to take over the roughly sixty per cent of the West Bank that is designated Area C under the Oslo Accords, and squeeze Palestinians into a hundred and sixty-five enclaves of Area A and B. I think, at this point, we have gone way beyond that. And it’s not just about cleansing Area C; it’s about taking over the entire open space and squeezing Palestinians not just to A and B but to the built-up areas of A and B, to the urban centers. So we’re kind of undoing Oslo.

我们看到一种企图,试图将巴勒斯坦人口限制在越来越小的土地上。大约十五年前,以色列人发起了一场名为“C区争夺战”的行动。他们试图接管根据《奥斯陆协议》被划为C区、约占约旦河西岸百分之六十的土地,并将巴勒斯坦人挤压到一百六十五个A区和B区的飞地中。我认为,目前我们已经远远超出了这个阶段。这不仅仅是清除C区的问题;而是接管整个开阔地带,将巴勒斯坦人不仅挤压到A区和B区,更是挤压到A区和B区的建成区、挤压到城市中心。所以我们某种程度上正在瓦解《奥斯陆协议》。

Can you talk about what the Oslo Accords envisioned for the West Bank and why the different areas are important?

《奥斯陆协议》为约旦河西岸规划了怎样的未来?为何不同区域如此重要? 1993年签署的《奥斯陆协议》构想了一个渐进式的权力移交过程,旨在五年内实现巴勒斯坦有限自治,并最终解决耶路撒冷地位、难民回归、犹太人定居点等核心问题。协议将西岸划分为三个行政区域: A区(约占18%)由巴勒斯坦民族权力机构完全控制民事与安全事务,涵盖拉马拉、杰里科等主要巴勒斯坦城市; B区(约占22%)由巴方管理民事,但以色列与巴方共同负责安全; C区(约占60%)则完全由以色列控制民事与安全,这片区域包含所有犹太人定居点、军事基地及连接各定居点的战略道路网络。 这种划分的深层矛盾在于:C区不仅占据西岸大部分土地与自然资源,其星罗棋布的定居点与道路系统更将巴勒斯坦社区切割成200多个分散的“孤岛”。而A区虽拥有自治表象,实则被C区形成的包围网所困——正如巴勒斯坦学者形容的“瑞士奶酪模型”,黄色奶酪(以色列控制区)包裹着无数空洞(巴勒斯坦聚居区)。这种地理碎片化使巴勒斯坦国建国的领土连续性成为幻影,也成为后续冲突频发的结构性根源。

The idea of Oslo was that we don’t jump from zero to a hundred, but we have an interim agreement, over five years, where parts of the West Bank would become Area A, where the Palestinian Authority, which was created by Oslo, would manage internal security and civic affairs. Area A mainly included the big population centers. Parts would become Area B, where the Palestinian Authority would manage civilian affairs, while sharing internal security with Israeli forces. And then parts would become Area C, which would remain under the complete control of Israel until a final status agreement. The accords intended that the majority of the West Bank would become A and B. The way things turned out is that about sixty per cent of the West Bank remained Area C. So most of the open space in the West Bank, the main highways and corridors, and, of course, many of the settlements, have remained under complete Israeli administration. And it’s estimated that more than three hundred thousand Palestinians live there.

奥斯陆协议的理念在于,我们不从零直接跨越到一百,而是通过一项为期五年的过渡协议,将约旦河西岸部分地区划为A区——由奥斯陆协议创立的巴勒斯坦权力机构负责内部安全与民事管理。A区主要涵盖人口稠密的大型聚居区。部分地区划为B区,由巴勒斯坦权力机构管理民事事务,并与以色列军队共同承担内部安全责任。其余部分则成为C区,在最终地位协议达成前完全由以色列控制。协议原本设想西岸大部分土地将归属A区和B区。但现实演变的结果是,约百分之六十的西岸土地仍属于C区。这意味着西岸大部分开阔地带、主要公路与通道,当然还包括众多定居点,至今仍处于以色列的完全管辖之下。据估算,有超过三十万巴勒斯坦人生活在这片区域。

