Q. & A.

How Donald Trump’s Iran War Is Destabilizing the Gulf

唐纳德·特朗普的伊朗战争如何搅动海湾局势
Despite their animosity toward Iran, America’s allies in the Middle East are worried that the region is headed for wider conflict.
尽管中东地区的美国盟友对伊朗怀有敌意,他们仍担忧该地区正滑向更广泛的冲突。
Huge plumes of smoke rising above fuel storage tanks.
Photograph from Reuters

Since the United States and Israel began bombing Iran, over a week ago, more than one thousand Iranians have reportedly been killed, and Iran has responded by attacking various Gulf states—such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates—which are allied with the U.S. Meanwhile, Israel has also been relentlessly bombing Lebanon, with the intention of disarming or wiping out Hezbollah, a paramilitary group backed by Iran which fired rockets at Israel earlier in the war. (Almost seven hundred thousand people have been driven out of their homes in Lebanon since Israel began its campaign, per the U.N.) Although many of the Gulf states have worked to counter Iranian influence in the region, often by way of military conflicts waged through proxies, there is no strong evidence that they supported the decision by the U.S. to attack Iran.

自美国与以色列一周多前开始轰炸伊朗以来,据报已有逾千名伊朗人丧生。伊朗则对沙特阿拉伯、卡塔尔、阿联酋等与美国结盟的海湾国家发动袭击。与此同时,以色列持续轰炸黎巴嫩,意图解除或消灭真主党武装——这个伊朗支持的准军事组织在战争初期曾向以色列发射火箭弹。(联合国数据显示,自以色列开展军事行动以来,黎巴嫩已有近七十万人流离失所。)尽管许多海湾国家常通过代理人战争来抗衡伊朗在该地区的影响力,但并无确凿证据表明它们支持美国袭击伊朗的决定。

I recently spoke by phone with Sanam Vakil, the director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the British think tank Chatham House, and a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, to understand how countries in the Gulf were balancing animosity toward the Iranian regime with concerns about what a wider war could mean for the region and the global economy. Our conversation, edited for length and clarity, is below.

我最近与英国智库查塔姆研究所中东与北非项目主任、约翰·霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院教授萨纳姆·瓦基尔(Sanam Vakil)进行了电话交流,探讨海湾国家如何在敌视伊朗政权与担忧更广泛战争对地区及全球经济的影响之间寻求平衡。以下是经过精简和梳理的对话内容。

Before the war started, there was a lot of talk that many of the Sunni states in the Middle East, which had historically been opposed to Iran, were nevertheless concerned that Israel was on the verge of becoming the regional hegemon. How do you look at that question now, after more than a week of the United States and Israel’s waging an extremely aggressive war with shifting goals?

战争爆发前,人们普遍谈论中东许多逊尼派国家——历史上一直反对伊朗——却担忧以色列即将成为地区霸权。如今,在美国和以色列发动这场目标不断变化的极端侵略性战争一周多之后,您如何看待这个问题?

First of all, I would perhaps recharacterize the states you’re talking about, so as not to refer to them as Sunni states. I think the sectarian prism is a bit of a dated way to categorize the region, and is frequently the way Israel goes about dividing a region that is much more of a mosaic and a tapestry of different identities that don’t fit cleanly in these sectarian blocks. But most of the countries around Iran are really caught between two destabilizing regional states.

首先,或许我应该重新界定你提到的那些国家,避免将它们统称为逊尼派国家。我认为用教派棱镜来划分这个地区已经有些过时了——以色列惯常用这种方式割裂这片土地,而实际上这里更像一幅由多元身份交织而成的镶嵌画,根本无法被整齐地塞进教派区块。环顾伊朗周边的国家,它们大多确实陷于两个搅动地区稳定的国家之间。

Iran has been a historical threat for most of its neighbors since 1979, but even before that, under the Pahlavi monarchy, it did exert hegemonic influence. And since October 7th, as Israel revised its security strategy away from what it calls “mowing the lawn,” or containing Iran-backed threats, Arab states have seen Israel as an actively destabilizing regional force. This is not because they don’t understand Israel’s security concerns, or because they support Hamas or Hezbollah. They see these groups as extremists, obviously Iran-backed, and responsible for weak governance in Palestine, in Lebanon, et cetera. But, in tandem, they see Israel’s behavior across the region as having gone far beyond degrading these groups and moving into regional destabilization, which is a serious challenge for Arab states.

