The Lede

How High-Powered Lasers Became Part of Donald Trump’s Border-Security Complex

高能激光如何成为特朗普边境安保体系的一部分
The funding debate in Congress is over immigration-enforcement practices, but the Administration is still spending unprecedented sums on military-grade equipment at the southern border.
国会围绕移民执法政策的拨款争论仍在继续,但政府仍在美墨边境投入前所未有的资金购置军用级别装备。
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Illustration by Adam Maida; Source photograph from Getty

Veronica Escobar, a four-term House member from Texas, went to bed early on February 10th. She represents Texas’s Sixteenth Congressional District, which includes most of El Paso, and serves on the House Appropriations Committee; the following morning, she was scheduled to attend a subcommittee hearing on the possible impacts of the then looming government shutdown on the Department of Homeland Security, and she wanted to get a good night’s rest. Around 11 P.M., Escobar was startled awake by a phone call. “My immediate concern is, ‘Is it my kids? Is it my mom? Has something happened?’ ” she recalled. It turned out to be something even more unexpected: an air-traffic controller from El Paso was calling to alert her that the Federal Aviation Administration had ordered the near-immediate closure of the region’s entire airspace for ten days—a move effectively unprecedented in the country since 9/11.

德克萨斯州联邦众议员维罗妮卡·埃斯科瓦尔(Veronica Escobar)在2月10日早早睡下了。她代表德克萨斯州第十六国会选区,该选区包括埃尔帕索市的大部分地区;她还在众议院拨款委员会任职。第二天上午,她计划参加一场小组委员会听证会,讨论当时迫在眉睫的政府停摆可能对国土安全部造成的影响,因此想好好休息一晚。晚上11点左右,埃斯科瓦尔被一通电话惊醒。“我第一反应是,'是不是我的孩子?是不是我母亲?出什么事了?'”她回忆道。结果却更出人意料:埃尔帕索的一位空中交通管制员来电提醒她,联邦航空管理局已下令几乎立即关闭该地区整个空域,为期十天——这是自9·11事件以来美国实际上前所未有的举措。

Escobar began calling her leadership team, and other officials in Texas and in the federal government. “There were just a million questions swimming through my mind,” she told me. Her first thought was that perhaps President Donald Trump and Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of Defense, had decided to bomb cartel targets in the city of Juárez, across the border from El Paso—something that various Administration officials, including the President, had been threatening to do for months. “If my community was about to be put in harm’s way,” Escobar said, “we had very little time to act.”

埃斯科瓦尔开始给她的领导团队打电话,也给得州和联邦政府的其他官员打电话。“我脑子里有无数个问题在打转,”她告诉我。她的第一个念头是,也许是唐纳德·特朗普总统和国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯决定轰炸边境对面华雷斯市的贩毒集团目标——包括总统在内的多位政府官员几个月来一直在威胁要这么做。“如果我的社区即将陷入危险,”埃斯科瓦尔说,“我们采取行动的时间就非常有限了。”

But each conversation that night was more baffling than the last; no one seemed to know what was happening. “I began thinking, I don’t think that we are at risk—I don’t think there’s anything for the community to be afraid of,” she said. “Phone call after phone call, there’s one word that kept coming to the surface in my brain, and that was ‘incompetence.’ ”

但当晚的每一次交谈都比上一次更令人困惑;似乎没人知道发生了什么。“我开始想,我认为我们没有危险——我认为社区没什么好害怕的,”她说。“一通又一通电话里,有个词不断在我脑海中浮现,那就是'无能'。”

The Pentagon, she soon learned, had lent Customs and Border Protection a high-energy laser, which the military had been developing to counter aerial drones. Without notifying the F.A.A., the agency had used it to shoot down what it suspected was a cartel drone smuggling drugs across the border. Instead, the target turned out to be a drifting party balloon. The F.A.A., fearing for civilian aircraft, had ordered the airspace closed. By morning, the closure had been lifted, but El Paso residents were now calling Escobar with panicked questions of their own: Should we flee? Are we at risk?