For many years, the Israeli government has been attempting to cleanse Area C of Palestinians. One way of doing this is to not give them building permits. About ninety-eight per cent of building requests by Palestinians in the area are denied. So Palestinians build “illegally.” Since 1988, the Israeli government has issued more than twenty-two thousand demolition orders, according to its own data, with around a thousand issued annually in recent years. But it is really the sharp escalation in settler violence in the past five or so years that has ultimately led to the displacement of a large number of Palestinian communities. We’re talking about more than sixty Palestinian herding-and-farming communities across the West Bank being forcibly displaced by settlers, according to Peace Now and Kerem Navot, because of settler violence in the past several years, mainly after October 7th.

多年来,以色列政府一直试图将C区的巴勒斯坦人清除出去。手段之一就是拒绝向他们发放建筑许可。该地区巴勒斯坦人提交的建筑申请中,约98%遭到拒绝。于是巴勒斯坦人只能“非法”建造。根据以色列政府自己的数据,自1988年以来,已发出超过2.2万份拆除令,近年来每年约发出1000份。但真正导致大量巴勒斯坦社区流离失所的,其实是过去五年左右定居者暴力行为的急剧升级。根据“即刻和平”与“葡萄园守望者”组织的统计,过去几年(主要是10月7日之后)由于定居者暴力,约旦河西岸超过60个巴勒斯坦农牧社区被强行驱逐。

So you see a continuity of the policy of the past thirty years, but you also have a break with the policy. This is where it’s important to understand that these settlements are a government-led program. From the mid-nineteen-nineties, more or less, Israel had formally approved and established only a handful of settlements through 2022. This government came to power in December of 2022. From 2023 to 2025, the Israeli government approved nearly seventy settlements.

由此可见,你既能看到过去三十年政策的延续性,也能看到政策的断裂。关键在于要理解这些定居点建设是政府主导的计划。大致从九十年代中期到2022年,以色列正式批准建立的定居点屈指可数。而本届政府于2022年12月上台后,从2023年到2025年间,以色列政府批准了近七十个定居点。

Then, from the early nineties through 2022 the Israeli government largely supported the establishment of a hundred and eighty-seven unauthorized outposts. These are settlements which are built even in violation of Israeli planning regulations, but, again, the vast majority of them are fully supported by the government. Under the current government, since 2022, we had about a hundred and eighty of them being built, according to Peace Now. We’re talking about a peak in the advancement of housing units in the West Bank. We’re talking about a peak of demolitions of Palestinian communities, Palestinian housing structures. We’re talking about a peak in so-called declarations of state land by Israel since Oslo. When the U.N. started tabulating settler violence in 2006, it recorded a hundred and seventeen incidents of settler violence against Palestinians that caused casualties and/or damaged property. In 2018, there were more than three hundred. In 2022, there was a new peak of more than eight hundred. In 2025 alone, we’re talking about 1,828 incidents. That is more than a tenfold increase. So, is settler violence new? No, but we are at a peak, and at a certain point quantity becomes quality.

接着,从九十年代初到2022年,以色列政府基本支持建立了187个未经授权的定居点。这些定居点甚至违反了以色列的规划法规,但同样,其中绝大多数都得到了政府的全力支持。根据“即刻和平”组织的数据,自2022年现任政府上台以来,约有180个此类定居点被建造。我们谈论的是西岸住房单元推进的高峰期。我们谈论的是巴勒斯坦社区、巴勒斯坦房屋建筑被拆除的高峰期。我们谈论的是自《奥斯陆协议》以来以色列所谓“国有土地”声明的高峰期。联合国自2006年开始统计定居者暴力事件时,记录了117起造成伤亡和/或财产损失的定居者暴力事件。2018年超过300起。2022年达到超过800起的新高峰。仅2025年就有1828起事件。这是超过十倍的增幅。那么,定居者暴力是新现象吗?不是,但我们正处于高峰,而量变终将引发质变。

Putting aside morality and international law for a second, how much of what is being done by the Israeli government is in line with Israeli domestic law? And how much of this is done separately?