自1979年以来,伊朗对多数邻国而言始终是历史性威胁,但即便在此之前,巴列维王朝时期的伊朗也确实施加过霸权影响。而自10月7日以来,随着以色列调整其安全战略——放弃所谓“修剪草坪”式(即遏制伊朗支持的威胁)策略,阿拉伯国家开始将以色列视为主动破坏地区稳定的力量。这并非因为他们不理解以色列的安全关切,也非因为他们支持哈马斯或真主党。阿拉伯国家视这些组织为极端主义者,明确受伊朗支持,且对巴勒斯坦、黎巴嫩等地的治理不善负有责任。但与此同时,他们认为以色列在整个地区的行动已远远超出削弱这些组织的范畴,正演变为破坏地区稳定的行为,这对阿拉伯国家构成了严峻挑战。

I think the biggest example of this, which shows this challenge for regional states, particularly Gulf Arab states, is what took place in Qatar just last year. An American airbase in the country was hit by Iranian missiles as part of the twelve-day war last June, in which America and Israel attacked Iran, and then Qatar was also hit by Israel later that year, when the Israelis targeted Hamas leaders in Doha. Those attacks really exemplified and amplified the challenge for a lot of Arab states across the region. They don’t have the ability to manage or contain Israel or Iran.

我认为最能体现这一挑战的例子——特别是对海湾阿拉伯国家而言——就是去年发生在卡塔尔的事件。去年六月,在为期十二天的战争中,美国与以色列袭击伊朗,该国一处美军基地遭到伊朗导弹袭击;同年晚些时候,以色列在卡塔尔首都多哈锁定哈马斯领导人时,卡塔尔又遭以军打击。这些袭击真切地凸显并放大了该地区许多阿拉伯国家面临的困境:它们既无力制约以色列,也无法遏制伊朗。

There has been conflicting speculation and opinion about how the Gulf states, mainly Saudi Arabia, view this conflict, and especially how they viewed the possibility of conflict before it started. Do you have an understanding of whether they were in favor of the United States and Israel attacking Iran?

关于海湾国家(主要是沙特阿拉伯)如何看待这场冲突,尤其是冲突爆发前他们对冲突可能性的评估,外界一直存在相互矛盾的猜测与观点。您是否了解他们是否曾支持美国和以色列对伊朗采取军事行动?

I think that the entire region knew that a war was inevitable in 2026, because the twelve-day war last June didn’t fully address the security issues from the perspective of the U.S. and Israel. And for the Gulf states, in particular, they were very acutely worried that this war would produce a massive destabilization that would end up with them as the targets. Why did they think that? Well, first of all, Iran had been messaging and warning them, making clear that this would be their response strategy. And, second, the Gulf states have been on the front line of past wars in the Gulf, going back to the Iran-Iraq War in the nineteen-eighties, and obviously the 1990 Gulf War. They collectively and individually lobbied the Bush Administration not to go into Iraq in 2003. And again, going into 2026, they pursued the same strategy. They recognized that this war would risk creating a conflict that spilled over into other countries in the region. So, bilaterally and collectively, they first pursued a strategy of trying to implore the Trump Administration to pursue diplomacy with Iran.

我认为整个地区都知道2026年战争不可避免,因为去年六月那场为期十二天的战争并未从美国和以色列的角度彻底解决安全问题。对海湾国家而言,他们尤其敏锐地担忧这场战争将引发大规模动荡,最终使他们成为攻击目标。为何如此?首先,伊朗一直在传递信息并警告他们,明确表示这将构成其应对策略。其次,回溯到1980年代的两伊战争以及1990年的海湾战争,海湾国家始终处于历次战争的前线。2003年他们曾集体或单独游说布什政府不要入侵伊拉克。而面对2026年的局势,他们再次采取了相同策略——他们意识到这场战争可能引发冲突外溢,波及地区其他国家。因此,无论是双边还是集体层面,他们首先尝试恳求特朗普政府与伊朗展开外交对话。

The Washington Post has reported that Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, was in favor of the war, for example, although the Saudis have denied this. But you are skeptical of the claim that they were in favor?

《华盛顿邮报》曾报道称,沙特阿拉伯王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼支持这场战争,尽管沙特方面对此予以否认。但您是否对他们持支持态度这一说法表示怀疑?