她很快得知,五角大楼曾借给海关与边境保护局一台高能激光器——军方原本开发这种设备是为了对抗无人机。该机构未经联邦航空管理局批准,便用它击落了一架疑似贩毒集团用于跨境走私毒品的无人机。结果,目标竟是一只飘荡的派对气球。联邦航空管理局出于对民用航空安全的担忧,下令关闭了该空域。到清晨时分,空域管制虽已解除,但埃尔帕索的居民们正带着恐慌的疑问致电埃斯科瓦尔:我们该逃离吗?我们身处险境吗?

For anyone who has followed border security during the past two decades, a controversial shooting by C.B.P. is hardly surprising—in at least six incidents documented by the A.C.L.U. since 2010, Border Patrol agents have fired across the border, killing people in Mexico, including a father barbecuing in a park with his family, and a sixteen-year-old who was shot in the back eight times after someone on his side of the border fence allegedly threw rocks at an agent. But a high-energy laser used to target drones was new. While much attention has focussed on D.H.S.’s urban enforcement efforts, in cities like Chicago and Minneapolis, Trump and Republican congressional leaders have also turbocharged security investments along the nation’s northern and southern borders, delivering new weaponry, technologies, and infrastructure, including dozens of miles of new border wall, a first-term promise of Trump’s that, contrary to his long-standing campaign pledges, is now being fully paid for by U.S. taxpayers.

对于过去二十年关注边境安全的人来说,美国海关与边境保护局(C.B.P.)的争议枪击事件并不令人意外——根据美国公民自由联盟(A.C.L.U.)自2010年以来记录的至少六起事件,边境巡逻队特工曾跨境开火,导致墨西哥境内多人死亡,其中包括一位在公园与家人烧烤的父亲,以及一名背部连中八枪的十六岁少年(据称当时边境围栏另一侧有人向特工投掷石块)。但用于追踪无人机的高能激光却是新鲜事物。尽管公众注意力多聚焦于国土安全部(D.H.S.)在芝加哥、明尼阿波利斯等城市的执法行动,特朗普与共和党国会领袖同时也在加速推进美国南北边境的安全投资,配备了新型武器、技术及基础设施——其中包含数十英里的新建边境墙。这项特朗普第一任期内的承诺,虽与其长期竞选誓言相悖,如今正由美国纳税人全额买单。

The numbers are staggering. Altogether, the so-called Procurement, Construction, and Improvements budget for C.B.P. totals some fifty-three billion dollars for the current fiscal year, with another twenty billion dollars available in its “operations and support” budget—a major increase from the roughly three billion dollars that the agency had been spending annually on construction in recent years. Indeed, that fifty-three-billion-dollar allotment is roughly equal to the entire 2024 defense expenditures of Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic, Switzerland, Finland, Greece, Belgium, Romania, Denmark, and Norway combined.

数字令人咋舌。美国海关和边境保护局(C.B.P.)本财年所谓的“采购、建设与改善”预算总额高达约530亿美元,另有200亿美元可用于其“运营与支持”预算——相比该机构近年来每年约30亿美元的建设支出,这堪称巨幅增长。事实上,这530亿美元的拨款额度,大致相当于匈牙利、奥地利、捷克、瑞士、芬兰、希腊、比利时、罗马尼亚、丹麦和挪威十国2024年国防开支的总和。

In the wake of the killings of Renee Nicole Good and Alex Pretti, in Minneapolis, congressional Democrats refused to help fund D.H.S. unless Republicans agreed to reforms of the agency’s immigration-enforcement practices. The department’s funding ran out on February 14th, leading to a partial shutdown of the nation’s third-largest Cabinet department, and congressional negotiations appear to have made little progress in the days since—with Democrats demanding, among other things, that the department require agents to wear visible identification and body cameras, ban the use of masks, and end racial profiling. The irony is that, even as many parts of D.H.S. are shut down and staff at agencies like the Transportation Security Administration are working without pay, the immigration operations at the heart of the debate are funded separately and thus continuing undiminished. In fact, the border’s spending spree is only gathering steam.