暂且抛开道德和国际法不谈,以色列政府当前的行为有多少是符合其国内法的?又有多少是在法律框架之外单独进行的?

Even the majority of what is done “outside of the law” is orchestrated and supported by Israeli institutions and by the state. When we talk about a hundred and eighty outposts being built, most of them are herding farms, where you take over a hilltop. These are often one family, two families, max, with ten or fifteen youngsters. They are small numbers of people taking a huge amount of land. And you go over and basically beat Palestinian farmers and shepherds off their land. And, today, large parts of the West Bank are inaccessible to Palestinians because of violence from settlers living in these herding farms. The scale of this is like nothing else since the 1967 war.

即便是那些“法外”行径,绝大多数也是由以色列的机构和国家在背后策划与支持。当我们谈论一百八十个前哨站正在兴建时,其中大部分是畜牧农场——占领一个山头就建一个。这些据点通常只有一两户人家,最多加上十来个年轻人。寥寥数人却占据着大片土地。他们过去基本上就是靠殴打巴勒斯坦农民和牧民来抢夺土地。如今,由于这些畜牧农场定居者的暴力行为,约旦河西岸大片区域已对巴勒斯坦人关闭。自1967年战争以来,这种规模的侵占行动是前所未有的。

Now, you can say these settlements are not officially sanctioned, but people show up on a hilltop and quickly acquire a paved road, running water, electricity in a house, and three hundred cows. Someone pays for this, someone builds the infrastructure. And that someone is often the settlement division of Israel’s World Zionist Organization, which is helping manage the so-called state land of Israel and the West Bank, and which was given responsibility by the state for the settlement enterprise that functions with a hundred per cent Israeli-government funding. So is this outside of the law?

你可以说这些定居点并非官方授权,但当人们出现在山丘上,转眼间就拥有了铺设好的道路、自来水、通电的房屋和三百头奶牛时——总有人为此买单,总有人在建设这些基础设施。而那个“总有人”往往就是以色列世界犹太复国主义组织的定居点事务部,该部门协助管理着所谓以色列与约旦河西岸的“国有土地”,并被国家赋予了管理定居点项目的职责,而这些项目百分之百由以色列政府提供资金。那么,这真的在法律框架之外吗?

Then, we just had the Cabinet decide to restart the so-called Settlement of Land Title registration process in the West Bank, which had been halted in 1968, and which raises the bar for Palestinians to establish ownership over land. This puts the burden of proof on Palestinians to show original documents from the Jordanian, British, and Ottoman times, and any parcel which is not proved private likely becomes public and goes to the state. We’re talking about sixty per cent of Area C that is now up for grabs because of this process. The Cabinet also gave an order to allow Israel to work against construction in areas A and B on the basis of environmental, archeological, or water-access concerns. Again, this is formal and official.

随后,内阁刚刚决定重启所谓的西岸土地产权登记程序——该程序自1968年起便已中止,此举提高了巴勒斯坦人确立土地所有权的门槛。巴勒斯坦人现在需要承担举证责任,必须出示约旦、英国和奥斯曼时期的原始文件;任何无法证明为私有的地块都可能转为公有,收归国有。通过这一程序,C区约60%的土地将面临被攫取的风险。内阁还下令允许以色列以环境、考古或水源保护为由,阻止A区和B区的建设活动。同样,这是正式且官方的决定。

You mentioned how much of this is happening openly and being stated forthrightly by the government. How different is that from when settlements grew in the years after Oslo?

你提到这些扩张行动大多是公开进行,且政府直言不讳。这与奥斯陆协议后那些年定居点扩张的情况有何不同?

Well, there is another element that is revolutionary, which is the scale of the extension of Israeli civilian state authorities into the West Bank. This is an act of annexation, with certain powers over civilian affairs in the West Bank being taken away from the military and given to what is called the Settlements Administration, a civilian-led force within the Ministry of Defense, under the control of the Finance Minister, Bezalel Smotrich. So you basically have the civilian authority of Israel in direct control over the West Bank, expanding settlements. That is also a revolutionary element. And you have an Israeli government whose guidelines, from December, 2022, are basically saying that the Jewish people have an exclusive and indisputable right to all the land of Israel. So, yes, we have a government that is not only saying the quiet part out loud but is actually bragging about it. That’s also something that the political conditions didn’t allow to happen in the nineties and the early two-thousands but which is happening today.