Yeah. There could have been some sort of eleventh-hour effort at convincing the Trump Administration that, if they were going to attack Iran, to try to do it properly and execute a war that wouldn’t leave the region vulnerable. But I think the fears of Gulf states have been borne out even worse than they imagined, because, obviously, the Iranians have struck more than just military installations, with strikes on infrastructure, energy sites, and civilian spaces. The diversity of these targets has exposed the weakness in the security architecture of Gulf states, and the reality of their geography being their destiny. And the strikes have also brought up a host of other issues. For example, the United States actually didn’t protect Gulf interests and prioritized protecting Israel’s interests. So the war has brought up a lot of security challenges that cannot be quickly or easily resolved. And I think the worst-case scenario for the Gulf states is playing out, because they’re seeing a U.S.-Israeli operation being executed very effectively, perhaps, on a military level, but with no day-after planning, and they recognize that President Trump has a short attention span and, as pressure mounts, could abruptly exit this war, leaving the region both paying the price for the war, and also exposed to what version of the Islamic Republic remains.

是的。或许曾有过某种最后时刻的努力,试图说服特朗普政府,如果他们要攻击伊朗,就该设法做得妥当,打一场不会让该地区陷入脆弱状态的战争。但我认为海湾国家的担忧已经应验,甚至比他们想象的更糟,因为伊朗人显然不仅打击了军事设施,还袭击了基础设施、能源设施和民用场所。这些目标的多样性暴露了海湾国家安全架构的弱点,以及地理现实决定命运的事实。这些袭击还引发了一系列其他问题。例如,美国实际上并未保护海湾国家的利益,而是优先保护以色列的利益。因此,这场战争带来了许多无法迅速或轻易解决的安全挑战。我认为海湾国家最担心的情况正在上演,因为他们看到美以联手的军事行动或许在战术层面执行得非常有效,却没有任何战后规划,而且他们意识到特朗普总统的注意力持续时间很短,随着压力增大,他可能突然退出这场战争,让该地区既承受战争的代价,又不得不面对一个面目全非的伊朗伊斯兰共和国。

Does that mean you think the Gulf States hope that the Americans and the Israelis only stop the war after there is regime change in Iran and the Islamic Republic has come to an end, or do you think they just want the war to be over quickly?

这是否意味着您认为海湾国家希望美国和以色列只有在伊朗发生政权更迭、伊斯兰共和国终结后才停止战争,还是您认为他们只是希望战争尽快结束?

I think that they want both things, but they’re very aware that the former is unachievable. You cannot fully dismantle this regime. That’s the reality. It’s heavily institutionalized and bureaucratized. And, even if you eliminate chains of command by killing and decapitating, there will still be bureaucrats, technocrats, and security officials who have been part of this regime. I think that they want this war to end as soon as possible, but they remain very anxious about the day after. And they think that a weakened, fragmented, divided Iran is going to be equally hard on its neighbors, from a humanitarian perspective, from an economic perspective, and from a security perspective. And we should also, obviously, say very clearly that the populations of these states have been watching the Gaza war for over two years and have become heavily politicized, and are now living through this war which has punctured the image of the Gulf as a safe haven for economic interests and as a destination for tourists. And they look vulnerable to Iranian attacks, even though they have mounted very effective defensive operations. That defense is a silver lining, but vulnerabilities have still been revealed.

我认为他们两者都想要,但他们非常清楚前者是无法实现的。你不可能彻底瓦解这个政权。这就是现实。它已经高度制度化、官僚化。即便通过杀戮和斩首行动清除指挥链,仍会有官僚、技术官僚和安全官员——他们本就是这政权的一部分。我认为他们希望这场战争尽快结束,但对战后局势依然深感焦虑。在他们看来,一个被削弱、分裂、割据的伊朗,从人道主义、经济和安全角度来看,对周边国家同样会造成巨大压力。当然我们也必须明确指出:这些国家的民众观察加沙战争已逾两年,政治意识高度觉醒,如今正亲身经历这场战争——它击碎了海湾地区作为经济利益安全港和旅游目的地的幻象。尽管他们实施了卓有成效的防御行动,但面对伊朗攻击时仍显得脆弱。防御行动固然是一线希望,但脆弱性已然暴露无遗。

You mentioned the Gulf states trying to convince the Bush Administration that invading Iraq was a mistake, and I’m thinking about how the relationship between the Gulf states and America has changed since then. One factor that feels very different from 2002 or 2003 is that some of the governments of the Gulf states have been paying Trump and his family. The Wall Street Journal reported that a U.A.E. government official invested half a billion dollars in the Trump family’s crypto company. Qatar basically bought Trump a plane. His son-in-law, Jared Kushner, is involved in business opportunities throughout the Middle East. And yet all of this added up to very little for the Gulf states. Does that make you question the relationship going forward?