明尼阿波利斯市发生芮妮·妮可·古德(Renee Nicole Good)和亚历克斯·普雷蒂(Alex Pretti)遇害案后,国会民主党人拒绝为国土安全部提供资金,除非共和党人同意改革该机构的移民执法方式。2月14日,该部门资金告罄,导致这个美国第三大内阁部门部分停摆。此后数日,国会谈判似乎进展甚微——民主党人要求该部门规定执法人员必须佩戴醒目的身份标识和随身摄像头、禁止使用面罩,并终止种族定性。讽刺的是,尽管国土安全部许多部门已停摆,运输安全管理局等机构的员工也在无薪工作,但处于争议核心的移民执法业务因有独立资金支持而照常运转。事实上,边境开支热潮正愈演愈烈。

According to the C.B.P., since Trump took office last year, the agency has issued about $11.4 billion in new border-wall contracts, part of a goal of hitting two hundred and fifty miles of additional barriers by September. Many of the largest new contracts, totalling just over three billion dollars, have gone to “smart wall” construction projects by a company known as BCCG A Joint Venture, an entity that shares an office-suite address in downtown Montgomery, Alabama, with a large-scale general contractor called Caddell Construction. Another six billion dollars in new border-security funding is set to flow to Fisher Sand & Gravel, a North Dakota company that helped Trump’s former campaign adviser Steve Bannon build a portion of supposedly privately funded border wall during the President’s first term; Bannon and three others were indicted, in 2020, by the Justice Department for defrauding hundreds of thousands of donors in connection with their “We Build the Wall” effort. (Bannon’s federal prosecution was preëmpted by a pardon from Trump in 2021; he pleaded guilty on state charges in New York in 2025, but received no jail time.)

据美国海关和边境保护局(C.B.P.)数据显示,自特朗普去年上任以来,该机构已签署约114亿美元的新边境墙建设合同,这是为达成在九月前新增250英里边境屏障目标的部分举措。其中规模最大的新建合同总额略超30亿美元,主要投向名为“BCCG联合企业”的智能边境墙建设项目。这家企业在阿拉巴马州蒙哥马利市中心的办公地址,与大型总承包商卡德尔建筑公司共享。另有60亿美元的新边境安全资金将流向北达科他州的费舍尔砂石公司——该公司曾协助特朗普的前竞选顾问史蒂夫·班农在总统首个任期内修建了一段号称由私人出资的边境墙;2020年,班农与其他三人因在“我们来筑墙”项目中欺诈数十万捐款者遭到司法部起诉。(班农的联邦诉讼因2021年获得特朗普特赦而中止;2025年他在纽约州法院对州级指控认罪,但未获刑期。)

Earlier attempts by D.H.S. and the Border Patrol to build “smart” border walls have ended poorly. An effort led by Boeing, launched in 2006 and known as the Secure Border Initiative (SBInet), ran months behind schedule and its tech was pooh-poohed by the Border Patrol agents who had to use it; by 2008, only twenty-eight miles of the prototype virtual fence had been erected, and cost estimates to secure the whole border had soared to thirty billion dollars. When the Obama Administration finally shut down the project, in 2011—with just over fifty miles operational—Representative Bennie Thompson, then the ranking member of the House Oversight Committee, called it a “grave and expensive disappointment.”

美国国土安全部和边境巡逻队此前尝试建造“智能”边境墙的努力均以失败告终。由波音公司主导的“安全边境计划”于2006年启动,不仅工期延误数月,其技术更遭到一线边境巡逻人员的诟病。截至2008年,仅建成28英里原型虚拟围栏,而整个边境防护工程的预估成本已飙升至300亿美元。当奥巴马政府于2011年最终叫停该项目时——实际投入使用的围栏仅五十余英里——时任众议院监督委员会首席成员的众议员本尼·汤普森斥之为“代价惨重的失败”。

But to peruse the federal-contract database for C.B.P.’s flood of spending is to see just how profitable the border-industrial complex has become since the start of Trump’s second term. Three separate contracts, totalling as much as four hundred and forty million dollars, have been awarded to the Silicon Valley defense darling Anduril Industries, which provides D.H.S. with a network of some three hundred autonomous surveillance towers that it estimates cover about thirty per cent of the southern border. In February, Wired reported a new billion-dollar D.H.S. purchasing agreement for the Peter Thiel-founded software company Palantir, which will allow Palantir, a maker of cutting-edge data integration and analysis tools, to largely bypass competitive bidding for new government projects. (Some Palantir employees have begun to question how their work is being used by ICE.)