此外,还有一个革命性的因素,那就是以色列民政机构在约旦河西岸的扩张规模。这是一种吞并行为——以色列将西岸部分民事事务管辖权从军方手中剥离,转交给所谓的“定居点管理局”。这个机构隶属国防部,由文职人员领导,实际受财政部长贝扎莱尔·斯莫特里赫掌控。如此一来,以色列的民政机构实质上直接控制了约旦河西岸,并持续扩张定居点。这同样具有革命性意义。再看以色列政府,其2022年12月颁布的指导方针基本宣告犹太民族对以色列全境拥有独占且无可争辩的权利。是的,我们面对的政府不仅把潜台词公开宣之于口,甚至为此洋洋自得。这种情形在九十年代和二十一世纪初的政治环境下绝无可能发生,如今却成为现实。

How would you describe the violence against Palestinians that’s been happening, over the past year or so, from both Israeli soldiers and settlers, and how has their sense of impunity changed or not changed?

你如何描述过去一年左右以色列士兵和定居者对巴勒斯坦人实施的暴力,以及他们的有罪不罚感发生了怎样的变化,或者没有变化?

There is complete impunity for settlers committing violence against Palestinians, but we’ve seen a development here, which is the development inside the I.D.F. It used to be that, for many, many years, we would see clips of settlers attacking Palestinians while I.D.F. soldiers stood idly by, doing nothing to stop it. Now, it’s important for you to understand that doing nothing in that scenario is O.K. When I say “O.K.,” I don’t mean morally O.K. I mean “O.K.” according to the rules of the I.D.F. The orders I received as a soldier, and the orders many soldiers receive on the ground, define our job in the West Bank as protecting the settlers, not the Palestinians. When we saw settlers attacking Palestinians, it wasn’t our job to intervene. That was the job of the Israeli police. So standing idly by while Palestinians are being beaten up by settlers is actually soldiers following orders.

定居者对巴勒斯坦人施暴可以完全不受惩罚,但这里出现了一个新动向——以色列国防军内部的变化。过去很多很多年里,我们经常看到这样的画面:定居者袭击巴勒斯坦人,而以色列国防军士兵袖手旁观,不加制止。现在需要理解的是,在这种情境下不作为是“可以”的。我说的“可以”不是指道德上可以,而是指根据以色列国防军的规定“可以”。我当兵时接到的命令,以及许多前线士兵收到的命令,都明确我们在约旦河西岸的职责是保护定居者,而非巴勒斯坦人。当我们看到定居者袭击巴勒斯坦人时,干预不是我们的任务。那是以色列警察的职责。所以,当巴勒斯坦人被定居者殴打时士兵袖手旁观,实际上是在执行命令。

And, again, this is where it gets very difficult to say “the state is involved” or “the state is not involved.” If the official order of soldiers on the ground is that your job is not to protect Palestinians, how do you make that call? But we’re not there anymore.

同样地,这里又很难简单断言“国家介入”或“国家未介入”。如果地面部队接到的正式命令是不保护巴勒斯坦人,士兵该如何抉择?但我们已经不在那个情境里了。

Several years ago, we started moving into a phase where, every once in a while, we would see soldiers joining the settlers and attacking Palestinians. And that is partially because, sometimes, the settlers in the videos were also soldiers on a weekend leave. Let’s say you come back to your house in the outpost, on a Saturday afternoon, and your neighbors are going down to beat up the Palestinian community below you. So you take your gun and you join the crowd, while still half dressed in your I.D.F. uniform. This is one example of how it happens.

