Q. & A.

How Donald Trump May Have Sabotaged His Chances for a Deal with Iran

特朗普如何可能亲手葬送了与伊朗达成协议的机会
The Iranian regime has shut down the Strait of Hormuz, destabilizing global markets and leaving the U.S. with no good options.
伊朗政权关闭了霍尔木兹海峡,搅乱了全球市场,令美国陷入进退两难的境地。
Donald Trump frowns.
Source photograph by Shawn Thew / Bloomberg / Getty

Last weekend, President Donald Trump vowed that he would carry out huge strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure, in a threat meant to get Iran’s government to open up the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s closure of the strait was one of the most geopolitically significant developments in a war that began last month with U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran, and has caused chaos in the region and in the world economy. In recent days, however, Trump has seemingly searched for ways to de-escalate the conflict, promising to postpone the strikes while Iran and the U.S. consider ceasefire negotiations.

上周末,美国总统唐纳德·特朗普扬言要对伊朗的能源基础设施发动大规模打击,以此威胁伊朗政府重新开放霍尔木兹海峡。伊朗关闭该海峡是本轮冲突中最具地缘政治影响的事件之一——这场始于上月美以对伊朗的联合打击,已导致地区局势乃至全球经济陷入混乱。不过近日,特朗普似乎正寻求为冲突降温的途径,承诺将暂缓打击行动,以便伊朗与美国考虑停火谈判。

I recently spoke by phone with Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed what concessions Iran would want in any negotiations to end the war, whether the U.S. and Israel have the same objectives in Iran, and why an off-ramp—let alone a permanent peace—may be so hard to find.

我最近与国际危机组织伊朗项目主任阿里·瓦埃兹(Ali Vaez)进行了电话交谈。在我们的对话中(为简洁清晰起见经过编辑),我们讨论了伊朗在结束战争的任何谈判中会要求哪些让步,美国和以色列在伊朗问题上是否有相同目标,以及为何难以找到缓和局势的出路——更不用说永久和平了。

From the perspective of the Iranian regime and its new leadership, what do you think their interests are in any potential deal to end the war with the United States and Israel?

从伊朗政权及其新领导层的角度来看,你认为他们在任何旨在结束与美国和以色列战争的潜在协议中,利益诉求是什么?

Look, the primary objective in any negotiation would be a deal that would insure the Islamic Republic’s survival. That has several requirements. One is, of course, that the hostilities against Iran would stop and that they would not start again—because Iran doesn’t want to end up being another country, like Lebanon or Gaza or Syria, that Israel or the United States can decide to bomb at will. This concept of the U.S. or Israel scheduling a Google Calendar reminder to bomb Iran every six months is not a situation that the Islamic Republic can tolerate, or believes that it would be able to survive, in the medium to long run. So the primary objective is to basically create the conditions under which Israel and the United States are deterred from committing an act of aggression against Iran ever again.

听着,任何谈判的首要目标都是达成一项能确保伊斯兰共和国生存的协议。这有几个必要条件。其一,当然是要停止对伊朗的敌对行动,并且确保这些行动不再重启——因为伊朗不想沦落成像黎巴嫩、加沙或叙利亚那样的国家,任由以色列或美国随心所欲地轰炸。美国或以色列在谷歌日历上设置每六个月轰炸伊朗一次的提醒——这种局面是伊斯兰共和国无法容忍的,也认为中长期内自己无法在这样的处境下存活。所以首要目标基本上是要创造条件,让以色列和美国从此不敢再对伊朗采取侵略行动。

But, at this point, just that is not enough, because Iran has been living with economic warfare against it for several decades. And, after this war, it would have to reconstruct in order to survive. And this is why it would need economic incentives that are real, not just promised and never delivered. So it also needs some sort of arrangement in which it would be able to secure economic reprieve. And that means that if the hot war ends, but Iran ends up in another cold war, that would be as fatal to the regime as the continuation of the hot war. And this is why Iran will impose difficult conditions for accepting a ceasefire.