你提到海湾国家曾试图说服布什政府入侵伊拉克是个错误,我想到自那时起海湾国家与美国的关系已发生改变。与2002或2003年相比,一个显著差异在于部分海湾国家政府持续向特朗普及其家族输送利益。《华尔街日报》曾披露阿联酋政府官员向特朗普家族的加密货币公司注资五亿美元;卡塔尔实质上为特朗普购置了私人飞机;其女婿贾里德·库什纳在中东地区广泛参与商业项目。然而这些投入似乎并未给海湾国家带来实质性回报。这是否会让你质疑双方关系的未来走向?

I think this is a really important point, because the Gulf states were quite enthusiastic about Trump returning to office. They obviously were so deeply frustrated, if not angry, with President Biden for his position on the Gaza war, and for his overly indulgent position toward Netanyahu during the war. And so they saw President Trump as being more pragmatic, transactional, and they hosted him very early on in his second term in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha, where he made this famous speech criticizing the idea of regime change and promised that the era of neoconservative American-funded operations in the region would be over, and this was a new America that with the Middle East was going to focus on “commerce, not chaos” and exporting “technology, not terrorism.” And this was wholly celebrated across the Gulf, that they would continue to be able to do business with the President and his family, and that the U.S. respected them, saw them as stable partners.

我认为这一点非常重要,因为海湾国家对于特朗普重返白宫曾抱有相当热切的期待。显然,他们对拜登总统在加沙战争中的立场,以及他在战争期间对内塔尼亚胡过于纵容的态度感到极度失望,甚至愤怒。因此,他们将特朗普总统视为更务实、更注重交易的政治人物,并在其第二任期伊始就邀请他访问利雅得、阿布扎比和多哈。特朗普在那次著名演讲中批评了政权更迭的理念,承诺美国新保守主义势力在该地区资助行动的时代已经终结,强调这是一个“专注商业而非混乱、输出技术而非恐怖主义”的新美国,将与中东建立新型关系。这番言论在整个海湾地区广受赞誉,他们期待能继续与总统及其家族保持商业往来,并相信美国会尊重他们,将其视为稳定的合作伙伴。

And I think, unfortunately, since then, they’ve been deeply disappointed by the Trump Administration. They’ve invested in the United States financially, and, I would say, they are still deeply committed to, and invested in, their security relationship with the U.S. Qatar, before this, had doubled down on its relationship with the U.S. It’s not just Qatar—each Gulf state has its own offering to the U.S., if you will, be it tech, be it a regional role, et cetera. Going forward, I don’t think this style of relationship is going to change right away, but there are certainly deep frustrations across the Gulf that this war has exposed, and concerns that it has made them vulnerable, that America hasn’t had their back. And I think there will be a tail to this.

我认为,不幸的是,自那以后,他们对特朗普政府深感失望。他们在经济上对美国进行了投资,而且,我想说,他们仍然深深致力于并投资于与美国的安保关系。在此之前,卡塔尔已经加倍押注与美国的联系。不仅是卡塔尔——每个海湾国家都有自己向美国提供的“筹码”,无论是技术、地区角色等等。展望未来,我不认为这种关系模式会立即改变,但这场战争确实暴露了海湾各国深深的挫败感,以及担忧——这场战争让他们变得脆弱,而美国没有支持他们。我认为这件事会产生深远影响。

You said that the Gulf states were fed up with Biden over Gaza. Saudi Arabia was also fed up at the beginning of Biden’s term, over what it perceived to be his moralism about the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. But I always assumed that the reason people like Mohammed bin Salman were angry about Gaza was not the reasons many of us were angry about Gaza but, rather, because he hoped that, after some sort of fig-leaf peace deal between the Israelis and Palestinians, you could have normalization agreements between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and Saudi business in the region would go more smoothly, while the Palestinian problem would be pushed to the side, and this was how the Middle East could function. And October 7th and the Gaza war made clear that that was a fiction, if it ever had been truly possible. And then what the past few years have revealed is not just that these countries can’t align with Israel, because their publics would be very angry about it, but that Israel is also now being so aggressive in the region that they have to rethink that entire idea. Is that too cynical?