几年前,我们开始进入这样一个阶段:时不时就会看到士兵加入定居者行列,袭击巴勒斯坦人。部分原因在于,有时视频里的定居者本身就是周末休假的士兵。想象一下:某个周六下午,你回到前哨站的家中,邻居们正要去山下殴打巴勒斯坦社区的人。于是你拿起枪加入人群,身上还半穿着以色列国防军的制服。这就是此类事件发生的典型场景。

Then, after October 7th, things completely, fundamentally changed. In a full-scale war, which was Israel’s situation after October 7th, the military is structured to send the best-equipped, best-trained units, which are the conscripts, to the front lines. And, in this case, after October 7th, the front lines were Lebanon and Gaza. So who stays in the West Bank? Reservists. Some of them are regular reserve units, but some of them are specific reserve units called regional-defense battalions, and there are regional brigades in the West Bank that have regional-defense battalions under them, which are units made up mostly of settlers. So we had more than five and a half thousand settlers mobilized into reserve units.

然而,10月7日之后,情况发生了彻底的根本性转变。在全面战争中——这正是以色列在10月7日后所处的状态——军队的部署结构会将装备最精良、训练最有素的义务兵部队派往前线。而在此次事件中,10月7日后的前线正是黎巴嫩和加沙地带。那么,谁留守约旦河西岸呢?预备役士兵。其中部分是常规预备役部队,但另一些则是被称为“区域防御营”的特设预备役单位——约旦河西岸的地区旅麾下编制着此类主要由定居者组成的区域防御营。最终,我们见证了超过五千五百名定居者被动员加入预备役部队。

So, if you are a Palestinian who was being beaten up by the settler who lives in an outpost above you, the same settler who has been trying to displace you for years, suddenly October 7th happened, and that settler is now part of the regional-defense battalion and has been issued a uniform and a gun. He is now the military. So when, in the middle of the night, he enters your house, puts you on the floor, beats you up, puts a gun to your head, and says, “You have forty-eight hours to leave. If not, we’re going to shoot you,” you leave. So, since October 7th, there has not been even a pretense of a buffer between the violent settlers and the Army. It’s the same people.

所以,如果你是一名巴勒斯坦人,多年来一直遭受住在你上方前哨站定居者的殴打和驱逐威胁,而10月7日事件发生后,那个定居者突然成了地区防御营的成员,领到了军装和枪支。他现在就是军队。于是当他在深夜闯入你家,把你按在地上殴打,用枪抵着你的头说“给你48小时滚蛋,否则就毙了你”时,你只能离开。自10月7日以来,暴力定居者与军队之间连表面的缓冲都已不复存在——他们根本就是同一批人。

It’s interesting you say that, because my next question for you was going to be how you think October 7th and the war in Gaza changed the political context of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. And I thought you were going to talk about Israeli public opinion, or the evolving aims of the Israeli government, but the degree to which the facts on the ground have changed on a practical level is striking.

你提到这一点很有意思,因为我接下来正想问:你认为10月7日事件和加沙战争如何改变了约旦河西岸以色列定居点的政治语境。我原以为你会谈及以色列民意或政府目标的演变,但现实层面发生的变化程度确实令人震惊。

In this way, yes. But October 7th also contributed to this by raising the bar of what level of violence is considered acceptable in the West Bank. The West Bank has always been behind Gaza, but, when the Israeli government’s behavior in Gaza went as far as it did, things changed in the West Bank, too. You can see it with the forcible transfer and displacement of some thirty-two thousand Palestinian refugees in the refugee camps in the northern part of the West Bank after October 7th. You see it with the mass destruction of agricultural areas. Thousands of olive trees were uprooted last year, and the Central Command general Avi Bluth made clear that the intention was collective punishment, even though the military denies this. The Israeli government’s aim is for every Palestinian community to know that, if there is an attack by someone in their community, they’re all going to pay the price.

从这个意义上说,确实如此。但10月7日事件也推高了约旦河西岸暴力行为的可接受门槛,加剧了这种趋势。约旦河西岸的局势一直比加沙地带缓和,但当以色列政府在加沙的行为达到如此程度时,西岸的情况也发生了变化。你可以看到,10月7日之后,约旦河西岸北部难民营中约有3.2万名巴勒斯坦难民遭到强制迁移和流离失所。你可以看到农业区遭到大规模破坏——去年有数千棵橄榄树被连根拔起,尽管军方予以否认,但中央司令部司令阿维·布卢特明确表示其意图是集体惩罚。以色列政府的目标是让每个巴勒斯坦社区都明白,如果社区中有人发动袭击,整个社区都将付出代价。

But did the openness of the Israeli government to talking about their aims in the West Bank change?