但翻阅海关与边境保护局(C.B.P.)激增开支的联邦合同数据库,就能看出自特朗普第二任期开始以来,边境工业复合体已变得多么有利可图。硅谷国防新宠安杜里尔工业公司(Anduril Industries)已获得三份独立合同,总额高达四亿四千万美元,该公司为国土安全部(D.H.S.)提供了约三百座自主监控塔组成的网络,据估计覆盖了南部边境约百分之三十的区域。今年二月,《连线》杂志报道了国土安全部与彼得·蒂尔创立的软件公司帕兰提尔(Palantir)新签署的价值十亿美元的采购协议——这家尖端数据集成与分析工具制造商将可基本绕过新政府项目的竞标流程。(部分帕兰提尔员工已开始质疑其工作成果正如何被移民与海关执法局利用。)

In some ways, the torrent of money is exactly as anticipated. In September, 2024, Tom Homan, who had previously been Trump’s acting head of ICE, allegedly accepted fifty thousand dollars in cash in an undercover F.B.I. sting operation, in which agents posed as businessmen seeking lucrative border-security contracts in a second Trump term. (For reasons that remain unclear, the case seems to have disappeared since Trump’s election, and Homan was promptly named the President’s new border czar. Homan denies any wrongdoing.)

从某些方面看,这股资金洪流完全在意料之中。2024年9月,曾担任特朗普任内移民与海关执法局代理局长的汤姆·霍曼(Tom Homan),据称在一次联邦调查局的卧底行动中收受了五万美元现金——当时探员假扮成商人,试图在特朗普可能的第二任期内获取利润丰厚的边境安全合同。(出于尚不明确的原因,此案自特朗普当选后似乎已销声匿迹,而霍曼随即被任命为总统新任边境事务总管。霍曼否认有任何不当行为。)

Many of ICE’s largest contracts, meanwhile, have gone to CoreCivic and the GEO Group, for-profit companies that ICE contracts to run detention facilities. A third company, Acquisition Logistics L.L.C., is contracted to run Camp East Montana, a new detention facility in El Paso, which is eventually expected to house five thousand beds. The facility happens to be on the military base Fort Bliss, where the Pentagon has been testing that high-energy anti-drone laser. The site, which was formerly used to intern Japanese Americans during the Second World War, has become a hub of harrowing reports of inhumane conditions, including a case involving a detainee who a witness reported was choked to death by guards. (D.H.S. denies any claims of inhumane conditions, and a spokesperson said that the detainee who died was attempting to kill himself when staff intervened to help him.) The ICE contract to run Camp East Montana is worth as much as $1.3 billion. Acquisition Logistics, which was founded in 2008, is based out of a residence in Henrico County, Virginia. News reports from last summer, when the contract was first announced, pointed out that the company had no known experience operating detention facilities, and its largest government contract had previously been worth around seventeen million dollars.

与此同时,移民与海关执法局(ICE)的许多大型合同都流向了CoreCivic和GEO集团这两家营利性公司,由它们负责运营拘留设施。第三家公司Acquisition Logistics有限责任公司则获得了运营东蒙大拿营的合同,这是埃尔帕索一处新建的拘留设施,预计最终可容纳五千张床位。该设施恰好位于布利斯堡军事基地内——五角大楼正是在这里测试高能反无人机激光武器。这片二战期间曾用于拘留日裔美国人的场地,如今已成为骇人听闻的非人道状况报告中心,其中一例案件涉及一名被拘留者,据目击者称其被警卫扼颈致死(美国国土安全部否认所有关于非人道状况的指控,发言人表示该名死者是在工作人员试图阻止其自杀时身亡)。移民与海关执法局运营东蒙大拿营的合同价值高达13亿美元。Acquisition Logistics公司成立于2008年,注册地址位于弗吉尼亚州亨利科县的一处住宅。去年夏季该合同首次公布时,新闻报道指出该公司并无运营拘留设施的已知经验,其此前最大的政府合同价值仅约1700万美元。

The murkiness of Acquisition Logistics’ involvement in El Paso is hardly an exception among many of the companies profiting from the border-security gold rush. Contracts worth tens of millions of dollars list just six or eight words of brief descriptions, such as twenty-seven million dollars for Deloitte, for “Systems Division Program Management Support,” or a half-billion-dollar contract for the Beltway I.T. contractor CACI that’s described blandly as “Border Enforcement Applications for Government Leading-Edge Information Technology.”