但眼下,仅此还不够,因为伊朗已经承受了数十年的经济战。而这场战争结束后,它必须重建才能生存。正因如此,它需要实实在在的经济激励,而非空头承诺。它还需要某种安排,以确保获得经济喘息空间。这意味着,即便热战结束,如果伊朗陷入另一场冷战,对现政权而言,其致命性不亚于热战的延续。这就是为何伊朗将为接受停火提出苛刻条件。

I have heard you say in the past that there were some ways in which the heavy sanctions on Iran, the economic warfare that you’re talking about, were beneficial to members of the regime and that the people who thought those sanctions would bring the government down were misguided. But now you seem to be saying that you think it’s important for the economic warfare against Iran to stop, not just for the welfare of the Iranian people, obviously, who’ve been suffering under sanctions, but for the regime itself. Why is that?

我过去听你说过,在某些方面,对伊朗的严厉制裁——也就是你所说的经济战——对政权成员是有利的,那些认为制裁会推翻政府的人是被误导了。但现在你似乎认为,停止对伊朗的经济战很重要,这显然不仅是为了伊朗人民的福祉——他们在制裁下饱受苦难——也是为了政权本身。为什么这么说?

So these are different issues. Before the war, when the regime was able to govern, even ineffectively or with a lot of mismanagement and corruption, it could still keep the economy afloat. And, yes, there were regime élites who were benefitting from sanctions and were being enriched, and they were secure in their position because they had enough to sustain their power. But, if you look at what happened to the Assad regime, at a certain point Bashar al-Assad couldn’t even afford to pay his security forces anymore. And this war has basically rendered Iran ungovernable unless it can undergo serious reconstruction. This isn’t just about sanctions relief. The Iranian regime needs money for reconstruction. It’s really as simple as that. There is no agreement in which it would accept American promises because it’s been burned by the U.S. too many times. And, in the absence of sanctions relief, the regime knows it would die on the vine.

所以这是不同的问题。战前,当政权尚能治理时——即便效率低下、管理不善、腐败横行——它仍能让经济勉强运转。是的,确实有政权精英从制裁中获利致富,他们地位稳固,因为拥有足够资源维持权力。但看看阿萨德政权的遭遇吧:曾几何时,巴沙尔·阿萨德甚至发不出安全部队的薪水。这场战争本质上已让伊朗陷入治理危机,除非能进行彻底重建。这不仅仅是解除制裁的问题。伊朗政权需要重建资金,事情就这么简单。他们不可能接受美国的承诺达成协议,因为被美国辜负太多次了。而若无制裁解除,政权深知自己将如藤蔓枯死。

So you’re saying that Iran needs some real guarantees. What do you think the Americans might plausibly offer now?

那么你是说,伊朗需要一些真正的保证。你认为美国人现在能提供什么切实可行的方案?

I think at this moment, the two sides’ positions are too divergent to be amenable to an agreement. The American demands are as maximalist as they have been throughout the Trump Administration, both in the first term and in the past year or so. And the Iranian position has now hardened. So the U.S. wants Iran to completely dismantle its nuclear program and abandon any ambition of doing enrichment on its soil ever again. It also wants Iran’s enriched uranium to be accounted for and handed over to the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also wants Iran to stop supporting its partners and proxies in the region, and eventually also accept limits on its ballistic-missile program. These are all conditions that Iran has refused to accept in the past, and now Iran believes that it’s in a position of strength, and it has even less incentive to accept those conditions.

我认为,目前双方的立场分歧太大,难以达成协议。美方的要求一如既往地强硬,无论是特朗普第一任期还是过去一年左右的时间里,都是如此。而伊朗的立场现在也变得更强硬。美国希望伊朗彻底拆除其核计划,放弃在其领土上进行铀浓缩的任何野心。它还希望伊朗的浓缩铀得到清点并移交给国际原子能机构。它还希望伊朗停止支持其在该地区的伙伴和代理人,并最终接受对其弹道导弹计划的限制。这些都是伊朗过去拒绝接受的条件,而现在伊朗认为自己处于强势地位,更没有动力接受这些条件。

Iranians, in return, are asking the U.S. for reparations. They may ask for recognition of the right to enrichment, and they want not a ceasefire but an end to the war—not just against themselves but also against Hezbollah in Lebanon. They want an arrangement for the control of the Strait of Hormuz that would allow them to charge transit fees. And they also want guarantees that the U.S. and Israel would not attack them again. So you put these two sets of conditions from both sides together, and we’re nowhere close to any kind of understanding, which means that the parties have only two options. Those are either to continue apace or to escalate. Continuation of this conflict—I don’t think it’s realistically possible without escalation because, at a certain point, in order to inflict more pain on each other, the two sides would have to cross new red lines, and that means escalation. And escalation is going to increase the risks of this conflict.