你说海湾国家对拜登在加沙问题上的态度感到厌倦。其实在拜登任期之初,沙特就曾因其对贾迈勒·卡舒吉遇害案表现出的道德立场而不满。但我始终认为,像穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼这样的人对加沙局势感到愤怒,与我们多数人的愤怒根源并不相同——他原本期待的是,在以色列和巴勒斯坦达成某种象征性和平协议后,沙特能与以色列实现关系正常化,沙特的地区商业活动将更顺畅,而巴勒斯坦问题则被搁置一旁,这曾是他们设想的中东运转模式。然而十月七日事件和加沙战争彻底表明,这种设想即便曾有过实现的可能,如今也已成幻影。过去几年揭示的不仅是这些国家无法与以色列结盟(因为其民众会强烈反对),更在于以色列如今在地区的激进姿态,迫使各方必须重新审视整个构想。我这样想是否太过悲观?

No. The cynicism prevails. Many Gulf leaders were clearly flirting with the idea that normalization could, through stronger economic ties and security partnerships, lead to greater regional integration, with or without the Palestinians. But there were two missing pieces in this vision for the region. One was the very clear sidestepping of Palestinian sovereignty, and the second was the issue of Iran. And I think these issues were ignored because people were taking too much of a zero-sum approach to the idea of normalization.

不。现实是,犬儒主义占了上风。许多海湾国家领导人显然在试探这样一种想法:无论巴勒斯坦人是否参与,关系正常化都能通过更紧密的经济联系和安全合作,推动更深层次的地域融合。但这一区域愿景存在两个缺失的环节:一是对巴勒斯坦主权问题的刻意回避,二是伊朗问题。我认为这些问题之所以被忽视,是因为人们在看待关系正常化时过于采取零和博弈的思维。

What do you mean?

你指的是什么?

Israelis see normalization as support of Israel at the expense of Iran. But the Abraham Accords weren’t an overt security arrangement. Israel has not come to the defense of those states, for example. Certainly, the U.A.E. and Bahrain—which signed the Abraham Accords—and Israel share a view that Iran is a destabilizing regional threat, but they diverge on how to manage Iran as a regional threat, right? And for other Gulf states, like Saudi Arabia or beyond, their alignment with Israel on seeing Iran in a negative way aside, they couldn’t publicly allow themselves to be perceived as pro-Israel, given the war in Gaza. And so, in addition to the challenge of the Palestinians, this has led to an abrupt halt in talking about normalization, at least for now. It doesn’t mean it can’t resurface in the future. Right now, Israel is seen as aggressive and destabilizing, and normalizing relations would be a real challenge.

以色列人将关系正常化视为对以色列的支持,代价是牺牲伊朗。但《亚伯拉罕协议》并非公开的安全安排。例如,以色列并未为那些国家提供防御。当然,签署《亚伯拉罕协议》的阿联酋、巴林与以色列都认为伊朗是破坏地区稳定的威胁,但在如何应对伊朗这一地区威胁的问题上,它们存在分歧,对吗?而对于其他海湾国家,如沙特阿拉伯或更远的国家,除了在负面看待伊朗的立场上与以色列一致外,鉴于加沙战争,它们无法公开允许自己被视作亲以色列。因此,除了巴勒斯坦问题的挑战外,这还导致关于关系正常化的讨论戛然而止,至少目前如此。这并不意味着未来不会重新浮出水面。眼下,以色列被视为具有侵略性和破坏稳定,关系正常化将是一个真正的挑战。

So you’re essentially saying that the Israelis saw normalization with the Gulf states as part of a strategy to contain Iran.

所以你的意思是,以色列人将同海湾国家的关系正常化视为遏制伊朗战略的一部分。

A hundred per cent.

百分之百。

But the Gulf states saw it differently? What was their rationale, then? The Saudis would get access to nuclear technology from the United States, which the Biden Administration implied it would help them with in return for normalization?

但海湾国家对此有不同看法?那么他们的理由是什么?沙特将获得来自美国的核技术,而拜登政府暗示,作为关系正常化的回报,美国会在这方面提供帮助?