“采购物流”公司在埃尔帕索的参与情况模糊不清,这在边境安全淘金热中获利的众多公司里绝非个例。价值数千万美元的合同往往只用六到八个词简单描述,比如德勤公司获得2700万美元的“系统部门项目管理支持”合同,又如环城公路IT承包商CACI获得5亿美元合同,仅平淡地表述为“面向政府尖端信息技术的边境执法应用”。

The contracting database also shows ICE and C.B.P. working to field and equip a literal army’s worth of agents and officers: ICE has spent $1.1 million on Glock-19 duty weapons for its officers, more than eight hundred and seventy-six thousand dollars purchasing “5.56MM RIFLE SUPPRESSORS AND ACCESSORIES,” nearly a million dollars on “less than lethal chemical munitions,” and another four hundred and fifty-eight thousand dollars to purchase “red dot handgun sights” for its agents’ weapons. This is in addition to numerous contracts for the new hires themselves, including ninety-two thousand dollars in uniforms from a Nashville outfitter for a C.B.P. Academy class, part of a larger sixty-one-million-dollar workwear contract; as much as twenty-six million dollars for background checks by a Colorado-based company that has long helped with government hiring; and a twenty-five-million-dollar contract to a Florida company for “Pre And Post-Employment Medical, Drug, And Fitness Examinations” for C.B.P.’s new hires.

合同数据库还显示,移民海关执法局和海关边境保护局正致力于为相当于一支军队规模的探员和官员配备装备:移民海关执法局已花费110万美元为其官员采购格洛克19型执勤武器,花费超过87.6万美元采购“5.56毫米步枪消音器及配件”,花费近100万美元采购“低致命性化学弹药”,另花费45.8万美元为其探员的武器采购“红点手枪瞄准镜”。除此之外,还有大量针对新聘人员本身的合同,包括从纳什维尔一家服装商处为海关边境保护局学院某班级采购价值9.2万美元的制服(这是一项价值6100万美元工作服大合同的部分内容);向科罗拉多州一家长期协助政府招聘的公司支付高达2600万美元的背景调查费用;以及与佛罗里达州某公司签订价值2500万美元的合同,为海关边境保护局新聘人员提供“聘用前后医疗、药物及体能检查”。

The U.S. border—particularly the southern border, with Mexico—has been heavily militarized since 9/11. For most of its history, in fact, the Border Patrol has been a place where America’s wars come home—where war-surplus machinery is repurposed for domestic policing. Some early border fences, which went up immediately after the end of the Second World War, were taken from Japanese internment camps; after the war, the Border Patrol received surplus airplanes to make patrolling easier.

自9·11事件以来,美国边境——尤其是与墨西哥接壤的南部边境——已高度军事化。事实上,纵观其历史,边境巡逻队始终是美国战争机器向内转的产物——战争剩余物资被改造用于国内治安。二战刚结束时建起的早期边境围栏,材料就取自日裔拘留营;战后,边境巡逻队获得了剩余飞机以便巡逻。

Today, eight aerostats, high-tech tethered surveillance blimps, are deployed along the border, part of an airship fleet that includes hand-me-down “tactical aerostats” formerly used by the U.S. military in Afghanistan. A fifty-two-million-dollar contract supplies the department with so-called light-enforcement helicopters, and the aerospace company Northrop Grumman has been awarded a nearly nine-hundred-million-dollar contract to maintain its P-3 surveillance aircraft. C.B.P. also has its own fleet of unmanned five-ton MQ-9 Predator drones, similar to the armed platforms that the C.I.A. and the Pentagon have used to target terrorists overseas, from Pakistan to Africa, which the agency uses for “persistent surveillance” along the border. (Last summer, the drones were used in Los Angeles during a series of anti-ICE protests, leading to criticism by congressional Democrats and civil-liberties groups.) On February 26th, less than a month after the birthday-balloon mishap, the U.S. military shot down a C.B.P. drone using the same type of high-energy laser that originally caused the airspace closure in El Paso. The most recent incident both underscored the lack of apparent coördination about advanced border-security technologies and raised new safety concerns for the F.A.A., which expanded a no-fly zone over Fort Hancock, where the shootdown occurred. In a statement, a group of Democratic lawmakers said, “Our heads are exploding over the news that DoD reportedly shot down a Customs and Border Protection drone using a high risk counter-unmanned aircraft system,” calling the incident the result of Administration “incompetence.”