作为回应,伊朗人要求美国做出赔偿。他们可能要求承认其铀浓缩权利,并且他们想要的不是停火,而是结束战争——不仅是针对他们自己的战争,也包括针对黎巴嫩真主党的战争。他们希望达成一项控制霍尔木兹海峡的协议,以便收取过境费。他们还希望得到美国和以色列不再攻击他们的保证。因此,将双方提出的这两组条件放在一起看,我们离任何形式的共识都相距甚远,这意味着双方只有两个选择:要么继续维持现状,要么升级冲突。我认为,这种冲突的持续实际上不可能不升级,因为在某个时刻,为了给对方造成更多痛苦,双方将不得不跨越新的红线,这意味着冲突升级。而升级将增加这场冲突的风险。

For the United States, there are only two possibilities in terms of escalation. One is a ground invasion of a Persian Gulf island or the southern shore of Iran, which could result in a very high number of American casualties, and obviously would deepen the conflict and make it even more complicated to solve. And the other option is to target Iranian energy infrastructure, which could result in Iran retaliating against the Gulf states and torching the entire regional infrastructure.

对美国而言,升级局势只有两种可能。一是对波斯湾岛屿或伊朗南部海岸发动地面入侵,这可能导致美军伤亡惨重,显然会加剧冲突并使解决之道更加复杂。另一种选择是打击伊朗能源基础设施,这可能引发伊朗对海湾国家的报复,进而焚毁整个区域的基础设施。

Which is perhaps why Trump backed down a little bit from his recent threat of targeting Iranian power plants, because he came to the conclusion that that would be the type of escalation he might not want right now, right?

这或许正是特朗普为何从近期威胁打击伊朗发电厂的立场上有所后退的原因——他意识到,这种升级行动恐怕不是当前想要的结果,对吧?

Yeah, correct.

是的,没错。

When you laid out what the Americans want, listing things like limits on Iranian uranium enrichment and an end to support for proxies in the region, and so on and so forth, that struck me as what someone at an American think tank would want. I don’t mean that as a criticism exactly. It’s not clear to me that that’s what Donald Trump cares about. I don’t think he is staying up late at night because Iran is funding Hezbollah in Lebanon. So I do wonder if there’s a way to make a deal here that does not fulfill the American demands but does fulfill Trump’s demands. I assume his demands right now are, one, to not look foolish and, two, to get the strait open so that the world economy can get back on its axis.

你刚才列举了美方的诉求——限制伊朗铀浓缩活动、停止支持地区代理人等等——这让我觉得更像是美国智库人士的愿望清单。我这么说并非完全出于批评。我不确定这些是否真是唐纳德·特朗普在乎的事情。很难想象他会因为伊朗资助黎巴嫩真主党而彻夜难眠。所以我确实在思考:是否存在某种方案,既能不满足美国那些正式诉求,又能满足特朗普本人的要求?我推测他当前的核心诉求无非两点:第一,不让自己显得愚蠢;第二,重开海峡让世界经济回归正轨。

No, you’re absolutely right. If it were up to Trump, I think he would accept a less-than-ideal agreement, but he has repeatedly demonstrated, and this is not a new phenomenon, that he lets negotiations be conducted by people who believe in those maximum estimates. What Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff have reportedly put on the table is almost a mirror image of Mike Pompeo’s twelve demands in Trump’s first term in office. And these are basically Israeli demands. So I don’t think Trump is acting independently here. These are a set of demands that have been in the circles that are close to him for many years, and they have become a kind of orthodoxy that I don’t think he can abandon, even if he doesn’t personally believe in them. So he’s stuck with them.