I think that there were many reasons for the Gulf states to move forward with normalization. It made sense to integrate; it made sense to share technology and build and benefit from Israel’s strong defense capabilities. But I think, ultimately, for many of the countries, this was also about the United States. It was about anchoring the U.S. as a partner in the accords to keep the United States engaged and present in the region. I think there were multiple motivations, and maybe, behind the scenes, there was this thought of, O.K., well, we’ll work together to share intelligence. We’re going to eventually integrate our air defenses—but it wasn’t going to result in this immediate anti-Iranian alliance, as the U.S. has tried to pitch it, or as many sorts of strategists would have hoped it would be.

我认为海湾国家推进关系正常化有多重原因。一体化符合逻辑;分享技术、借助以色列强大的防御能力进行建设并从中获益,也符合逻辑。但我想,对许多国家而言,这最终也关乎美国。这是要将美国锚定为协议中的合作伙伴,以确保美国持续介入并存在于该地区。我认为存在多重动机,或许在幕后还有这样的考量:好吧,我们将合作共享情报,最终将整合我们的防空系统——但这并不会像美国试图推销的那样,或像许多战略家所希望的那样,立即形成一个反伊朗联盟。

In your first answer, you said that looking at the region through a lens of Sunni versus Shia is misleading in some way, especially when it comes to Iran’s poor relations with some of its neighbors. But, certainly, many of the proxy conflicts that Iran and these states have got involved in, from Syria to Lebanon, have had this through line. So, can you explain why you don’t like that framing?

在你第一个回答中,你提到用逊尼派与什叶派对立的视角看待该地区在某些方面具有误导性,尤其是在伊朗与部分邻国关系紧张的问题上。但不可否认的是,从叙利亚到黎巴嫩,伊朗与这些国家卷入的许多代理人冲突确实存在这条主线。那么,能否请你解释为何不认同这种分析框架?

First of all, their populations are much more diverse. Second, not all Shia groups are the same, nor are they aligned. Third, we are post-sectarian in the Middle East, and that has been a sort of ideological shift that we have seen over the past ten years as well. As countries have normalized, they’ve moved away from instrumentalizing religious rhetoric. All the way down to Saudi Arabia, there’s been a step away from this religious language. The problems between these states are structural, about competition, and about power. I don’t think that religion and identity explain the tensions, even if they are sometimes used by leaders to justify competition and regional interventionism, for example. Yes, Iran has had a greater degree of success in working with Shia groups like Hezbollah, but Iran also has a broad array of non-state relationships that don’t align that way.

首先,这些国家的人口构成要多元得多。其次,并非所有什叶派团体都相同,它们之间也并非铁板一块。第三,中东已经进入后教派时代,这是过去十年来我们目睹的一种意识形态转变。随着各国关系正常化,它们逐渐放弃了工具化的宗教修辞。即便是沙特阿拉伯,也已开始远离这种宗教话语。这些国家间的问题本质上是结构性的,关乎竞争与权力博弈。我认为宗教和身份认同并不能解释紧张局势的根源——尽管领导人有时会以此为借口,为竞争和地区干预主义辩护。诚然,伊朗在与真主党等什叶派团体合作方面取得了较大成功,但伊朗同时也建立了广泛的非国家关系网络,这些关系并非完全按教派路线排列。

Such as Hamas.

比如哈马斯。

Hamas, yes, and some non-state-actor groups in Iraq. And the Assad regime wasn’t a so-called Twelver Shia state. The commonality of these groups is less about religion and more about resistance to the U.S. and Israel. But, second, the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia have been embracing more liberal interpretations of Islam and less exportation of Islam across the region, which has been received well internationally as well as regionally. Just look at the competition with, and eventual blockade of, Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and others, which started in 2017. So many of these issues are driven by issues of governance, economic competition, and various regional rivalries, which sometimes play out through proxy groups. It’s much more complicated now than Sunni vs. Shia. ♦

哈马斯,是的,还有伊拉克的一些非国家行为体。阿萨德政权也并非所谓的十二伊玛目派什叶派国家。这些组织的共性与其说是宗教,不如说是对美国和以色列的抵抗。但另一方面,阿联酋和沙特阿拉伯一直在接纳更自由的伊斯兰教诠释,减少向整个地区输出伊斯兰教义,这种做法在国际和地区层面都获得了良好反响。看看2017年开始的沙特、阿联酋等国对卡塔尔的竞争乃至最终封锁就明白了。许多这类问题都是由治理问题、经济竞争和各种地区对抗驱动的,有时会通过代理人团体来展开。现在的情况远比逊尼派与什叶派的对立复杂得多。♦

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