如今,边境线上部署着八个高科技系留监视飞艇,它们属于一支飞艇舰队,其中还包括美军在阿富汗使用过的二手“战术飞艇”。一份价值5200万美元的合同为海关与边境保护局提供了所谓的轻型执法直升机,而航空航天公司诺斯罗普·格鲁曼则获得了近9亿美元的合同,用于维护该局的P-3侦察机。该局还拥有自己的无人驾驶MQ-9“捕食者”无人机编队,这种五吨重的无人机与中情局和五角大楼在从巴基斯坦到非洲等地用于锁定恐怖分子的武装平台相似,该局将其用于边境“持续监视”。(去年夏天,这些无人机曾在洛杉矶用于监控一系列反移民及海关执法局抗议活动,引发国会民主党人和民权组织的批评。)2月26日,在生日气球事件发生不到一个月后,美军使用最初导致埃尔帕索空域关闭的同类型高能激光击落了一架海关与边境保护局的无人机。这起最新事件既凸显了先进边境安保技术明显缺乏协调,也为联邦航空管理局带来了新的安全隐患——该局已扩大事发地汉考克堡上空的禁飞区。一群民主党议员在声明中表示:“得知国防部据称使用高风险反无人机系统击落海关与边境保护局的无人机,我们简直要气炸了”,称这起事件是政府“无能”的结果。

Escobar, the House member, told me that the El Paso-airspace incident has raised other questions about what C.B.P. is doing and where the money is going. Trump loves the physicality and toughness indicated by building miles of border wall, but the giant stretches of open border that the wall is meant to secure no longer represent the most pressing security needs. Instead, Escobar said, the need lies in renovating the overburdened and outdated ports of entry that handle daily trade, commerce, and travel between the U.S. and Mexico. “A vast majority of illegal drugs are coming into our country through our land ports of entry,” Escobar said. “One of the best investments that the federal government can make in border communities would be in renovating and modernizing our port-of-entry infrastructure.”

众议员埃斯科瓦尔告诉我,埃尔帕索领空事件引发了其他疑问:美国海关与边境保护局究竟在做什么?资金又流向了何处?特朗普钟情于修建边境墙所彰显的实体屏障与强硬姿态,但那些本应被高墙守护的广阔开放边境地带,如今已不再代表最紧迫的安全需求。埃斯科瓦尔指出,真正的需求在于改造那些不堪重负、设施陈旧的入境口岸——它们每日承载着美墨之间的贸易往来与人员流动。“绝大多数非法毒品正是通过陆路入境口岸流入我国,”埃斯科瓦尔说,“联邦政府对边境社区的最佳投资之一,应当是改造并升级我们的入境口岸基础设施。”

And yet the question of how all this money is to be spent is almost entirely absent from the current congressional-appropriations debate. Even as the shutdown negotiations focus on administrative and policy reforms to how C.B.P. and ICE operate nationwide, there’s still plenty of money for both agencies to spend. The C.B.P., for instance, has so far “obligated” just ten per cent of its supersized construction-and-procurement budget—leaving, as of late February, $47,592,145,788 still to go, a sum slightly larger than the G.D.P. of Estonia. “I am very concerned,” Escobar told me. “These contractors and these private entities are pocketing American taxpayer dollars, while their shareholders are making money hand over fist.” ♦

然而,国会当前的拨款辩论几乎完全回避了这笔巨款将如何支出的问题。尽管政府停摆谈判聚焦于海关与边境保护局(CBP)及移民与海关执法局(ICE)在全国范围内运作的行政与政策改革,这两大机构仍握有充裕资金可供支配。以海关与边境保护局为例,其超大规模的基建与采购预算迄今仅“承诺支付”了百分之十——截至二月下旬,仍有475.92亿美元待支出,这笔金额略高于爱沙尼亚的国内生产总值。“我深感忧虑,”埃斯科瓦尔告诉我,“这些承包商和私营实体正将美国纳税人的钱收入囊中,而他们的股东则在赚得盆满钵满。” ♦

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