不,你说得完全正确。如果由特朗普个人决定,我认为他会接受一份不那么理想的协议,但他一再表明——这并非新现象——他让那些信奉极限估算的人主导谈判。据报道,贾里德·库什纳和史蒂夫·维特科夫提出的方案,几乎是特朗普第一任期时迈克·蓬佩奥“十二项要求”的翻版。而这些本质上是以色列的要求。因此我不认为特朗普在此事上是独立行动的。这套要求在他身边的圈子里已存在多年,几乎成为一种不容置疑的正统信条,即便他本人未必认同,恐怕也难以摆脱。所以他其实是被这套框架困住了。

And now the problem, even if Trump wants to step aside from the maximalism of the current demands—the Iranians have demands that will be very difficult for him to meet. So I have a hard time really seeing how we can get to a diplomatic agreement anytime soon.

而现在的问题是,即便特朗普愿意从当前这些极端要求中抽身——伊朗方面提出的条件,对他来说也极难满足。因此,我实在难以想象我们能在短期内达成外交协议。

What role are America’s allies in the region, other than Israel, playing here? There’s been reporting in the past few days that the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has been encouraging Trump to continue the war.

除了以色列,美国在该地区的盟友扮演着怎样的角色?过去几天的报道显示,沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼一直在鼓励特朗普继续这场战争。

I don’t think there is a single view among U.S. allies in the Gulf. There are a range of perspectives. There are those, like Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait, who would be happy with this war stopping immediately and some sort of mutually beneficial solution being presented. But for Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia I think the situation is different. They do not want this war to end with an Iran that can still project power beyond its borders and threaten their interests again by controlling the strait. The problem is that they don’t have a clear concept of what defanging Iran really means because Iran is threatening these countries by basically firing drones and missiles toward them. And, as we have seen in the war in Ukraine, in order to completely destroy Iran’s ability to produce these cheap drones, which can be made easily in any basement, the U.S. would basically have to invade the entire country, which is just not on the cards. And, as we have seen in the case of Yemen, you can completely destroy a country’s infrastructure, its economy, and you still can’t stem its ability to produce projectiles that could disrupt the Gulf’s economy.

我认为美国在海湾地区的盟友之间并不存在统一的立场。各方观点各异。像阿曼、卡塔尔和科威特等国,会乐于见到这场战争立即停止,并达成某种互利解决方案。但对巴林、阿拉伯联合酋长国和沙特阿拉伯而言,情况则有所不同。他们不希望这场战争以伊朗仍能向境外投射力量告终——伊朗通过控制海峡,可能再次威胁到他们的利益。问题在于,这些国家对于“拔除伊朗獠牙”究竟意味着什么并没有清晰的概念,因为伊朗正是通过向这些国家发射无人机和导弹构成威胁。而正如我们在乌克兰战争中看到的,要彻底摧毁伊朗生产这些廉价无人机的能力——它们在任何地下室都能轻易制造——美国基本上需要入侵整个伊朗,这显然不在考虑范围内。也门的情况也表明,即便彻底摧毁一个国家的基础设施和经济,仍然无法阻止其制造扰乱海湾经济的投射武器。

So this is why I think that all the Gulf countries want Iran weakened, but I don’t think the ones who want Iran vanquished have a clear definition of what vanquished really means. And if the U.S. is to go all the way, go for broke, and dismantle the Iranian state or turn it into a failed state, the Gulf countries would be the ones who would then be paying for the consequences. They would have a giant failed state of some ninety-three million people right next door to them, which would cast a shadow over all the prosperity plans that they have been planning for the next generation.

因此我认为,海湾国家都希望伊朗被削弱,但那些希望伊朗被彻底击溃的国家,其实并不清楚“彻底击溃”究竟意味着什么。倘若美国决定孤注一掷,彻底瓦解伊朗政权或令其沦为失败国家,最终承担后果的将是海湾国家。届时他们将面对一个九千三百万人口的巨型失败国家横亘在侧,这层阴影将笼罩他们为下一代规划的所有繁荣蓝图。

I think the Gulf states are just angry because they didn’t expect Iran to target them. They thought that the degree of détente that they had engaged in over the past few years was sufficient to deter Iran from attacking them. And now that it has happened they don’t have a clear strategy for how to bring this to some sort of soft landing. Other countries have experienced similar situations, like Germany in Europe and Japan in East Asia after 1945. But in those cases there was the total defeat of a state that had hegemonic ambitions, and then there was reintegration. In this case, it’s very hard to imagine either of those scenarios. As I said, totally defeating the Islamic Republic would require the kind of investment in blood and treasure that America is unlikely to have the appetite for. And reintegration is also something that there is no plan for in the region. So this is why I’m saying that the way this is going it is just going to create a more dangerous region, not a region in which the Gulf countries can go back to business as usual.