但以色列政府对于讨论其在约旦河西岸目标的开放态度,是否有所改变呢?

Some of that was already in the open before October 7th. It started when the current government was formed, in late 2022. But what October 7th did was create the political possibility that the most extreme version of settlements, which had been on the shelf for many years, could be accelerated and pushed past the finish line.

早在10月7日之前,部分迹象就已显露。这一切始于2022年底现任政府组建之时。但10月7日事件带来的政治契机在于,那些搁置多年的最极端定居点方案,如今可能加速推进并最终落地。

One example of this was targeting UNRWA, the U.N. Palestinian-relief agency created after 1948. Before October 7th, it had actually been the Israeli establishment that was defending UNRWA, not because they love it but because there was no alternative. But then October 7th happens, and the government can push its plan to dismantle UNRWA, at least partially, past the finish line. The same process happened with the government’s attempt to dismantle the Palestinian Authority in order to kill and bury the hope for Palestinian self-determination.

其中一个例子是针对联合国近东巴勒斯坦难民救济和工程处(UNRWA)的行动。这个联合国巴勒斯坦援助机构成立于1948年后。在10月7日之前,实际上是以色列当局在维护该机构——并非出于喜爱,而是因为没有替代选择。但10月7日事件发生后,政府得以推动其至少部分瓦解该机构的计划越过终点线。同样的过程也发生在政府试图瓦解巴勒斯坦权力机构的行动中,其目的是扼杀并埋葬巴勒斯坦自治的希望。

What plan do you think the current Israeli government wants to implement in the West Bank? It seems like, in the short to medium term, its plan is to force Palestinians to congregate in smaller and smaller, mostly urban areas of the West Bank.

我认为,当前以色列政府的计划似乎是,在中短期内,迫使巴勒斯坦人聚集在西岸越来越小的、主要是城市的区域。

Yeah, exactly. It’s about confining a growing demographic, pushing the Palestinian population into shrinking patches of land, and basically taking over all the open spaces, while, in parallel, expanding the Israeli-settler footprint. This tells me that we have learned nothing since October 7th, because these conditions are actually the conditions that cause instability, conflict, and violence. Smotrich recently said that they need to start encouraging “voluntary migration” from Gaza. I think that hints at where this is going.

没错,正是如此。这关乎围困一个不断增长的人口群体,将巴勒斯坦人驱赶到日益缩小的土地上,同时实质上接管所有开放空间,并同步扩张以色列定居者的势力范围。这让我感到,自10月7日以来我们毫无长进,因为这些条件恰恰是滋生动荡、冲突与暴力的土壤。斯莫特里赫最近声称,他们需要开始鼓励加沙地带的“自愿迁移”。我想这暗示了事态的发展方向。

For me, the issue is very simple. This idea of squeezing a growing demographic of people into a shrinking territory with the belief that technological superiority will allow you permanent domination is the bubble that exploded on October 7th. If anyone wants to prevent another October 7th, if anyone wants to protect and defend the lives of Israelis and Palestinians, then you must give Palestinians freedom. The security of Jewish self-determination is interlinked and intertwined with achieving Palestinian self-determination. And what’s happening in the West Bank on a daily basis is eroding this possibility. So we are basically heading toward escalation and increasing conflict. ♦

于我而言,问题再简单不过。将日益增长的人口挤压进日渐缩小的领土,却相信技术优势能带来永久统治——这种幻想已在10月7日破灭。若有人想避免下一个10月7日,若有人想守护以色列人与巴勒斯坦人的生命,就必须给予巴勒斯坦人自由。犹太民族自决权的安全保障,与实现巴勒斯坦民族自决权本就相互交织。而约旦河西岸每日上演的现实,正在侵蚀这种可能性。我们正无可避免地滑向冲突升级的深渊。♦

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