我认为海湾国家之所以愤怒,是因为他们没料到伊朗会以他们为目标。他们以为过去几年所进行的缓和已经足以阻止伊朗攻击他们。如今攻击既已发生,他们却没有明确的策略来让局势实现某种软着陆。其他国家也曾经历过类似处境,比如1945年后的欧洲德国和东亚日本。但在那些案例中,一个怀有霸权野心的国家遭遇了彻底失败,随后才迎来重新融入国际社会的进程。而在当前局势下,这两种情景都很难想象。正如我所说,要彻底击败伊斯兰共和国,需要付出美国不太可能愿意承受的血与财富的代价。而重新融入国际社会,也是该地区目前毫无规划的事项。正因如此,我认为事态发展只会让这个地区变得更加危险,海湾国家不可能回到一切照旧的局面。

What you have laid out seems bad for the Gulf and the world and the people of Iran, but it doesn’t completely contradict something that we’ve read about in terms of Israel’s aims, which is that a weakened or unstable Iran may actually be what the Netanyahu government prefers. And it does suggest to me that Israel may then have some interest in keeping this war going for a long time. Which means, if Trump is going to come to any sort of deal with the Iranians, he needs to make a real effort to rein in the Israelis.

您所描述的情况对海湾地区、世界乃至伊朗人民而言似乎都不乐观,但这与我们此前了解的以色列某些战略目标并不完全矛盾——内塔尼亚胡政府或许确实更倾向于看到一个被削弱或陷入动荡的伊朗。这让我联想到,以色列可能确实有动机让这场战争持续下去。这意味着,如果特朗普打算与伊朗达成任何形式的协议,他就必须下真功夫约束以色列的行动。

Yeah. So whenever Trump decides to stop the war Israel has no choice but to fall in line. The problem is that there is no unilateral ceasefire that Trump can impose because the Iranians agreed to a ceasefire last time, and in their view it only invited another aggression.

是的。所以只要特朗普决定叫停战争,以色列别无选择,只能服从。问题在于,特朗普无法单方面强制停火——因为伊朗人上次同意停火后,在他们看来,这反而招致了新的侵略。

After the Twelve-Day War?

十二日战争之后?

Yeah, exactly. And so that option of Trump getting tired of this and leaving is just not possible because the Iranians will keep fighting. And then it’s a question of whether Trump would be able to end this war without opening the strait, because now I think the goalposts have moved in a way that the conflict is no longer really about degrading Iran’s military capabilities or decapitating the system or destroying its infrastructure. It’s really about reopening the strait. And, again, that is not possible without escalation and continuation of this war.

没错,正是如此。所以特朗普厌倦这场战争并抽身而退的可能性根本不存在,因为伊朗人会持续战斗。问题在于特朗普能否在不重新开放海峡的情况下结束战争——我认为当前局势已经发生变化,冲突焦点不再真正在于削弱伊朗军力、斩首其政权体系或摧毁其基础设施,核心诉求已转变为重新开放霍尔木兹海峡。而要实现这一点,又必然意味着冲突升级与战争延续。

You are right that not reopening the strait is something that Israel is comfortable with because it doesn’t need to necessarily deal with the consequences of it. If Iran and the Gulf states destroy one another’s sources of wealth, if Iran turns into another failed state, if there’s chaos throughout the region, Israel would reign over all of it in a militarized fortress.

你说得对,以色列确实对海峡持续关闭的局面感到自在,因为它无需直接承担后果。倘若伊朗与海湾国家相互摧毁对方的财富命脉,倘若伊朗沦为又一个失败国家,倘若整个地区陷入混乱,以色列将能凭借其军事化堡垒在这片土地上占据主导地位。

And so I think Israel is totally fine with it, but Trump, at this point, even if he wants to come down off the high horse and put aside some of the maximalist demands of Israel, would still have to make concessions to the Iranians that would be very uncomfortable for him, I think, at a personal level. And this is why I think that, although Israel did start this war and dragged the U.S. into it, ending it is really no longer dependent on Israel. It’s dependent on Iran and Trump. And, as I said, those two have positions that are totally incompatible at this moment.

因此我认为以色列对此完全乐见其成,但特朗普此刻即便想放下身段、搁置以色列的部分极端诉求,仍将不得不向伊朗作出让步——这些让步对他个人而言会非常难堪。正因如此,虽然这场战争确实是以色列挑起并将美国拖入其中,但终结战争的关键已不再取决于以色列,而取决于伊朗与特朗普。而正如我所说,这两方目前的立场完全无法调和。

Can you say more about your belief that Netanyahu dragged Trump into the war? Netanyahu needs Trump for his reëlection campaign. He needs Trump to keep pressuring the Israeli President to pardon him. Trump could have said no to the war. And as you were saying, if Trump wants to call this off, he can get Bibi to call it off. So, if Israel dragged Trump into this, it’s only because Trump seemed unwilling to use the power that he had, no?

能否详细谈谈您为何认为内塔尼亚胡将特朗普拖入了这场战争?内塔尼亚胡需要特朗普助其竞选连任,需要特朗普持续向以色列总统施压以获得特赦。特朗普本可以拒绝参战。正如您所言,若特朗普想终止这场战争,他完全能让内塔尼亚胡收手。所以,即便真是以色列将特朗普拖入战局,那也只是因为特朗普似乎不愿动用他手中的权力,不是吗?

I agree with that. I’m not saying that he didn’t know what he was doing. I’m just saying that I think Trump believed some of the things that we now know Bibi told him before the war, including the idea that the regime was so brittle that killing the Supreme Leader would result in people coming to the streets again and taking over government institutions. And, yes, Trump made the decision to go in. Israel didn’t make that decision for him, but I don’t think we can ignore that Israel created a context for him to believe this would be an easy undertaking.

我同意这一点。我并非说他不知道自己在做什么。我只是认为,特朗普确实相信了内塔尼亚胡在战前向他灌输的一些说法——包括那个如今看来站不住脚的观点:这个政权如此脆弱,只要除掉最高领袖,民众就会再次走上街头,接管政府机构。是的,最终做出行动决定的是特朗普本人,以色列没有替他做这个决定。但我们不能忽视的是,正是以色列营造了一种氛围,让他误以为这会是一场轻松的军事行动。

I think the success of the Venezuela operation probably played into that a little bit, too. I don’t know if Trump would have done this the same way if Venezuela had gone off the rails.

我认为委内瑞拉行动的成功可能也起到了一定作用。如果委内瑞拉局势失控,我不确定特朗普是否还会采取同样的做法。

Yeah. Look, there are a lot of other factors as well, including Iran’s reaction to Qasem Soleimani’s killing, and Iran’s reaction to the U.S. bombing of Iran during the Twelve-Day War. After those successful operations, Trump had concluded that war with Iran is cost-free, and changing that perception is precisely the objective of the Iranians in this war. And I think they have managed to achieve that, maybe not fully but to a certain extent. And the question at the end of the day is: Who’s going to blink first?

确实。你看,这其中还涉及许多其他因素,包括伊朗对卡西姆·苏莱曼尼遇刺事件的反应,以及伊朗对美国在“十二日战争”期间轰炸其领土的回应。在这些军事行动成功后,特朗普曾认定与伊朗开战无需付出代价,而伊朗在此次冲突中的目标,正是要扭转这种认知。我认为他们已经在一定程度上实现了这个目标,或许尚未完全达成,但已初见成效。归根结底,问题在于:谁会先退缩?

Some of the things that Trump is saying, honestly, don’t make sense to me. I no longer really understand what he’s trying to do, but to my knowledge there are no serious talks between the U.S. and Iran, and the Iranians would not engage in high-level meetings with the U.S. until and unless they know that he’s going to make major concessions to them. And again, at this moment, I don’t see any evidence of it. ♦

说实话,特朗普的一些言论让我感到费解。我已经不太明白他究竟想做什么,但据我所知,目前美伊之间并没有严肃的对话。除非伊朗方面确信特朗普将作出重大让步,否则他们不会与美国进行高层会晤。而就目前来看,我还没有看到任何这方面的迹象。♦

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